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285

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# CHARACTERISTICS.

V O L U M E III.

MISCELLANEOUS REFLECTIONS ON  
the preceding treatises, and other critical  
subjects.

A notion of the TABLATURE, or JUDG-  
MENT OF HERCULES.

W I T H

A Letter concerning DESIGN.

Printed in the year MDCCLVIII.



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T R E A T I S E VI.

V I Z.

Miscellaneous Reflections, &c.

*Scilicet uni æquus virtuti, atque ejus amicis.*

Horat. sat. 1. lib. 2.

Printed first in the year MDCCXIV.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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# MISCELLANEOUS REFLECTIONS.

## M I S C E L L A N Y I.

### C H A P. I.

*Of the nature, rise, and establishment of MISCELLANIES. — The subject of these which follow. — Intention of the writer.*

**P**Eace be with the soul of that charitable and courteous author, who, for the common benefit of his fellow-authors, introduced the ingenious way of MISCELLANEOUS *writing!* — It must be owned, that since this happy method was established, the harvest of *wit* has been more plentiful, and the labourers more in number than heretofore. It is well known to the able practitioners in *the writing art*, “That as easy as it is to *conceive wit*, it is the hardest thing imaginable to be *delivered* of it, upon certain terms.” Nothing could be more severe or rigid than the conditions formerly prescribed to writers, when CRITICISM took place, and *regularity* and *order* were thought essential in a treatise. The notion of a *genuine work*, a *legitimate* and *just piece*, has certainly been the occasion of great timidity and backwardness among the adventurers in *wit*: and the imposition of such strict *laws* and *rules* of composition, has sat heavy on the free spirits and forward geniuses of mankind. It was a *yoke*, it seems, which our forefathers bore; but which, for our parts, we have generously

rously thrown off. In effect, the invidious distinctions of *bastardy* and *legitimacy* being at length removed, the natural and lawful issue of the brain comes with like advantage into the world: and *wit* (*mere WIT*) is well received, without examination of *the kind*, or censure of *the form*.

This the MISCELLANEOUS *manner* of writing, it must be owned, has happily effected. It has rendered almost every soil productive. It has disclosed those various *seeds* of wit, which lay suppressed in many a bosom; and has reared numberless *conceits* and curious *fancies*, which the natural rudeness and asperity of their native soil would have withheld, or at least not have permitted to rise above the ground. From every *field*, from every *hedge* or *hillock*, we now gather as delicious fruits and fragrant flowers, as of old from the richest and best-cultivated *gardens*. Miserable were those ancient planters, who, understanding not how to conform themselves to the rude *taste* of unpolished mankind, made it so difficult a task to serve the world with *intellectual* entertainments, and furnish out the repasts of *literature* and *science*.

There was certainly a time when the name of AUTHOR stood for something considerable in the world. To succeed happily in such a labour as that of writing a *treatise* or a *poem*, was taken as a sure mark of understanding and good sense. The task was painful: but, it seems, it was honourable. How the case happened, in process of time, to be so much reversed, is hard to say. The primitive authors perhaps being few in number, and highly respected for their art, fell under the weight of *envy*. Being sensible of their misfortune in this respect, and being excited, as it is probable, by the example of some popular genius, they quitted their regular schemes and accurate forms of workmanship,

manship, in favour of those *wits* who could not possibly be received as AUTHORS upon such difficult terms. It was necessary, it seems, that *the bottom* of wit should be enlarged. It was advisable that more hands should be taken into the work. And nothing could better serve this popular purpose, than the way of MISCELLANY, or *common ESSAY*; in which the most confused head, if fraught with a little invention, and provided with *common-place-book* learning, might exert itself to as much advantage as the most orderly and well-fettled judgment.

To explain the better how this revolution in letters has been effected, it may not perhaps be indecent, should we offer to compare our writing-artists to the *manufacturers* in *stuff* or *silk*. For among these it is esteemed a principal piece of skill, to frame a pattern, or plan of workmanship, in which the several colours are agreeably disposed; with such proportionable adjustment of the various figures and devices, as may, in the whole, create a kind of *harmony* to the eye. According to this method, each *piece* must be, in reality, *an original*. For to copy what has gone before, can be of no use. The fraud would easily be perceived. On the other side, to work *originally*, and in a manner *create* each time anew, must be a matter of pressing weight, and fitted to the strength and capacity of none besides the choicest workmen.

A manner therefore is invented to confound this simplicity and conformity of design. *Patch-work* is substituted. *Cuttings* and *shreds* of learning, with various *fragments*, and *points* of wit, are drawn together, and tacked in any fantastic form. If they chance to cast a *lustre*, and spread a sort of *sprightly glare*, the MISCELLANY is approved, and the *complex* form and texture of the

work admired. The EYE, which before was to be won by regularity, and had kept true to measure and strict proportion, is by this means pleasingly drawn aside, to commit a kind of *debauch*, and amuse itself in gaudy colours, and disfigured shapes of things. Custom, in the mean while, has not only tolerated this licentiousness, but rendered it even commendable, and brought it into the highest repute. The *wild* and *whimsical*, under the name of the *odd* and *pretty*, succeed in the room of the *graceful* and the *beautiful*. Justness and accuracy of thought are set aside, as too constraining, and of too painful an aspect to be endured in the agreeable and more easy commerce of *gallantry*, and modern *wit*.

Now, since it has been thought convenient, in these latter ages, to distinguish the provinces of WIT and WISDOM, and set apart *the agreeable* from *the useful*, it is evident there could be nothing devised more suitable to the distinct and separate interest of the former of these provinces, than this *complex* manner of performance which we call MISCELLANY. For whatever is *capricious* and *odd*, is sure to create *diversion*, to those who look no further. And where there is nothing like *nature*, there is no room for the troublesome part of *thought* or *contemplation*. It is the perfection of certain *grotesque* painters, to keep as far from nature as possible. To find *a likeness* in their works, is to find the greatest fault imaginable. A natural *connection* is a slur. A *coherence*, a *design*, a *meaning*, is against their purpose, and destroys the very spirit and genius of their workmanship.

I remember formerly when I was a spectator in the *French* theatre, I found it the custom, at the end of every grave and solemn *tragedy*, to introduce

roduce a comic *farce*, or MISCELLANY, which they called *the little piece*. We have indeed a method still more extraordinary upon our own stage. For we think it agreeable and just, to mix the *little piece* or *farce* with the main plot or fable through every act. This perhaps may be the rather chosen, because our tragedy is so much deeper and bloodier than that of the *French*, and therefore needs more immediate refreshment from the elegant way of *drollery*, and *burlesque wit*; which being thus closely interwoven with its opposite, makes that most accomplished kind of *theatrical MISCELLANY*, called by our poets a *tragi-comedy*.

I could go further perhaps, and demonstrate, from the writings of many of our grave *divines*, the speeches of our *senators*, and other principal models of our national erudition, "That the MISCELLANEOUS manner is at present in the highest esteem." But since my chief intention in the following sheets is to descant cursorily upon some late pieces of a *British* author, I will presume, that what I have said already on this head is sufficient; and that it will not be judged improper or absurd in me, as I proceed, to take advantage of this *miscellaneous taste* which now evidently prevails. According to this method, whilst I serve as *critic* or *interpreter* to this new writer, I may the better correct his phlegm, and give him more of the fashionable air and manner of the world; especially in what relates to the subject and manner of his two *last* pieces, which are contained in his second volume. For these being of the more regular and formal kind, may easily be oppressive to the airy reader; and may therefore, with the same assurance as *tragedy*, claim the necessary relief of the *little piece* or *farce* above mentioned.

Nor ought the title of a MISCELLANEOUS *writer* to be denied me, on the account that I have grounded my *miscellanies* upon a certain set of treatises already published. *Grounds and foundations* are of no moment in a kind of work, which, according to modern establishment, has properly neither *top* nor *bottom*, *beginning* nor *end*. Besides, that I shall no way confine myself to the precise contents of these treatises; but, like my fellow-*miscellanarians*, shall take occasion to vary often from my proposed subject, and make what *deviations* or *excursions* I shall think fit, as I proceed in my *random* ESSAYS.

## C H A P. II.

*Of controversial writings: answers: replies.*——  
*Polemic divinity; or the writing church-militant.*——  
*Philosophers, and bear-garden.*——  
*Authors paired and matched.*——  
*The match-makers.*——  
*Foot-ball.*——  
*A dialogue between our author and his bookseller.*

**A**Mong the many improvements daily made in the art of writing, there is none perhaps which can be said to have attained a greater height than that of *controversy*, or the method of *answer* and *refutation*. It is true indeed, that anciently the wits of men were for the most part taken up in other employment. If authors writ *ill*, they were despised; if *well*, they were by some party or other espoused. For *parties* there would necessarily be, and *sects* of every kind, in learning and philosophy. Every one sided with whom he liked; and having the liberty of hearing *each* side speak for itself, stood in no need of express *warning-pieces* against pretended sophistry, or dangerous reasoning. Particular *answers* to single treatises, were thought to



to be of little use. And it was esteemed no compliment to a reader, to help him so carefully in the judgment of every piece which came abroad. Whatever *sects* there were in those days, the zeal of *party-causes* ran not so high as to give the reader a taste of those *personal* reproaches, which might pass in a debate between the different *party-men*.

Thus matters stood of old; when as yet the method of writing *controversy* was not raised into an *art*, nor the feuds of contending authors become the chief amusement of the learned world. But we have at present so high a relish of this kind, that the writings of the learned are never truly gustful, till they are come to what we may properly enough call *their due ripeness*, and have begot a *fray*. When the *answer* and *reply* is once formed, our curiosity is excited; we begin then, for the first time, to whet our attention, and apply our ear.

For example: Let a zealous *divine*, and flaming champion of our faith, when inclined to shew himself in print, make choice of some tremendous *mystery* of religion, opposed heretofore by some damnable *heresiarch*; whom having vehemently refuted, he turns himself towards the orthodox opinion, and supports the true belief, with the highest eloquence and profoundest erudition; he shall, notwithstanding this, remain perhaps in deep obscurity, to the great affliction of his bookseller, and the regret of all who bear a just veneration for *church-history*, and the ancient purity of the *Christian* faith. But let it so happen, that, in this prosecution of his deceased adversary, our *doctor* raises up some *living antagonist*; who, on the same foot of orthodoxy with himself, pretends to arraign his expositions, and refute the refuter upon every article he has advanced; from this moment the writing gathers life, the public listens, the book-  
seller

feller takes heart, and when issue is well joined, the repartees grown smart, and the contention vigorous between the learned parties, a ring is made, and readers gather in abundance. Every one takes party, and encourages his own side. "This shall be my champion! — This man for my money!" " — Well hit, on our side! — Again, a good stroke! — There he was even with him! — Have at him the next bout!" — Excellent sport! and when the *combatants* are for a while drawn off, and each retired with his own companions; what *praises* and *congratulations!* what *applauses* of the supposed *victor!* and how honourably is he saluted by his favourers, and complimented even to the disturbance of his modesty! "Nay, but Gentlemen! — Good Gentlemen, do you really think thus? — Are you sincere with me? — Have I treated my adversary as he deserves? Never was man so mauled. Why, you have killed him downright. O, Sirs! you flatter me. He can never rise more. Think ye so indeed? Or if he should, it would be a pleasure to see how you would handle him."

These are the triumphs. This is what sets *sharp*; this gives the author his *edge*, and excites the reader's attention; when the trumpets are thus sounded to the croud, and a kind of *amphitheatrical* entertainment exhibited to the multitude, by these *gladiatorian* penmen.

The author of the preceding treatises being by profession a nice *inspector* into the *ridicule* of things, must in all probability have raised to himself some such views as these, which hindered him from engaging in the way of *controversy*. For, when by accident, the first of these treatises \* (*a private*

\* *Viz.* The letter concerning enthusiasm.

letter,

letter, and, in the writer's esteem, little worthy of the public's notice) came to be read abroad in copies, and afterwards in print, the smartest *answers* which came out against it, could not, it seems, move our author to form any *reply*. All he was heard to say in return was, "That he thought whoever had taken upon him to publish a book in answer to that casual piece, had certainly made either a very high compliment to the author, or a very ill one to the public."

It must be owned, that when a writer of any kind is so considerable as to deserve the labour and pains of some shrewd heads to refute him in public, he may, in the quality of an *author*, be justly congratulated on that occasion. It is supposed necessarily, that he must have writ with some kind of ability or wit. But if his *original* performance be in truth no better than ordinary, his *answerer's* ~~task~~ must certainly be very mean. He must be very indifferently employed, who would take upon him to answer nonsense in form, ridicule what is of itself a *jest*, and put it upon the world to read a *second book*, for the sake of the impertinencies of a *former*.

Taking it however for granted, "That a sorry treatise may be the foundation of a considerable answer;" a *reply* still must certainly be ridiculous, whichever way we take it. For either the author, in his original piece, has been truly refuted, or not. If refuted, why does he defend? if not refuted, why trouble himself? What has the public to do with his private quarrels, or his adversary's impertinence? Or supposing the world, out of curiosity, may delight to see a *pedant* exposed by a man of better-wit, and a *controversy* thus unequally carried on between two such opposite parties;

ties ; how long is this diversion likely to hold good ? and what will become of these *polemic* writings a few years hence ? What is already become of those mighty *controversies*, with which some of the most eminent authors amused the world within the memory of the youngest scholar ? An *original* work or two may perhaps remain ; but for the subsequent *defences*, the *answers*, *rejoinders*, and *replications* ; they have been long since paying their attendance to the *pastry-cooks*. Mankind perhaps were heated at that time, when first those matters were debated : but they are now cool again. They laughed ; they carried on the humour ; they blew the coals ; they teized, and set on, maliciously, and to create themselves diversion. But the *jest* is now over. No one so much as inquires where the *wit* was ; or where possibly the *sting* should lie of those notable reflections and satirical hints, which were once found so pungent, and gave the readers such high delight. — Notable *philosophers* and *divines*, who can be contented to make sport, and write in learned *Billingsgate*, to divert the coffeehouse, and entertain the assemblies at booksellers shops, or the more airy stalls of inferior book-retailers !

It must be allowed, that in this respect *controversial writing* is not so wholly unprofitable ; and that for *book-merchants*, of whatever kind or degree, they undoubtedly receive no small advantage from a right improvement of a *learned scuffle*. Nothing revives them more, or makes a quicker trade, than a *pair* of substantial *divines*, or grave *philosophers*, well matched, and soundly backed ; till, by long worrying one another, they are grown out of breath, and have almost lost their force of biting. — “ So have I known a crafty *glazier*, in time  
“ of frost, procure a *foot-ball*, to draw into the  
“ street the emulous chiefs of the robust youth.  
“ The

“ The tumid bladder bounds at every kick, bursts  
 “ the withstanding *casements*, the *chaffies*, *lanterns*,  
 “ and all the brittle vitreous *ware*. The noise of  
 “ blows and outcries fills the whole neighbour-  
 “ hood; and ruins of glass cover the stony pave-  
 “ ments, till the bloated *battering engine*, sub-  
 “ dued by force of foot and fist, and yielding up  
 “ its breath at many a fatal cranny, becomes lank  
 “ and harmless, sinks in its flight, and can no longer  
 “ uphold the spirit of the contending parties.”

This our author supposes to have been the occa-  
 sion of his being so often and zealously compli-  
 mented by his *amanuensis*, (for so he calls his  
 bookfeller or printer \*), on the fame of his first  
 piece. The obliging craftsman has at times pre-  
 sented him with many a handsome book, set off  
 with titles of *remarks*, *reflections*, and the like,  
 which, as he assured him, were ANSWERS to his  
 small treatise. “ Here, Sir! (says he), you have a  
 “ considerable hand has undertaken you! — This  
 “ Sir, is a *reverend* — This a right reverend  
 “ — This a *noted* author — Will you not re-  
 “ ply, Sir? — O’ my word, Sir, the world is in  
 “ expectation. Pity they should be disappointed!  
 “ A dozen sheets, Sir, would be sufficient.  
 “ — You might dispatch it presently.  
 “ Think you so? I have my paper ready —  
 “ and a good letter. — Take my word for it  
 “ — You shall see, Sir! Enough. But  
 “ hark ye (Mr *A, a, a, a*), my worthy *engineer*,  
 “ and manager of the war of letters! Ere you pre-  
 “ pare your artillery, or engage me in acts of ho-  
 “ stility, let me hear, I intreat you, whether or  
 “ no my adversary be taken notice of. — Wait

\* Vol. I. p. 239.

“ for his *second* edition. And if by next year, or  
 “ year or two after, it be known in good com-  
 “ pany, that there is such a book in being, I shall  
 “ then perhaps think it time to consider of a *reply*.”

## C H A P. III.

*Of the letter concerning enthusiasm. — Foreign critics. — Of letters in general; and of the epistolary style. — Addresses to great men. — Authors and horsemanship. — The modern amble. — Further explanation of the MISCELLANEOUS manner.*

**A**S resolute as our author may have shewn himself in refusing to take notice of the smart writings published against him by certain *zealots* of his own country, he could not, it seems, but out of curiosity observe what the *foreign* and more *impartial critics* might object to his small treatise, which he was surpris'd to hear had been translated into foreign languages, soon after it had been published here at home. The first censure of this kind which came to our author's sight, was that of the *Paris Journal des savans* \*. Considering how little favourable the author of the letter had shewn himself towards the *Romish* church, and policy of *France*, it must be own'd those journalists have treated him with sufficient candour; though they fail'd not to take what advantages they well could against the writing, and particularly arraigned it for the want of order and method †.

The Protestant writers, such as live in a free

\* Du 25 Mars 1709.

† Ses pensées ne semblent occuper dans son ouvrage, que la place que le hazard leur a donnée. *Ibid.* p. 181.

country,

country, and can deliver their sentiments without constraint, have certainly done our author more honour than he ever presumed to think he could deserve \*. His *translator* indeed, who had done him the previous honour of introducing him to the acquaintance of the foreign world, represents particularly, by the turn given to the latter end of the letter, that the writer of it was, as to his condition and rank, little better than an inferior dependent on the Noble Lord to whom he had addressed himself. And in reality, the *original* has so much of that air, that I wonder not, if what the author left ambiguous, the translator has determined to the side of *clientship* and *dependency*.

But whatever may have been the circumstance or character of our author himself, that of his *great* friend ought in justice to have been considered by those former critics above mentioned. So much at least should have been taken notice of, that there was a *real* GREAT MAN characterised, and suitable measures of address and style preserved. But they who would neither observe this, nor apprehend the letter itself to be *real*, were insufficient critics, and unqualified to judge of the turn or humour of a piece which they had never considered in a proper light.

It is become indeed so common a practice among authors, to feign a correspondency, and give the title of a *private letter*, to a piece addressed solely to the *public*, that it would not be strange to see other *journalists* and *critics*, as well as the gentlemen of *Paris*, pass over such particularities, as things of form. This prejudice however could

\* (1.) *Bibliothèque choisie*, année 1709. tome 19. p. 427.

(2.) *Histoire des ouvrages des savans*, mois d'Octobre, Novembre, et Decembre 1708. p. 514.

(3.) *Nouvelles de la république des lettres*, mois de Mars 1710.

not misguide a chief critic of the Protestant side ; when mentioning this *letter concerning enthusiasm*\*, he speaks of it as a real *letter*, (such as in truth it was), not a precise and formal TREATISE †, designed for *public* view.

It will be owned surely, by those who have learned to judge of elegance and wit by the help merely of modern languages, that we could have little relish of the best *letters* of a *Balsac* or *Voiture*, were we wholly ignorant of the *characters* of the principal persons to whom those *letters* were actually written. But much less could we find pleasure in this reading, should we take it into our heads, that both the personages and correspondence itself were merely fictitious. Let the best of *Tully's* epistles be read in such a narrow view as this, and they will certainly prove very insipid. If a real *Brutus*, a real *Atticus* be not supposed, there will be no real *Cicero*. The elegant writer will disappear : as will the vast labour and art with which this eloquent *Roman* writ those letters to his illustrious friends. There was no kind of composition in which this great author prided or pleased himself more than in this ; where he endeavoured to throw off the mien of *the philosopher* and *orator*, whilst in effect he employed both his rhetoric and philosophy with the greatest force. They who can read an *epistle* or *satire* of *Horace* in somewhat better than a mere scholastic relish, will comprehend, that *the concealment of order and method*, in this man-

\* *Ceux qui l'ont luë ont pu voir en général, que l'auteur ne s'y est pas proposé un certain plan, pour traiter sa matiere methodiquement ; parceque c'est une lettre, et non un traité.* Bibliotheque Choisie. Ibid. p. 428.

† If in this joint edition, with other works, *the letter* be made to pass under that general name of *treatise* ; it is the bookseller must account for it. For the author's part, he considers it as no other than what it originally was.



ner of writing, makes the chief beauty of the work. They will own, that unless a reader be in some measure apprised of the characters of an *Augustus*, a *Mæcenæ*, a *Florus*, or a *Trebatius*, there will be little relish in those *satires* or *epistles* addressed in particular to the courtiers, ministers, and great men of the times. Even the SATIRIC, OR MISCELLANEOUS manner of the polite ancients, required as much *order* as the most regular pieces. But the *art* was to destroy every such token or appearance, give an *extemporary* air to what was writ, and make the *effect* of art be felt, without discovering the *artifice*. There needs no further explanation on this head. Our author himself has said enough in his *Advice to an author*\*, particularly where he treats of the *simple style*, in contradiction to the *learned*, the *formal*, or *methodic*.

It is a different case indeed, when the title of *epistle* is improperly given to such works as were never writ in any other view than that of being made public, or to serve as exercises or specimens of the wit of their composer. Such were those infinite numbers of *Greek* and *Latin* epistles, writ by the ancient *sophists*, *grammarians*, or *rhetoricians*; where we find the real character of the *epistle*, the genuine style and manners of the corresponding parties sometimes imitated; but at other times not so much as aimed at, nor any measures of *historical truth* preserved. Such perhaps we may esteem even the letters of a *Seneca* † to his

\* Vol. I. p. 183. 201. 202.

† It is not the *person*, *character*, or *genius*, but the *style* and *manner* of this great man, which we presume to censure. We acknowledge his noble sentiments and worthy actions. We own the *patriot* and *good minister*: but we reject the *writer*. He was the first of any note or worth who gave credit to that *false style* and *manner* here spoken of. He might, on this account, be called in

his friend *Lucilius*. Or supposing that philosophical courtier had really such a correspondency; and, at several times, had sent so many fair epistles, honestly signed and sealed, to his country-friend at a distance;

really the corrupter of Roman eloquence. This indeed could not but naturally, and of itself, become relax and dissolute, after such a relaxation and dissolution of manners, consequent to the change of government, and to the horrid luxury and effeminacy of the Roman court, even before the time of a *Claudius*, or a *Nero*. There was no more possibility of making a stand for language, than for liberty. As the world now stood, the highest glory which could be attained by mortal man, was to be mitigator or moderator of that universal tyranny already established. To this I must add, that in every city, principality, or smaller nation, where *single WILL* prevails, and court-power, instead of laws or constitutions, guides the state; it is of the highest difficulty for the best minister to procure a just, or even a tolerable administration. Where such a minister is found, who can but moderately influence the petty tyranny, he deserves considerable applause and honour. But in the case we have mentioned, where a universal monarchy was actually established, and the interest of a whole world concerned; he surely must have been esteemed a guardian-angel, who, as a *prime minister*, could, for several years, turn the very worst of courts, and worst-conditioned of all princes, to the fatherly care and just government of mankind. Such a *minister* was *Seneca* under an *Agrippina* and a *Nero*. And such he was acknowledged by the ancient and never-sparing *satirists*, who could not forbear to celebrate, withal, his *generosity* and *friendship* in a private life:

*Nemo petit modicis quæ mittebantur amicis  
A Seneca: quæ Piso bonus, quæ Cotta solebat  
Largiri: namque et titulis, et facibus olim  
Major habebatur donandi gloria.*

Juvenal. sat. 5.

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*Quis tam  
Perditus, ut dubitet Senecam præferre Neroni?*

Id. sat. 8.

This remark is what I have been tempted to make by the way, on the *character* of this Roman author, more mistaken (if I am not very much so myself) than any other so generally studied. As for the *philosophic* character or function imputed to him, it was foreign, and no way proper or peculiar to one who never assumed so much as that of *sophist*, or *pensionary teacher of philosophy*. He was far  
wide

distance ; it appears however by the epistles themselves, in their proper *order*, (if they may be said to have any), that, after a few attempts at the beginning, the author by degrees loses sight of his correspondent, and takes the *world* in general for his reader or disciple. He falls into the random way of *miscellaneous* writing ; says every where great and noble things, in and out of the way, accidentally as *words* led him, (for with these he plays perpetually) ; with infinite wit, but with little or no coherence ; without a shape or body to his work ; without a real *beginning*, a *middle*, or an *end* \*. Of a *hundred and twenty-four* epistles, you may, if you please, make *five hundred*, or *half a score*. A great one, for instance, you may divide into *five* or *six*. A little one you may tack to another ; and that to another ; and so on. The unity of the writing will be the same ; the life and spirit full as well preserved. It is not only *whole letters* or *pages* you may change and manage thus at pleasure : every *period*, every *sentence* almost, is independent ; and may be taken asunder, trans-

wide of any such order or profession. There is great difference between a courtier who takes a fancy for philology, and a philosopher who should take a fancy for a court. Now, *Seneca* was born a *courtier* ; being son of a *court-rhetor* ; himself bred in the same manner, and taken into favour for his wit and genius, his admired style and eloquence ; not for his learning in the books of philosophy and the ancients. For this indeed was not very profound in him. In short, he was a man of wonderful wit, fluency of thought and language, an *able minister*, and *honest courtier*. And what has been delivered down to his prejudice, is by the common enemy of all the free and generous *Romans*, that apish shallow historian, and court-flatterer, *Dion Cassius*, of a low age, when *barbarism* (as may be easily seen in his own work) came on apace, and the very traces and features of virtue, science, and knowledge, were wearing out of the world.

\* *Infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 1. parag. 6. from the end, in the notes ; and vol. 1. p. 114.

posed, postponed; anticipated, or set in any new order, as you fancy.

This is the manner of writing so much admired and imitated in our age, that we have scarce the idea of any other model. We know little, indeed, of the difference between one *model* or *character* of writing and another. All runs to the same tune, and beats exactly one and the same measure. Nothing, one would think, could be more tedious than this uniform *pace*. The common *amble* or *Canterbury* is not, I am persuaded, more tiresome to a good rider, than this *see saw* of ESSAY-writers is to an able reader. The just composer of a legitimate piece is like an able traveller, who exactly measures his journey, considers his ground, premeditates his stages, and intervals of relaxation and intention, to the very conclusion of his undertaking, that he happily arrives where he first proposed when he set out. He is not presently *upon the spur*, or in his full *career*; but walks his steed *leisurely* out of his stable, settles himself in his stirrups, and when fair road and season offer, puts on perhaps to a *round trot*; thence into a *gallop*, and after a while *takes up*. As down, or meadow, or shady lane present themselves, he accordingly suits his pace, favours his palfrey; and is sure not to bring him puffing, and in a heat, into his last inn. But the *post-way* is become highly fashionable with modern authors. The very same stroke sets you out, and brings you in. Nothing stays, or interrupts. Hill or valley; rough or smooth; thick or thin: no difference; no variation. When an author sits down to write, he knows no other business he has, than to be *witty*, and take care that his periods be well turned, or (as they commonly say) *run smooth*. In this manner, he doubts not to gain the character of *bright*. When he has

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writ as many pages as he likes, or as his run of fancy would permit, he then perhaps considers what *name* he had best give to his new writing; whether he should call it *letter, essay, miscellany, or* ought else. The bookseller perhaps is to determine this at last, when all, besides the preface, epistle dedicatory, and title-page, is dispatched.

—*Incertus scamnum, faceretne Priapum.*

—*Deus inde ego!*

Horat. sat. 8. lib. 1.

M I S C E L L A N Y II.

C H A P. I.

*Review of ENTHUSIASM. Its defence, praise:*

— *Use in business, as well as pleasure:— Operation by fear, love.— Modifications of enthusiasm: magnanimity; heroic virtue; honour; public zeal; religion; superstition; persecution; martyrdom.— Energy of the ecstatic devotion in the tender sex.— Account of ancient priesthood.— Religious war.— Reference to a succeeding chapter.*

**W**Hether in fact there be any real *inchantment*, any influence of *stars*, any power of *dæmons* or of foreign natures over our own minds, is thought questionable by many. Some there are who assert the negative, and endeavour to solve the appearances of this kind by the natural operation of our passions, and the common course of outward things. For my own part, I cannot but at this present apprehend a kind of *inchantment* or *magic* in that which we call ENTHUSIASM; since I find, that having touched slightly on this subject,

subject, I cannot so easily part with it at pleasure.

After having made some cursory reflections on our author's *letter* \*, I thought I might have sufficiently acquitted myself on this head; till passing to his next treatise, I found myself still further engaged. I perceived plainly, that I had as yet scarce entered into our author's *humour*, or felt any thing of that *passion*, which, as he informs us, is so easily communicable and naturally engaging. But what I had passed over in my first reflections, I found naturally rising in me, upon second thoughts. So that by experience I proved it true what our author says †, "That we all of us know some-thing of this principle." And now that I find I have in reality so much of it imparted to me, I may with better reason be pardoned, if, after our author's example, I am led to write on such subjects as these, with caution, at different *reprises*; and not singly, *in one breath*.

I have heard indeed, that the very reading of treatises and accounts of *melancholy*, has been apt to generate that passion in the over-diligent and attentive reader. And this perhaps may have been the reason why our author himself (as he seems to intimate towards the conclusion of his first *letter* ‡) cared not in reality to grapple closely with his subject, or give us, at once, the precise definition of ENTHUSIASM. This however we may, with our author, presume to infer, from the coolest of all studies, even from *criticism* itself, (of which we have been lately treating §), "That there is a power in numbers, harmony, proportion, and beauty of every kind, which naturally captivates

\* *Viz.* Letter concerning ENTHUSIASM, above, vol. 1. treatise 1.

† Vol. 1. p. 41. 42.

‡ *Viz.* treatise 1. (Letter of ENTHUSIASM), vol. 1. p. 42. lin. 20.

§ Vol. 2. p. 55. 78. 300. &c.

" the

“ the heart, and raises the imagination to an opinion or conceit of something *majestic* and *divine*.”

Whatever this subject may be *in itself*, we cannot help being transported with the thought of it. It inspires us with something more than ordinary, and raises us above ourselves. Without this imagination or conceit, *the world* would be but a dull circumstance, and *life* a sorry pass-time. Scarce could we be said *to live*. The animal functions might in their course be carried on; but nothing further sought for, or regarded. The gallant sentiments, the elegant fancies, the *belle passions*, which have, all of them, this BEAUTY in view, would be set aside, and leave us probably no other employment than that of satisfying our coarsest appetites at the cheapest rate, in order to the attainment of a supine state of indolence and inactivity.

Slender would be the enjoyments of *the lover*, the *ambitious man*, the *warrior*, or the *virtuoso*, (as our author has elsewhere \* intimated), if in the beauties which they admire, and passionately pursue, there were no reference or regard to any higher *majesty* or *grandeur*, than what simply results from the particular objects of their pursuit. I know not, in reality, what we should do to find a seasoning to most of our pleasures in life, were it not for the taste or relish which is owing to this particular passion, and the conceit or imagination which supports it. Without this, we could not so much as admire a *poem*, or a *picture*; a *garden*, or a *palace*; a charming *shape*, or a *fair face*. LOVE itself would appear the lowest thing in nature, when thus anticipated, and treated according to the *anti-enthusiastic* poet's method :

\* Vol. 2. p. 300.

*Et jacere humorem collectum in corpora quæque* \*.

How *heroism* or *magnanimity* must stand in this hypothesis, is easy to imagine. The MUSES themselves must make a very indifferent figure in this philosophical draught. Even the prince of poets † would prove a most insipid writer, if he were thus reduced. Nor could there, according to this scheme, be yet a place of honour left even for our *Latin* poet ‡, the great disciple of this unpolite philosophy, who dares with so little equity employ the MUSES art in favour of such a system. But in spite of his philosophy, he every where gives way to *admiration*, and *rapturous views* of NATURE. He is transported with the several beauties of the WORLD, even whilst he arraigns the order of it, and destroys the principle of *beauty*, from whence in ancient languages the WORLD || itself was named.

This is what our author advances, when in behalf of ENTHUSIASM he quotes its formal enemies, and shews that they are as capable of it as its greatest confessors and assertors. So far is he from degrading *enthusiasm*, or disclaiming it in himself, that he looks on this passion, simply considered, as the most *natural*, and its object as the *justest* in the world. Even VIRTUE itself he takes to be no other than a noble *enthusiasm* justly di-

\* Lucret. lib. 4.

† Οὐδὲν μέρος Ὀμήρῳ ἄθειον, ἐδὲ δυνάσει ἄπορον, ἐδὲ ἀρχῆς ἔρημον, ἀλλὰ πάντα μισὰ θεῶν ὀνομάτων ἔθ' ἑὴν λόγων, ἔθ' ἑίας τέχνης. Maximus Tyr. dissert. 16.

‡ Viz. Lucretius; as above, vol. 1. p. 40.

|| Κόσμος, *mundus*. From whence that expostulation, Εὐ σοὶ μὲν τις κόσμος ὑφίστασθαι δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ παντὶ ἀκοσμία; M. Αντ. βιβ. 8. And that other allusion to the same word, Κόσμον δ' ἐτύμας τὸ σύμπαν, ἀλλ' ἐκ ἀκοσμίαν ὀνομάσαις ἂν. Below, Misc. 5. chap. 1. parag. 5. from the end, in the notes.

rected,



rected, and regulated by that high standard which he supposes in the nature of things.

He seems to assert \*, “ That there are certain moral *species* or *appearances* so striking, “ and of such force over our natures, that when “ they present themselves, they bear down all “ contrary opinion or conceit, all opposite passion, “ sensation, or mere bodily affection.” Of this kind he makes VIRTUE itself to be the chief; since of all views or contemplations, this, in his account, is the most naturally and strongly affecting. The exalted part of *love* is only borrowed hence. That of pure *friendship* is its immediate self. He who yields his life a sacrifice to his prince or country; the lover who for his paramour performs as much; the heroic, the amorous, the religious *martyrs*, who draw their views, whether visionary or real, from this *pattern* and *exemplar* of DIVINITY; all these, according to our author’s sentiment, are alike actuated by this passion, and prove themselves in effect so many different *enthusiasts*.

Nor is thorough *honesty*, in his hypothesis, any other than this zeal, or passion, moving strongly upon the *species* or *view* of the DECORUM, and SUBLIME of actions. Others may pursue different forms †, and fix their eye on different species, (as all men do on one or other): the real *honest man*, however plain or simple he appears, has that highest species, *honesty* ‡ itself, in view; and instead of *outward* forms or *symmetries*, is struck with that of *inward* character, the harmony and numbers of the heart, and beauty of the affections,

\* Vol. 1. p. 107. 108. &c.; and vol. 2. p. 79. 81, 2, 3.

† Vol. 2. p. 322. 323.

‡ The *bonestum*, *pulchrum*, τὸ καλόν, πρίπον. *Infra*, Misc. 3. chap. 2. parag. 6. from the end.

which

which form the manners and conduct of a truly *social* life.

It is indeed peculiar to the genius of that cool philosophy above described \*, that as it denies the order or harmony of things in general, so, by a just consequence and truth of reasoning, it rejects the habit of admiring or being charmed with whatever is called *beautiful* in particular. According to the regimen prescribed by this philosophy, it must be acknowledged, that the evils of *love*, *ambition*, *vanity*, *luxury*, with other disturbances derived from the florid, high, and elegant ideas of things, must in appearance be set in a fair way of being radically cured.

It need not be thought surprising, that *religion* itself should, in the account of these philosophers, be reckoned among those vices and disturbances, which it concerns us after this manner to extirpate. If the idea of *majesty* and *beauty* in other inferior subjects be in reality distracting, it must chiefly prove so, in that *principal subject*, the basis and foundation of this conceit. Now, if *the subject* itself be not *in nature*, neither the idea, nor the passion grounded on it, can be properly esteemed *natural*: and thus all *admiration* ceases, and ENTHUSIASM is at an end. But if there be *naturally* such a passion, it is evident that RELIGION itself is of the kind, and must be therefore *natural* to man.

We can admire nothing profoundly, without a certain religious veneration. And because this borders so much on *fear*, and raises a certain tremor or horror of like appearance, it is easy to give that turn to the affection, and represent all

\* *Supra*, p. 22. ; and vol. 1. p. 37. 38. 90. &c.

ENTHUSIASM and *religious ecstasy* as the product or mere effect of FEAR :

*Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor.*

But the original passion, as appears plainly, is of another kind, and in effect is so confessed by those who are the greatest opposers of religion, and who, as our author observes, have shewn themselves sufficiently convinced, "That although these  
" ideas of *divinity* and *beauty* were vain, they  
" were yet in a manner innate, or such as men  
" were really born to, and could hardly by any  
" means avoid \*."

Now, as all affections have their excess, and require judgment and discretion to moderate and govern them; so this high and noble affection, which raises man to action, and is his guide in business, as well as pleasure, requires a steady rein and strict hand over it. All *moralists* worthy of any name have recognised the passion; though among these the wisest have prescribed restraint, pressed *moderation*, and to all TYRO's in philosophy forbid the forward use of admiration, rapture, or ecstasy, even in the subjects they esteemed the highest, and most *divine*. They knew very well that the first motion, appetite, and ardour of the youth in general towards philosophy and knowledge †, depended chiefly on this turn of temper: yet were they well apprised, withal, that in the progress of this study, as well as in the affairs of life, the florid ideas and exalted fancy of this kind became the fuel of many incendiary passions; and that, in religious concerns particularly, the habit

\* Letter of ENTHUSIASM, vol. I. p. 38.

† So the *Stagirite*: Διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἔ νυν ἔ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφῆν. *Metaph* lib. I. cap. 2. See below, *Misc.* 4. chap. I. parag. 28. in the notes.

of admiration and contemplative delight would, by over-indulgence, too easily mount into high *fanaticism*, or degenerate into abject *superstition*.

Upon the whole, therefore, according to our author, ENTHUSIASM is, in itself, a very natural *honest* passion; and has properly nothing for its object but what is *good* and *honest* \*. It is apt indeed, he confesses, to run astray. And by modern example we know, perhaps yet better than by any ancient, that, in religion, the ENTHUSIASM which works *by love* is subject to many strange irregularities; and that which works *by fear*, to many monstrous and horrible superstitions. *Mystics* and *fanatics* are known to abound, as well in our *reformed*, as in the *Romish* churches. The pretended floods of grace poured into the bosoms of the *quietists*, *pietists*, and those who favour the ecstatic way of devotion, raise such transports as by their own profelytes are confessed to have something strangely agreeable, and in common with what ordinary lovers are used to feel. And it has ben remarked by many, that the *female* saints have been the greatest improvers of this *soft* part of religion. What truth there may be in the related operations of this pretended grace and *amorous* zeal, or in the accounts of what has usually passed between the *saints* of each sex, in these devout ecstasies, I shall leave the reader to examine; supposing he will find credible accounts, sufficient to convince him of the dangerous progress of ENTHUSIASM in this *amorous lineage*.

There are many *branches* indeed more vulgar, as that of FEAR, MELANCHOLY, CONSTERNATION, SUSPICION, DESPAIR. And when the passion turns more towards *the astonishing* and *fright*.

\* Τὸ καλὸν ἔ ἀγαθόν.

*ful*, than *the amiable and delightful side*, it creates rather what we call superstition than ENTHUSIASM. I must confess withal, that what we commonly style *zeal* in matters of religion, is seldom without a mixture of both these extravagancies. The ecstatic motions of *love* and *admiration*, are seldom unaccompanied with the *horrors* and *consternations* of a lower sort of devotion. These paroxysms of zeal are in reality as the hot and cold fits of an ague, and depend on the different and occasional *views* or *aspects* of the DIVINITY, according as the worshipper is guided from without\*, or affected from within, by his particular constitution. Seldom are those *aspects* so determinate and fixed, as to excite constantly one and the same spirit of devotion. In religions, therefore, which hold most of *love*, there is generally room left for *terrors* of the deepest kind. Nor is there any religion so diabolical, as, in its representation of DIVINITY, to leave no room for *admiration* and *esteem*. Whatever *personage* or *spectre* of DIVINITY is worshipped, a certain *esteem* and *love* is generally affected by his worshippers. Or if, in the devotion paid him, there be in truth no real or absolute *esteem*, there is however a certain astonishing *delight* or *ravishment* excited.

This passion is experienced, in common, by every worshipper of the *zealot-kind*. The motion, when unguided, and left wholly to itself, is in its nature turbulent and incentive. It disjoins the natural frame, and relaxes the ordinary tone or tenor of the mind. In this disposition the reins are let loose to all passion which arises: and *the mind*, as far as it is able to act or think in such a state, approves the riot, and justifies the wild ef-

\* *Infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 3. from the end.

*sects*, by the supposed sacredness of *the cause*. Every dream and frenzy is made INSPIRATION; every affection, zeal. And in this persuasion the *zealots*, no longer self-governed, but set adrift to the wide sea of passion, can in one and the same spirit of devotion exert the opposite passions of *love* and *hatred*; *unite* affectionately, and *abhor* furiously; *curse*, *bles*s, *sing*, *mourn*, *exult*, *tremble*, *carefs*, *assassinate*, *infiict* and *suffer* MARTYRDOM \*, with a thousand other the most vehement efforts of variable and contrary affection.

The common *Heathen* religion, especially in its latter age, when adorned with the most beautiful temples, and rendered more illustrious by the munificence of the *Roman* senate and succeeding emperors, ran wholly into pomp, and was supported chiefly by that sort of ENTHUSIASM, which is raised from the external objects of *grandeur*, *majesty*, and what we call *august* †. On the other side, the *Egyptian* or *Syrian* religions, which lay more in *mystery* and *concealed rites*; having less dependence on the magistrate, and less of that *decorum* of

\* A passage of history comes to my mind, as it is cited by an eminent *divine* of our own church, with regard to that *spirit of* MARTYRDOM which furnishes, it seems, such solid matter for the opinion and faith of many zealots. The *story*, in the words of our *divine*, and with his own reflections on it, is as follows. "Two "*Franciscans* offered themselves to the fire to prove *Savonarola* to be a heretic. But a certain *Jacobine* offered himself to the fire to prove that *Savonarola* had true revelations, and was no heretic. "In the mean time *Savonarola* preached; but made no such confident offer, nor durst he venture at that new kind of fire-ordeal. "And put case, all *four* had passed through the fire, and died "in the flames; what would that have proved? Had he been a heretic, or no heretic, the more, or the less, for the confidence of these *zealous* idiots? If we mark it, a great many arguments "whereon many *sects* rely, are no better probation than this comes "to." Bishop *Taylor*, in his dedicatory discourse before his *liberty of prophesying*. See *letter of enthusiasm*, vol. 1. p. 19. 20.

† *Intra*, Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 6. from the end.

art,

art, politeness, and magnificence, ran into a more *pusillanimous, frivolous, and mean* kind of SUPERSTITION; “the observation of days, the forbearance of meats, and the contention about traditions, seniority of laws, and priority of *godships* \*.”

—————*Summus utrinque*  
*Inde furor vulgo, quod Numina vicinorum*  
*Odit uterque locus, quum solos credat habendos*  
*Esse Deos, quos ipse colit.*—————

History, withal, informs us of a certain establishment in *Ægypt*, which was very extraordinary, and must needs have had a very uncommon effect; no way advantageous to that nation in particular, or to the general society of mankind. We know very well, that nothing is more injurious to the *police*, or municipal constitution of any city or colony, than the forcing of a particular trade. Nothing more dangerous than the overpeopling any manufacture, or multiplying the *traders* or *dealers* of whatever vocation, beyond their natural proportion, and the public *demand*. Now, it happened of old, in this mother-land of superstition, that the sons of certain artists were by law obliged always to follow the same calling with their fathers †. Thus, the son of a *priest* was always a *priest* by *birth*, as was the whole lineage after him, without interruption. Nor was it a custom with this nation, as with others, to have only *one* single priest

\* *Juvenal. sat 15. vers. 35. See vol. 2. p. 290. 291.*

† “*Ἔστι δὲ Ἀιγυπτίων ἐπὶ τὰ γένηα. καὶ τύλων, οἱ μὲν ἱερεῖς, οἱ δὲ μάχιμοι κεκλήασι.*—*Οὐδὲ τούτοις ἔξεσι τέχνην ἐπατηῆσαι ὑδαίνῃ, ἀλλὰ τὰ εἰς πόλεμον ἐπασχέουσι μῦνα, καὶς παρὰ πατρὸς ἐνδεκόμενοι.* *Herodot. l. 2. § 164.*

*Ἱρᾶται δὲ ἕκ εἰς ἐκάστῃ τῶν Θεῶν, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ—ἱεράν δὲ τις ἀποδάνῃ, τότε ὁ καὶς ἀνικατίζεται.* *Ibid. § 37.*

or priestesses to a temple\* : but as the number of gods and temples was infinite, so was that of the priests. The religious foundations were without restriction ; and to one single worship or temple, as many of the holy order might be retainers, as could raise a maintenance from the office.

Whatever happened to other races or professions, that of the *priest*, in all likelihood, must, by this regulation, have propagated the most of any. It is a tempting circumstance, to have so easy a mastery over the world ; to subdue by wit instead of force ; to practise on the passions, and triumph over the judgment of mankind ; to influence private families, and public councils ; conquer conquerors ; controul the magistrate himself, and govern without the envy which attends all other government or superiority. No wonder if such a *profession* was apt to multiply ; especially when we consider the easy living and security of the *professors*, their exemption from all labour and hazard ; the

\* Τῆς δὲ χώρας ἀνάσσει εἰς τρία μέρη διηρημένως, &c. Cum tota regio in tres partes divisa sit, primam sibi portionem vindicat ordo sacerdotum, magna apud indigenas auctoritate pollens, tum ob pietatem in Deos, tum quod multam ex eruditione scientiam ejusmodi homines afferunt. Ex redditibus autem suis cuncta per Ægyptum sacrificia procurant, ministros alunt ; et propriis commoditatibus ancillantur, ταῖς ἰδίαις χρείαῖς χρηγύσσιν. Non enim (Ægyptii) existimant fas esse Deorum honores mutari, sed semper ab eisdem eodem ritu peragi, neque eos necessariorum copia destitui qui in commune omnibus consulunt. In universum namque de maximis rebus consulentes, indefinenter regi præsto sunt, in nonnullis tanquam participes imperii, in aliis reges, duces, et magistri (συνεργοί, ἐπιστάται, δαδάσκαλοι) existentes. Ex astrologia quoque et sacrorum inspectione, futura prædicunt, atque e sacrorum librorum scriptis res gestas cum utilitate conjunctas prælegunt. Non enim, ut apud Græcos, unus tantummodo vir, aut scæmina una, sacerdotio fungitur ; sed complures sacrificia et honores Deum obeuntes, liberis suis eandem vitæ rationem quasi per manus tradunt. Hi autem cunctis oneribus sunt immunes, et primos post regem honoris et potestatis gradus obtinent. *Diod. Sic. lib. 1. p. 66.*

supposed



supposed sacredness of their character; and their free possession of *wealth, grandeur, estates, and women.*

There was no need to invest such a *body* as this, with rich lands and ample territories, as it happened in *Ægypt*. The *generation* or *tribe* being once set apart as sacred, would, without further encouragement, be able, no doubt, in process of time, to establish themselves a plentiful and growing *fund*, or religious *land-bank*. It was a sufficient *donative*, to have had only that *single privilege* from the law \*, “ That they might retain what they could get; and that it might be lawful for their order, to receive such estates by voluntary contribution, as could never afterwards be converted to other uses.”

Now, if, besides the method of propagation by *descent*, other methods of increase were allowed in this order of men; if *voluntiers* were also admitted at pleasure, without any stint or confinement to a certain number, it is not difficult to imagine, how enormous the growth would be of such a science or profession, thus recognised by the *magistrate*, thus invested with *lands and power*, and thus intitled to whatever extent of *riches* or *possession* could be acquired by practice and influence over the superstitious part of mankind.

There were, besides, in *Ægypt* some natural causes of superstition, beyond those which were common to other regions. This nation might well abound in *prodigies*, when even their country and *soil* itself was a kind of *prodigy* in nature. Their solitary idle life, whilst shut up in their houses by the regular inundations of the *Nile*, the unwholesome vapours arising from the new mud, and slimy relics

\* *Infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 23.

of their river, exposed to the hot suns; their various meteors and *phænomena*; with the long vacancy they had to observe and comment on them; the necessity, withal, which, on the account of their navigation, and the measure of their yearly drowned lands, compelled them to promote the studies of *astronomy* and other *sciences*, of which their priesthood could make good advantages: all these may be reckoned perhaps as additional causes of the immense growth of superstition, and the enormous increase of the priesthood in this fertile land.

It will, however, as I conceive, be found unquestionably true, according to political arithmetic, in every nation whatsoever, "that *the quantity of*  
 " SUPERSTITION (if I may so speak) will, in proportion, nearly answer *the number of priests,*  
 " diviners, soothsayers, prophets, or such who  
 " gain their livelihood, or receive advantages by  
 " officiating in religious affairs." For if these *dealers* are numerous, they will *force* a trade. And as the liberal hand of the magistrate can easily raise swarms of this kind, where they are already but in a moderate proportion; so where, through any other cause, the number of these increasing still by degrees, is suffered to grow beyond a certain measure, they will soon raise such a ferment in mens minds, as will at least compel the magistrate, however sensible of the grievance, to be cautious in proceeding to a *reform*.

We may observe in other necessary professions, raised on the infirmities and defects of mankind, (as, for instance, in *law* and *physic*), "that, with  
 " the least help from the bounty or beneficence of  
 " the magistrate, the number of the professors,  
 " and the subject-matter of the profession, is found  
 " over

“over and above increasing.” New difficulties are started; new subjects of contention; *deeds* and *instruments* of law grow more numerous and prolix; *hypotheses, methods, regimens*, more various, and the *materia medica* more extensive and abundant. What, in process of time, must therefore naturally have happened in the case of *religion*, among the *Ægyptians*, may easily be gathered.

Nor is it strange that we should find the *property*\* and power of the *Ægyptian* priesthood, in ancient days, arrived to such a height, as in a manner to have swallowed up the state and monarchy. A worse accident befel the *Persian* crown, of which the hierarchy having got absolute possession, had once a fair chance for the universal empire. Now, that the *Persian* or *Babylonian* hierarchy was much after the model of the *Ægyptian*, though different perhaps in rites and ceremonies, we may well judge; not only from the history of the *Magi* †, but from what is recorded of ancient colonies sent long before by the *Ægyptians* into *Chaldea* ‡, and the adjacent countries. And whether the *Ethiopian* model was from that of *Ægypt*, or the *Ægyptian* from that of *Ethiopia*, (for each nation had its pretence §), we know by remarkable effects \*\*, that the *Ethio-*  
*pians*

\* Which was one third. Βυλομίον δὲ τὴν ἴσιν, &c. Sed cum his lucro etiam sacerdotes invivare vellet ad cultus istos, (nempe Osiridis, mariti fato functi), ter: iam eis terra partem ac προσόδος, ad eorum ministeria et sacra munia, fraendam donavit. Diod. Sic. lib. 1. A remarkable effect of female superstition! See also the passage of the same historian, cited above, p. 30. in the notes.

† See treatise 2. viz. *Sensus Communis*, vol. 1. p. 65. &c. Herodotus gives us the history at length in his third book.

‡ Diod. Sic. lib. 1. p. 17. & 73.

§ Herodot. Euterpe; et Diod. Sic. lib. 3.

\*\* Κατὰ τὴν Μερὸν οἱ περὶ τὰς πᾶν ἑθῶν διασπείρας τε ἔ τιμὰς διακρίβοντες ἱερεῖς, &c. Qui in Meroa (urbe, et insula primaria Æthiopyum).

*pian* empire was once in the same condition; the state having been wholly swallowed in the exorbitant power of their landed hierarchy. So true it is, "that *dominion* must naturally follow *property*." Nor is it possible, as I conceive, for any state or monarchy to withstand the incroachments of a growing hierarchy, founded on the *model* of these *Ægyptian* and *Asiatic* priesthoods. No SUPERSTITION will ever be wanting among the ignorant and vulgar, whilst the able and crafty have a power to gain inheritances and possessions, by working on this *human weakness*. This is a fund, which, by these allowances, will prove inexhaustible. New *modes* of worship, new *miracles*, new *heroes*, *saints*, *divinities*, (which serve as new occasions for *sacred DONATIVES*), will be easily supplied on the part of the religious orders; whilst the civil magistrate authorises the accumulative DONATION, and neither restrains the *number* or *possessions* of the sacred body.

We find, withal, that in the early days of this ancient *priestly nation*, of whom we have been speak-

*thiopum*) *Deorum cultus et honores administrant sacerdotes, (arcta autem hic maxima pollet auctoritate), quandocumque ipsis in mentem venerit, misso ad regem nuncio, vita se illum abdicare jubent. Oraculis enim Deorum hoc edicti; nec fas esse ab ullo mortalium, quod Dii immortales jusserint, contemni.*——So much for their kings. For as to subjects, the manner was related a little before. *Unus ex lictoribus ad regem mittitur, signum mortis præferens; quo ille viso, domum abiens sibi mortem consciscit.* This the people of our days would call passive obedience and priest-craft, with a witness. But our historian proceeds——*Et per superiores quidem ætates, non armis aut vi coacti, sed meræ superstitionis ut' αὐτῆς τῆς θεοειδαίμωνίας fascino, mente capti reges, sacerdotibus morem gesserunt: donec Ergamenes, Æthiopum rex, (Ptolomæo Secunda rerum potente), Græcorum disciplina et philosophia particeps, mandata illa primus adspernari ausus fuit. Nam hic animo, qui regem deceret, sunt, cum militum manu in locum inaccessum, ubi aureum fuit templum Æthiopum, profectus; omnes illos sacrificos jugulavit, et abolito more pristino, sacra pro arbitrio suo instauravit.* Diod. Sic. lib. 3.

ing,

ing, it was thought expedient also, for the increase of *devotion*, to enlarge their *system* of DEITY; and, either by *mystical genealogy*, *consecration*, or *canonization*, to multiply their revealed objects of worship, and raise new *personages* of DIVINITY in their religion. They proceeded, it seems, in process of time, to increase the number of their *Gods*\*, so far that, at last, they became in a manner numberless. What odd shapes, species, and forms of *Deity* were in latter times exhibited, is well known. Scarce an *animal* or *plant* but was adopted into some share of *Divinity*.

*O sanctas gentes, quibus hæc nascuntur in hortis  
Numina †! —————*

No wonder, if by a nation so abounding in religious *orders*, spiritual conquests were sought in foreign countries, colonies led abroad †, and missionaries detached on expeditions, in this prosperous service. It was thus a *zealot*-people, influenced of old by their very region and climate, and who, through a long tract of time, under a peculiar policy, had been raised both by art and nature to an immense growth in religious science and mystery, came by degrees to spread their variety of rites and ceremonies; their distinguishing marks of *separate* worships and *secret* communities, through

\* Ὡς δὲ αὐτοὶ λέγουσι, ἔτια ἐσι ἑκακισχίλια ἔ μύρια ἐς Ἀμασιν βασιλευσαντα, ἐπεὶ τε ἐκ τῶν ὀκτὼ Θεῶν οἱ δυνάδεια Θεοὶ ἐγένοντο. Herodot. lib. 2. § 43.

† Juvenal. sat. 15. v. 10.

‡ Οἱ δὲ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ, &c. Ægyptii plurimas colonias ex Ægypto in orbem terrarum disseminatas fuisse dicunt. In Babylonem colonos deduxit Belus, qui Neptuni et Libyæ filius habetur: et posita ad Euphratem sede, instituit sacerdotes ad morem Ægyptiorum exemptos impensis et oneribus publicis, quos Babylonii vocant Chaldaeos, qui, exemplo sacerdotum et physicorum, astrologorumque in Ægypto, observant stellas. Diod. Sic. lib. 1. p. 17. Ibid. p. 73.

the

the distant world, but chiefly through their neighbouring and dependent countries.

We understand from history, that even when the *Ægyptian state* was least powerful in arms, it was still respected for its *religion* and *mysteries*. It drew strangers from all parts to behold its wonders. And the fertility of its soil forced the adjacent people, and wandering nations who lived dispersed in single tribes, to visit them, court their alliance, and solicit a trade and commerce with them, on whatsoever terms. The strangers, no doubt, might well receive religious rites and doctrines from those to whom they owed their *maintenance* and *bread*.

Before the time that *Israel* was constrained to go down to *Egypt*, and sue for maintenance to these powerful *dynasties* or lowland states, the holy *patriarch Abraham* himself had been necessitated to this compliance on the same account\*. He applied in the same manner to the *Ægyptian court*. He was at first well received, and handsomely presented; but afterwards ill used, and out of favour with the prince; yet suffered to depart the kingdom, and retire with his effects; without any attempt of recalling him again by force, as it happened in the case of his posterity. It is certain, that if this holy *patriarch*, who first instituted the sacred rite of *circumcision* within his own family or tribe, had no regard to any policy or religion of the *Ægyptians*; yet he had formerly been a guest and inhabitant in *Egypt*, (where historians †

mention

\* Gen. xii. 10. &c.

† Abramus, quando Ægyptum ingressus est, nondum circumcisisus erat, neque per annos amplius viginti post reditum. — Illius posterii circumcisi sunt, et ante introitum, et dum in Ægypto commorati sunt: post exitum vero non sunt circumcisi, quamdiu vixit Moses. — Fecit itaque Josue cultros lapideos, et circumcidit filios Israel in colle

mention this to have been a national rite), long ere he had received any divine notice or revelation concerning this affair \*. Nor was it in religion merely that this reverend guest was said to have derived knowledge and learning from the *Egyptians*. It was from this *parent-country* of *occult sciences* that he was presumed, together with other wisdom, to have learned that of *judicial astrology* †; as his successors did afterwards other prophetic and miraculous arts, proper to the *Magi*, or *priesthood* of this land.

One cannot indeed but observe, in after times, the strange adherence and servile dependency of the whole *Hebrew* race on the *Egyptian* nation. It appears, that though they were of old abused in the person of their grand patriarch; though afterwards held in bondage, and treated as the most abject slaves; though twice expelled, or necessitated to save themselves by flight, out of this oppressive region; yet in the very instant of their last retreat, whilst they were yet on their march, conducted by visible Divinity, supplied and fed from heaven, and supported by continual miracles; they notwithstanding inclined so strongly to the manners, the religion, rites, diet, customs, laws, and constitutions of their tyrannical masters, that it was with the utmost difficulty they could be withheld from

*colle præputiorum. Factum Deus ratum habuit, dixitque, Hodie ἀφείλον τον ὀνειδισμὸν Αἰγύπτου ἀφ' ὑμῶν, abstuli opprobrium Aegypti a vobis, Josue, cap. 5. ver. 3. Tam Aegyptiis quam Judæis opprobrio erant incircumcisi.—Apud Aegyptios circumcidendi ritus vetustissimus fuit, et ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ab ipso initio institutus. Illi nullorum aliorum hominum institutis uti volunt. Herodot. lib. 2. cap. 51. Τὰ αἰδοῖα φ' ἄλλοι μὲν εἴωσι ὡς ἐγένοντο, πλὴν ὅσοι ἀπὸ τέτων ἰμαθὸν Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ περιτάμνονται. Herodot. lib. 2. cap. 36. Matthæi chronicus canon, p. 72.*

\* Gen. xvii.

† Julius Firmicus, apud Masheamum, p. 452. 453.

returning again into the same subjection\*. Nor could their great captains and legislators prevent their relapsing perpetually into the same worship to which they had been so long accustomed †.

How far the divine Providence might have indulged the stubborn habit and stupid humour of this people, by *giving them laws* (as the prophet says ‡) *which*

\* It can scarce be said in reality, from what appears in holy writ, that their retreat was *voluntary*. And for the historians of other nations, they have presumed to assert, that this people was actually expelled *Egypt* on account of their *leprosy*; to which the *Jewish* laws appear to have so great a reference. Thus *Tacitus*: *Plurimi auctores consentiunt, orta per Aegyptum tabe, qua corpora fœdaret, regem Oecchorim, addito Hammonis oraculo, remedium petentem, purgare regnum, et id genus hominum ut invisum Deis, alias in terras avehere jussim.* Sic conquistum collectumque vulgus, — *Mosem unum monuisse, &c.* Hist. lib. 5. cap. 3. *Aegyptii, quum scabiem et vitiliginem paterentur, responso moniti, eum (Mosem) cum agris, ne pestis ad plures serperet, terminis Aegypti pellunt. Dux igitur exulatum factus, sacra Aegyptiorum furto abstulit: qua repetentes armis Aegyptii, domum redire tempestatibus compulsi sunt.* Justin. lib. 36. cap. 2. And in *Marsham* we find this remarkable citation from *Manetho*: *Amenophin regem affectasse Θεῶν γυνώσκειν διαρῆν, ὡσπερ Ὀρ ἕς τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς βασιλευκῶν, Deorum esse contemplatorem, sicut Orum quendam regum priorum. Cui responsum est, ὅτι δύνηται θεὸς ἰδῆν, quod posset videre Deos, si regionem a leprosis et immundis hominibus purgaret.* Chronicus Canon, p. 52.

† See what is cited above (p. 36. in the notes from *Marsham*) of the *Jews* returning to circumcision under *Joshua*, after a generation's intermission; this being approved by God, for the reason given, "That it was taking from them the reproach of the *Egyptians*, or what rendered them odious and impious in the eyes of that people." Compare with this the passage concerning *Moses* himself, *Exod.* iv. 18. 25. 26. (together with *Acts* vii. 30. 34.); where, in regard to the *Egyptians*, to whom he was now returning when fourscore years of age, he appears to have circumcised his children, and taken off this national reproach: *Zipporah* his wife, nevertheless, reproaching him with the bloodiness of the deed; to which she appears to have been a party only through necessity, and in fear rather of her husband, than of GOD.

‡ *Ezek.* xx. 25. *Acts* xv. 10. Of these *Egyptian* institutions received amongst the *Jews*, see our *Spencer*. *Cum morum quorundam antiquorum toleratio vi magna polleret, ad Hebraeorum animos Dei legi et cultui conciliandos, et a reformatione Mosaica invidiam omnem amoliretur;*



which he himself approved not, I have no intention to examine. This only I pretend to infer from what has been advanced, "That the manners, opinions, rites, and customs of the Egyptians, had, in the earliest times, and from generation to generation, strongly influenced the Hebrew people, (their guests and subjects), and had undoubtedly gained a powerful ascendancy over their natures."

How extravagant soever the multitude of the Egyptian superstitions may appear, it is certain that their doctrine and wisdom were in high repute, since it is taken notice of in holy scripture, as no small advantage even to Moses himself, "that he

*moliretur; maxime conveniebat, ut Deus ritus aliquos antiquitus usutatos in factorum suorum numerum assumeret, et lex a Mose data speciem aliquam cultus olim recepti ferret. — Ita nempe nati fœdique erant Israelite, ex Aegypto recens egressi, quod Deo pene necesse esset (humanitus loqui fas sit) rituum aliquorum veterum usum eis indulgere, et illius instituta ad eorum morem et modulum accommodare. Nam populus erat a teneris Aegypti moribus assuetus, et in iis multorum annorum usu confirmatus. — Hebraei, non tantum Aegypti moribus assueti, sed etiam refractarii fuerunt. — Quemadmodum cujusque regionis et terra populo sua sunt ingenia, moreque proprii, ita natura gentem Hebraeorum, præter ceteros orbis incolas, ingenio moroso, difficili, et ad infamiam usque pertinaci, fixit. — Cum itaque veteres Hebraei moribus essent asperis et asperatis adeo, populi conditio postulavit, ut Deus ritus aliquos usu veteri firmatos eis concederet, et νομικὴν λαλῶσαν τῇ ἰαυτῶν ἀσθενείᾳ συμβαίνουσαν (uti loquitur Theodoretus) cultum legalem eorum infirmitati accommodatum instituerit. — Hebraei superstitiosa gens erant, et omni pene literatura destituti. Quam alte gentium superstitionibus immergebantur, e legibus intelligere licet, quæ populo tanquam remedia superstitionis imponebantur. Coniunxerunt autem bellua superstitio, si præsertim ab ignorantie tenebris novam ferociam et contumaciam hausserit. Facile vero credi potest, Israelitas, nuper e servorum domo liberatos, artium humaniorum rudes fuisse, et vix quicquam supra lateres atque allium Aegypti sapuisse. Quando itaque Deo jam negotium esset, cum populo tam barbaro, et superstitioni tam impense dedito; pene necesse fuit, ut aliquid eorum infirmitati daret, eosque dolo quodam (non argumentis) ad seipsum alliceret. Nul- lum animal sepe superstitioso, rudi præcipue, morosius est, aut majori arte tractandum. Spencerus de leg. Hebr. p. 627. 628. 629.*

“ had imbibed *the wisdom* of this nation \*;” which, as is well known, lay chiefly among their *priests* and *Magi*.

Before the time that the great *Hebrew* legislator received his education among these *sages*, a *Hebrew* slave †, who came a youth into the *Egyptian* court, had already grown so powerful in this kind of wisdom, as to outdo the chief *diviners*, *prognosticators*, and *interpreters* of *Egypt*. He raised himself to be chief minister to a prince, who, following his advice, obtained in a manner the whole *property*, and consequently *the absolute dominion* of that land. But to what height of power the established priesthood was arrived even at that time, may be conjectured hence, “ that the *crown* “ (to speak in a modern style) offered not to meddle with the *church-lands* ;” and that in this great *revolution* nothing was attempted, so much as by way of purchase or exchange ‡, in prejudice of this *landed* clergy ; the prime minister himself having joined his interest with theirs, and entered by marriage into their alliance §. And in this he was followed by the great founder of the *Hebrew* state. For he also \*\* matched himself with the priesthood of some of the neighbouring nations, and traders into *Egypt* ††, long ere his establishment

\* (1.) Καὶ ἐπαιδεύθη Μωσῆς ΠΑΣΗ ΣΟΦΙΑ Αἰγυπτίων ἧ δὲ δυνατὸς ἐν λόγοις ἔν ἐργοῖς. Αἰτ. Αποστ. vii. 22.

(2.) Exod. vii. 11. & 22.

(3.) Ibid. viii. 7.

(4.) Justin. lib. 36. cap. 2.

† Gen. xxxix. &c. Minimus ætate inter fratres Joseph fuit, cujus excellens ingenium veriti fratres clam interceptum peregrinis mercatoribus venderant. A quibus deportatus in Ægyptum, cum magicas ibi artes solerti ingenio percepisset, brevi ipsi regi percarus fuit. Justin. lib. 36. cap. 2.

‡ Gen. xlvii. 22. 26.

§ Gen. xli. 45.

\*\* Exod. iii. 1. and xviii. 1. &c.

†† Such were the Midianites, Gen. xxxvii. 28. 36.

of the *Hebrew* religion and commonwealth. Nor had he perfected his *model*, till he consulted the foreign priest his father-in-law \*, to whose advice he paid such remarkable deference.

BUT to resume the subject of our speculation, concerning the wide diffusion of the priestly science or function: It appears from what has been said, that notwithstanding the *Egyptian* priesthood was, by ancient establishment, hereditary, the skill of *divining*, *soothsaying*, and *magic*, was communicated to others besides their national sacred body; and that the *wisdom* of the *Magicians*, their power of *miracles*, their interpretation of *dreams* and *visions*, and their art of administering in divine affairs, were intrusted even to *foreigners* who resided amongst them.

It appears, withal, from these considerations, how apt the *religious* profession was to spread itself widely in this region of the world; and what efforts would naturally be made by the more necessitous of these unlimited professors, towards a fortune, or maintenance, for themselves and their successors.

Common arithmetic will, in this case, demonstrate to us, "that as the proportion of so many *laymen* to each *priest* grew every day less and less, so the wants and necessities of each *priest* must grow more and more." The *magistrate* too, who, according to this *Egyptian* regulation, had resigned his title or share of right in sacred things, could no longer govern, as he pleased, in these affairs, or check the growing number of these *professors*. The spiritual generations were left to prey on others, and (like *fish* of prey) even on themselves, when destitute of other capture, and

\* Exod. xviii. 17.—24.

confined within too narrow limits. What method, therefore, was there left to heighten the ZEAL of worshippers, and augment their *liberality*, but “to foment their *emulation*, prefer worship to worship, faith to faith; and turn the “spirit of ENTHUSIASM to the side of sacred horror, religious *antipathy*, and *mutual discord* between worshippers?”

Thus provinces and nations were divided by the most *contrary* rites and customs which could be devised, in order to create the strongest *aversion* possible between creatures of a like species. For when all other animosities are allayed, and anger of the fiercest kind appeased, the *religious hatred*, we find, continues still, as it began, without provocation or voluntary offence. The presumed *misbeliever* and *blasphemer*, as one rejected and abhorred of GOD, is through a pious imitation abhorred by the *adverse* worshipper, whose *enmity* must naturally increase as his *religious zeal* increases.

From hence the opposition rose of temple against temple, profelyte against profelyte. The most zealous worship of *one* GOD, was best expressed (as they conceived) by the open defiance of *another*. SIR-names and titles of DIVINITY passed as *watch-words*. He who had not the SYMBOL, nor could give *the world*, received *the knock*.

*Down with him! Kill him! Merit heaven  
thereby;*

as our poet has it, in his *American* tragedy\*.

Nor did PHILOSOPHY †, when introduced into *religion*, extinguish, but rather inflame this *zeal*: as we may shew perhaps in our following chapter more particularly; if we return again, as is likely,

\* Dryden, *Indian Emperor*, act 5. scene 2.

† *Infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 27.

to this subject. For this, we perceive, is of a kind apt enough to grow upon our hands. We shall here, therefore, observe only what is obvious to every student in sacred antiquities, that from the contentious learning and sophistry of the ancient schools, (when true science, philosophy, and arts were already deep in their decline \*), *religious problems* of a like contentious form sprang up; and certain *doctrinal TESTS* were framed, by which *religious parties* were engaged and listed against one another, with more animosity than in any other cause or quarrel had been ever known. Thus *religious massacres* began, and were carried on; temples were demolished; holy utensils destroyed; the sacred pomp trodden under foot, insulted, and the insulters in their turn exposed to the same treatment, in their persons as well as in their worship. Thus *madness* and *confusion* were brought upon the world, like that CHAOS, which the poet miraculously describes in the mouth of his mad hero: when even in celestial places, disorder and blindness reigned:—"No dawn of light;

—— " *No glimpse or starry spark;*

" *But gods met gods, and jostled in the dark †.*

\* Vol. 1. p. 174. 274. in the notes; and infra, Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 23. &c.

† Oedipus of Dryden and Lee.

## C H A P. II.

*Judgment of divines and grave authors concerning enthusiasm.—Reflections upon scepticism.—A sceptic Christian.—Judgment of the inspired concerning their own inspirations.—Knowledge and belief.—History of religion resumed.—ZEAL offensive and defensive.—A church in danger.—Persecution.—Policy of the church of Rome.*

WHAT I had to remark of my own concerning ENTHUSIASM, I have thus dispatched: what others have remarked on the same subject, I may, as an *apologist* to another author, be allowed to cite; especially if I take notice only of what has been dropped very naturally by some of our most approved *authors*, and ablest *divines*.

It has been thought an odd kind of temerity, in our author, to assert; "That even ATHEISM itself was not wholly exempt from *enthusiasm*; that there have been in reality *enthusiastical Atheists*; and that even the spirit of *martyrdom* could, upon occasion, exert itself as well in *this* cause, as in any *other* \*." Now, besides what has been intimated in the preceding chapter, and what in fact may be demonstrated from the examples of *Vaninus* and other martyrs of a like principle, we may hear an excellent and learned *divine* †, of highest authority at home, and fame abroad; who, after having described an *enthusiastical Atheist*, and one *atheistically inspired*, says of this very sort of men, "that they are *fanatics* too; however that word seem to have a more peculiar respect to *something of a DEITY*: all

\* *Viz.* in his letter concerning enthusiasm, in vol. 1.

† Dr Cudworth's intellectual system, p. 134.

“ Atheists

“ Atheists being that *blind goddess* NATURE’s *fanatics*.”

And again : “ All Atheists (says he) are possessed with a certain kind of madness, that may be called *pneumatophobia* \*, that makes them have an irrational but desperate abhorrence from spirits or incorporeal substances ; they being acted also, at the same time, with an *hylomania*, whereby they madly dote upon *matter*, and devoutly worship it, as the only NUMEN.”

What the power of ECSTASY is, whether through *melancholy*, *wine*, *love*, or other natural causes, another learned divine of our church †, in a discourse upon enthusiasm, sets forth ; bringing an example from *Aristotle*, “ of a *Syracusean* poet,

\* The good Doctor makes use here of a stroke of railery against the over-frighted *anti-superstitious* gentlemen, with whom our author reasons at large in his second treatise, (*viz.* vol. 1. p. 65. 66. &c. and 68. 69. &c.). It is indeed the nature of *fear*, as of all other passions, when excessive, to defeat its own end, and prevent us in the execution of what we naturally propose to ourselves as our advantage. SUPERSTITION itself is but a certain kind of *fear*, which possessing us strongly with the apprehended wrath or displeasure of *divine powers*, hinders us from judging what those powers are in themselves, or what conduct of ours may, with best reason, be thought suitable to such highly rational and superior natures. Now, if, from the experience of many gross delusions of a superstitious kind, the course of this fear begins to turn ; it is natural for it to run, with equal violence, a contrary way. The extreme passion for religious objects passes into an aversion, and a certain *horror* and *dread* of *imposture* causes as great a disturbance as even *imposture* itself had done before. In such a situation as this, the mind may easily be blinded ; as well in one respect as in the other. It is plain, *both* these disorders carry something with them which discovers us to be in some manner beside our reason, and out of the right use of judgment and understanding. For how can we be said to *intrust* or *use* our reason, if in any case we fear to be convinced ? How are we masters of ourselves, when we have acquired the habit of bringing horror, aversion, favour, fondness, or any other temper than that of mere *indifference* and *impartiality*, into the judgment of opinions, and search of truth ?

† Dr More, § 11. 19. 20. and so on.

“ who

“ who never verified so well, as when he was in  
 “ *his distracted fits.*” But as to *poets* in general,  
 compared with the *religious enthusiasts*, he says:  
 There is this difference, “ that a *poet* is an enthu-  
 “ *siast* in jest; and an *enthusiast* is a poet in good  
 “ earnest.”

“ It is a strong temptation (says the Doctor)  
 “ with a *melancholist* \*, when he feels a storm of  
 “ *devotion* and *zeal* come upon him like a mighty  
 “ *wind*; his heart being full of affection, his head  
 “ pregnant with clear and sensible representations,  
 “ and his mouth flowing and streaming with fit  
 “ and powerful expressions, such as would astonish  
 “ an ordinary auditory †; it is, I say, a shrewd  
 “ temptation to him, to think it the very *Spirit of*  
 “ *God* that then moves supernaturally in him;  
 “ whereas all that excess of *zeal* and *affection*, and  
 “ *fluency* of words, is most palpably to be resol-  
 “ ved into the power of *melancholy*, which is a  
 “ kind of *natural inebriation.*”

The learned Doctor, with much pains afterwards,  
 and by help of the Peripatetic philosophy, explains  
 this *enthusiastic inebriation*, and shews in particu-  
 lar ‡, “ how the vapours and fumes of *melancholy*  
 “ partake of the nature of wine.”

One might conjecture from hence, that the ma-  
 licious opposers of early Christianity were not un-  
 versed in this philosophy; when they sophistically  
 objected against the apparent force of *the divine*

\* Dr More, § 16.

† It appears from hence, that in the notion which this learned  
 divine gives us of ENTHUSIASM, he comprehends the *social* or *po-*  
*popular* genius of the passion; agreeably with what our author in his  
 letter concerning *Enthusiasm* (p. 11. 12. 34. 35.) has said of the influence  
 and power of the *assembly* and *auditory* itself, and of the communi-  
 cative force and rapid progress of this ecstatic fervor, once kindled,  
 and set in action.

‡ Dr More, § 20. 22. 23. 26.



*Spirit* speaking in divers languages, and attributed it “to the power of *new wine* \*.”

But our devout and zealous Doctor seems to go yet further. For, besides what he says of the *enthusiastic* power of *fancy* in Atheists †, he calls *melancholy* a *pertinacious and religious complexion* ‡; and asserts, “That there is not any true spiritual *grace* from God, but this mere natural constitution, according to the several tempers and workings of it, will not only *resemble*, but sometimes *seem to outstrip*.” And after speaking of *prophetic* ENTHUSIASM †, and establishing (as our author does \*\*) a *legitimate* and a *bastard* fort, he asserts and justifies the *devotional* ENTHUSIASM (as he calls it) of *holy and sincere souls* ††, and ascribes *this* also to MELANCHOLY.

He allows, “that the soul may sink so far into *phantasms*, as not to recover the use of her free faculties; and that this enormous strength of *imagination*, does not only beget the belief of *mad internal apprehensions*, but is able to assure us of the presence of *external objects* which are *not*.” He adds, “that what *custom* and *education* do by degrees, *distempered FANCY* may do in a *shorter time*.” And speaking of ECSTASY and the power of MELANCHOLY in *ecstatic fancies* ††, he says, “that what *the imagination* then puts forth of herself, is as *clear* as broad day; and the perception of the soul at least as *strong* and *vigorous*, as at any time in beholding things *awake*.”

From whence the Doctor infers, “that the *strength of perception* is no sure ground of truth.”

Had any other than a reverend father of our

\* Acts ii. 13. † Dr More, § 1. ‡ § 15. † § 30.  
and 57. \*\* Vol. 1. p. 40. 41. †† § 63. †† § 28.

church expressed himself in this manner, he must have been contented perhaps to bear a sufficient charge of *scepticism*.

It was good fortune in my Lord Bacon's case, that he should have escaped being called an ATHEIST, or a SCEPTIC, when speaking in a solemn manner of the *religious passion*, the ground of SUPERSTITION, or ENTHUSIASM, (which he also terms a *panic* \*), he derives it from an imperfection in the creation, make, or natural constitution of man. How far the author of *the letter* † differs from this author in his opinion both of the end and foundation of this passion, may appear from what has been said above. And, in general, from what we read in the other succeeding treatises of our author, we may venture to say of him with assurance, "that he is as little a SCEPTIC, (according to the vulgar sense of that word), as he is *Epicurean*, or *Atheist*." This may be proved sufficiently from his *philosophy*: and for any thing higher, it is what he no where presumes to treat; having forborn in particular to mention any holy

\* *Natura rerum omnibus viventibus indidit metum et formidinem, vita atque essentia sua conservatricem, ac mala ingruentia vitantem et depellentem. Veruntamen eadem natura modum tenere nescia est, sed timoribus salutaribus semper vanos et inanes admiscet: adeo ut omnia (si intus conspici darentur) panicis terroribus plenissima sint, praesertim humana; et maxime omnium apud vulgum, qui superstitione (quae vere nihil aliud quam panicus terror est), in immensum laborat et agitur; praecipue temporibus duris, et trepidis, et adversis. Franciscus Bacon de augment. scient. lib. 2. c. 13.*

The author of *the letter*, I dare say, would have expected no quarter from his critics, had he expressed himself as this celebrated author here quoted; who, by his *natura rerum*, can mean nothing less than the *universal dispensing nature*, erring blindly in the very first design, contrivance, or original frame of things; according to the opinion of *Epicurus* himself, whom this author, immediately after, cites with praise.

† *Viz.* the letter concerning ENTHUSIASM, above, in vol. 1.

*mysteries*

*mysteries* of our religion, or sacred article of our belief.

As for what relates to *revelation* in general \*, if I mistake not our author's meaning, he professes to believe, as far as is possible for any one who himself had never experienced any *divine communication*, whether by *dream*, *vision*, *apparition*, or other *supernatural operation*; nor was ever present as eye-witness of any *sign*, *prodigy*, or *miracle* whatsoever. Many of these, he observes †, are at this day pretendedly exhibited in the world, with an endeavour of giving them the perfect air and exact resemblance of those recorded in holy writ. He speaks indeed with contempt of the mockery of *modern miracles* and *inspiration*. And as to all pretences to things of this kind in our *present* age, he seems inclined to look upon them as no better than mere *imposture* or *delusion*. But for what is recorded of ages heretofore, he seems to resign his judgment, with entire condescension, to his superiors. He pretends not to frame any *certain* or *positive* opinion of his own, notwithstanding his best searches into antiquity, and the nature of *religious record* and *tradition*: but on all occasions submits most willingly, and with full confidence and trust, to the opinions *by law established* ‡. And if this be not sufficient to free him from the reproach of SCEPTICISM, he must, for ought I see, be content to undergo it.

To say truth, I have often wondered to find such a disturbance raised about the simple name of SCEPTIC

\* *Infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 31.

† Vol. 1. p. 34. 35. &c.; and vol. 2. p. 243. 244. &c.

‡ Vol. 1. p. 281, 2. &c.; and *infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 19. Misc. 5. chap. 1. parag. 6. and chap. 3. parag. 31.

RIC \*. It is certain, that, in its original and plain signification, the word imports no more than barely, "that state or frame of mind in which every one remains, on every subject of which he is *not certain.*" He who is *certain*, or presumes to say *he knows*, is in that particular, whether he be mistaken or in the right, a DOGMATIST. Between these *two* states or situations of mind, there can be no medium. For he who says, "*that he believes for certain, or is assured of what he believes;*" either speaks ridiculously, or says in effect, "*that he believes strongly, but is not sure.*" So that whoever is not *conscious* of revelation, nor has *certain knowledge* of any miracle or sign, can be no more than SCEPTIC in the case: and the best Christian in the world, who being destitute of the means of *certainty*, depends only on history and tradition for his belief in these particulars, is at best but a *sceptic-Christian*. He has no more than a nicely critical *historical faith* †, subject to various speculations, and a thousand different *criticisms* of languages and literature.

This he will naturally find to be the case, if he attempts to search into *originals*, in order to be *his own judge*, and proceed on the bottom of *his own* discernment and understanding. If, on the other hand, he is *no critic*, nor competently learned in these ORIGINALS; it is plain he can have no *original* judgment of his own; but must rely still on the *opinion* of those who have opportunity to examine such matters, and whom he takes to be the unbiassed and disinterested judges of these *religious narratives*. His faith is not in ancient *facts* or

\* Vol. 2. p. 152, 3. 243. &c.; and *infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 31. 32. &c.

† Vol. 1. p. 114, 15.; and *infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 31. &c.

*persons,*

persons, nor in the ancient *writ*, or primitive recorders; nor in the successive collators or conservators of these records, (for of these he is unable to take cognifance): but his confidence and trust must be in those *modern men*, or *societies of men*, to whom the public, or he himself, ascribes the judgment of these *records*, and commits the determination of *sucred writ*, and *genuine story*.

Let the person seem ever so positive or dogmatical in these high points of learning; he is yet in reality no *dogmatist*, nor can any way free himself from a certain kind of SCEPTICISM. He must know himself still capable of *dcubting*: or if, for fear of it, he strives to banish every opposite thought, and resolves not so much as to deliberate on the case; this still will not acquit him. So far are we from being able to *be sure* when we have a mind, that indeed we can never be thoroughly *sure*, but then only when we cannot help it, and find of necessity we must be so, whether we will or not. Even the highest *implicit faith* is in reality no more than a kind of passive SCEPTICISM; “a resolution to examine, recollect, consider, or hear as little as possible to the prejudice of that *belief*, which having once espoused, we are ever afterwards afraid to lose.”

If I might be allowed to imitate our *author*, in daring to touch now and then upon the *characters* of our divine *worthies*, I should, upon this subject of BELIEF, observe how fair and generous the great *Christian* convert and *learned APOSTLE* has shewn himself in his sacred writings. Notwithstanding he had himself an *original testimony* and *revelation* from heaven, on which he grounded his conversion; notwithstanding he had in his own person the experience of outward *miracles* and inward *communications*; he condescended still, on

many occasions, to speak *sceptically*, and with some hesitation and reserve, as to the *certainty* of these divine exhibitions. In his account of some transactions of this kind, himself being the witness, and speaking (as we may presume) of his own person, and proper vision, he says only, that “*he knew a man: whether in the body or out of it, he cannot tell. But such a one caught up to the third heaven he knew formerly, (he says), above fourteen years before his then writing* \*.” And when in another capacity the same inspired writer, giving precepts to his disciples, distinguishes what he writes *by divine commission*, from what he delivers *as his own judgment and private opinion* †, he condescends nevertheless to speak as one no way positive, or master of any absolute *criterion* in the case. And in several subsequent passages he expresses himself as under some kind of doubt how to judge or determine certainly ‡, “*whether he writes by inspiration or otherwise.*” He only “*thinks he has the Spirit.*” He “*is not sure,*” nor would have us to depend on him as *positive* or *certain* in a matter of so nice discernment.

The holy founders and inspired authors of our religion, required not, it seems, so strict an *assent*, or such *implicit faith*, in behalf of their *original* writings and revelations, as later uninspired doctors, without the help of divine testimony, or any miracle on their side, have required in behalf of their own comments and interpretations. The earliest and worst of *heretics*, it is said, were those called *Gnostics*, who took their name from an audacious pretence to *certain knowledge* and *comprehension* of the greatest *mysteries* of faith. If the most dangerous state of opinion was this *dogmatical* and

\* 2 Cor. xii. 2. 3.

† 1 Cor. vii. 10. 12.

‡ 1 Cor. vii. 40.

presumptuous

presumptuous sort, the safest, in all likelihood, must be the *sceptical* and modest.

There is nothing more evident than that our *holy RELIGION*, in its original constitution, was set so far apart from all *philosophy*, or refined *speculation*, that it seemed in a manner diametrically opposed to it. A man might have been not only a *sceptic* in all the controverted points of the academies, or schools of learning, but even a perfect *stranger* to all of this kind, and yet complete in his religion, faith, and worship.

Among the polite Heathens of the ancient world, these different provinces of *religion* and *philosophy* were upheld, we know, without the least interfering with each other. If in some barbarous nations the *philosopher* and *priest* were joined in one, it is observable that the mysteries, whatever they were, which sprang from this extraordinary conjunction, were kept secret and undivulged. It was satisfaction enough to the *priest-philosopher*, if the initiated party preserved his respect and veneration for the tradition and worship of the temple, by complying in every respect with the requisite performances and rites of worship. No account was afterwards taken of the *philosophic faith* of the profelyte or worshipper. His opinions were left to himself, and he might philosophise according to what foreign school or sect he fancied. Even amongst the *Jews* themselves, the *Sadducee* (a *materialist*, and denier of the soul's immortality) was as well admitted as the *Pharisee*; who, from the schools of *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, or other later philosophers of *Greece*, had learned to reason upon *immaterial substances*, and the *natural immortality of souls*.

It is no astonishing reflection to observe, how fast the world declined in wit and sense\*, in man-

\* Vol. 1. p. 173. &c.; and in the preceding chapter, p. 43.

hood, reason, science, and in every art, when once the *Roman* empire had prevailed, and spread an universal tyranny and oppression over mankind. Even the *Romans* themselves, after the early sweets of one peaceful and long reign, began to groan under that yoke of which they had been themselves the imposers. How much more must other nations, and mighty cities, at a far distance, have abhorred this tyranny, and detested their common servitude, under a people who were themselves no better than mere slaves ?

It may be looked upon, no doubt, as providential, that at this time, and in these circumstances of the world, there should arise so high an expectation of a *divine deliverer* ; and that from the eastern parts and confines of *Judea*, the opinion should spread itself of such a *deliverer to come*, with strength from heaven sufficient to break that empire, which no earthly power remaining could be thought sufficient to encounter. Nothing could have better disposed the generality of mankind, to receive the *evangelical advice* ; whilst they mistook *the news*, as many of the first Christians plainly did, and understood the promises of a *Messias* in this temporal sense, with respect to his *second coming*, and *sudden reign* here upon *earth*.

SUPERSTITION, in the mean while, could not but naturally prevail, as *misery* and *ignorance* increased \*. The *Roman* emperors, as they grew more barbarous, grew so much the more superstitious. The *lands* and *revenues*, as well as the *numbers* of the *Heathen* priests, grew daily. And when the season came, that, by means of a convert emperor, the

\* Vol. 1. p. 103. ; and below, parag. 6. from the end:

Heathen



Heathen *church-lands* \*, with an increase of power, became transferred to the Christian clergy, it was no wonder, if, by such riches and authority, they were in no small measure influenced and corrupted; as may be gathered even from the accounts given us of these matters by themselves.

When, together with this, the *schools* of the ancient philosophers †, which had been long in their decline, came now to be dissolved, and their sophistic teachers became ecclesiastical instructors; the unnatural union of *religion* and *philosophy* was completed, and the monstrous product of this match appeared soon in the world. The odd exterior shapes of Deities, temples, and holy utensils, which by the *Ægyptian* sects ‡ had been formerly set in

\* How rich and vast these were, especially in the latter times of that empire, may be judged from what belonged to the single order of the *Vestals*, and what we read of the revenues belonging to the temples of the *Sun*, (as in the time of the monster *Heliogabalus*), and of other donations by other emperors. But what may give us yet a greater idea of their riches, is, that in the latter Heathen times, which grew more and more superstitious, the restraining laws, (or statutes of *mort-main*), by which men had formerly been withheld from giving away estates by *will*, or otherwise, to religious uses, were repealed; and the Heathen church left, in this manner, as a bottomless gulf, and devouring receptacle of land and treasure. *Senatus-consulto, et constitutionibus principum, heredes instituere concessum est Apollinem Dædymum, Dianam Ephesiam, matrem deorum, &c.* Ulpianus post Cod. Theodos. p. 92. apud Marsh.

This answers not amiss to the modern practice and expression of *making our soul our heir*; giving to *God* what has been taken sometimes with freedom enough from *man*; and conveying estates in such a manner in this world, as to make good interest of them in another. The reproach of the ancient *satirist* is at present out of doors. It is no affront to religion now-a-days to compute its profits. And a man might well be accounted dull, who, in our present age, should ask the question, *Dicite, pontifices, in sacro quid facit aurum?* *Perf. sat. 2.* See below, *Misc. 2. chap. 2. parag. 6. from the end, and ib. par. 8. from the end, in the notes; and chap. 2. parag. 8. from the end.*

† As above, p. 43.

‡ *Supra*, p. 28. 29. 32. 33. 42. and vol. I. p. 274. in the notes.

battle against each other, were now metamorphosed into *philosophical forms* and *phantoms*; and, like flags and banners, displayed in hostile manner, and borne *offensively*, by one party against another. In former times, those barbarous nations above mentioned were the sole warriors in these religious causes; but now the whole world became engaged; when, instead of *storks* and *crocodiles*, other ensigns were erected; when *sophistical chimeras*, *crabbed notions*, *bombastic phrases*, *solecisms*, *absurdities*, and a thousand monsters of a *scholastic* brood, were set on foot, and made the subject of vulgar animosity and dispute.

Here first began that spirit of *bigotry* which broke out in a more raging manner than had been ever known before, and was less capable of *temper* or *moderation* than any species, - form, or mixture of religion in the ancient world. *Mysteries*, which were heretofore treated with profound respect, and lay unexposed to vulgar eyes, became public and prostitute; being enforced with terrors, and urged with compulsion and violence, on the unfitted capacities and apprehensions of mankind. The very *Jewish* traditions, and *Cabalistic* learning underwent this fate. That which was naturally the subject of profound speculation and inquiry, was made the necessary subject of a strict and absolute assent. The *allegorical*, *mythological* account of sacred things, was wholly inverted; liberty of judgment and exposition taken away; no ground left for inquiry, search, or meditation; no refuge from the *dogmatical* spirit let loose. Every quarter was taken up; every portion prepossessed. All was reduced to *article* and *proposition* \*.

\* *Infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 3. par. 13. from the end, in the notes; *et supra*, p. 45.

Thus

Thus a sort of *philosophical* ENTHUSIASM overspread the world. And BIGOTRY (a species of *superstition* \* hardly known before) took place in mens affections, and armed them with a new jealousy against each other. Barbarous terms and idioms were every day introduced; monstrous definitions invented and imposed; new schemes of faith erected from time to time; and hostilities, the fiercest imaginable, exercised on these occasions. So that the ENTHUSIASM or ZEAL which was usually shewn by mankind in behalf of their particular worships, and which for the most part had been hitherto *defensive* only, grew now to be universally of the *offensive* kind.

IT may be expected of me perhaps, that being fallen thus from remote antiquity to later periods, I should speak on this occasion with more than ordinary exactness and regularity. It may be urged against me, that I talk here as *at random*, and *without book*; neglecting to produce my authorities, or continue my quotations, according to the professed style and manner in which I began this present chapter. But as there are many greater privileges, by way of variation, interruption, and digression, allowed to us *writers of MISCELLANY*; and especially to such as are *commentators* upon other authors; I shall be content to remain mysterious in this respect, and explain myself no further than by a noted *story*, which seems to suit our author's purpose, and the present argument.

It is observable from holy writ, that the ancient *Ephesian* worshippers, however zealous or enthu-

\* Let any one who considers distinctly the meaning and force of the word BIGOTRY, endeavour to render it in either of the ancient languages, and he will find how peculiar a passion it implies; and how different from the mere affection of *enthusiasm* or *superstition*.

fiastic they appeared, had only a *defensive* kind of zeal in behalf of their temple \*, whenever they thought in earnest it was brought in danger. In the tumult which happened in that city near the time of the holy apostle's retreat, we have a remarkable instance of what our author calls a religious *panic* †. As little *bigots* as the people were, and as far from any *offensive* zeal, yet when their established church came to be called in question, we see in what a manner their zeal began to operate. “ *All with one voice, about the space of two hours, cried out, saying, Great is Diana of the Ephesians ‡.*” At the same time this assembly was so confused, that *the greater part knew not wherefore they were come together* ||; and consequently could not understand why their church was in any danger. But the ENTHUSIASM was got up, and a PANIC fear for the church had struck the multitude. It ran into a popular rage, or epidemical *phrensy*, and was communicated (as our author expresses it \*\*) “ *by aspect, or, as it were, by contact or sympathy.*”

\* The magnificence and beauty of that temple is well known to all who have formed any idea of the ancient *Grecian* arts and workmanship. It seems to me to be remarkable, in our learned and elegant apostle, that, though an enemy to this mechanical spirit of religion in the *Ephesians*, yet, according to his known character, he accommodates himself to their humour, and the natural turn of their ENTHUSIASM; by writing to his converts in a kind of *architect* style, and almost with a perpetual allusion to *building*, and to that *majesty, order, and beauty*, of which their temple was a masterpiece. Ἐποικοδομηθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ θεμελίῳ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἔ. προφητῶν, ὅντος ἀκρογωνιαίῳ λίθῳ αὐτῷ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. Ἐν ᾧ πάντα ἡ οἰκοδομὴ συναρμολογούμενη αὐξοῦ εἰς ναὸν ἅγιον ἐν Κυρίῳ. Ἐν ᾧ ἔ. ὑμεῖς συνοικοδομεῖσθε εἰς κατοικητήριον τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν πνεύματι. — Eph. ii. 20. 21. 22. And so chap. iii. 17. 18. &c. and chap. iv. 16. 29.

† Acts of the Apostles, chap. xix. ῥ 23.

‡ Ibid. ῥ 28. and 34.

|| Ibid. ῥ 32.

\*\* Letter of enthusiasm, vol. I. p. 11.

It

It must be confessed, that there was, besides these motives, a *secret spring* which forwarded this ENTHUSIASM. For certain parties concerned, men of craft, and strictly united in interest, had been secretly called together, and told, "Gentlemen! (or *Sirs!*), ye know that by this *mystery* or craft we have our wealth. Ye see, withal, and have heard, that not only here at *Ephesus*, but almost throughout all *Asia*, this *Paul* has persuaded and turned away many people, by telling them, *they are no real gods who are figured or wrought with hands*; so that not only this our *craft* is in danger; but also *the temple* itself\*."

Nothing could be more *moderate* and wise, nothing more agreeable to that magisterial science or policy which our author recommends †, than the behaviour of the *town-clerk* or *recorder* of the city, as he is represented on this occasion in holy writ. I must confess indeed, he went pretty far in the use of this moderating art. He ventured to assure the people, "that every one acquiesced in their ancient worship of the great goddess, and in their tradition of the image, which fell down from *Jupiter!* that these were facts undeniable: and that the new sect neither meant the pulling down of their church, nor so much as offered to blaspheme or speak amiss of their goddesses."

This, no doubt, was stretching the point sufficiently; as may be understood by the event, in after time. One might perhaps have suspected this recorder to have been himself a *dissenter*, or at least an *occasional conformist*, who could answer so roundly for the new sect, and warrant the *church in being* secure of damage, and out of all *danger* for the future. Mean while the tumult was ap-

\* Act. Apost. xix. 25. &c.

† Letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1. p. 12. &c.

peased :

peased: no harm befel the temple for that time. The new sect acquiesced in what had been spoken on their behalf. They allowed the apology of the recorder. Accordingly the zeal of the Heathen church, which was only *defensive*, gave way; and the new religionists were prosecuted no further.

Hitherto, it seems, the face of PERSECUTION had not openly shewn itself in the wide world. It was sufficient security for every man, that he gave no disturbance to what was publicly established. But when *offensive zeal* came to be discovered in one party, the rest became in a manner necessitated to be aggressors in their turn. They who observed, or had once experienced this intolerating spirit, could no longer tolerate on their part \*. And they

\* Thus the controversy stood before the time of the Emperor *Julian*; when blood had been so freely drawn, and cruelties so frequently exchanged, not only between Christian and Heathen, but between Christian and Christian. after the most barbarous manner. What the zeal was of many early Christians against the idolatry of the old Heathen church, (at that time the established one), may be comprehended by any person who is ever so slenderly versed in the history of those times. Nor can it be said indeed of us moderns, that in the quality of *good Christians*, (as that character is generally understood), we are found either backward or scrupulous in assigning to perdition such wretches as we pronounce *guilty of idolatry*. The name *idolater* is sufficient excuse for almost any kind of insult against the person, and much more against the worship of such a misbeliever. The very word *Christian* is in common language used for *man*, in opposition to *brute-beast*, without leaving so much as a middle place for the poor *Heathen* or *Pagan*; who, as the greater beast of the two, is naturally doomed to massacre, and his gods and temples to fracture and demolition. Nor are we masters of this passion, even in our best humour. The *French* poet (we see) can with great success, and general applause, exhibit this primitive zeal, even on the public stage: *Polyeucte*, act 2. scene 6.

*Ne perdons plus de temps, le sacrifice est prêt.  
Allons y du vray Dieu soutenir l'intérêt,  
Allons fouler aux piés ce foudre ridicule  
Dont arme un bois pourri ce peuple trop crédule;  
Allons en éclairer l'aveuglement fatal,  
Allons briser ces Dieux de pierre et de métal:*

*Abandonnons*

they who had once exerted it over others, could expect no better quarter for themselves. So that nothing less than *mutual extirpation* became the aim, and almost open profession of each religious society.

In

*Abandonnons nos jours à cette ardeur celeste,  
Faisons triompher Dieu ; qu'il dispose du reste.*

I should scarce have mentioned this, but that it came into my mind how ill a construction some people have endeavoured to make of what our author, stating the case of Heathen and Christian persecution, in his *letter of enthusiasm*, has said concerning the Emperor *Julian*. It was no more indeed than had been said of that virtuous and gallant Emperor by his greatest enemies ; even by those who (to the shame of Christianity) boasted of his having been most insolently affronted on all occasions, and even treacherously assassinated by one of his Christian soldiers. As for such authors as these, should I cite them in their proper invective style and saint-like phrase, they would make no very agreeable appearance, especially in *miscellanies* of the kind we have here undertaken. But a letter of that elegant and witty Emperor may not be improperly placed amongst our citations, as a pattern of his humour and genius, as well as of his principle and sentiments, on this occasion. *Julian's epistles*, numb. 52.

JULIAN to the BOSTRENS.

“ I should have thought, indeed, that the *Galilean* leaders would  
 “ have esteemed themselves more indebted to me, than to him who  
 “ preceded me in the administration of the empire. For in his time  
 “ many of them suffered exile, persecution, and imprisonment.  
 “ Multitudes of those whom in their religion they term *heretics*,  
 “ were put to the sword : insomuch that in *Samsata, Cyzicum,*  
 “ *Paphlagonia, Bithynia, Galatia,* and many other countries, whole  
 “ towns were levelled with the earth. The just reverse of this has  
 “ been observed in my time. The exiles have been recalled, and  
 “ the proscribed restored to the lawful possession of their estates.  
 “ But to that height of fury and distraction are this people arrived,  
 “ that being no longer allowed the privilege to tyrannize over one  
 “ another, or persecute either their own sectaries, or the religious of  
 “ the lawful church, they swell with rage, and leave no stone un-  
 “ turned, no opportunity unemployed, of raising tumult and sedi-  
 “ tion. So little regard have they to true piety ; so little obedience  
 “ to our laws and constitutions, however humane and tolerating.  
 “ For still do we determine and steddily resolve, never to suffer one  
 “ of them to be crown involuntarily to our alters. \* \* \* As for  
 “ the mere people, indeed, they appear driven to these riots and se-  
 “ ditions

In this extremity, it might well perhaps have been esteemed the happiest wish for mankind, that *one* of these contending parties of incompatible religionists should at last prevail over the rest; so as, by an universal and absolute power, to determine

“ditions by those amongst them whom they call CLERICS; who are now enraged to find themselves restrained in the use of their former power and intemperate rule. \* \* \* They can no longer act the magistrate or civil judge, nor assume authority to make people’s *wills*, supplant relations, possess themselves of other mens patrimonies, and by specious pretences transfer *all* into their own possession. \* \* \* For this reason I have thought fit, by this *public EDICT*, to forewarn the people of this sort, that they raise no more commotions, nor gather in a riotous manner about their seditious CLERICS, in defiance of the magistrate, who has been insulted, and in danger of being stoned, by these incited rabbles. In their congregations, they may, notwithstanding, assemble as they please, and croud about their leaders, performing worship, receiving doctrine, and praying, according as they are by them taught and conducted: but if with any tendency to sedition, let them beware how they hearken, or give assent; and remember, it is at their peril, if by these means they are secretly wrought up to mutiny and insurrection. \* \* \* Live, therefore, in peace and quietness! neither spitefully opposing, or injuriously treating one another. You misguided people of the new way, beware on your side! And you of the ancient and established church, injure not your neighbours and fellow-citizens, who are enthusiastically led away in ignorance and mistake, rather than with design or malice! It is by DISCOURSE and REASON, not by *blows, insults, or violence*, that men are to be informed of truth, and convinced of error. Again, therefore, and again, I injoin and charge the zealous followers of the true religion, no way to injure, molest, or affront the *Galilaan* people.”

Thus the generous and mild Emperor; whom we may indeed call *Heathen*, but not so justly *apostate*: since being, at different times of his youth, transferred to different schools or universities, and bred under tutors of each religion, as well *Heathen* as *Christian*; he happened, when of full age, to make his choice (though very unfortunately) in the former kind, and adhered to the ancient religion of his country and forefathers. See the same Emperor’s letters to *Artabius*, numb. 7. and to *Hecebolus*, numb. 43. and to the people of *Alexandria*, numb. 10. See vol. 1. p. 19.

orthodoxy



orthodoxy \*, and make that opinion effectually *catholic*, which in their particular judgment had the best right to that denomination. And thus, by force of massacre and desolation, *peace* in worship, and *civil* unity by help of the *spirituals*, might be presumed in a fair way of being restored to mankind.

I shall conclude with observing, how ably the *Roman-Christian*, and once *catholic* church, by the assistance of their converted emperors †, proceeded in the establishment of their growing hierarchy. They considered wisely the various *superstitions* and *enthusiasms* of mankind, and proved the different kinds and force of each. All these seeming contrarieties of human passion they knew how to comprehend in their political model and subservient system of divinity. They knew how to make advantage both from the high speculations of *philosophy*, and the *grossest ideas* of vulgar *ignorance*. They saw there was nothing more different than *that* ENTHUSIASM which ran upon *spirituals*, according to the simpler views of the divine existence ‡, and *that* which ran upon external proportions, magnificence of structures, ceremonies, processions, quires, and those other harmonies which captivate *the eye and ear* §. On this account they even added to this *latter* kind, and displayed religion in a yet more gorgeous habit of temples, statues, paintings, vestments, copes, mitres, purple, and the cathedral pomp. With these arms they could subdue the victorious *Goths*,

\* *Infra*, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. penult.

† Vol. 1. p. 103. *Supra*, p. 54. 55.

‡ Vol. 2. p. 202, 3.

§ *Supra*, p. 28.

and secure themselves an *Atilla* \*, when their *Cæsars* failed them.

The truth is, it is but a vulgar species of ENTHUSIASM, which is moved chiefly by *shew* and *ceremony*, and wrought upon calices and candles, robes, and figured dances. Yet this, we may believe, was looked upon as no slight ingredient of *devotion* in those days; since, at this hour, the manner is found to be of considerable efficacy with some of the devout amongst ourselves, who pass the least for *superstitious*, and are reckoned in the number of the polite world. This the wise hierarchy duly preponderating; but being satisfied withal, that there were other tempers and hearts which could not so easily be captivated by this *exterior* allurements, they assigned another part of religion to profelytes of another *character* and *complexion*, who were allowed to proceed on a quite different bottom, by the *inward way* of *contemplation*, and *divine love*.

They are indeed so far from being jealous of mere ENTHUSIASM, or the *ecstatic* manner of devotion, that they allow their *mystics* to write and preach in the most rapturous and seraphic strains. They suffer them, in a manner, to supersede all external worship, and triumph over outward forms; till the refined religionists proceed so far, as either expressly or seemingly to dissuade the practice of the vulgar and established ceremonial duties. And

\* When this victorious ravager was in full march to *Rome*, St *Leon* (the then Pope) went out to meet him in solemn pomp. The *Goth* was struck with the appearance, obeyed the priest, and retired instantly with his whole army in a *panic fear*; alledging, that, among the rest of the *pontifical* train, he had seen one of an extraordinary form, who threatened him with death, if he did not instantly retire. Of this important encounter there are in the *Peter's* church in the *Vatican*, and elsewhere, at *Rome*, many fine sculptures, paintings, and representations, deservingly made, in honour of the miracle.

then,

then, indeed, they check the supposed *exorbitant* ENTHUSIASM, which would prove dangerous to their *hierarchal* state\*.

If modern *visions*, *prophecies*, and *dreams*, *charms*, *miracles*, *exorcisms*, and the rest of this kind, be comprehended in that which we call FANATICISM or SUPERSTITION, to this spirit they allow a full career; whilst to ingenious writers they afford the liberty, on the other side, in a civil manner, to call in question these spiritual feats performed in monasteries, or up and down by their *mendicant* or *itinerant* priests, and ghostly missionaries.

This is that ancient *hierarchy*, which, in respect of its first foundation, its policy, and the consistency of its whole frame and constitution, cannot but appear in some respect august and venerable, even in such as we do not usually esteem weak eyes. These are the spiritual conquerors; who, like the first *Cæsars*, from small beginnings, established the foundations of an almost universal monarchy. No wonder if at this day the immediate view of this hierarchal residence, the *city* and *court* of *Rome*, be found to have an extraordinary effect on foreigners of other latter churches. No wonder if the amazed surveyors are for the future so apt either to conceive the horriest aversion to all priestly government, or, on the contrary, to admire it, so far as even to wish a coalescence or reunion with this ancient *mother-church*.

In reality, the exercise of power, however arbitrary or despotic, seems less intolerable under such a spiritual sovereignty, so extensive, ancient, and of such a long succession, than under the petty

\* Witness the case of *Molinos*, and of the pious, worthy, and ingenious *Abbé Fenelon*, now *Archbishop of Cambrai*:

tyrannies and mimical polities of some new pretenders. The former may even *persecute* \* with a tolerable grace: the latter, who would willingly derive their authority from the former, and graft on their *successive right*, must necessarily make a very awkward figure. And whilst they strive to give themselves the same air of independency on the civil magistrate; whilst they affect the same authority in government, the same grandeur, magnificence, and pomp in worship, they raise the highest ridicule, in the eyes of those who have real discernment, and can distinguish *originals* from *copies* :

*O imitatores, servum pecus † †*

C H A P. III.

*Of the force of humour in religion. — Support of our author's argument in his essay on the freedom of wit and raillery. — ZEAL discussed. Spiritual surgeons: executioners: carvers. — Original of human sacrifice. — Exhilaration of religion. — Various aspects from outward causes.*

THE celebrated *wits* of the MISCELLANARIAN race, the *essay-writers*, *casual discoursers*, *reflection-coiners*, *meditation-founders*, and others of the irregular kind of writers, may plead it as their peculiar advantage, “that they follow the *variety of NATURE.*” And in such a *climate* as ours, their plea, no doubt, may be very just. We *islanders*, famed for other mutabilities, are particularly noted for the variableness and incon-

\* *Infra*, Misc. 2. chap. 3. parag. 30.

† *Horat. lib. 1. epist. 19.*

stancy of our weather. And if our taste in *letters* be found answerable to this temperature of our climate, it is certain a writer must, in our account, be the more valuable in his kind, as he can agreeably *surprise* his reader, by *sudden changes* and *transports*, from one extreme to another.

Were it not for the known prevalency of this relish, and the apparent deference paid to those geniuses who are said to *elevate* and *surprise*, the author of these MISCELLANIES might, in all probability, be afraid to entertain his reader with this multifarious, complex, and desultory kind of reading. It is certain, that if we consider the beginning and process of our present work, we shall find sufficient variation in it. From a professed levity, we are lapsed into a sort of gravity unsuitable to our manner of setting out. We have steered an adventurous course, and seem newly come out of a stormy and rough sea. It is time indeed we should enjoy a calm, and instead of expanding our sails before the swelling gusts, it befits us to retire under the lee-shore, and ply our oars in a smooth water.

It is the *philosopher*, the *orator*, or the *poet*, whom we may compare to some first-rate vessel, which lanches out into the wide sea, and with a proud motion insults the encountering surges. We *ESSAY-writers* are of the *small-craft*, or *galley-kind*. We move chiefly by starts and bounds, according as our motion is by frequent intervals renewed. We have no great adventure in view, nor can tell certainly whither we are bound. We undertake no mighty voyage by help of stars or compass; but row from creek to creek, keep up a coasting-trade, and are fitted only for fair weather and the summer-season.

Happy therefore it is for us in particular, that  
having

having finished our course of ENTHUSIASM, and pursued our author into his *second* treatise \*, we are now, at last, obliged to turn towards pleasanter reflections, and have such subjects in view as must naturally reduce us to a more familiar style. WIT and HUMOUR (the professed subjects of the treatise now before us) will hardly bear to be examined in ponderous sentences and poised discourse. We might now perhaps do best, to lay aside the gravity of strict argument, and resume the way of *chat*; which, through aversion to a contrary *formal manner*, is generally relished with more than ordinary satisfaction. For excess of *physic* (we know) has often made men hate the name of *wholesome*. And an abundancy of forced instruction, and solemn counsel, may have made men full as averse to any thing delivered with an air of high *wisdom and science*; especially if it be so *high* as to be set above all human art of *reasoning*, and even above reason itself, in the account of its sublime dispensers.

However, since it may be objected to us by certain *formalists* of this sort, "That we can prove nothing duly without proving it *in form*;" we may for once condescend to their demand, state our case *formally*, and divide our subject into parts, after the *precise* manner, and according to just *rule and method*.

Our purpose, therefore, being to defend an author who has been charged as too presumptuous for introducing the way of WIT and HUMOUR into *religious searches*; we shall endeavour to make appear,

1<sup>st</sup>, That WIT and HUMOUR are corroborative of *religion*, and promotive of *true faith*.

\* *Viz.* Essay on the freedom of wit and humour, vol. 1.

2dly, That they are used as proper *means* of this kind by the holy founders of religion.

3dly, That, notwithstanding the dark complexion and sour humour of some religious teachers, we may be justly said to have in the main a *witty* and *good-humoured religion*.

Among the earliest acquaintance of my youth, I remember, in particular, *a club* of three or four merry gentlemen, who had long kept company with one another, and were seldom separate in any party of pleasure or diversion. They happened once to be upon a travelling adventure, and came to a country where they were told for certain, they should find the worst entertainment, as well as the worst roads imaginable. One of the gentlemen, who seemed the least concerned for this disaster, said slightly, and without any seeming design, "that the best expedient for them in this extremity would be, to keep themselves in high humour, and endeavour to commend every thing which the place afforded." The other gentlemen immediately took the hint; but, as it happened, kept silence, passed the subject over, and took no further notice of what had been proposed.

Being entered into the dismal country, in which they proceeded without the least complaint, it was remarkable, that if, by great chance, they came to any tolerable bit of road, or any ordinary prospect, they failed not to say something or other *in its praise*, and would light often on such pleasant *fancies* and *representations* as made the objects in reality agreeable.

When the greatest part of the day was thus spent, and our gentlemen arrived where they intended to take their quarters, the first of them who made trial of the fare, or tasted either *glass* or *dish*, recommended it with such an air of assurance, and

in such lively expressions of approbation, that the others came instantly over to his opinion, and confirmed his *relish* with many additional encomiums of their own.

Many ingenious reasons were given for the several *odd* tastes and looks of things, which were presented to them at table. "Some meats were *wholesome*; others of a *high taste*; others according to the manner of eating in *this* or *that foreign country*." Every dish had the flavour of some celebrated receipt in *cookery*; and the *wine* and other liquors had, in their turn, the advantage of being treated in the same elegant strain. In short, our gentlemen eat and drank heartily, and took up with their indifferent fare so well, that it was apparent they had wrought upon themselves to *believe* they were tolerably well served.

Their servants, in the mean time, having laid no such plot as this against themselves, kept to their *senses*, and stood it out, "that their masters had certainly lost *theirs*. For how else could they *swallow* so contentedly, and take all for good which was set before them?"—

Had I to deal with a malicious reader, he might perhaps pretend to infer from this *story* of my travelling friends, that I intended to represent it as an easy matter for people to persuade themselves into what *opinion* or *belief* they pleased. But it can never surely be thought, that men of true *judgment* and *understanding* should set about such a task as that of perverting their own *judgment*, and giving a wrong bias to their REASON. They must easily foresee, that an attempt of this kind, should it have the least success, would prove of far worse consequence to them than any perversion of their *taste*, *appetite*, or ordinary *senses*.

I must confess it, however, to be my imagination,



tion, that where *fit circumstances* concur, and many inviting occasions offer from the side of mens *interest*, their *humour*, or their *passion*; it is no extraordinary case to see them enter into such a *plot* as this against their own understandings, and endeavour, by all possible means, to persuade both themselves and others of what they think *convenient* and *useful to believe*.

If, in many particular cases, where favour and affection prevail, it be found so easy a thing with us to impose upon ourselves, it cannot surely be very hard to do it, where we take for granted *our highest interest is concerned*. Now, it is certainly no small *interest* or *concern* with men; to believe what is by authority established; since, in the case of disbelief, there can be no choice left, but either to live a *hypocrite*, or be esteemed *profane*. Even where men are left to themselves, and allowed the freedom of their choice, they are still forward enough *in believing*; and can officiously endeavour to persuade themselves of the truth of any flattering imposture.

Nor is it unusual to find men successful in this *endeavour*; as, among other instances, may appear by the many *religious faiths* or *opinions*, however preposterous or contradictory, which, age after age, we know to have been raised on the foundation of *miracles* and pretended *commissions* from heaven. These have been as generally espoused and passionately cherished, as the greatest truths, and most certain revelations. It is hardly to be supposed, that such combinations should be formed, and forgeries erected with such success and prevalency over the understandings of men, did not *they themselves* co-operate, of their own accord, towards the imposture, and shew, "that, by a good  
" will

“ will and hearty desire of believing, they had in reality a considerable hand in the deceit.”

It is certain, that in a country where FAITH has for a long time gone by *inheritance*, and *opinions* are entailed by *law*, there is little room left for the vulgar to alter their persuasion, or deliberate on the choice of their religious belief. Whenever a government thinks fit to concern itself with *mens opinions*, and, by its absolute authority, impose any particular *belief*, there is none perhaps ever so ridiculous or monstrous, in which it needs doubt of having good success. This we may see thoroughly effected in certain countries, by a steady policy, and sound application of punishment and reward, with the assistance of *particular courts* erected to this end; *peculiar methods* of justice; *peculiar magistrates* and *officers*; proper *inquests*, and certain *wholesome severities*, not slightly administered, and played with, (as certain triflers propose), but daly and properly enforced; as is absolutely requisite to this end of strict *conformity* and *unity* in one and the same profession, and manner of worship.

But should it happen to be *the TRUTH* itself which was thus effectually propagated by the means we have described, the very nature of such *means* can, however, allow but little honour to the *propagators*, and little merit to the *disciples* and *believers*. It is certain, that *Mahometism*, *Paganism*, *Judaism*, or any *other belief* may stand, as well as *the truest*, upon this foundation. He who is now an *orthodox Christian*, would, by virtue of such a discipline, have been infallibly as true a *Musfulman*, or as errant a *heretic*, had his birth happened in another place.

For this reason, there can be no rational belief but where *comparison* is allowed, *examination* permitted,

mitted, and a sincere *toleration* established. And in this case, I will presume to say, "that *whatever* BELIEF is once espoused or countenanced by the magistrate, it will have a sufficient advantage, without any help from force or menaces on one hand, or extraordinary favour and partial treatment on the other." If the BELIEF be in any measure consonant to *truth* and *reason*, it will find as much favour in the eyes of mankind as *truth* and *reason* need desire. Whatever difficulties there may be in any particular *speculations* or *mysteries* belonging to it, the better sort of men will endeavour to pass them over. They will *believe* (as our author says\*) *to the full stretch of their* REASON, and add spurs to their FAITH, in order to be the more *sociable*, and conform the better with what their *interest*, in conjunction with their *good humour*, inclines them to receive as credible, and observe as their *religious duty* and *devotional task*.

Here it is that GOOD HUMOUR will naturally take place, and the *hospitable disposition* of our travelling friends above recited will easily transfer itself into *religion*, and operate in the same manner with respect to the *established faith*, (however miraculous or incomprehensible), under a tolerating, mild, and gentle government.

Every one knows, indeed, that by HERESY is understood a stubbornness in *the will*, not a defect merely in *the understanding*. On this account it is impossible that an honest and *good-humoured* man should be a *schismatic* or *heretic*, and affect to separate from his national worship on slight reason, or without severe *provocation*.

To be pursued by *petty* INQUISITORS; to be

\* Letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1. p. 26.

threatened with *punishment*, or *penal laws*; to be *marked out* as dangerous and suspected; to be *railed at in high places*, with all the studied wit and art of calumny; are indeed sufficient provocations to *ill humour*, and may force people to *divide*, who at first had never any such intention. But the virtue of *good humour* in RELIGION is such, that it can even reconcile persons to a belief in which they were never bred, or to which they had conceived a former prejudice.

From these considerations we cannot but of course conclude, “that there is nothing so ridiculous in respect of policy, or so wrong and odious in respect of common humanity, as a moderate and half-way PERSECUTION.” It only frets the sore; it raises the *ill humour* of mankind; excites the keener spirits; moves indignation in beholders; and sows the very seeds of schism in mens bosoms. A *resolute and bold-faced* PERSECUTION leaves no time or scope for these engendering distempers, or gathering ill-humours. It does the work at once; by *extirpation*, *banishment*, or *massacre*; and, like a bold stroke in surgery, dispatches by one short *amputation*, what a bungling hand would make worse and worse, to the perpetual sufferance and misery of the patient.

If there be on earth a proper way to render the most sacred truth suspected, it is by supporting it with *threats*, and pretending to *terrify* people into the belief of it. This is a sort of daring mankind in a cause where they know themselves superior, and out of reach. The weakest mortal finds within himself, that though he may be *outwitted* and *deluded*, he can never be *forced* in what relates to his *opinion* or *assent*. And there are few men so ignorant of human nature, and of what they hold in common with their kind, as not to comprehend,  
“ that

“ that where great vehemence is expressed by any  
 “ one in what relates solely to *another*, it is seldom  
 “ without some private interest of *his own*.”

In common matters of dispute, the angry disputant makes the best cause to appear the worst. A *clown* once took a fancy to hear the *Latin* disputes of doctors at a university. He was asked what pleasure he could take in viewing such combatants, when he could never know so much as which of the parties had the better. “ For that matter,” replied the *clown*, “ I a’n’t such a fool neither, but I can “ see who’s the first that puts t’other into a pas- “ sion.” Nature herself dictated this lesson to the clown, “ that he who had the better of the argu- “ ment, would be *easy* and *well-humoured*; but he “ who was unable to support his cause by reason, “ would naturally lose his temper, and grow *violent*.”

Were two travellers agreed to tell their story separate in public; the one being a man of sincerity, but *positive* and *dogmatical*; the other less sincere, but *easy* and *good-humoured*. Though it happened that the accounts of this latter gentleman were of the more miraculous sort, they would yet sooner gain belief, and be more favourably received by mankind, than the strongly-asserted relations and vehement narratives of the other *fierce* defender of the truth.

That GOOD HUMOUR is a chief cause of compliance, or acquiescence in matters of *faith*, may be proved from the very *spirit* of those whom we commonly call CRITICS. It is a known prevention against the gentlemen of this character, “ that they “ are generally *ill-humoured* and *splenetic*.” The world will needs have it, that their *spleen* disturbs them. And I must confess I think the world in general to be so far right in this conceit, that though all *critics* perhaps are not necessarily *splenetic*, all

*splenetic people* (whether naturally such, or made so by ill usage) have a necessary propensity to *criticism* and *satire*. When men are *easy* in themselves, they let others remain so; and can readily comply with what seems *plausible*, and is thought conducing to *the quiet or good correspondence* of mankind. They study to raise no difficulties or doubts. And in religious affairs, it is seldom that they are known forward to entertain ill thoughts or surmises, whilst they are unmolested. But if disturbed by groundless arraignments and suspicions, by unnecessary *invectives* and bitter declamations, and by a contentious quarrelsome aspect of religion, they naturally turn *critics*, and begin to question every thing. The spirit of *satire* rises with the *ill mood*: and the chief passion of men thus diseased and thrown out of good humour, is, to find fault, censure, unravel, confound, and leave nothing without exception and controversy.

These are the *sceptics* or *scrupulists*, against whom there is such a clamour raised. It is evident, in the mean while, that the very *clamour* itself, joined with the usual menaces and shew of force, is that which chiefly raises this *sceptical* spirit, and helps to multiply the number of these inquisitive and *ill-humoured* CRITICS. Mere *threats*, without power of execution, are only exasperating and provocative. They who are masters of the *carnal* as well as *spiritual* weapon \*, may apply each at their pleasure, and in what proportion they think necessary. But where the magistrate resolves steadily to reserve his *fascēs* for his own proper province, and keep the edge-tools and deadly instruments out of other hands, it is in vain for spiritual pretenders to take such magisterial airs. It can

\* *Supra*, p. 66.

then

then only become them to brandish such arms, when they have strength enough to make the magistrate resign his office, and become *provost* or *executioner* in their service.—

Should any one who happens to read these lines, perceive in himself a rising animosity against the author, for asserting thus zealously the notion of a *religious liberty*, and *mutual toleration*; it is wished that he would maturely deliberate on the cause of his disturbance and ill-humour. Would he deign to look narrowly into himself, he would undoubtedly find that it is not ZEAL for *religion* or the *truth* which moves him on this occasion. For had he happened to be in a nation where he was *no conformist*, nor had any hope or expectation of obtaining the precedency for his *own* manner of worship, he would have found nothing preposterous in this our doctrine of *indulgence*. It is a fact indubitable, that whatever sect or religion is undermost, though it may have persecuted at any time before; yet as soon as it begins to suffer persecution in its turn, it recurs instantly to the principles of MODERATION, and maintains this our plea for *complacency*, *sociableness*, and GOOD HUMOUR in *religion*. The mystery therefore of this animosity, or rising indignation of my devout and zealous reader, is only this: “That being devoted to the interest of a party already in possession or expectation of the temporal advantages annexed to a particular belief, he fails not, as a zealous party-man, to look with jealousy on every unformable opinion, and is sure to justify those means which he thinks proper to prevent its growth.” He knows, that if in matters of religion any one believes amiss, it is at his own peril. If *opinion* damns, *vice* certainly does as much. Yet will our gentleman easily find, if he inquires the least into *himself*, that he has no such furious

concern for the security of mens *morals*, nor any such violent resentment of their *vices*, when they are such as no way incommode him. And from hence it will be easy for him to infer, “that the passion he feels on this occasion, is not from pure ZEAL, but private INTEREST, and worldly EMULATION.”

COME we now (as authentic rhetoricians express themselves) to our *second head*: which we should again subdivide into *firsts* and *seconds*, but that this manner of carving is of late days grown much out of fashion.

It was the custom of our ancestors, perhaps as long since as the days of our hospitable King *Arthur*, to have nothing served at table but what was *entire* and substantial. It was a whole boar, or solid ox which made the feast. The figure of the animal was preserved entire, and the dissection made in form by the appointed *carver*, a man of might as well as profound craft and notable dexterity; who was seen erect, with goodly mien and action, *displaying* heads and members, *dividing* according to art, and *distributing* his subject-matter into proper *parts*, suitable to the stomachs of those he served. In latter days it is become the fashion to eat with less ceremony and method. Every one chuses to *carve* for himself. The learned manner of *dissection* is out of request; and a certain method of cookery has been introduced, by which the *anatomical* science of the table is entirely set aside. *Ragouts* and *fricassees* are the reigning dishes, in which every thing is so dismembered and thrown out of all order and form, that no part of the mass can properly be *divided*, or distinguished from another.

*Fashion* is indeed a powerful mistress, and by her



her single authority has so far degraded the carving method and use of *solids*, even in discourse and writing, that our religious pastors themselves have many of them changed their manner of distributing to us their spiritual food. They have quitted their substantial service, and uniform division into *parts* and *under parts*; and in order to become fashionable, they have run into the more savoury way of learned *ragout* and *medley*. It is the unbred rustic orator alone who presents his clownish audience with a *divisible discourse*. The elegant court-divine exhorts in MISCELLANY, and is ashamed to bring his *two's* and *three's* before a fashionable assembly.

Should I therefore, as a mere *miscellanarian* or *essay-writer*, forgetting what I had premised, be found to drop *a bead*, and lose the connecting thread of my present discourse, the case perhaps would not be so preposterous. For fear however lest I should be charged for being worse than my word, I shall endeavour to satisfy my reader, by pursuing my *method* proposed; if peradventure he can call to mind, what that method was; or if he cannot, the matter is not so very important, but he may safely pursue his reading, without further trouble.

To proceed therefore: Whatever means or methods may be employed at any time in maintaining or propagating *a religious belief* already current and established, it is evident that the first beginnings must have been founded in that natural complacency and GOOD HUMOUR, which inclines to trust and confidence in mankind. *Terrors* alone, though accompanied with miracles and prodigies of whatever kind, are not capable of raising that sincere faith and absolute reliance which is required in favour of the divinely-authorized *instructor*, and  
spiritual

spiritual *chief*. The affection and love which procures a true adherence to the new religious foundation, must depend either on a real or counterfeit GOODNESS in the *religious founder* \*. Whatever ambitious spirit may inspire him; whatever savage zeal or persecuting principle may lie in reserve, ready to disclose itself when authority and power is once obtained; the *first* scene of doctrine, however, fails not to present us with the agreeable views of *joy, love, meekness, gentleness, and moderation*.

In this respect RELIGION, according to the common practice in many sects, may be compared to that sort of *courtship* of which the fair sex are known often to complain. In the beginning of an amour, when these innocent charmers are first costed, they hear of nothing but *tender vows, submission, service, love*. But soon afterwards, when won by this appearance of gentleness and humility, they have resigned themselves, and are no longer *their own*; they hear a different note, and are taught to understand *submission* and *service* in a sense they little expected. *Charity* and *brotherly love* are very engaging sounds: but who would dream that out of abundant charity and brotherly love should come *steel, fire, gibbets, rods*, and such a sound and hearty application of these remedies as should at once advance the worldly greatness of religious pastors, and the particular interest of private souls, for which they are so charitably concerned?

It has been observed by our author †, “that the *Jews* were naturally a very cloudy people.” That they had certainly in religion, as in every thing else, the least *good humour* of any people in

\* Vol. 1. p. 72. and vol. 2. p. 251.

† Letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1. p. 22; and above, p. 38. 39.

the

the world, is very apparent. Had it been otherwise, their holy legislator and deliverer, who was declared *the meekest man on earth\**, and who for many years together, had, by the most popular and kind acts, endeavoured to gain their love and affection, would, in all probability have treated them afterwards with more sweetness, and been able, with less blood and massacre †, to retain them in their religious duty. This however we may observe, that if the first *Jewish* princes, and celebrated kings, acted in reality according to the institutions of their great founder, not only MUSIC, but even PLAY and DANCE, were of holy appointment, and divine right. The first monarch of this nation, though of a *melancholy complexion*, joined MUSIC with his spiritual exercises, and even used it as a remedy under that *dark ENTHUSIASM* or *evil spirit* ‡; which, how far it might resemble that of *prophecy*, experienced by him even after his apostasy §, our author pretends not to determine \*\*. It is certain, that the successor of this prince was a hearty espouser of the *merry* devotion, and, by his example, has shewn it to have been fundamental in the religious constitution of his people. †† The famous *entry* or *high dance* performed by him, after so conspicuous a manner, in the procession of the sacred *coffer*, shews that he was not ashamed of expressing any ecstasy of *joy*, or playsome *humour* ††, which was practised by the meanest of the priests or people on such an occasion †††.

Besides

\* Numb. xii. 3. † Exod. xxxii. 27. &c.; Numb. xvi. 41.

‡ 1 Sam. xviii. 10. & xix. 9. § Ibid. v. 23. 24.

\*\* Letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1. p. 35. †† 2 Sam. vi. 5. 14. 16.

‡‡ Ibid. v. 22.

‡‡‡ Though this *dance* was not performed quite naked, the dancers, it seems, were so slightly clothed, that, in respect of modesty, they might

Besides the many songs and hymns dispersed in holy writ, the book of *Psalms* itself, *Job*, *Proverbs*, *Canticles*, and other entire volumes of the sacred collection, which are plainly *poetry*, and full of humorous images, and jocular wit, may sufficiently shew how readily the inspired authors had recourse to HUMOUR and DIVERSION, as a proper means to promote *religion*, and strengthen *the established faith*.

When the affairs of the *Jewish* nation grew desperate, and every thing seemed tending to a total conquest and captivity, the style of their holy writers and prophets might well vary from that of earlier days, in the rise and vigour of their commonwealth; or during the first splendor of their monarchy, when the princes themselves prophesied, and potent kings were of the number of the sacred penmen. This still we may be assured of, that however *melancholy* or *ill-humoured* any of the prophets may appear at any time, it was not that kind of spirit which *God* was wont to encourage in them. Witness the case of the prophet *Jonah*, whose character is so naturally described in holy writ.

Pettish as this prophet was, unlike a man, and

might as well have wore nothing; their nakedness appearing still by means of their high caperings, leaps, and violent attitudes, which were proper to this dance. The reader, if he be curious, may examine what relation this religious ecstasy and naked dance had to the *naked* and *processional* prophecy, (1 Sam. xix. 23. and 24.), where prince, priest, and people prophesied in conjunction; the prince himself being both of the *itinerant* and *naked* party. It appears, that even before he was yet advanced to the throne, he had been seized with this prophesying *spirit-errant*, *processional* and *saltant*, attended, as we find, with a sort of martial dance, performed in troops or companies, with pipe and tabret accompanying the march, together with psaltery, harp, cornets, timbrels, and other variety of music. See 1 Sam. x. 5. and xix. 23. 24. &c.; and 2 Sam. vi. 5.; and above, *Letter of enthusiasm*, vol. 1. p. 35.

resembling

resembling rather some refractory boyish pupil, it may be said, that GOD, as a kind tutor, was pleased to humour him, bear with his anger, and, in a lufory manner, expose his childish frowardness, and shew him to himself.

“ Arise,” (said his gracious Lord), “ and go to *Nineveh* \*.” “ No such matter,” says our prophet to himself; but away over-sea for *Tarshish*. He fairly plays the truant, like an arch schoolboy; hoping to hide out of the way. But his tutor had good eyes, and a long reach. He overtook him at sea, where a storm was ready prepared for his exercise, and a fish’s belly for his lodging. The renegade found himself in harder du-rance than any at land. He was sufficiently mortified; he grew good, prayed, moralized, and spoke mightily against *lying vanities* †.

Again, ‡ the prophet is taken into favour, and bid go to *Nineveh*, to foretell destruction. He fore-tells it. *Nineveh* repents; God pardons; and the prophet is angry.

“ || Lord! — Did I not foresee what this would come to? *Was not this my saying, when I was safe and quiet at home?* — What else should I have run away for? — As if I knew not how little dependence there was on the resolution of those who are always so ready to forgive, and repent of what they have determined. — No! — Strike me dead! — Take my life this moment. *It is better for me.* — If ever I prophesy again.” \*\*\*\*\*

“ And dost thou well then to be thus angry,

\* *Jonah*, chap. i. &c.

† *Ibid.* ii. 8.

‡ *Ibid.* iii. 1. &c.

|| *Ibid.* iv. 1. 2. 3.

“ *Jonah!*

“ *Jonah!* Consider with thyself! — Come!  
 “ — Since thou wilt needs retire out of the city,  
 “ to see at a distance *what will come of it*; here,  
 “ take a better fence than thy own *booth* against  
 “ the hot sun which incommodes thee. Take this  
 “ tall *plant*, as a *shady covering for thy head*.  
 “ Cool thyself, and be *delivered from thy grief* \*.”

When *the Almighty* had shown this indulgence to *the prophet*, he grew better-humoured, and passed a tolerable night. But the next morning the *worm* came, and an *east-wind*: the arbor was nipped; the sun shone vehemently, and the prophet's head was heated as before. Presently the ill mood returns, and the prophet is at the old pass.

“ *Better die, than live at this rate.* — *Death,*  
 “ *death,* alone can satisfy me. Let me hear no  
 “ longer of living. — No! — It is in vain to  
 “ talk of it †.” —

Again, God expostulates; but is taken up short, and answered churlishly by the testy prophet.

“ Angry he is; angry he *ought to be*, and angry  
 “ he *will be, to his death* ‡.” But the ALMIGHTY, with the utmost pity towards him, in this *melancholy* and *froward temper*, lays open the folly of it; and exhorts to *mildness* and GOOD HUMOUR, in the most tender manner, and under the most *familiar* and *pleasant images*; whilst he shews *expressly* more regard and tenderness to the very CATTLE and *brute-beasts*, than the prophet to his OWN HUMAN KIND, and to those very *disciples* whom by his preaching he had converted ||.

In the ancients parts of sacred story, where the beginning of things, and origin of human race are

\* *Jonah* iv. 4. 5. 6.

† *Ibid.* † 7. 8.

‡ *Ibid.* iv. 9.

|| See the last verse of this prophet.

represented

represented to us, there are sufficient instances of this *familiarity of style*, this popular pleasant intercourse, and manner of dialogue between GOD and *man* \*; I might add even between *man* and *beast* †; and, what is still more extraordinary, between GOD and SATAN ‡.

Whatsoever of this kind may be *allegorically* understood, or in the way of PARABLE or FABLE; this I am sure of, that the *accounts, descriptions, narrations, expressions, and phrases*, are in themselves many times exceedingly *pleasant, entertaining, and facetious*. But fearing lest I might be misinterpreted, should I offer to set these passages in their proper light, (which, however, has been performed by undoubted good Christians, and most learned and eminent divines of our own church ¶), I forbear to go any further into the examination or criticism of this sort.

As for our Saviour's style, it is not more *vehement* and *majestic* in his gravest animadversions or declamatory discourses, than it is *sharp, humorous, and witty* in his repartees, reflections, fabulous narrations, or parables, similes, comparisons, and other methods of *milder* censure and reproof. His exhortations to his disciples; his particular designation of their manners; the pleasant images under which he often couches his morals and prudential rules; even his miracles themselves, (especially the first he ever wrought \*\*), carry with them a certain *festivity, alacrity, and GOOD HUMOUR*, so remarkable, that I should look upon it as impossible

\* Genesis iii. 9. &c.

† Numb. xxii. 28. &c.

‡ (1.) Job i. ii.

(2.) 2 Chron. xviii. 18. 19. &c.

¶ See Burnet, *Archæol. cap. 7. p. 280. &c.*

\*\* St John ii. 11.

not to be moved in a pleasant manner at their recital.

Now, if what I have here asserted in behalf of PLEASANTRY and HUMOUR be found just and real in respect of the *Jewish* and *Christian* religions, I doubt not it will be yielded to me, in respect of the ancient *Heathen* establishments, that the highest care was taken by their original founders, and following reformers, to exhilarate religion, and correct that melancholy and gloominess to which it is subject, according to those different modifications of ENTHUSIASM above specified\*.

Our author, as I take it, has elsewhere shewn †, that these founders were real musicians, and improvers of poetry, music, and the entertaining arts; which they in a manner incorporated with religion; not without good reason, as I am apt to imagine. For to me it plainly appears, that in the early times of all religions, when nations were yet barbarous and savage, there was ever an aptness or tendency towards the dark part of superstition, which, among many other horrors, produced that of *human sacrifice*. Something of this nature might possibly be deduced even from holy writ ‡. And in other histories we are informed of it more at large.

Every

\* Above, chap. i. 2.

† Vol. I. p. 186, 7.

‡ Gen. xxii. 1. 2. &c.; and Judg. xi. 30. 31. &c.

These places relating to *Abraham* and *Jephthah*, are cited only with respect to the notion which these primitive warriors may be said to have entertained concerning this horrid enormity, so common among the inhabitants of *Palestine* and other neighbouring nations. It appears, that even the elder of these *Hebrew* princes was under no extreme surprise on this trying revelation. Nor did he think of expostulating in the least on this occasion; when, at another time, he could be so importunate for the pardon of an inhospitable, murderous, impious, and incestuous city, Gen. xviii. 23. &c. See *Marsham's*



Every one knows how great a part of the old *Heathen* worship consisted in *play, poetry, and dance*. And though some of the more melancholy and superstitious votaries might approach the shrines of their DIVINITIES with mean *grimaces, crouchings,* and other *fawning* actions, betraying the low thoughts they had of the divine nature; yet it is well known, that in those times the *illiberal sycophantic* \* manner of devotion was by the wiser sort contemned, and oft suspected, as knavish and indirect †.

How different an air and aspect the good and virtuous were presumed to carry with them to the temple, let *Plutarch* singly, instead of many others, witness, in his excellent treatise of *superstition* ‡; and

*ham's citations, p. 76. 77. Ex istis satius est colligere hanc Abrahami tentationem non fuisse κεκαινοβρημίωνν πράξιν, actionem innovatam; non recens excogitatam, sed ad pristinos Cananeorum mores designatam. See the learned Capel's dissertation upon Jephthah: "Ex hujus voti lege (Lev. xxvii. 28. 29.) JEPHTE filiam omnino videtur immolasse, hoc est, morte affecisse, et executus est in ea votum quod ipse voverat, Jud. xi. 39."*

\* See vol. I. p. 26.

† — Non tu prece poscis emaci, &c.

Haud civis promptam est, murmurque humilesque susurros,  
Tollere de templis. —————

De Jove quid sentis? Estne, ut præponere cures.

Hunc cuiam? —————

————— Qua tu mercede Deorum

Emeris auriculas? —————

O curva in terris anima, et cælestium inanes!

Quid juvat hoc, templis nostros immittere mores,

Et bona Düs ex hac feclerata ducere pulpa?

Perf. sat. 2.

Non est meum, si mugiat Afrisis

Malus procellis, ad miseris preces

Decurrere. —————

Hor. lib. 3. od. 29.

See vol. I. p. 103.; and above, p. 55. in the notes.

‡ "Ω βάρβαρ' ἔξευρόντες Ἕλληνες κατὰ τῆ δεισιδαιμονία, πηλώσεις, καλαθοβορώσεις, σαββατισμούς, ῥίψετε ἐπὶ πρόσωπα αἰσχράς, προσκα-

and in another against the *Epicurean* Atheism, where it will plainly enough appear what a share

GOOD

Ἰσους, ἀλλοκότους προσκυνήσεις, &c. "O wretched Greeks!" (*says he, speaking to his then declining countrymen*), "who in a way of superstition run so easily into the relish of barbarous nations, and bring into religion that frightful mien of sordid and visifying devotion, ill-favoured humiliation and contrition, abject looks and countenances, consternations, prostrations, disfigurations, and, in the act of worship, distortions, constrained and painful postures of the body, wry faces, beggarly tones, mumpings, grimaces, orings, and the rest of this kind.—A shame indeed to us *Grecians!*"  
 "—For to us (we know) it is prescribed from of old by our peculiar laws concerning music, and the public *choruses*, that we should perform in the handsomest manner, and with a *just and manly countenance*, avoiding those grimaces and contortions of which some singers contract a habit. And shall we not in the more immediate worship of the DEITY preserve this *liberal air* and *manly appearance*? Or, on the contrary, whilst we are nicely observant of other forms and decencies in the temple, shall we neglect this greater decency in voice, words, and manners? and with vile cries, fawnings, and prostitute behaviour, betray the natural dignity and majesty of that divine religion and national worship delivered down to us by our forefathers, and purged from every thing of a barbarous and savage kind?"

What *Plutarch* mentions here, of the *just countenance or liberal air*, the εὖμα δίκαιον, of the musical performer, is agreeably illustrated in his *Alcibiades*. It was that heroic youth, who, as appears by this historian, first gave occasion to the *Athenians* of the higher rank wholly to abandon the use of *flutes*; which had before been highly in favour with them. The reason given, "was the *liberal air* which attended such performers, and the *unmanly disfiguration* of their looks and countenance, which this piping-work produced." As for the real figure or plight of the *superstitious mind*, our author thus describes it. "Gladly would the poor contentless mind, by whiles, keep festival and rejoice: but such as its religion is, there can be no free mirth or joy belonging to it. Public thanksgivings are but private mournings. Sighs and sorrows accompany its praises. Fears and horrors corrupt its best affections. When it assumes the outward ornaments of best apparel for the temple, it even then strikes melancholy, and appears in paleness and ghastly looks. While it worships, it trembles. It sends up vows in faint and feeble voices, with eager hopes, desires, and passions, discoverable in the whole disorder of the outward frame: and, in the main, it evinces plainly by practice, that the notion of *Pythagorus* was but vain, who dared assert, that we were then in the best state, and carried our most becoming looks  
 "with

GOOD HUMOUR had in that which the politer ancients esteemed as *piety* and true *religion* \*.

BUT

"with us, when we approached the gods. For then, above all other seasons, are the superstitious found in the most abject miserable state of mind, and with the meanest presence and behaviour; approaching the sacred shrines of the divine powers in the same manner as they would the dens of bears or lions, the caves of basilisks or dragons, or other hideous recesses of wild beasts or raging monsters. To me therefore it appears wonderful, that we should arraign Atheism as impious; whilst superstition escapes the charge. Shall he who holds there are no divine powers, be esteemed impious; and shall not he be esteemed far more impious, who holds the divine beings such in their nature as the superstitious believe and represent? For my own part, I had rather men should say of me," &c. See vol. 1. p. 31. in the notes. Nothing can be more remarkable than what our author says again, a little below. "The *Atheist* believes there is no Deity; the *religionist* (or superstitious believer) wishes there were none. If he believes, it is against his will: mistrust he dares not, nor call his thought in question. But could he with security, at once, throw off that oppressive fear, which like the rock of *Tantalus* impends, and presses over him; he would with equal joy spurn his enslaving thought, and embrace the *Atheist's* state and opinion as his happiest deliverance. *Atheists* are free of superstition; but the superstitious are ever *willing Atheists*, though impotent in their thought, and unable to believe of the Divine Being as they gladly would. *Nunī dē tō mōn Athiō dēnsidai monias ūdēn mētisin: ō dē dēnsidai mon tē proairisiē ādēios ōn, āsdēnēstērōs isin ē tū dōxāzēn perī dēōn ō βύλιται.*" See vol. 1. p. 26. 27. 31. 32.

\* Where, speaking of religion, as it stood in the Heathen church, and in his own time, he confesses, "that as to the vulgar disposition, there was no remedy. Many even of the better sort would be found, of course, to intermix with their veneration and esteem something of *terror* or *fear* in their religious worship, which might give it perhaps the character of *SUPERSTITION*: but that this evil was a thousand times overbalanced by the satisfaction, hope, joy, and delight, which attended religious worship. This (says he) is plain and evident from the most demonstrable testimonies. For neither the societies, or public meetings in the temples, nor the festivals themselves, nor any other diverting parties, sights, or entertainments, are more delightful or rejoicing than what we ourselves behold, and act in the divine worship, and in the holy sacrifices and mysteries which belong to it. Our disposition and temper is not, on this occasion, as if we were in the presence of worldly potentates, dread sovereigns, and despotic princes. Nor are we here found meanly humbling ourselves,

BUT now, methinks, I have been sufficiently *grave* and *serious*, in defence of what is directly contrary to seriousness and gravity. I have very solemnly pleaded for *gaiety* and GOOD HUMOUR: I have declaimed against *pedantry* in learned language, and opposed *formality* in form. I now find myself somewhat impatient to get loose from the constraint of *method*: and I pretend lawfully to exercise the privilege which I have asserted, of rambling from subject to subject, from style to style, in my MISCELLANEOUS manner, according to my present profession and character.

I may, in the mean while, be censured probably for passing over my *third* head. But the methodical reader, if he be scrupulous about it, may content himself with looking back: and if possibly he can pick it out of my *second*, he will forgive this anticipation, in a writing which is governed less by form than humour. I had indeed resolved with myself to make a large collection of passages from our most eminent and learned divines, in order to have set forth this *latter* head of my chapter; and by better authority than my own to have evinced, "that we had in the main a *good-humoured religion*." But after considering a little while, I came to this short issue with myself, "That it was better not to cite *at all*, than to cite *partially*." Now, if I cited *fairly* what was said, as well on the melancholy as the chearful side of our religion, the matter, I found, would be pretty doubtfully balanced: and the result at last would

"crouching in fear and awe, and full of anxiety and confusion, as would be natural to us in such a case. But where *the Divinity* is esteemed the *nearest*, and most *immediately present*, there horrors and amazements are the *farthest banished*; there the heart, we find, gives freest way to pleasure, to entertainment, to play, mirth, humour, and diversion; and this even to an excess."

be

be this, "That, generally speaking, as oft as a  
 " divine was in good humour, we should find RE-  
 " LIGION *the sweetest and best-humoured thing in*  
 " nature: but at other times (and that pretty  
 " often) we should find a very different face of  
 " matters."

Thus are we alternately exalted and humbled,  
 cheered and dejected, according as our spiritual di-  
 rector \* is himself influenc'd: and this, peradven-  
 ture, for our edification and advantage; "that, by  
 " these contrarieties and changes, we may be ren-  
 " dered more supple and compliant." If we are  
 very low, and down, we are taken up. If we are  
 up, and high, we are taken down.—This is *di-*  
*scipline*; this is *authority and command*.—Did  
 religion carry constantly *one and the same face*,  
 and were it always represented to us *alike in every*  
*respect*, we might perhaps be over-bold, and make  
 acquaintance with it in too familiar a manner: we  
 might think ourselves fully knowing in it, and as-  
 sured of its true *character and genius*. From  
 whence perhaps we might become more refractory  
 towards the ghostly teachers of it, and be apt to  
 submit ourselves the less to those who, by appoint-  
 ment and authority, represent it to us in such  
 lights as they esteem most proper and convenient.

I shall therefore not only conclude *abruptly*, but  
 even *sceptically*, on this my *last head*; referring  
 my reader to what has been said already, on my  
 preceding heads, for the bare probability "of our  
 " having, in the main, a *witty and good-humour-*  
 " *ed RELIGION*."

This, however, I may presume to assert, that  
 there are undoubtedly some *countenances or aspects*  
 of our religion, which are *humorous and pleasant*

\* *Supra*, p. 27.

in themselves; and that the sadder representations of it are many times so *over sad* and *dismal*, that they are apt to excite a very contrary passion to what is intended by the representers.

## M I S C E L L A N Y II.

## C H A P. I.

*Further remarks on the author of the treatises. — His order and design. — His remarks on the SUCCESSION of wit, and progress of letters and philosophy. — Of words, relations, affections. — Countrymen and country. — Old-England. — Patriots of the soil. — Virtuosi, and philosophers. — A TASTE.*

HAVING already asserted my privilege, as a MISCELLANEOUS or ESSAY writer of the modern establishment, to write on every subject, and in every method, as I fancy; to use order, or lay it aside, as I think fit; and to treat of *order* and *method* in other works, though free perhaps and unconfined as to my own: I shall presume, in this place, to consider the present method and order of my author's treatises, as in this *joint* edition they are ranged.

Notwithstanding the high airs of SCEPTICISM which our author assumes in his first piece, I cannot, after all, but imagine, that even there he proves himself, at the bottom, a *real* DOGMATIST, and shews plainly that he has his private *opinion, belief, or faith*, as strong as any *devotee* or *religionist* of them all. Though he affects perhaps to strike at other hypotheses and schemes, he has something of his own still in reserve, and holds

a certain *plan* or *system* peculiar to himself, or such, at least, in which he has at present but few companions or followers.

On this account I look upon his management to have been much after the rate of some *ambitious* ARCHITECT; who being called perhaps to prop a roof, redress a leaning wall, or add to some particular apartment, is not contented with this small specimen of his mastership: but pretending to demonstrate the *unservicableness* and inconvenience of the *old* fabric, forms the design of a *new* building, and longs to shew his skill in the principal parts of architecture and mechanics.

It is certain, that, in matters of learning and philosophy, the practice of *pulling down* is far pleasanter, and affords more entertainment, than that of *building* and *setting up*. Many have succeeded, to a miracle, in the first, who have miserably failed in the latter of these attempts. We may find a thousand engineers who can *sap*, *undermine*, and *blow up*, with admirable dexterity, for one single one who can *build* a fort, or lay the platform of a citadel. And though compassion in *real* war may make the ruinous practice less delightful, it is certain, that in the *literate* warring-world, the springing of mines, the blowing up of towers, bastions, and ramparts of PHILOSOPHY, with *systems*, *hypotheses*, *opinions*, and *doctrines* into the air, is a spectacle of all other the most naturally rejoicing.

Our author, we suppose, might have done well to consider this. We have fairly conducted him through his *first* and *second* LETTER, and have brought him, as we see here, into his *third* piece. He has hitherto, methinks, kept up his *sapping* method, and *unravelling* humour, with tolerable good grace. He has given only some few, and very

very slender hints \* of going further, or attempting to erect any scheme or model which may discover his pretence to a real *architect*-capacity. Even in this his *third* piece he carries with him the same *sceptical* mien: and what he offers by way of *project* or *hypothesis*, is very faint, hardly spoken aloud; but muttered to himself, in a kind of dubious whisper, or feigned SOLILOQUY. What he discovers of *form* and *method*, is indeed so accompanied with the random *miscellaneous* air, that it may pass for raillery, rather than good earnest. It is in his following treatise † that he discovers himself openly, as a plain *dogmatist*, a *formalist*, and *man of method*; with his hypothesis tacked to him, and his opinions so close-sticking, as would force one to call to mind the figure of some precise and strait-laced professor in a university.

What may be justly pleaded in his behalf, when we come in company with him, to *inquire* into such solemn and profound subjects, seems very doubtful. Mean while, as his affairs stand hitherto in this his treatise of *advice*, I shall be contented to yoke with him, and proceed, in my *miscellaneous* manner, to give my *ADVICE* also to men of note; whether they are *authors* or *politicians*, *virtuosi* or *fine gentlemen*; comprehending *him*,

\* *Viz.* in the letter of *enthusiasm*, which makes treatise 1. See vol. 1. p. 31. 32. 33. 38. at the end; — and p. 41. concerning the *previous knowledge*. — So again, treatise 2. vol. 1. p. 61. & 89. — And again, treatise 3. vol. 1. p. 230, 1, 2, 3. where the *INQUIRY* is proposed, and the system and genealogy of the *affections* previously treated; with an apology (p. 244.) for the *examining practice*, and seeming pedantry of the method. — And afterwards the apology for treatise 4. in treatise 5. vol. 2. p. 195. 196. Concerning this series and dependency of these joint treatises, see more particularly below, Misc. 4. chap. 1. parag. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Misc. 5. chap. 2. parag. 17. 18. &c.

† *Viz.* Treatise 4. the *INQUIRY* concerning virtue, vol. 2.

the



the said author, as one of the number of the advised, and *myself* too, (if occasion be), after his own example of *self-admonition* and *private address*.

BUT, first, as to our author's dissertation in this *third* treatise \*, where his reflections upon *authors* in general, and *the rise and progress of arts*, make the inlet or introduction to his *philosophy*; we may observe, that it is not without some appearance of reason that he has advanced this method. It must be acknowledged, that though, in the earliest times, there may have been *divine* men of a transcending genius, who have given laws both in religion and government, to the great advantage and improvement of mankind; yet PHILOSOPHY itself, as a *science* and known *profession* worthy of that name, cannot with any probability be supposed to have risen (as our author shews) till other *arts* had been raised, and, in a certain proportion, advanced before it. And as this was of the greatest dignity and weight, so it came *last* into form. It was *long* clearing itself from the affected dress of *sophists*, or enthusiastic air of *poets*; and appeared *late* in its genuine, simple, and just beauty.

The reader perhaps may justly excuse our author for having in this place so overloaded his margin with those weighty authorities and ancient citations †, when he knows that there are many grave professors in humanity and letters among the moderns who are puzzled in this search, and write both repugnantly to one another, and to the plain and *natural* evidence of the case. The real *lineage* and *SUCCESSION* of *wit*, is indeed plainly founded in *nature*; as our author has endeavoured to make appear both from *history* and *fact*. The *Greek*

\* Vol. I. p. 185, 6, 7, &c.

† *Viz.* vol. I. p. 190, &c.

*nation,*

nation, as it is *original* to us in respect of these *polite arts and sciences*, so it was in reality *original to itself*. For whether the *Egyptians, Phenicians, Thracians*, or *Barbarians* of any kind, may have hit fortunately on *this* or *that* particular invention, either in agriculture, building, navigation, or letters; which-ever may have introduced *this* rite of worship, *this* title of a Deity, *this* or *that* instrument of music, *this* or *that* festival, game, or dance, (for on this matter there are high debates among the learned); it is evident, beyond a doubt, that the *arts and sciences* were formed in *Greece* itself. It was there that *music, poetry*, and the rest came to receive some kind of shape, and be distinguished into their several orders and degrees. Whatever flourished, or was raised to any degree of correctness, or real perfection in the kind, was by means of *Greece* alone, and in the hand of that sole polite, most civilized, and accomplished nation.

Nor can this appear strange, when we consider the fortunate constitution of that people. For though composed of different nations, distinct in laws and governments, divided by seas and continents, dispersed in distant islands; yet being originally of the same extract, united by one single language, and animated by that social, public, and *free* spirit, which, notwithstanding the animosity of their several warring states, induced them to erect such heroic congresses and powers as those which constituted the *Amphiſtonian councils*, the *Olympic, Iſthmian*, and other *games*; they could not but naturally polish and refine each other. It was thus they brought their beautiful and comprehensive language to a just *standard*, leaving only such variety in the dialects as rendered their poetry, in particular, so much the more agreeable. The *standard* was in the same proportion carried into  
other

other arts. The *secretion* was made. The several *species* found, and set apart. The performers and masters in every kind, honoured, and admired. And, last of all, even CRITICS themselves acknowledged and received as *masters* over all the rest. From *music, poetry, rhetoric*, down to the simple prose of *history*, through all the plastic arts of *sculpture, statuary, painting, architecture*, and the rest, every thing *muse-like*, graceful, and exquisite, was rewarded with the highest honours, and carried on with the utmost ardour and emulation. Thus *Greece*, though she *exported* arts to other nations, had properly for her own share no *import* of the kind. The utmost which could be named, would amount to no more than raw *materials*, of a rude and barbarous form. And thus the nation was evidently *original* in art; and with them every noble study and science was (as the great master, so often cited by our author, says of certain kinds of poetry) *self-formed* \*, wrought out of nature, and drawn from the necessary operation and course of things, working, as it were, of their own accord, and proper inclination. Now, according to this *natural* growth of arts, peculiar to *Greece*, it would necessarily happen, that at the beginning, when the force of language came to be first proved; when the admiring world made their first *judgment*, and essayed their *taste* in the elegancies of this sort, the *lofty*, the *sublime*, the *astonishing* and *amazing* would be the most in fashion, and preferred. *Me-*

\* *Αὐτοσχιδίαση.* Vol. i. p. 192. It is in this sense of the *natural* production, and *self-formation* of the arts, in this *free* state of ancient *Greece*, that the same great master uses this word a little before, in the same chapter of his poetics, (*viz.* the 4th), speaking in general of the poets: Κατὰ μικρὸν προάγοντες, ἐγέννησαν τὴν ποίησιν, ἐκ τῶν αὐτοσχιδιασμάτων. And presently after, Δίξιος δὲ γενομένης, αὐτὴ ἢ Φύσις τὸ οἰκῶν μέτρον ἔυρε.

*taphorical* speech, multiplicity of *figures* and *high-founding* words, would naturally prevail. Though in the commonwealth itself, and in the affairs of government, men were used originally to plain and direct speech; yet when speaking became *an art*, and was taught by sophists, and other pretended masters, the *high-poetic*, and the *figurative* way began to prevail, even at the bar, and in the public assemblies: infomuch that the grand master, in the above-cited part of his *rhetorics* \*, where he extols the tragic poet *Euripides*, upbraids the rhetoricians of his own age, who retained that very bombastic style, which even *poets*, and those too of the tragic kind, had already thrown off, or at least considerably mitigated. But the *taste* of *Greece* was now polishing. A better judgment was soon formed, when a *Demosthenes* was heard, and had found success. The people themselves (as our author has shewn) came now to reform their COMEDY and familiar manner, after TRAGEDY, and the higher style, had been brought to its perfection under the last hand of an *Euripides*. And now in all the principal works of *ingenuity* and *art*, SIMPLICITY and NATURE began chiefly to be sought: and this was the TASTE which lasted through so many ages, till the ruin of all things, under a universal monarchy.

If the reader should peradventure be led by his curiosity to seek some kind of comparison between this ancient *growth* of TASTE, and that which we have experienced in modern days, and within our own nation; he may look back to the *speeches* of our ancestors in parliament. He will find them, generally speaking, to have been very short and plain, but coarse, and what we properly call *homespun*,

\* Vol. 1. p. 193, 4. in the notes.

till

till *learning* came in vogue, and *science* was known amongst us. When our princes and senators became scholars, they spoke *scholastically*. And the *pedantic style* was prevalent, from the first dawn of letters, about the age of the reformation, till long afterwards. Witness the best-written discourses, the admired speeches, orations, or sermons, through several reigns, down to these latter, which we compute within the present age. It will undoubtedly be found, that, till very late days, the fashion of speaking, and the turn of wit, was after the *figurative* and *florid* manner. Nothing was so acceptable as the high-sounding phrase, the far-fetched comparison, the capricious point, and play of words; and nothing so despicable as what was merely of the plain or natural kind. So that it must either be confessed, that, in respect of the preceding age, we are fallen very low in TASTE; or that, if we are in reality improved, the *natural* and *simple* manner which *conceals* and *covers* ART, is the most truly *artful*, and of the genteelest, truest, and best-studied taste; as has above been treated more at large\*.

Now, therefore, as to our author's PHILOSOPHY itself, as it lies concealed in *this* treatise †, but more professed and formal in his *next* ‡; we shall proceed gradually according to his own method: since it becomes not one who has undertaken the part of his airy assistant and humorous *paraphrast*, to enter suddenly, without good preparation, into his *dry* reasonings and *moral* researches about the *social passions* and *natural affections*, of which he is such a punctilious *examiner*.

\* P. 14. and vol. 1. p. 201, 2.

† *Viz.* Soliloquy; or, Advice to an Author; treatise 3. vol. 1.

‡ *Viz.* Inquiry, &c. treatise 4. vol. 2.

Of all human affections, the noblest and most becoming human nature, is that of LOVE to *one's country*. This, perhaps, will easily be allowed by all men, who have *really a COUNTRY*, and are of the number of those who may be called A PEOPLE \*, as enjoying the happiness of a real constitution and polity, by which they are *free and independent*. There are few such *countrymen* or *free-men* so degenerate, as *directly* to discountenance or condemn this passion of love to their community and national brotherhood. The *indirect* manner of opposing this principle, is the most usual. We hear it commonly, as a complaint, "That there is little of this LOVE extant in the world." From whence it is hastily concluded, "That there is little or nothing of *friendly* or *social affection* inherent in our *nature*, or proper to our *species*." It is however apparent, that there is scarce a creature of human kind, who is not possessed at least with some inferior degree or meaner sort of this *natural affection to a country*.

*Nescio qua-natale solum dulcedine captos  
Ducit †.*—

It is a wretched aspect of humanity which we figure to ourselves, when we would endeavour to resolve the very essence and foundation of this generous passion into a relation to mere clay and dust, exclusively of any thing *sensible, intelligent, or moral*. It is, I must own, on certain *relations †*,

\* A multitude held together by force, though under one and the same head, is not properly united: nor does such a body make a *people*. It is the social league, confederacy, and mutual consent, founded in some common good or interest, which joins the members of a community, and makes a *people ONE*. Absolute power annuls the *public*: and where there is no *public*, or *constitution*, there is in reality no *mother-COUNTRY*, or *NATION*. See vol. 1. p. 81. 82.

† Ovid. Pont. lib. 1. eleg. 3. v. 35.

‡ Τα Καθήκοντα ταῖς σχέσεσι παραμελῶνται.

or

or respective *proportions*, that all natural affection does in some measure depend. And in this view it cannot, I confess, be denied, that we have each of us a certain relation to the mere *earth* itself, the very mould or surface of that *planet*, in which, with other animals of various sorts, we (poor reptiles!) were also bred and nourished. But had it happened to one of us *British* men to have been born at *sea*, could we not therefore properly be called *British* men? Could we be allowed *countrymen* of no sort, as having no distinct relation to any certain *soil* or *region*; no original neighbourhood but with the watery inhabitants and sea-monsters? Surely, if we were born of *lawful* parents, *lawfully* employed, and under the protection of *law*; where-ever they might be then detained, to whatever colonies sent, or whithersoever driven by any accident, or in expeditions or adventures in the public service, or that of mankind, we should still find we had a *home*, and *country*, ready to lay claim to us. We should be obliged still to consider ourselves as *fellow-citizens*, and might be allowed to love our *country* or *nation*, as honestly and heartily as the most inland inhabitant or native of the soil. Our *political* and *social* capacity would undoubtedly come in view, and be acknowledged full as natural and essential in our species, as the *parental* and *filiat* kind, which gives rise to what we peculiarly call *natural affection*. Or supposing that both our birth and parents had been unknown, and that in this respect we were in a manner younger brothers in society to the rest of mankind; yet, from our nurture and education, we should surely espouse some *country* or other, and joyfully embracing the protection of a magistracy, should of necessity and by force of nature join ourselves to the general society of mankind, and those in particular, with whom

we had entered into a nearer communication of benefits, and closer sympathy of affections. It may therefore be esteemed no better than a mean subterfuge of narrow minds, to assign this *natural passion* for *society* and *a country*, to such a relation as that of a mere *fungus* or common *excrecence*, to its *parent-mould*, or nursing *dunghill*.

The RELATION of *countryman*, if it be allowed any thing at all, must imply something *moral* and *social*. The notion itself presupposes a naturally *civil* and *political* state of mankind, and has reference to that particular part of society to which we owe our chief advantages as *men*, and rational creatures, such as are *naturally* and *necessarily* united for each other's happiness and support, and for the highest of all happinesses and enjoyments \*; "the intercourse of *minds*, the free use of our *reason*, and the exercise of mutual love and *friendship*."

An ingenious physician among the moderns, having in view the natural dependency of the *vegetable* and *animal* kinds on their *common mother* EARTH, and observing, that both the one and the other draw from her their continual sustenance, (some rooted and fixed down to their first abodes, others unconfined, and wandering from place to place to suck their nourishment), he accordingly, as I remember, styles this latter animal race, *her released sons*; *filius terræ emancipatos*. Now, if this be our only way of reckoning for mankind, we may call ourselves indeed *the sons of EARTH*, at large; but not of *any particular SOIL*, or *district*. The division of climates and regions is fantastic and artificial; much more the limits of particular countries, cities, or provinces. Our *natale solum*, or mother-earth, must, by this account, be the *real*

\* Vol. 1. p. 84. &c. and vol. 2. p. 233. &c.



GLOBE itself which bears us, and in respect of which we must allow the common *animals*, and even the *plants* of all degrees, to claim an equal *brotherhood* with us, under this *common* PARENT.

According to this calculation, we must, of necessity, carry our *relation* as far as to the whole material world or universe, where alone it can prove complete. But, for the particular district or tract of earth, which, in a vulgar sense, we call our COUNTRY, however bounded, or geographically divided, we can never, at this rate, frame any accountable *relation* to it, nor consequently assign any *natural* or *proper affection* towards it.

If unhappily a man had been born either at an *inn*, or in some dirty *village*; he would hardly, I think, circumscribe himself so narrowly, as to accept a denomination or *character* from those nearest appendices, or local circumstances of his nativity. So far should one be from making the *hamlet* or *parish* to be characteristical in the case, that hardly would the *shire* itself, or *county*, however rich or flourishing, be taken into the honorary term or appellation of *one's* COUNTRY.

“ What then shall we presume to call our COUNTRY? Is it *England* itself? But what of *Scotland*? Is it therefore *Britain*? But what of *the other islands*, the northern *Orcades*, and the southern *Jersey* and *Guernsey*? What of the *Plantations* and poor *Ireland*? ”——Behold here a very dubious circumscription!

But what, after all, if there be a *conquest* or *captivity in the case*? a *migration*? a national *secession*, or abandonment of our native seats for some other soil or climate? This has happened, we know, to our forefathers. And as great and powerful a people as we have been of late, and have ever shewn ourselves, under the influence of *free* councils,

councils, and a tolerable *ministry*; should we relapse again into slavish principles, or be *administered* long under such heads, as having no thought of liberty for themselves, can have much less for *Europe* or their *neighbours*; we may at last feel a war at home, become the *seat* of it, and in the end *a conquest*. We might then gladly embrace the hard condition of our predecessors, and exchange our beloved native *soil* for that of some remote and uninhabited part of the world. Now, should this possibly be our fate; should some considerable colony or body be formed afterwards out of our remains, or meet, as it were by miracle, in some distant climate; would there be for the future no *Englishman* remaining? no common bond of alliance and friendship, by which we could still call *countrymen*, as before? How came we, I pray, by our ancient name of *Englishmen*? Did it not travel with us over *land* and *sea*? Did we not indeed bring it with us heretofore from as far as the remoter parts of *Germany* to this island?

I MUST confess, I have been apt sometimes to be very angry with our language, for having denied us the use of the word *PATRIA*, and afforded us no other name to express our *native community* than that of *country*; which already bore two different significations\*, abstracted from mankind or society. Reigning words are many times of such force as to influence us considerably in our apprehension of things. Whether it be from any such cause as this, I know not; but certain it is, that, in the idea of a *CIVIL state* or *NATION*, we *Englishmen* are apt to mix somewhat more than ordinary gross and earthy. No people who owed so

\* *Rus et regio.* In French *campagne* and *païs*.

much

much to A CONSTITUTION, and so little to A SOIL or CLIMATE, were ever known so indifferent towards *one*, and so passionately fond of *the other*. One would imagine, from the common discourse of our *countrymen*, that the finest lands near the *Euphrates*, the *Babylonian* or *Persian paradises*, the rich plains of *Egypt*, the *Grecian Tempe*, the *Roman Campania*, *Lombardy*, *Provence*, the *Spanish Andalusia*, or the most delicious tracts in the *Eastern* or *Western Indies*, were contemptible countries in respect of *Old England*.

Now, by the good leave of these worthy *patriots of the soil*, I must take the liberty to say, I think *Old England* to have been in every respect a very indifferent country; and that *Late England*, of an age or two old, even since *Queen Bess's* days, is indeed very much mended for the better. We were, in the beginning of her grandfather's reign, under a sort of *Polish* nobility, and had no other liberties than what were in common to us with the then fashionable monarchies and *Gothic* lordships of *Europe*. For *religion* indeed, we were highly famed above all nations, by being the most subject to our *ecclesiastics* at home, and the best tributaries and servants to *the holy see* abroad.

I must go further yet, and own, that I think *Late England*, since *the revolution*, to be better still than *Old England*; by many a degree; and that, in the main, we make somewhat a better figure in *Europe*, than we did a few reigns before. But however our people may of late have flourished, our name or credit have risen; our trade and navigation, our manufactures or our husbandry been improved; it is certain, that our *region*, *climate*, and *soil*, is, in its own nature, still one and the same. And to whatever politeness we may suppose ourselves already arrived, we must confess, that  
we

we are the *latest barbarous*, the *last civilized* or *polished* people of *Europe*. We must allow, that our first conquest by the *Romans* brought us out of a state hardly equal to the *Indian* tribes; and that our last conquest by the *Normans* brought us only into the capacity of receiving arts and civil accomplishments from *abroad*. They came to us by degrees, from remote distances, at second or third hand, from other courts, states, academies, and foreign nurseries of wit and manners.

Notwithstanding this, we have as overweening an opinion of ourselves, as if we had a claim to be *original* and *earth-born*. As oft as we have changed our masters, and mixed races with our several successive conquerors, we still pretend to be as *legitimate* and *genuine* possessors of *our soil*, as the ancient *Athenians* accounted themselves to have been of *theirs*. It is remarkable however, in that truly ancient, wise, and witty people, that as fine territories and noble countries as they possessed, as indisputable masters and superiors as they were in all science, wit, politeness, and manners, they were yet so far from a conceited, selfish, and ridiculous contempt of others, that they were, even in a contrary extreme, “ admirers of whatever was in the least degree ingenious or curious in *foreign* nations.” Their great men were constant *travellers*. Their legislators and philosophers made their voyages into *Egypt*, passed into *Chaldea* and *Persia*, and failed not to visit most of the dispersed *Grecian* governments and colonies, through the islands of the *Ægean* in *Italy*, and on the coasts of *Asia* and *Africa*. It was mentioned as a prodigy, in the case of a great philosopher \*, though known to have been always poor, “ that he should never have travelled, nor

\* Socrates.

“ had

“ had ever gone out of *Athens* for his improvement.” How modest a reflection in those who were *themselves Athenians* !

For our part, we neither care that *foreigners* should travel to us, nor any of ours should travel into *foreign countries* \*. Our best policy and breeding is, it seems, “ to look abroad as little as possible ; contract our views within the narrowest compass ; and despise all knowledge, learning, or manners which are not of a *home-growth*.” For hardly will the *ancients* themselves be regarded by those who have so resolute a contempt of what the politest *moderns* of any nation, besides their own, may have advanced in the way of *literature, politeness, or PHILOSOPHY.*

\* An ill token of our being thoroughly civilized ; since, in the judgment of the polite and wise, this inhospitable disposition was ever reckoned among the principal marks of *barbarism*. So *Strabo*, from other preceding authors, κοινὸν μὲν ἦναι τοῖς βαρβάροις πᾶσιν ἔθος τὴν ΞΕΝΗΑΑΣΙΑΝ, l. 17. p. 802.

The Ζεὺς Ξένιος of the ancients was one of the solemn characters of Divinity ; the peculiar attribute of the supreme DEITY, benign to mankind, and recommending universal love, mutual kindness, and benignity, between the remotest and most unlike of human race. Thus their divine poet, in harmony with their sacred oracles, which were known frequently to confirm this doctrine.

Ξᾶν' ἢ μοι θεῖμις ἔσ', ὃδ' εἰ κακίαν σίθεν ἔλθοι,  
Ξῆνον ἀτιμῆσαι πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσιν ἄπαντες  
Ξῆνοι ————— ΟΔΤΣ. ξ.

Again,

—'Ουδέ τις ἀμμι βροτῶν ἐπιμισγίται ἄλλος.  
ΑΛΛ' ὅδε τις δὺςνιος ἀλάμενος ἐνθάδ' ἰκάνει,  
Τὸν νῦν χρὴ κομῆειν πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσιν ἄπαντες  
Ξῆνοι ————— ΟΔΤΣ. ζ.

And again,

'Αφνειὸς βιότοιο, φίλος δ' ἦν ἀνθρώποισι  
Πάντας γὰρ φιλίεσκεν, ὃδῶ ἐπι οἰκία καίαν. ΙΑΙΑΔ. ζ.

See also *Odyss.* lib. 3. vers. 34. &c. and 67. &c. lib. 4. vers. 30. &c. and 60.

Such was ancient *Heathen CHARITY*, and pious duty, towards the whole of mankind ; both those of different nations, and different worships. See vol. 2. p. 124, ξ.

THIS

THIS disposition of our *countrymen*, from whatever causes it may possibly be derived, is, I fear, a very prepossessing circumstance against our author; whose design is, to advance something *new*, or at least something *different* from what is commonly current in PHILOSOPHY and MORALS. To support this design of his, he seems intent chiefly on this single point, "to discover how we may, to best advantage, form within ourselves, what, in the polite world, is called *a relish*, or good TASTE."

He begins, it is true, as near *home* as possible, and sends us to the narrowest of all conversations, that of SOLILOQUY or *self-discourse*. But this correspondence, according to his computation, is wholly impracticable, without a previous commerce with the world; and the larger this commerce is, the more practicable and improving the other, he thinks, is likely to prove. The sources of this improving art of *self-correspondence* he derives from the highest politeness and elegance of ancient *dialogue* and *debate*, in matters of wit, knowledge, and ingenuity. And nothing, according to our author, can so well revive this *self-corresponding* practice, as the same search and study of the highest politeness in modern *conversation*. For this, we must necessarily be at the pains of going further abroad than the province we call HOME. And, by this account, it appears, that our author has little hopes of being either relished or comprehended by any other of his countrymen, than those who delight in the open and *free* commerce of the world, and are rejoiced to gather views, and receive light from every quarter; in order to judge the best of what is perfect, and according to a just *standard*, and true TASTE in every kind.

It may be proper for us to remark, in favour of  
our

our author, that the sort of *ridicule* or *railery* which is apt to fall upon PHILOSOPHERS, is of the same kind with that which falls commonly on the VIRTUOSI, or refined *wits* of the age. In this latter general denomination we include the real *fine gentlemen*, the lovers of *art* and *ingenuity*; such as have seen *the world*, and informed themselves of the *manners* and *customs* of the several nations of *Europe*; searched into their *antiquities* and *records*; considered their *police*, *laws*, and *constitutions*; observed the situation, strength, and ornaments of their *cities*, their principal *arts*, *studies*, and amusements; their *architecture*, *sculpture*, *painting*, *music*, and their taste in *poetry*, *learning*, *language*, and *conversation*.

Hitherto there can lie no *ridicule*, nor the least scope for *satiric wit* or *railery*. But when we push this *virtuoso* CHARACTER a little further, and lead our polished gentleman into more nice researches; when, from the view of *mankind* and their affairs, our speculative genius, and minute examiner of nature's works, proceeds with equal or perhaps superior zeal in the contemplation of the *insect-life*, the conveniencies, habitations, and economy of a race of *shell-fish*; when he has erected a *cabinet* in due form, and made it the real pattern of his mind, replete with the same trash and trumpery of correspondent empty notions, and chimerical conceits; he then indeed becomes the subject of sufficient *railery*, and is made the *jest* of common conversations.

A worse thing than this happens commonly to these *inferior* VIRTUOSI. In seeking so earnestly for *rarities*, they fall in love with RARITY for *rareness sake*. Now, the greatest *rarities* in the world are MONSTERS. So that the *study* and *relish* of these gentlemen, thus assiduously employed,

becomes at last in reality *monstrous*: and their whole delight is found to consist in selecting and contemplating whatever is most *monstrous*, disagreeing, out of the way, and to the least purpose of any thing in nature.

In PHILOSOPHY, matters answer exactly to this *virtuoso* scheme. Let us suppose a man, who having this resolution merely, how to employ his understanding to the best purpose, considers “*who* or “*what* he is; *whence* he arose, or had his being; “*to what end* he was designed; and to what “*course of action* he is, by his natural frame and “*constitution, destined:*” should he *descend* on this account *into himself*, and examine his inward powers and faculties; or should he *ascend* beyond his own immediate species, city, or community, to discover and recognise his *higher polity* or *community*, (that *common and universal one* of which he is born a member); nothing surely of this kind could reasonably draw upon him the least contempt or mockery. On the contrary, the *finest gentleman* must, after all, be considered but as an IDIOT, who talking much of the knowledge of *the world* and *mankind*, has never so much as thought of the study or knowledge of *himself*, or of the nature and government of that *real public* and WORLD, from whence he holds his being.

*Quid sumus, et quidnam victuri gignimur*\*?—

“*Where* are we? Under what *roof*? or on board “*what vessel*? Whither *bound*? On what *business*? Under whose *pilotship*, *government*, or “*protection*?” are questions which every sensible man would naturally ask, if he were on a sudden transported into a new scene of life. It is admi-

\* *Perf. Sat. 3, vers. 67.*

rable,



rable, indeed, to consider, that a man should have been long come into a world, carried his reason and sense about with him, and yet have never seriously asked himself this single question, "WHERE am I? or WHAT?" but, on the contrary, should proceed regularly to every *other* study and inquiry, postponing *this* alone, as the least considerable; or leaving the examination of it to *others* commissioned, as he supposes, to understand and think for him upon this head. To be bubbled, or put upon by any sham advices in this affair, is, it seems, of no consequence! We take care to examine accurately, by our *own* judgment, the affairs of *other* people, and the concerns of the world which least belong to us: but what relates more immediately to *ourselves*, and is our chief *SELF-interest*, we charitably leave to *others* to examine for us, and readily take up with the first comers; on whose honesty and good faith, it is presumed, we may safely rely.

Here, methinks, *the ridicule* turns more against the *philosophy-haters* than the *virtuosi* or *philosophers*. Whilst PHILOSOPHY is taken (as in its prime sense it ought) for *mastership in LIFE and MANNERS*, it is like to make no ill figure in the world, whatever impertinencies may reign, or however extravagant the times may prove. But let us view PHILOSOPHY, like mere *virtuosity*, in its usual career, and we shall find *the ridicule* rising full as strongly against the professors of the higher as the lower kind. *Cockle-shell* abounds with each. Many things exterior, and without ourselves, of no relation to our real interests, or to those of society and mankind, are diligently investigated: Nature's remotest operations, deepest mysteries, and most difficult *phænomena*, discussed, and whimsically explained; *hypotheses* and *fantastic systems* erected;

erected; a universe anatomised; and by some notable scheme \* so solved and reduced, as to appear an easy *knack* or *secret* to those who have the *clew*. Creation itself can, upon occasion, be exhibited; *transmutations*, *projections*, and other *philosophical* ARCANAs, such as in the *corporeal* world can accomplish all things; whilst in the *intellectual* a set frame of metaphysical phrases and distinctions can serve to solve whatever difficulties may be propounded, either in *logics*, *ethics*, or any real *science*, of whatever kind.

It appears from hence, that the defects of PHILOSOPHY, and those of *virtuosity*, are of the same nature. Nothing can be more dangerous than a wrong *choice*, or *misapplication* in these affairs. But as ridiculous as these studies are rendered by their senseless managers, it appears, however, that each of them are, in their nature, essential to the *character* of a *fine gentleman*, and *man of sense*.

To *philosophise*, in a just signification, is but to carry *good-breeding* a step higher. For the accomplishment of breeding is, to learn whatever is *decent* in company, or *beautiful* in arts; and the sum of philosophy is, to learn what is *just* in society, and *beautiful* in nature, and the order of the world.

It is not *wit* merely, but a *temper*, which must form the WELL-BRED MAN. In the same manner, it is not a *head* merely, but a *heart* and *resolution*, which must complete the *real* PHILOSOPHER. Both *characters* aim at what is *excellent*, aspire to a *just taste*, and carry in view the model of what is *beautiful* and *becoming*. Accordingly, the respective conduct and distinct manners of each

\* Vol. 2. p. 137, 41.

party are regulated; *the one* according to the perfectest ease, and good entertainment of COMPANY; *the other* according to the strictest interest of MANKIND and SOCIETY: *the one* according to a man's rank and quality in his private nation; *the other* according to his rank and dignity in NATURE.

Whether each of these offices, or social parts, are in themselves as *convenient* as *becoming*, is the great question which must some way be decided. The WELL-BRED MAN has already decided this in his own case; and declared on the side of what is handsome: for whatever he practises in this kind\*, he accounts no more than what he owes purely to himself; without regard to any further advantage. The *pretender* to PHILOSOPHY, who either knows not how to determine this affair, or if he has determined, knows not how to pursue his point with constancy and firmness, remains, in respect of *philosophy*, what a clown or coxcomb is in respect of *breeding* and *behaviour*. Thus, according to our author, the TASTE of beauty, and the *relish* of what is decent, just, and amiable, perfects the *character* of the GENTLEMAN, and the PHILOSOPHER. And the study of such a TASTE or *relish* will, as we suppose, be ever the great employment and concern of him who covets as well to be *wise* and *good*, as *agreeable* and *polite*.

*Quid VERUM atque DECENS, curo, et rogo, et  
omnis in hoc sum †.*

\* Vol. I. p. 100, 1.

† Horat. lib. I. ep. I. ver. 11:

## C H A P. II.

*Explanation of a TASTE continued.* — *Ridiculers of it.* — *Their wit and sincerity.* — *Application of the taste to affairs of government and politics.* — *Imaginary CHARACTERS in the state.* — *Young nobility and gentry.* — *Pursuit of BEAUTY.* — *Preparation for philosophy.*

BY this time, surely, I must have proved myself sufficiently engaged in the project and design of our *self-discoursing* AUTHOR, whose defence I have undertaken. His pretension, as plainly appears in this third treatise, is to recommend MORALS\* on the same foot with what in a lower sense is called *manners*; and to advance PHILOSOPHY (as harsh a subject as it may appear) on the very foundation of what is called *agreeable* and *polite*. And it is in this method and management that, as his interpreter, or paraphrast, I have proposed to imitate and accompany him, as far as my *miscellaneous* CHARACTER will permit.

Our joint endeavour, therefore, must appear this; to shew, “that nothing which is found  
“charming or delightful in the polite world, no-  
“thing which is adopted as pleasure, or entertain-  
“ment, of whatever kind, can any way be ac-  
“counted for, supported, or established, without  
“the pre-establishment or supposition of a certain  
“TASTE\*.” Now, a TASTE or *judgment*, it is supposed, can hardly come ready formed with us into the world. Whatever principles or materials of this kind we may possibly bring with us; whatever good faculties, senses, or anticipating sensations and imaginations, may be of Nature’s growth,

\* Vol. I. p. 263. &amp;c.

† Ibid.

and

and arise properly, of themselves, without our art, promotion, or assistance; the general *idea* which is formed of all this management, and the clear *notion* we attain of what is preferable and principal in all these subjects of choice and estimation, will not, as I imagine, by any person, be taken for *innate*. Use, practice, and culture, must precede the *understanding* and *wit* of such an advanced size and growth as this. A legitimate and just TASTE can neither be begotten, made, conceived, or produced, without the antecedent *labour* and *pains* of CRITICISM.

For this reason we presume not only to defend the cause of CRITICS, but to declare open war against those indolent supine *authors, performers, readers, auditors, actors, or spectators*; who making their HUMOUR alone the rule of what is *beautiful* and *agreeable*, and having no account to give of such their HUMOUR or odd FANCY, reject the *criticising* or *examining art*, by which alone they are able to discover the *true BEAUTY* and *WORTH* of every object.

According to that affected *ridicule* which these insipid remarkers pretend to throw upon just CRITICS, the enjoyment of all real arts or natural beauties would be entirely lost: even in behaviour and manners we should at this rate become in time as barbarous as in our pleasures and diversions. I would presume it, however, of these *critic-haters*, that they are not yet so uncivilized, or void of all social sense, as to maintain, "that the most barbarous life, or brutish pleasure, is as desirable as the most polished or refined."

For my own part, when I have heard sometimes men of reputed ability join in with that effeminate plaintive tone of *invective* against CRITICS, I have really thought they had it in their fancy to keep  
down

down the growing geniuses of the youth, their rivals, by turning them aside from that *examination* and *search* on which all good performance, as well as good judgment, depends. I have seen many a time a well-bred man, who had himself a real *good TASTE*, give way, with a malicious complaisance, to the humour of a company, where, in favour chiefly of the tender sex, this soft languishing contempt of *critics*, and their labours, has been the subject set afoot. "Wretched creatures!" (says one), "impertinent things, these *critics*, as ye call them!—as if one cou'dn't know what was agreeable or pretty, without their help.—" "It is fine indeed, that one shou'dn't be allowed to fancy for one's self.—Now, should a thousand critics tell me, that Mr *A*——'s new *play* wa'n't the wittiest in the world, I wou'dn't mind them one bit."

This our real man of wit hears patiently; and adds, perhaps of his own, "that he thinks it, truly, somewhat hard, in what relates to people's diversion and entertainment, that they should be obliged to chuse what pleased *others*, and not *themselves*." Soon after this he goes himself to the *play*, finds one of his effeminate companions commending or admiring at a wrong place. He turns to the next person who sits by him, and asks privately, "*What he thinks of his companion's relish?*"

Such is the malice of the world! They who by pains and industry have acquired a *real TASTE* in arts, rejoice in their advantage over others, who have either none at all, or such as renders them ridiculous. At an *auction* of books or pictures, you shall hear these gentlemen persuading every one "to bid for what he fancies." But, at the same time, they would be soundly mortified themselves,

selves, if, by such as they esteemed good judges, they should be found to have purchased by a *wrong fancy*, or *ill TASTE*. The same gentleman who commends his neighbour for ordering his garden or apartment, *as his HUMOUR* leads him, takes care his own should be ordered *as the best judgments would advise*. Being once a judge himself, or but tolerably knowing in these affairs, his aim is not "to change the being of things, and bring TRUTH and NATURE to his *humour* ; but, leaving NATURE and TRUTH just as he found them, to accommodate his *humour* and *fancy* to *their STANDARD*." Would he do this in a yet higher case, he might in reality become as *wise* and *great* a MAN, as he is already a *refined and polished GENTLEMAN*. By *one* of these TASTES he understands how to lay out his garden, model his house, fancy his equipage, appoint his table : by *the other* he learns of what value these amusements are in life, and of what importance to a man's freedom, happiness, and self-enjoyment. For if he would try effectually to acquire the real *science* of TASTE of *life*, he would certainly discover, "that a RIGHT MIND, and GENEROUS AFFECTION, had more beauty and charm than all other *symmetries* in the world besides : " and "that a grain of *honesty* and *native worth* was of more value than all the *adventitious ornaments*, *estates*, or *preferments* ; for the sake of which some of the better sort so often turn *knaves* ; forsaking their principles, and quitting their *honour* and *freedom*, for a mean, timorous, shifting state of *gaudy servitude*."

A LITTLE better TASTE (were it a *very little*) in the affair of *life itself*, would, if I mistake not, mend the manners, and secure the happiness of some

Some of our *noble countrymen*, who come with high advantage and a worthy *character* into the public. But ere they have long engaged in it, their WORTH unhappily becomes venal. *Equipages, titles, precedencies, staffs, ribands*, and other such glittering *ware*, are taken in exchange for inward MERIT, HONOUR, and a CHARACTER.

This they may account perhaps a *shrewd bargain*. But there will be found very untoward abatements in it, when the matter comes to be experienced. They may have descended in reality from ever so glorious ancestors, patriots, and sufferers for their nation's liberty and welfare: they may have made their entrance into the world upon this bottom of anticipated fame and honour: they may have been advanced on this account to dignities, which they were thought to have deserved. But when induced to change their honest measures, and sacrifice their *cause* and *friends* to an *imaginary private interest*; they will soon find, by experience, that they have lost the relish and TASTE of *life*; and for insipid wretched *honours*, of a deceitful kind, have unhappily exchanged an amiable and sweet *honour*, of a sincere and lasting relish, and good favour. They may, after this, act *farces*, as they think fit, and hear qualities and virtues assigned to them under the titles of *graces, excellencies, honours*, and the rest of this mock-praise and mimical appellation. They may even with serious looks be told of *honour* and *worth*, their PRINCIPLE, and their COUNTRY: but they know better within themselves, and have occasion to find that, after all, the world too knows better; and that their few *friends* and *admirers* have either a very shallow wit, or a very profound hypocrisy.

It is not in *one* party alone that these *purchases* and *sales* of HONOUR are carried on. I can represent



present to myself a noted PATRIOT, and reputed *pillar* of the religious part of our constitution, who having by many and long services, and a steady conduct, gained the reputation of thorough zeal with his own party, and of sincerity and honour with his very enemies, on a sudden (the time being come that the fulness of his reward was set before him) submits complacently to the proposed bargain, and sells himself for what he is worth, in a vile detestable old-age, to which he has reserved the infamy of betraying both his *friends* and *country*.

I can imagine, on the other side, one of a contrary party; a noted friend to LIBERTY in *church* and *state*; an abhorrer of the slavish dependency on *courts*, and of the narrow principles of *bigots*: such a one, after many public services of note, I can see wrought upon, by degrees, to seek *court-preferment*; and this too under a *patriot*-character. But having perhaps tried this way with less success, he is obliged to change his *character*, and become a *royal flatterer*, a courtier *against his nature*; submitting himself, and suing, in so much the meaner degree, as his inherent principles are well known at court, and to his new-adopted party, to whom he feigns himself a *profelyte*.

The greater the *genius* or *character* is of such a person, the greater is his slavery, and heavier his load. Better had it been that he had never discovered such a zeal for public good, or signalized himself in *that party* which can with least grace make sacrifices of national interests to a *crown*, or to the *private* will, appetite, or pleasure of a *prince*. For supposing such a *genius* as this had been to act his part of courtship in some foreign and absolute court; how much less infamous would his part have proved? how much less slavish, amidst a people who were *all slaves*? Had he peradventure been  
one

one of that forlorn begging troop of gentry extant in *Denmark* or *Sweden*, since the time that those nations lost their liberties; had he lived out of a free nation, and happily-balanced constitution; had he been either conscious of no talent in the affairs of government, or of no opportunity to exert any such, to the advantage of mankind: where had been the mighty shame, if perhaps he had employed some of his abilities in flattering like others, and paying the necessary homage required for safety's sake, and self-preservation, in absolute and despotic governments? The TASTE, perhaps, in strictness, might still be *wrong*, even in *this* hard circumstance: but how *inexcusable* in a quite contrary one! For let us suppose our courtier not only an *Englishman*, but of the rank and stem of those old *English* patriots who were wont to curb the licentiousness of our court, arraign its flatterers, and purge away those poisons from the ear of princes; let us suppose him of a competent fortune and moderate appetites, without any apparent *luxury* or *lavishment* in his manners: what shall we, after this, bring in excuse, or as an apology, for such a choice as his? How shall we explain this preposterous *relish*, this odd preference of *subtlety* and *indirectness*, to true *wisdom*, open *honesty*, and *uprightness*?

It is easier, I confess, to give account of this *corruption* of TASTE in some *noble youth* of a more sumptuous gay fancy; supposing him born truly *great*, and of *honourable descent*; with a *generous free MIND*, as well as *ample fortune*. Even these *circumstances* themselves may be the very causes perhaps of his being thus *ensnared*. The elegance of his fancy in outward things\*, may have made

\* Vol. I. p. 108.

him overlook the worth of *inward character* and *proportion*: and the love of grandeur and magnificence, wrong turned, may have possessed his imagination over-strongly with such things as *frontispieces, parterres, equipages, trim varlets in party-coloured cloaths*; and others in *gentlemen's apparel*.—Magnanimous exhibitions of *honour and generosity!*—“In town, a palace and suitable furniture! In the country the same; with the addition of such edifices and gardens as were unknown to our ancestors, and are unnatural to such a climate as *Great Britain!*”

Mean while the year runs on; but the year's income answers not its expence. “For which of these articles can be retrenched? which way take up, after having thus set out?” A *princely* fancy has begot all this; and a *princely* slavery, and *court-dependence*, must maintain it.

The young gentleman is now led into a *chace*, in which he will have slender capture, though toil sufficient. He is himself *taken*. Nor will he so easily get out of that labyrinth, to which he chose to commit his steps, rather than to the more direct and plainer paths in which he trod before.

“Farewel that generous proud spirit, which was wont to speak only what it approved, commend only whom it thought worthy, and act only what it thought right! *Favourites* must be now observed, *little engines* of power attended on, and loathsomely carested: an honest man dreaded, and every free tongue or pen abhorred as dangerous and reproachful.” For till our gentleman is become wholly prostitute and shameless; till he is brought to laugh at *public virtue*, and the very notion of *common good*; till he has openly renounced all principles of honour and honesty, he must in good policy avoid those to whom he lies so

much exposed, and shun that commerce and familiarity which was once his chief delight.

Such is the sacrifice made to a wrong pride, and ignorant self-esteem; by one whose inward character must necessarily, after this manner, become as mean and abject, as his outward behaviour insolent and intolerable.

There are another sort of *suitors to power*, and *traffickers of inward WORTH and LIBERTY* for outward *gain*, whom one would be naturally drawn to compassionate. They are themselves of a humane, compassionate, and friendly nature, well-wishers to their country and mankind. They could, perhaps, even embrace *POVERTY* contentedly, rather than submit to any thing diminutive either of their *inward* freedom or *national liberty*. But what they can bear in their own persons, they cannot bring themselves to bear in the persons of such as are to come after them. Here the *best* and *noblest* of affections are borne down by the excess of the *next best*, those of *tenderness for relations and near friends*.

Such captives as these would disdain, however, to devote themselves to any prince or ministry whose ends were wholly tyrannical, and irreconcilable with the true interest of their nation. In other cases of a less degeneracy, they may bow down perhaps *in the temple of Rimmon*, support the weight of their *supine LORDS*, and prop the steps and ruining credit of their *corrupt patrons*.

This is drudgery sufficient for such honest natures; such as by hard fate alone could have been made dishonest. But as for *pride* or *insolence* on the account of their outward advancement and seeming elevation; they are so far from any thing resembling it, that one may often observe what is very contrary in these fairer *characters* of men.

For

For though perhaps they were known somewhat *rigid* and *severe* before, you see them now grown in reality *submissive* and *obliging*. Though in conversation formerly *dogmatical* and *overbearing*, on the points of state and government; they are now *the patientest* to hear, *the least forward* to dictate, and the readiest to embrace any entertaining subject of discourse, rather than that of the *public*, and their own *personal advancement*.

Nothing is so near *virtue* as this behaviour; and nothing so remote from it, nothing so sure a token of the most profligate manners, as the contrary. In a free government, it is so much the interest of every one *in place*, who profits by the public, to demean himself with *modesty* and *submission*; that to appear immediately the more insolent and haughty on such an advancement, is the mark only of a contemptible genius, and of a want of true understanding, even in the narrow sense of *interest* and *private good*.

Thus we see, after all, that it is not merely what we call *principle*, but a *TASTE*, which governs men. They may think for certain, "this is *right*, or that *wrong*:" they may believe "this a *crime*, or that a *sin*; this punishable by *man*, or that by *God*:" yet, if the *savour* of things lie cross to *HONESTY*; if the *fancy* be florid, and the *appetite* high towards the subaltern beauties and lower order of worldly symmetries and proportions; the conduct will infallibly turn this latter way.

Even *conscience*, I fear, such as is owing to religious discipline, will make but a slight figure, where this *TASTE* is set amiss. Among the vulgar perhaps it may do wonders. A *devil* and a *hell* may prevail, where a *jail* and *gallows* are thought insufficient. But such is the nature of the liberal, polished, and refined part of mankind; so far are

they from the mere simplicity of babes and sucklings ; that, instead of applying the notion of a future reward or punishment to their immediate behaviour in society, they are apt, much rather, through the whole course of their lives, to shew evidently, that they look on the pious narrations to be indeed no better than childrens tales, or the amusement of the mere vulgar :

*Esse aliquos manes, et subterranea regna,*

\* \* \* \* \*

*Nec pueri credunt, nisi qui nondum ære lavantur †.*

Something therefore should, methinks, be further thought of, in behalf of our generous youths, towards the correcting of their TASTE, or *relish* in the concerns of *life*. For this at last is what will influence. And in this respect *the youth* alone are to be regarded. Some hopes there may be still conceived of *these*. The rest are confirmed and hardened in their way. A middle-aged knave, however devout or orthodox, is but a common wonder ; an old one is no wonder at all : but a young one is still (thank Heaven !) somewhat extraordinary. And I can never enough admire what was said once by a worthy man, at the first appearance of one of these young able prostitutes, “ that he even trembled  
“ at the sight, to find nature capable of being turn-  
“ ed so soon ; and that he boded greater calamity  
“ to his country from this single example of *young*  
“ villany, than from the practices and arts of all  
“ the *old* knaves in being.”

Let us therefore proceed in this view, addressing ourselves to the grown *youth* of our polite world. Let the appeal be to these whose *relish* is retrie-

† Juv. sat. 2. vers. 145.

vable, and whose *taste* may yet be formed in *morals*, as it seems to be already in *exterior manners* and *behaviour*.

THAT there is really a STANDARD of this latter kind, will immediately, and on the first view, be acknowledged. The contest is only, "Which is *right?* — which the *unaffected* carriage, and *just* demeanor? and which the *affected* and *false?*" Scarce is there any one who pretends not to know and to decide what is *well-bred* and *handsome*. There are few so affectedly clownish, as absolutely to disown *good-breeding*, and renounce the notion of A BEAUTY in *outward manners* and *deportment*. With such as these, where-ever they should be found, I must confess, I could scarce be tempted to bestow the least pains or labour, towards convincing them of a *beauty* in *inward sentiments* and *principles*.

Whoever has any impression of what we call *gentility* or *politeness*, is already so acquainted with the DECORUM and GRACE of things, that he will readily confess a pleasure and enjoyment in the very *survey* and *contemplation* of this kind. Now, if in the way of polite pleasure, *the study* and *love* of BEAUTY be essential; *the study* and *love* of SYMMETRY and ORDER, on which *beauty* depends, must also be essential, in the same respect.

It is impossible we can advance the least in any *relish* or *taste* of outward symmetry and order, without acknowledging that the proportionate and regular state is the truly *prosperous* and natural in every subject. The same features which make deformity, create incommodiousness and disease. And the same shapes and proportions which make beauty, afford advantage, by adapting to activity and use. Even in the imitative or *designing* arts, (to

which our author so often refers), the *truth* or *beauty* of every figure or statue is measured from the perfection of nature, in her just adapting of every limb and proportion to the activity, strength, dexterity, life, and vigour of the particular species or animal *designed*.

Thus *beauty* and *truth*\* are plainly joined with the notion of *utility* and *convenience*, even in the apprehension of every ingenious artist, the *architect* †, the *statuary*, or the *painter*. It is the same in the *physician's* way. Natural *health* is the just proportion, *truth*, and regular course of things, in a constitution. It is *the inward beauty of the BODY*. And when the harmony and just measures of the rising pulses, the circulating humours, and the moving airs or spirits are disturbed or lost, *deformity* enters, and with it *calamity* and *ruin*.

Should not this, one would imagine, be still the same case, and hold equally as to *the MIND*? Is there nothing *there* which tends to disturbance and dissolution? Is there no natural tenor, tone, or order of the passions or affections? no *beauty* or *deformity* in this *moral* kind? Or, allowing that there really is, must it not, of consequence, in the same manner, imply *health* or *sickliness*, *prosperity*

\* Vol. 1. p. 111. &c.

† In GRÆCIS operibus, nemo sub mutulo denticulos constituit, &c. Quod e' go supra cantherios et templa in veritate debet esse collocatum, id in imaginibus, si infra constitutum fuerit, mendosam habebit operis rationem. Estiamque ANTIQUI non probaverunt, neque instituerunt, &c. Ita quod non potest in veritate fieri, id non putaverunt in imaginibus factum, posse certam rationem habere. Omnia enim certa proprietate, et a veris NATURÆ deductis moribus, traduxerunt in operum perfectiones: et ea probaverunt quorum explicationes in disputationibus rationem possunt habere VERITATIS. Itaque ex eis originibus symmetrias et proportiones uniuscujusque generis constitutas reliquerunt. Vitruvius, lib. 4. cap. 2. whose commentator Philander may be also read on this place. See above, vol. 1. p. 163. 263. &c. 266. 274. &c. and below, Misc. 5. chap. 1. parag. 38. 39. &c.

OR



or *disaster*? Will it not be found in this respect, above all, "that what is BEAUTIFUL\* is *harm-  
nious* and *proportionable*; what is *harmonious*  
and *proportionable* is TRUE; and what is at  
once both *beautiful* and *true*, is, of consequence,  
agreeable and GOOD?"

Where

\* This is the HONESTUM, the PULCHRUM, τὸ καλόν, on which our author lays the stress of VIRTUE, and the merits of this cause; as well in his other treatises, as in this of *Soliloquy* here commented. This *beauty* the Roman orator, in his rhetorical way, and in the majesty of style, could express no otherwise than as a *mystery*. HONESTUM igitur id intelligimus, quod tale est, ut, detracta omni utilitate, sine ullis premiis fructibusve, per seipsam possit jure laudari. Quod quale sit, non tam definitione qua sum usus intelligi potest, (quamquam aliquantum potest), quam COMMUNI omnium JUDICIO, et optimi cujusque studiis, atque factis; qui per multa ab eam unam causam faciunt, quia decet, quia rectum, quia honestum est; etsi nullum consecuturum emolumentum vident. Our author, on the other side, having little of the orator, and less of the constraint of formality belonging to some graver characters, can be more familiar on this occasion: and accordingly descending, without the least scruple, into whatever style or humour, he refuses to make the least difficulty or *mystery* of this matter. He pretends, on this head, to claim the assent not only of orators, poets, and the higher virtuosi, but even of the beaux themselves, and such as go no farther than the dancing-master to seek for *grace* and *beauty*. He pretends, we see, to fetch this *natural idea* from as familiar amusements as dress, equipage, the tiring-room, or toy-shop. And thus, in his proper manner of SOLILOQUY, or *self-discourse*, we may imagine him running on; beginning perhaps with some particular *scheme*, or fancied *scale* of BEAUTY, which, according to his philosophy, he strives to erect; by distinguishing, sorting, and dividing into things *animate*, *inanimate*, and *mixed*: as thus.

In the INANIMATE, beginning from those *regular figures* and *symmetries* with which children are delighted, and proceeding gradually to the proportions of *architecture*, and the other arts.—The same in respect of *sounds* and MUSIC. From beautiful stones, rocks, *minerals*, to *vegetables*, woods, aggregate parts of the world, seas, rivers, mountains, vales.—The globe.—Celestial bodies, and their order. The higher *architecture* of nature.—NATURE herself, considered as *inanimate* and *passive*.

In the ANIMATE, from *animals*, and their several kinds, tempers, sagacities, to men.—And from single *persons* of men, their private characters, understandings, *geniuses*, dispositions, manners, to public societies, *communities*, or *commonwealths*.—From flocks, herds,

Where then is this BEAUTY or *harmony* to be found? How is this SYMMETRY to be discovered and applied? Is it any other *art* than that of PHILOSOPHY, or *the study of inward numbers and proportions*, which can exhibit this in life? If no other;

herds, and other natural *assemblages* or *groups* of living creatures, to human intelligences and correspondences, or whatever is higher in the kind. The correspondence, union, and harmony of NATURE herself, considered as *animate* and intelligent.

In the MIXED, as in a *single person* (a body and a mind) the union and harmony of this kind, which constitutes the real *person*; and the friendship, love, or whatever other affection is formed on such an object. A *household*, a *city*, or *nation*, with certain lands, buildings, and other appendices, or local ornaments, which jointly form that agreeable idea of *home, family, country* —

“ And what of this?” (says an airy spark, no friend to meditation or deep thought); “ what means this *catalogue* or *scale*, as you are pleased to call it? Only, Sir, to satisfy myself, that I am not alone, or single in a certain fancy I have of a thing called BEAUTY; that I have almost the whole world for my companions; and that each of us *admirers* and earnest *pursuers* of BEAUTY, (such as in a manner we all are), if peradventure we take not a certain sagacity along with us, we must err widely, range extravagantly, and run ever upon a false scent. We may (in the sportsman’s phrase) *have many bares afoot*, but shall stick to no real *game*, nor be fortunate in *any capture* which may content us.

“ See with what ardour and vehemence, the young man, neglecting his proper race and fellow-creatures, and forgetting what is *decent, handsome, or becoming* in human affairs, pursues these SPECIES in those common objects of his affection, a *horse, a hound, a hawk!* — What doting on these *beauties!* — What admiration of the *kind* itself! And of the particular *animal*, what care, and in a manner idolatry and consecration; when the beast beloved is (as often happens) even set apart from use, and only kept to gaze on, and feed the enamoured fancy with highest delight! — See! in another youth, not so forgetful of *human kind*, but remembering it still in a wrong way! a φιλόκαλος of another sort, a CHÆREA. *Quam elegans formarum spectator!* — See! as to other *beauties*, where there is no possession, no enjoyment or reward, but barely seeing and admiring: as in the *virtuoso*-passion, the love of *painting*, and the *designing* arts of every kind, so often observed. How fares it with our *princely genius*, our *grandee* who assembles all these *beauties*, and, within the bounds of his sumptuous palace, in-  
 “ ses all these graces of a thousand kinds? ———— What pains!  
 “ study!

other, who then can possibly have a TASTE of this kind, without being beholden to PHILOSOPHY? Who can admire the *outward* beauties, and not recur instantly to the *inward*, which are the most real and essential, the most naturally affecting, and of the highest pleasure, as well as profit and advantage?

In

“ study! science! — Behold the disposition and order of these  
 “ finer sorts of apartments, gardens, *villa's*! — The kind of  
 “ harmony to the eye, from the various shapes and colours agree-  
 “ ably mixed, and ranged in lines, intercrossing without confusion,  
 “ and fortunately coincident. — A *parterre*, cypresses, groves,  
 “ wildernesses. — Statues here and there, of *virtue*, *fortitude*, *tem-*  
 “ *perance*. — *Heroes* busts, *philosophers* heads, with suitable  
 “ mottoes and inscriptions. — Solemn representations of things  
 “ deeply natural. — *Caves*, *grottoes*, *rocks*. — *Urns* and *obel-*  
 “ *isks* in retired places, and disposed at proper distances and points  
 “ of light; with all those symmetries which silently express a reign-  
 “ ing order, peace, harmony, and beauty! — But what is there  
 “ answerable to this in the MINDS of the possessors? — What *pos-*  
 “ *session* or *propriety* is theirs? What *constancy* or *security* of enjoy-  
 “ ment? What *peace*, what *harmony* WITHIN.”

Thus our MONOLOGIST, or *self-discoursing* author, in his usual strain; when incited to the search of BEAUTY and the DECORUM, by vulgar admiration, and the universal acknowledgment of the SPECIES in *outward* things, and in the *meaner* and *subordinate* subjects. By this inferior *species*, it seems, our strict inspector disdains to be allured: and refusing to be captivated by any thing less than the *superior*, *original*, and *genuine* kind, he walks at leisure, without emotion, in deep philosophical reserve, through all these pompous scenes; passes unconcernedly by those court-pageants, the illustrious and much-envied potentates of the place; overlooks *the rich*, *the great*, and even *the fair*; feeling no other astonishment than what is accidentally raised in him, by the view of these impostures, and of this specious *snare*. For here he observes those gentlemen chiefly to be caught and fastest held, who are the highest ridiculers of such reflections as his own, and who, in the very height of this ridicule, prove themselves the impotent contempters of a SPECIES, which, whether they will or no, they ardently pursue; come in a *face*, and certain regular lines or features; others in a *palace* and *apartments*; others in an *equipage* and *dress*. — “ O EFFEMINACY! EFFEMINACY! who would imagine this could be the *vice* of such as appear no inconsiderable men! — But *person* is a subject of flattery which reaches beyond the bloom of youth.”  
 “ The

In so short a compass does that learning and knowledge lie, on which *manners* and *life* depend. It is *we ourselves* create and form our TASTE. If we resolve to have it *just*, it is in our power. We may esteem and value, approve and disapprove, as we would wish. For who would not rejoice to be always equal and consonant to himself, and have constantly that opinion of things which is natural and proportionable? But who dares search OPINION to the bottom, or call in question his *early* and *prepossessing* TASTE? Who is so just to himself, as to recal his FANCY from the power of *fashion* and *education* to that of REASON? Could we, however, be thus courageous, we should soon settle in ourselves such an *opinion* of GOOD, as would secure to us an *invariable, agreeable, and just* TASTE in life and manners.

THUS have I endeavoured to tread in my *author's* steps, and prepare the reader for the serious and downright philosophy, which even in this last-commented treatise \* our author keeps still as a mystery, and dares not formally profess. His presence has been to *advise authors*, and polish *styles*; but his aim has been to correct *manners*, and regulate *lives*. He has affected SOLILOQUY,

“ The experienced senator, and aged general, can, in our days, dispense with a *toilet*, and take his outward form into a very extraordinary adjustment and regulation.—All *embellishments* are affected, besides the true. And thus, led by example, whilst we run in search of *elegancy* and *neatness*, pursuing BEAUTY, and adding, as we imagine, more lustre and value to our own *person*, we grow, in our real *character* and truer SELF, deformed and monstrous, servile and abject; stooping to the lowest terms of courtship; and sacrificing all internal proportion, all *intrinsic* and real BEAUTY and WORTH, for the sake of things which carry scarce a shadow of the kind.” *Supra*, vol. 2. p. 296. &c. and vol. 1. p. 108. &c. and p. 264.

\* *Viz.* treatise 3. Advice to an author, vol. 1.

as pretending only to censure himself; but he has taken occasion to bring others into his company, and make bold with *personages* and *characters* of no inferior rank. He has given scope enough to raillery and humour, and has intrenched very largely on the province of us *miscellanarian* writers. But the reader is now about to see him in a new aspect \*, “ a formal and professed *philosopher*, “ a *system-writer*, a *dogmatist*, and *expounder*.”  
 — *Habes consistentem reum.*

So to his PHILOSOPHY I commit him: though, according as my genius and present disposition will permit, I intend still to accompany him at a distance, keep him in sight, and convoy him, the best I am able, through the dangerous seas he is about to pass.

M I S C E L L A N Y IV.

C H A P. I.

*Connection and union of the subject-treatises.* —  
 PHILOSOPHY in form. — *Metaphysics.* —  
 EGO-ity. — *Identity.* — *Moral footing.* —  
*Proof and discipline of the fancies.* — *Settle-*  
*ment of OPINION.* — *Anatomy of the mind.*  
 — *A fable.*

WE have already, in the beginning of our preceding *miscellany*, taken notice of our author's plan, and the connection and dependency of his *joint tracts* †, comprehended in two preceding volumes. We are now, in our commentator-capacity, arrived at length to his *second*

\* *Viz.* in treatise 4. (the INQUIRY, &c.) vol. 2.

† Above, p. 94. Again below, Misc. 5. chap. 2. parag. 16. &c.

volume,

volume, to which the three pieces of his *first* appear preparatory. That they were really so designed, the *advertisement* to the first edition of his *soliloquy* is a sufficient proof. He took occasion there, in a line or two, under the name of his *printer*, or (as he otherwise calls him) his *amanuensis*, to prepare us for a *more elaborate* and *methodical* piece which was to follow. We have this system now before us. Nor need we wonder, such as it is, that it came so hardly into the world, and that our author has been delivered of it with so much difficulty, and after so long a time. His *amanuensis* and he were not, it seems, heretofore upon such good terms of correspondence; otherwise such an unshapen *fœtus*, or false birth, as that of which our author in his title-page \* complains, had not formerly appeared abroad. Nor had it ever risen again in its more decent form, but for the accidental publication of our author's first letter †, which, by a necessary train of consequences, occasioned the revival of this abortive piece, and gave usherance to its companions.

It will appear therefore in this *joint* edition of our author's *five treatises*, that the *three* former are preparatory to the *fourth*, on which we are now entered; and the *fifth* (with which he concludes) a kind of *apology* for this revived treatise concerning *virtue* and *religion*.

As for his *APOLOGY*, (particularly in what relates to *revealed religion*, and a *world to come*), I commit the reader to the disputant divines and gentlemen, whom our author has introduced in that concluding piece of *dialogue-writing*, or *rhapsodical philosophy*. Mean while, we have here no

\* *Viz.* to the *INQUIRY*, (treatise 4.), vol. 2.

† *Viz.* letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1.

other

other part left us, than to enter into the *dry* PHILOSOPHY, and *rigid manner* of our author; without any *excursions* into various literature; without help from the *comic* or *tragic* MUSE, or from the flowers of *poetry* or *rhetoric*.

Such is our present pattern, and strict *moral task*; which our more humorous reader foreknowing, may immediately, if he pleases, turn over; skipping (as is usual in many grave works) a chapter or two, as he proceeds. We shall, to make amends, endeavour afterwards, in our following MISCELLANY, to entertain him again with more chearful fare, and afford him *a dessert*, to rectify his palate, and leave his mouth at last in good relish.

To the *patient* and *grave* READER, therefore, who, in order to *moralize*, can afford to retire into his closet, as to some religious or devout exercise, we presume thus to offer a few reflections, in the support of our author's profound INQUIRY. And accordingly we are to imagine our author speaking, as follows.

How little regard soever may be shewn to that *moral speculation* or INQUIRY which we call the *study of ourselves*, it must, in strictness, be yielded, that all knowledge whatsoever depends upon this *previous one*; "and that we can in reality be assured of nothing, till we are first assured of what *we are* OURSELVES." For by this alone we can know what *certainty* and *assurance* is.

That there is *something* undoubtedly which *thinks*, our very doubt itself, and scrupulous thought, evinces. But in *what subject* that thought resides, and how *that* subject is continued *one and the same*, so as to answer constantly to the supposed train of thoughts or reflections which seem to run so har-

moniously through a long course of life, with the *same* relation still to one *single* and *self-same* PERSON; this is not a matter so easily or hastily decided, by those who are nice self-examiners, or searchers after *truth* and *certainty*.

It will not, in this respect, be sufficient for us to use the seeming *logic* of a famous modern \*, and say, "*We think*; therefore *we are*." Which is a notably invented saying, after the model of that like philosophical proposition; That "*what is, is*." — Miraculously argued! "*If I am, I am*." —

Nothing more certain! For the EGO, or I, being established in the first part of the proposition, the *ergo*, no doubt, must hold it good in the latter. But the question is, "What constitutes the WE or I?" and, "Whether the I of this instant, be the same "with that of any instant preceding, or to come." For we have nothing but *memory* to warrant us; and memory may be false. We may believe we have thought and reflected thus or thus; but we may be mistaken. We may be conscious of that as *truth*, which perhaps was no more than *dream*: and we may be conscious of that as a *past* dream, which perhaps was never before so much as dreamed of.

This is what *metaphysicians* mean, when they say, "That *identity* can be proved only by *consciousness*; but that consciousness, withal, may "be as well false as real, in respect of what is "past." So that the same successional *we* or *I* must remain still, on this account, undecided.

To the force of this reasoning I confess I must so far submit, as to declare, that, for my own part, I take my being *upon trust*. Let others philosophize as they are able: I shall admire their

\* Monsieur Descartes.

strength,



strength, when, upon this topic, they have refuted what able *metaphysicians* object, and *Pyrrhonists* plead in their own behalf.

Mean while, there is no impediment, hindrance, or suspension of *action*, on account of these wonderfully refined *speculations*. Argument and debate go on still. Conduct is settled. Rules and measures are given out, and received. Nor do we scruple to act as resolutely upon the mere supposition that *we are*, as if we had effectually proved it a thousand times, to the full satisfaction of our *metaphysical* or *Pyrrhonian* antagonist.

This to me appears sufficient ground for a *moralist*. Nor do I ask more, when I undertake to prove the reality of VIRTUE and MORALS.

If it be certain that I AM; it is certain and demonstrable WHO and WHAT I ought to be, even on my own account, and for the sake of my own private happiness and success. For thus I take the liberty to proceed.

The *affections* of which I am conscious, are either GRIEF OR JOY, DESIRE OR AVERSION. For whatever mere *sensation* I may experience, if it amounts to neither of these, it is indifferent, and no way *affects* me.

That which causes *joy* and *satisfaction* when present, causes *grief* and *disturbance* when absent: and that which causes *grief* and *disturbance* when present, does, when absent, by the same necessity, occasion *joy* and *satisfaction*.

Thus LOVE (which implies *desire*, with *hope* of good) must afford occasion to *grief* and *disturbance*, when it acquires not what it earnestly seeks. And HATRED (which implies *aversion*, and *fear* of ill) must, in the same manner, occasion *grief* and *calamity*, when that which it earnestly shunned, or

would have escaped, remains present, or is altogether unavoidable.

That which being *present*, can never leave the mind at rest, but must of necessity cause *aversion*, is its *ILL*. But that which can be sustained without any *necessary abhorrence*, or *aversion*, is not its *ILL*; but remains *indifferent* in its own nature; the *ILL* being in the affection only, which wants redress.

In the same manner, that which being *absent*, can never leave the mind at rest, or without *disturbance* and *regret*, is, of necessity, its *GOOD*. But that which can be *absent*, without any *present* or *future disturbance to the mind*, is not its *GOOD*, but remains *indifferent* in its own nature. From whence it must follow, that the affection towards it, *as supposed GOOD*, is an *ill* affection, and creative only of *disturbance* and *disease*. So that the *AFFECTIONS* of *love* and *hatred*, *liking* and *dislike*, on which the happiness or prosperity of the person so much depends, being influenced and governed by *OPINION*; the highest *good* or *happiness* must depend on *right opinion*, and the highest misery be derived from *wrong*.

To explain this, I consider, for instance, the fancy or imagination I have of *death*, according as I find this subject naturally passing in my mind. To this *fancy* perhaps I find united an *OPINION* or *APPREHENSION* of *evil* and *calamity*. Now, the more my *apprehension* of this evil increases, the greater, I find, my *disturbance* proves, not only at the approach of the supposed evil, but at the very distant thought of it. Besides that the *thought* itself, will of necessity so much the oftener recur, as the *aversion* or *fear* is violent and increasing.

From this supposed evil I must, however, fly with so much the more earnestness, as the *OPINION* of the

the *evil* increases. Now, if the increase of the *aversion* can be no cause of the decrease or diminution of the *evil itself*, but rather the contrary; then the increase of the *aversion* must necessarily prove *the increase of disappointment and disturbance*. And so, on the other hand, the *diminution* or *decrease* of the *aversion* (if this may any way be effected) must, of necessity, prove the *diminution of inward disturbance*, and the better *establishment of inward quiet and satisfaction*.

Again, I consider with myself, that I have the *imagination*\* of something BEAUTIFUL, GREAT, and BECOMING in things. This *imagination* I apply perhaps to such subjects as *plate, jewels, apartments, coronets, patents of honour, titles, or precedencies*. I must therefore naturally seek these, not as mere conveniencies, means, or helps in life, (for as such my passion could not be so excessive towards them), but as EXCELLENT in themselves, necessarily attractive of my *admiration*, and directly and immediately causing my happiness, and giving me satisfaction. Now, if *the PASSION* raised on this *opinion* (call it *avarice, pride, vanity, or ambition*) be indeed incapable of any real satisfaction, even under the most successful course of fortune; and then too, attended with perpetual fears of disappointment and loss; how can the mind be other than miserable, when possessed by it? But if, instead of forming thus *the opinion of GOOD*; if, instead of placing WORTH or EXCELLENCE in these *outward* subjects, we place it, where it is

\* Of the necessary being and prevalency of some such IMAGINATION or SENSE, (natural and common to all men, irresistible, of original growth in the mind, the guide of our affections, and the ground of our *admiration, contempt, shame, honour, disdain*, and other natural and unavoidable impressions), see vol. I. p. 108. 9. 263, &c. vol. 2. p. 19. 20. 21. 297. 315, 16. 322.; and above, p. 20, &c. and 127. &c. in the notes.

truest, in the *affections* or *sentiments*, in the *governing part*, and *inward character*; we have then the full enjoyment of it within our power: the *imagination* or *opinion* remains *steady* and *irreversible*: and the *love*, *desire*, and *appetite* is answered, without apprehension of loss or disappointment.

Here therefore arises work and employment for us *within*; “to regulate FANCY, and rectify OPINION\*, on which all depends.” For if our *loves*, *desires*, *hatreds*, and *aversions*, are left to themselves, we are necessarily exposed to endless vexation and calamity: but if these are found capable of amendment, or in any measure flexible or variable by *opinion*; we ought, methinks, to make trial at least, how far we might by this means acquire felicity and content.

Accordingly, if we find it evident, on one hand, that, by indulging any wrong appetite, (as either *debauch*, *malice*, or *revenge*), the opinion of the *false good* increases; and the appetite, which is a *real ill*, grows so much the stronger; we may be as fully assured, on the other hand, that, by restraining this affection, and nourishing a contrary fort in opposition to it, we cannot fail to diminish what is *ill*, and increase what is properly our *happiness* and *good*.

On this account, a man may reasonably conclude, “that it becomes him, by working upon

\* “Ὅτι πάντα ἡ υπόληψις ἔσται ἐπὶ σοί. Ἄρον ἔν ὅτε θίλεις τὴν υπόληψιν, ἔσπερ κάμψαντι τὴν ἀκραν Γαλήνην, σαθαρά πάντα ἔσονται ἀκύμων. Μ. Αντ. βιβ. 16’.

Ὅσον ἔστιν ἡ λεκάνη τῷ ὕδατι, τοιούτου ἡ ψυχὴ. Ὅσον ἡ αὐγὴ ἡ προσπίπτουσα τῷ ὕδατι, τοιούτου αἱ φαντασίαι. Ὅταν ἔν τὸ ὕδωρ κινήθῃ, δοκεῖ μὲν ἔσθαι αὐγὴ κινῆσθαι: ἢ μὲν τοι κινῆται ἔσταν τοίνυν σκολεθῆ τίς ἢ χ αἱ τίχται ἔσταν ἀρεταὶ συγχέονται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐφ’ ὅσων καταστάτος δὲ καθίσταται κα’ ἐκείνα. Ἀρρ. βιβ. γ’. See vol. I. p. 146. &c. 231. &c. 254. &c.; and vol. 2. p. 328.

“ his

“ his own mind, to withdraw the *fancy* or *opinion* of GOOD or ILL: from that to which justly, and by necessity, it is not joined; and apply it, with the strongest resolution, to that with which it naturally agrees.” For if the *fancy* or *opinion* of good be joined to what is not durable, nor in my power either to acquire or to retain; the more such an *opinion* prevails, the more I must be subject to disappointment and distress. But if there be that to which, whenever I apply the *opinion* or *fancy* of good, I find the *fancy* more consistent, and the *good* more durable, solid, and within my power and command; then the more such an *opinion* prevails in me, the more satisfaction and happiness I must experience.

Now, if I join the *opinion of good* to the possessions of the MIND; if it be in *the affections* themselves that I place my highest joy, and in those objects, whatever they are, of *inward* worth and beauty, (such as *honesty, faith, integrity, friendship, honour*); it is evident I can never possibly, in this respect, rejoice amiss, or indulge myself too far in the enjoyment. The greater my indulgence is, the less I have reason to fear either reverse or disappointment.

This, I know, is far contrary in another *regimen* of life. The tutorage of FANCY and PLEASURE, and the easy philosophy of taking that for good which *pleases me*, or which *I fancy merely*\*, will, in time, give me uneasiness sufficient. It is plain, from what has been debated, that the less *fanciful* I am in what relates to my content and happiness, the more powerful and absolute I must be in self-enjoyment, and the possession of my good. And since it is *fancy* merely which gives

\* Vol. I. p. 242, vol. 2. p. 169.

the force of good, or power of passing, as such, to things of chance and outward dependency; it is evident, that the more I take from *fancy* in this respect, the more I confer upon *myself*. As I am less led or betrayed by *fancy* to an esteem of what depends on *others*, I am the more fixed in the esteem of what depends on *myself* alone. And if I have once gained the *taste* of LIBERTY\*, I shall easily understand the force of this reasoning, and know both my *true SELF* and INTEREST.

The method therefore required in this my inward œconomy, is, to make those *fancies* themselves the objects of my aversion which justly deserve it, by being the cause of a wrong estimation and measure of *good* and *ill*, and consequently the cause of my unhappiness and disturbance.

Accordingly (as the learned masters in this science advise) we are to begin rather by the *averse* †, than by the *prone* and *forward* disposition. We are

\* Vol. 2. p. 325. and below, Misc. 5. chap. 3. parag. 19.

† Ἄρον ἔν τὴν ἑκκλησίαν ἀπὸ πάντων τῶν ἔκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ἢ μετὰ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ παρά φύσιν τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν Εὐχ. κεφ. ζ'.

Ὁρεξίν ἀραί σε δεῖ παντελῶς, ἑκκλησίαν ἐπὶ μόνα μεταθεῖναι τὰ προαιρέτικὰ. Ἀρρ. εἰς γ' κεφ. κβ'. This subdued or moderated admiration or zeal in the highest subjects of *virtue* and *divinity*, the philosopher calls σύμμετρον ἢ καθισταμένην τὴν ὄρεξιν; the contrary disposition, τὸ ἀλογον ἢ ὠστικόν. Βιβ. γ' κεφ. κς'. The reason why this over-forward ardour and pursuit of high subjects runs naturally into enthusiasm and disorder, is shewn in what succeeds the first of the passages here cited. *viz.* Τῶν δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὅσον ὀρέγεσθαι καλὸν ἂν, ὑδὲν ὑδέπω σοι πάρεσι. And hence the repeated injunction, Ἀπόσχου ποτὲ παντάπασιν ὀρέξεως, ἵνα ποτὲ ἢ εὐλόγως ὀρεχθῆς· εἰ δ' εὐλόγως, ὅταν ἔχῃς τί ἐν σεαυτῷ ἰγαθὲν εὐ ὀρεχθῆσθαι. Βιβ. γ' κεφ. ιγ'. To this *Horace*, in one of his latest epistles of the deeply philosophical kind, alludes.

*Insani sapiens nomen ferat, equus iniqui,*

*Ultra quam sua est virtutem si petat ipsam.* Epist. 6. lib. 1.

And in the beginning of the epistle,

*Nil admirari prope re est una, Numici,*

*Solusque quæ possit facere et servare beatum.* Ibid.

For

are to work rather by the weaning than the engaging passions; since if we give way chiefly to *inclination*, by loving, applauding, and admiring what is *great and good*, we may possibly, it seems, in some high objects of that kind, be so amused and ecstasied as to lose ourselves, and miss our proper mark, for want of a steady and settled aim. But being more sure and infallible in what relates to our *ill*, we should begin, they tell us, by applying our aversion on that side, and raising our indignation against those meannesses of opinion and sentiment which are the causes of our subjection and perplexity.

Thus the COVETOUS FANCY, if considered as the cause of misery, (and consequently detested as a real ill), must of necessity abate: and the AMBITIOUS FANCY, if opposed in the same manner, with resolution, by better thought, must resign itself, and leave the mind free and disincumbered in the pursuit of its better objects.

Nor is the case different in the passion of COWARDICE, or FEAR OF DEATH. For if we leave this passion *to itself*, (or to certain *tutors* to manage for us), it may lead us to the most anxious and tormenting state of life. But if it be opposed

For though these first lines (as many other of *Horace's* on the subject of philosophy) have the air of the *Epicurean discipline* and *Lucretian style*; yet, by the whole taken together, it appears evidently on what system of ancient philosophy this epistle was formed. Nor was this prohibition of the *wondering* or *admiring* habit, in early students, peculiar to *one* kind of philosophy alone. It was common to many; however the reason and account of it might differ in one sect from the other. The *Pythagoreans* sufficiently checked their TYRO'S, by silencing them so long on their first courtship to *philosophy*. And though *admiration*, in the Peripatetic sense, as above mentioned, may be justly called the inclining principle or first motive to PHILOSOPHY; yet this mistress, when once espoused, teaches us *to admire*, after a different manner from what we did before. See above, p. 26. and vol. 1. p. 32.

by

by sounder opinion, and a just estimation of things, it must diminish of course: and the natural result of such a practice must be, the rescue of the mind from numberless fears, and miseries of other kinds.

Thus at last a MIND, by knowing *itself*, and its own proper powers and virtues, becomes *free* and independent. It sees its hindrances and obstructions; and finds they are wholly from *itself*, and from *opinions wrong conceived*. The more it conquers in this respect, (be it in the least particular), the more it is its own *master*, feels its own *natural LIBERTY*, and congratulates with itself on its own *advancement* and *prosperity*.

Whether some who are called *philosophers* have so applied their meditations, as to understand any thing of this language, I know not. But well I am assured, that many an *honest* and *free-hearted fellow*, among the *vulgar rank of people*, has naturally some kind of feeling or apprehension of this self-enjoyment; when refusing to act for lucre or outward profit, the thing which from his soul he abhors, and thinks below him; he goes on, with harder labour, but more content, in his direct plain path. He is secure *within*; free of what the world calls *policy*, or design; and sings, (according to the old *ballad*),

*My mind to me a kingdom is, &c.*

Which in *Latin* we may translate,

---

*Et mea  
Virtute me involvo, probamque  
Pauperiem sine dote quæro* \*.

BUT I forget, it seems, that I am now speak-

\* Horat. od. 29. lib. 3.



ing in the person of our *grave* INQUIRER. I should consider I have no right to vary from the pattern he has set; and that whilst I accompany him in this particular treatise, I ought not to make the least escape out of the high road of demonstration, into the diverting paths of *poetry* or *humour*.

As *grave* however as MORALS are presumed in *their own nature*, I look upon it as an essential matter in their delivery, to take now and then the natural air of *pleasantry*. The first MORALS which were ever delivered in the world, were in *parables, tales, or fables*. And the latter and most consummate distributors of morals, in the very politest times, were great *tale-tellers*, and retainers to honest *Æsop*.

After all the regular *demonstrations* and *deductions* of our *grave* author, I dare say it would be a high relief and satisfaction to his reader, to hear an *apologue*, or *fable*, well told, and with such humour as to need no sententious *moral* at the end, to make the application.

As an experiment in this case, let us at this instant imagine our *grave inquirer* taking pains to shew us, at full length, the unnatural and unhappy excursions, roving, or expeditions of our un-governed FANCIES and OPINIONS over a world of *riches, honours, and other ebbing and flowing goods*. He performs this, we will suppose, with great sagacity, to the full measure and scope of our attention. Mean while, as full or satiated as we might find ourselves of serious and solid demonstration, it is odds but we might find vacancy still sufficient to receive instruction by another method. And I dare answer for success, should a merrier *moralist* of the *Æsopian school* present himself; and, hearing of this *chace* described by our *philosopher*, beg leave to represent it to the  
life,

life, by a homely *cur* or two of his master's ordinary breed.

“ Two of this race (he would tell us) having  
 “ been daintily bred, and in high thoughts of what  
 “ they called *pleasure* and *good living*, travelled  
 “ once in quest of game and rarities, till they  
 “ came by accident to the sea-side. They saw  
 “ there, at a distance from the shore, some float-  
 “ ing pieces of wreck, which they took a fancy  
 “ to believe some wonderful rich *dainty*, richer  
 “ than *ambergreese*, or the richest product of the  
 “ ocean. They could prove it, by their appetite  
 “ and longing, to be no less than *quintessence of*  
 “ *the main, ambrosial substance*, the *repast of ma-*  
 “ *rine deities*, surpassing all which *earth* afforded.  
 “ — By these rhetorical arguments, after long  
 “ reasoning with one another in this florid vein,  
 “ they proceeded from one extravagance of fancy  
 “ to another, till they came at last to this issue.  
 “ Being unaccustomed to swimming, they would  
 “ not, it seems, in prudence, venture so far out  
 “ of their depth as was necessary to reach their  
 “ imagined *prize*: but being stout drinkers, they  
 “ thought with themselves, they might compass  
 “ to drink all which lay in their way, even *the*  
 “ *SEA* itself; and that by this method they might  
 “ shortly bring their goods safe to dry land. To  
 “ work therefore they went, and drank till they  
 “ were both *burst*.”

For my own part, I am fully satisfied that there are more *sea-drinkers* than one or two to be found among the principal personages of mankind; and that if these *dogs* of ours were *filly curs*, many who pass for *wise* in our own race are little wiser, and may properly enough be said to have *the sea to drink*.

It is pretty evident, that they who live in the  
 highest

highest sphere of human affairs have a very uncertain view of the thing called *happiness* or *good*. It lies out at sea, far distant, in the *offing*; where those gentlemen ken it but very imperfectly: and the means they employ in order to come up with it, are very wide of the matter, and far short of their proposed end. — “First, a general acquaintance. — Visits, levees. — Attendance upon the *great and little*. — Popularity. — A place in parliament. — Then another at court. — Then intrigue, corruption, prostitution. — Then a higher place. — Then a *title*. — Then a remove. — A *new MINISTER!* — Factions at court. — Shipwreck of *ministries*. — The *new*: the *old*. — Engage with *one*: piece up with *’other*. — Bargains; losses; after-games; retrievals.” — Is not this *the sea to drink?*

*At si divitiæ prudentem reddere possent,  
Si cupidum timidumque minus te; nempe ruberes,  
Viveret in terris te si quis avarior uno* \*.

But lest I should be tempted to fall into a manner I have been obliged to disclaim in this part of my *miscellaneous* performance; I shall here set a period to this discourse, and renew my attempt of serious reflection and grave thought, by taking up my clew in a fresh chapter.

\* Horat. epist. 2. lib. 2.

## C H A P. II.

*Passage from terra incognita to the visible world.*  
 — *Mistressship of NATURE.* — *Animal-*  
*confederacy, degrees, subordination.* — *Ma-*  
*ster-animal man. Privilege of his birth.* —  
*Serious countenance of the author.*

AS heavily as it went with us in the deep philosophical part of our preceding chapter, and as necessarily engaged as we still are to prosecute the same serious INQUIRY, and search into those dark sources; it is hoped, that our remaining philosophy may flow in a more easy vein, and the second running be found somewhat clearer than the first. However it be, we may, at least, congratulate with ourselves for having thus briefly passed over that *metaphysical* part, to which we have paid sufficient deference. Nor shall we scruple to declare our opinion, "That it is, in a manner, necessary for one who would usefully philosophise, to have a knowledge in this part of philosophy, sufficient to satisfy him that there is no knowledge or wisdom to be learned from it." For of this truth nothing besides experience and study will be able fully to convince him.

When we are even past these empty regions and shadows of philosophy, it will still perhaps appear an uncomfortable kind of travelling through those other *invisible ideal* worlds; such as the study of *morals*, we see, engages us to visit. Men must acquire a very peculiar and strong habit of turning their eye inwards, in order to explore the *interior regions and recesses* of the MIND, the *hollow caverns* of deep thought, the private seats of fancy, and the *wastes and wildernesses*, as well as the  
 more

more fruitful and cultivated *tracts* of this *obscure climate*.

But what can one do? or how dispense with these *darker* disquisitions and *moon-light* voyages, when we have to deal with a sort of *moon-blind* WITS, who, though very acute and able in their kind, may be said to renounce *day-light*, and *extinguish*, in a manner, the bright visible outward world, by allowing us to *know* nothing beside what we can *prove*, by strict and formal *demonstration*?

It is therefore to satisfy such rigid *inquirers* as these, that we have been necessitated to proceed by the *inward* way; and that in our preceding chapter we have built only on such foundations as are taken from our very *perceptions, fancies, appearances, affections, and opinions* themselves, without regard to any thing of an *exterior* WORLD, and even on the supposition that there is *no such world in being*.

Such has been our late dry task. No wonder if it carries, indeed, a meagre and raw appearance. It may be looked on, in *philosophy*, as worse than a mere *Egyptian imposition*. For to make *brick* without *straw* or *stubble*, is perhaps an easier labour, than to prove *MORALS* without a *world*, and establish a *conduct of life* without the supposition of *any thing living or exant* besides our immediate *fancy*, and *WORLD of imagination*.

But having finished this *mysterious* work, we come now to open *day*, and *sun-shine*: and, as a poet perhaps might express himself, we are now ready to quit

*The dubious labyrinths, and Pyrrhonean cells  
Of a Cimmerian darkness.*—

We are, henceforward, to trust our eyes, and take for real *the whole creation*, and *the fair forms* which lie before us. We are to believe the ana-

tomy of our *own body*, and, in proportionable order, *the shapes, forms, habits, and constitutions* of other animal-races. Without demurring on the profound modern hypothesis of *animal insensibility*, we are to believe firmly and resolutely, “that other creatures have their *sense and feeling*, their mere *passions and affections*, as well as ourselves.” And in this manner we proceed accordingly, on our author’s scheme, “to inquire what is truly *natural* to each creature; and whether that which is *natural* to each, and is its *perfection*, be not withal its *happiness, or good*.”

To deny there is any thing properly *natural*, (after the concessions already made), would be undoubtedly very preposterous and absurd. NATURE and the *outward* world being owned existent, the rest must of necessity follow. The *anatomy* of bodies, the *order* of the spheres, the *proper mechanisms* of a thousand kinds, and the infinite *ends* and suitable *means* established in the general constitution and order of things; all this being once admitted, and allowed to pass as certain and unquestionable, it is as vain afterwards to except against the phrase of *natural* and *unnatural*, and question the propriety of this speech applied to the particular forms and beings in the world, as it would be to except against the common appellations of *vigour* and *decay* in plants, *health* or *sickness* in bodies, *sobriety* or *distraction* in minds, *prosperity* or *degeneracy* in any variable part of the known creation.

We may, perhaps, for humour’s sake, or after the known way of disputant hostility, in the support of any odd hypothesis, pretend to deny this *natural* and *unnatural* in things. It is evident however, that though our humour or taste be, by such affectation, ever so much depraved; we cannot resist

first our natural *anticipation* in behalf of NATURE \* ; according to whose supposed *standard* we perpetually approve and disapprove, and to whom in all natural appearances, all moral actions, (whatever

we

\* See what is said above on the word *sensus communis*, in that second treatise, vol. 1. p. 79. &c. and p. 85. 108. &c. and in the same vol. p. 263. &c. and 274, 5. &c. and in vol. 2. p. 230-308, 9. &c. concerning the *natural ideas*, and the *preconceptions* or *presentations* of this kind; the *προληψιας*, of which a learned critic and master in all philosophy, modern and ancient, takes notice, in his lately-published volume of *Socratic dialogues*; where he adds this reflection, with respect to some philosophical notions much in vogue amongst us, of late, here in England. *Obiter dumtaxat addemus, Socraticam, quam exposuimus, doctrinam magno usui esse posse, si probe expendatur, dirimenda inter viros doctos controversia, ante paucos annos, in BRITANNIA præsertim, exorta, de ideis innatis, quas dicere possis ἰμπεριεῖς ἰνοιας. Quamvis enim nullæ sint, si accurate loquamur, notiones a natura animis nostris infixæ; attamen nemo negarit ita esse facultates animorum nostrorum natura adfectas, ut quam primum ratione uti incipimus, verum a falso, malum a bono aliquo modo distinguere incipiamus. Species veritatis nobis semper placet; displicet contra mendacii: ino et HONESTUM INHONESTO præferimus; ob semina nobis indita, qua tum demum in lucem prodeunt, cum ratiocinari possumus, eoque uberiores fructus proferunt, quo melius ratiocinamur, accuratioreque institutione adjuvamus.* *Æsch. dial. cum Silvis philol. Jo. Cler. ann. 1711. p. 176.* They seem indeed to be but weak *philosophers*, though able *spinners*, and artful confounders of words and notions, who would refute *Nature* and *Common Sense*. But NATURE will be able still to shift for herself, and get the better of those schemes, which need no other force against them, than that of *Horace's* single verse :

*Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit. Unde, nisi INTUS*

*Monstratum?*

Sat. 1. lib. 2.

AN ASS (as an *English* author says) never butts with his ears; though a creature born to an *armed forehead*, exercises his *butting* faculty long ere his *horns* are come to him. And perhaps if the *philosopher* would accordingly examine himself, and consider his *natural* passions, he would find there were such belonged to him as *Nature* had premeditated in his behalf, and for which she had furnished him with *ideas* long before any particular practice or experience of his own. Nor would he need be scandalized with the comparison of a *goat*, or *boar*, or other of *Horace's* premeditating animals, who have more *natural* wit, it seems, than our *philosopher*; if we may

we contemplate, whatever we have in debate), we inevitably appeal, and pay our constant homage, with the most apparent zeal and passion.

It is here, above all other places, that we may say with strict justice,

NATURAM expellas furca, tamen usque recur-  
ret\*.

The airy gentlemen, who have never had it in their thoughts to study NATURE in their own species; but being taken with other loves, have applied their parts and genius to the same study in a horse, a dog, a game-cock, a hawk, or any other animal of that degree †, know very well, that to each species there belongs a several humour, temper, and turn of inward disposition, as real and peculiar as the figure and outward shape which is with so much curiosity beheld and admired. If there be any thing every so little amiss or wrong in the inward frame, the *humour* or *temper* of the creature, it is readily called *vicious*; and when more than ordinarily wrong, *unnatural*. The humours of the creatures, in order to their redress, are attentively observed; sometimes indulged and flattered; at other times controuled and checked with proper severities. In short, their affections, passions, appetites, and antipathies are as duly regarded as those

judge of him by his own hypothesis, which denies the same implanted SENSE and natural ideas to his own kind.

*Cras donaberis hædo;*

*Cui frens turgida cornibus*

*Primis, et venerem et prælia destinat.*

Od. 13. lib. 3.

And

*Verris obliquum meditantis istum.*

Ib. od. 22.

\* Hor. lib. 1. ep. 1c.

† Vol. 2. p. 67. 68. &c. and 97. &c. and 230. &c.



in human kind, under the strictest discipline of education. Such is the *SENSE of inward proportion and regularity of affections*, even in our noble youths themselves; who in this respect are often known expert and able *masters of education*, though not so susceptible of *discipline and culture* in their own case, after those early indulgences to which their greatness has intitled them.

As little favourable however as these sportly gentlemen are presumed to show themselves towards the care or culture of their *own species*; as remote as their contemplations are thought to lie from *nature and philosophy*; they confirm plainly and establish our philosophical foundation of the *natural ranks, orders, interior and exterior proportions of the several distinct species and forms of animal beings.* Ask one of these gentlemen, unawares, when solicitously careful and busied in the great concerns of his *stable or kennel*, “whether his *hound* or *greyhound-bitch* who eats her puppies, is as *natural* as the other who nurses them?” and he will think you frantic. Ask him again, “whether he thinks the *unnatural* creature who acts thus, or the *natural one* who does otherwise, is best in its kind, and enjoys itself the most?” and he will be inclined to think still as strangely of you. Or if perhaps he esteems you worthy of better information, he will tell you, “That his *best-bred* creatures, and of the *truest* race, are ever the noblest and most generous in their *natures*: that it is this chiefly which makes the difference between the *horse* of good blood, and the errant *jade* of a base breed; between the *game-cock*, and the *dunghill-craven*; between the true *hawk*, and the mere *kite* or *buzzard*; and between the right *mastiff, hound, or spaniel*, and the very *mungrel*.” He might, withal, tell you

you perhaps with a masterly air in this brutescience, "That the timorous, poor-spirited, lazy, " and gluttonous of his *dogs*, were those whom he " either suspected to be of a spurious race, or who " had been, by some accident, spoiled in their " nursing and management; for that this was not " *natural* to them: That in every kind, they " were still the miserablest creatures who were thus " spoiled; and that having each of them their proper *chace* or *business*, if they lay resty and *out of their game*, chambered and idle, they were the same as if taken out of their element: That the saddest curs in the world, were those who took the kitchen-chimney and dripping-pan for their delight; and that the only *happy DOG* (were one to be a *dog ONE'S SELF*) was *he*, who, in his proper sport and *exercise*, his *natural* pursuit and game, endured all hardships, and had so much delight in exercise and in the field, as to forget *home* and his *reward*."

Thus the *natural* habits and affections of the inferior creatures are known, and their *unnatural* and degenerate part discovered. Depravity and corruption is acknowledged as real in their *affections*, as when any thing is mishapen, wrong, or monstrous in their *outward make*. And notwithstanding much of this inward depravity is discoverable in the creatures tamed by man, and, for his service or pleasure merely, turned from their natural course into a contrary life and habit; notwithstanding that, by this means, the creatures who naturally herd with one another, lose their associating humour, and they who naturally pair and are constant to each other, lose their kind of conjugal alliance and affection; yet when released from human servitude, and returned again to their natural *wilds*, and rural liberty, they instantly resume their *natural*

*natural* and regular habits, such as are conducing to the increase and prosperity of their own species.

Well it is perhaps for *mankind*, that though there are so many animals who naturally herd for *company's sake*, and *mutual affection*, there are so few who, for *conveniency*, and by *necessity*, are obliged to a strict union, and kind of confederate state. The creatures who, according to the œconomy of their kind, are obliged to make themselves habitations of defence against the seasons and other incidents; they who, in some parts of the year, are deprived of all subsistence, and are therefore necessitated to accumulate in another, and to provide withal for the safety of their collected stores, are by *their nature* indeed as strictly joined, and with as proper affections towards their public and community, as the looser kind, of a more easy subsistence and support, are united in what relates merely to their offspring, and the propagation of their species. Of these *thoroughly-associating* and *confederate animals*, there are none I have ever heard of, who, in bulk or strength, exceed *the BEAVER*. The major part of these *political* animals, and creatures of a *joint stock*, are as inconsiderable as the race of *ANTS* or *BEEs*. But had nature assigned such an œconomy as this to so puissant an animal, for instance, as *the ELEPHANT*, and made him, withal, as prolific as those smaller creatures commonly are; it might have gone hard perhaps with *mankind*: and a single animal, who, by his proper might and prowess, has often decided the fate of the greatest battles which have been fought by human race, should he have grown up into a society, with a genius for architecture and mechanics, proportionable to what we observe in those smaller creatures; we should, with all our invented machines,

chines, have found it hard to dispute with him the dominion of the continent.

Were we in a disinterested view, or with somewhat less selfishness than ordinary, to consider the œconomies, parts, interests, conditions, and terms of life, which *Nature* has distributed and assigned to the several *species* of creatures round us, we should not be apt to think ourselves so hardly dealt with. But whether our lot in this respect be just or equal, is not the question with us at present. It is enough that we know, "there is certainly an assignment and distribution: that each œconomy or part so distributed, is in itself uniform, fixed, and inviolable: and that if any thing in the creature be accidentally impaired, if any thing in the inward form, the disposition, temper, or affections, be contrary or unsuitable to the distinct œconomy or part, the creature is wretched and unnatural."

The social or natural affections, which our author considers as essential to the health, *wholeness*, or integrity of the particular creature, are such as contribute to the welfare and prosperity of that *whole* or *species*, to which he is by nature joined. All the affections of this kind our author comprehends in that single name of *natural*. But as the design or end of nature in each animal system, is exhibited chiefly in the support and propagation of the particular species; it happens, of consequence, that those affections of earliest alliance and mutual kindness between the parent and the offspring, are known more particularly by the name of *natural affection* \*. However, since it is evident that all defect or depravity of affection, which counterworks or opposes the original constitution and œ-

\* *Στέργειν*. For which we have no particular name in our language.  
conomy

economy of the creature, is *unnatural*; it follows, "that in creatures, who, by their particular œconomy, are fitted to *the strictest society* and rule of *common good*, the *most unnatural* of all affections are those which separate from this community; and the *most truly natural*, generous, and noble, are those which tend towards *public service*, and the interest of *the SOCIETY at large.*"

This is the main *problem* which our author, in more *philosophical* terms, demonstrates, in this treatise \*, "That for a creature whose natural end is *society*, to operate as is by *Nature appointed him*; towards the good of such his *SOCIETY* or *WHOLE*, is in reality to pursue his own natural and proper *GOOD*;" and, "That to operate *contrarywise*, or by such affections as sever from that common good, or public interest, is, in reality, to work towards his own natural and proper *ILL.*" Now, if *man*, as has been proved, be justly ranked in the number of those creatures whose œconomy is according to a *joint stock* and *public weal*; if it be understood, withal, that the only state of his affections which answers rightly to this *public weal*, is the regular, orderly, or virtuous state; it necessarily follows, "that *VIRTUE* is his *natural good*, and *VICE* his *misery and ill.*"

As for that further consideration, "whether *NATURE* has orderly and justly distributed the several *œconomies* or *parts*; and whether the defects, failures, or calamities of *particular systems* are to the advantage of all *in general*, and contribute to the perfection of the *one common and universal system*;" we must refer to our author's profounder speculations in this his *INQUIRY*,

† *Viz.* the Inquiry concerning Virtue, vol. 2.

and

and in his following *philosophic* DIALOGUE. But if what he advances in this respect be real, or at least the most probable by far of any scheme or representation which can be made of *the universal nature and cause of things*; it will follow, “That since MAN has been so constituted, by means of his rational part, as to be conscious of this his more immediate relation to the universal system, and principle of order and intelligence; he is not only *by nature* sociable, within the limits of his own species or kind; but in a yet more generous and extensive manner. He is not only born to VIRTUE, *friendship, honesty, and faith*; but to RELIGION, *piety, adoration, and a generous surrender\** of his mind to whatever happens from that *supreme CAUSE, or ORDER* of things, which he acknowledges entirely *just and perfect.*”

THESE are our *author's* formal and grave sentiments; which if they were not truly *his*, and sincerely espoused by him, as the real result of his best judgment and understanding, he would be guilty of a more than common degree of imposture. For, according to his own rule †, an affected gravity, and feigned seriousness, carried on through any subject, in such a manner as to leave no insight into the fiction or intended raillery, is, in truth, no *raillery* or *wit* at all; but a gross, immoral, and illiberal way of *abuse*, foreign to the character of a *good writer, a gentleman, or man of WORTH.*

But since we have thus acquitted ourselves of that serious part, of which our reader was beforehand well apprised, let him now expect us again in

\* Vol. 2. p. 52. &c.

† Vol. 1. p. 47.

our original MISCELLANEOUS manner and capacity. It is here, as has been explained to him, that *raillery* and *humour* are permitted; and flights, fallies, and excursions of every kind, are found agreeable and requisite. Without this, there might be less safety found perhaps in *thinking*. Every light *reflection* might run us up to the dangerous state of *meditation*. And in reality, *profound thinking* is many times the cause of *shallow thought*. To prevent this *contemplative habit* and *character*, of which we see so little good effect in the world, we have reason perhaps to be fond of the *diverting* manner in writing and discourse, especially if the subject be of a *solemn* kind. There is more need, in this case, to interrupt the long-spun thread of reasoning, and bring into the mind, by *many* different glances and broken views, what cannot so easily be introduced by *one* steady bent, or continued stretch of sight.

M I S C E L L A N Y V.

C H A P. I.

*Ceremonial adjusted between* AUTHOR *and* READER. — *Affectation of precedency in the former.* — *Various claim to inspiration.* — *Bards; prophets; Sibylline scripture.* — *Written oracles; in verse and prose.* — *Common interest of ancient letters and Christianity.* — *State of wit, elegance, and correctness.* — *Poetic truth.* — *Preparation for criticism on our author, in his concluding treatise.*

OF all the artificial relations formed between mankind, the most capricious and variable is that of *author* and *reader*. Our author, for his

part, has declared his opinion of this, where he gives his advice to modern authors \*. And though he supposes that every *author in form*, is, in respect of the particular matter he explains, superior in understanding to his *reader*; yet he allows not that any author should assume the upper-hand, or pretend to withdraw himself from that necessary subjection to foreign judgment and criticism, which must determine the place of honour on the reader's side.

It is evident that an author's art and labour are for his *reader's* sake alone. It is to his reader he makes his application, if not openly and avowedly, yet at least with implicit courtship. *Poets* indeed, and especially those of a modern kind, have a peculiar manner of treating this affair with a high hand. They pretend to set themselves above mankind. "Their *pens* are *sacred*; their style and utterance *divine*." They write often, as in a language foreign to human kind; and would disdain to be reminded of those poor elements of speech, their *alphabet* and *grammar*.

But here inferior mortals presume often to intercept their flight, and remind them of their fallible and human part. Had those first poets who began this pretence to *inspiration*, been taught a manner of communicating their rapturous thoughts and high ideas by some other medium than that of *style* and *language*; the case might have stood otherwise. But the *inspiring* DIVINITY or MUSE having, in the explanation of herself, submitted her wit and sense to the mechanic rules of *human arbitrary* composition; she must, in consequence, and by necessity, submit herself to *human arbitration*, and *the judgment* of the *literate world*. And thus

\* *Viz.* treatise 3. vol. 1.



THE READER is still superior, and keeps the upper-hand.

It is indeed no small absurdity, to assert a work or treatise, written in *human language*, to be above *human criticism* or *censure*. For if the art of writing be from the grammatical rules of human invention and determination; if even these rules are formed on casual practice and various use; there can be no *scripture* but what must, of necessity, be subject to the reader's narrow scrutiny and strict judgment; unless a language and grammar, different from any of human structure, were delivered down from heaven, and miraculously accommodated to human service and capacity.

It is no otherwise in the grammatical art of characters, and *painted speech*, than in the art of *painting* itself. I have seen, in certain Christian churches, an ancient piece or two, affirmed, on the solemn faith of priestly tradition, "to have been angelically and divinely wrought, by a supernatural hand and sacred pencil." Had the piece happened to be of a hand like *Raphael's*, I could have found nothing certain to oppose to this tradition. But having observed the whole *style* and manner of the pretended heavenly workmanship to be so indifferent as to vary in many particulars from *the truth of art*, I presumed within myself to beg pardon of the tradition, and assert confidently, "that if the *pencil* had been heaven-guided, it could never have been so lame in its performance;" it being a mere contradiction to all divine and moral truth, that a *celestial hand*, submitting itself to the rudiments of a *human art*, should sin against *the ART itself*, and express *falsehood* and *error*, instead of *justness* and *proportion*.

It may be alledged perhaps, "That there are, however, certain *AUTHORS* in the world, who  
 O 2 " though,

“ though, of themselves, they neither boldly claim  
 “ the privilege of *divine inspiration*, nor carry in-  
 “ deed the least resemblance of *perfection* in their  
 “ style or composition; yet they subdue *the* READ-  
 “ ER, gain the ascendent over his thought and  
 “ judgment, and force from him a certain *implicit*  
 “ *veneration and esteem.*” To this I can only  
 answer, “ That if there be neither spell nor in-  
 “ chantment in the case, this can plainly be no  
 “ other than mere ENTHUSIASM;” except, per-  
 haps, where *the supreme powers* have given their  
 sanction to any *religious record*, or *pious writ*:  
 and in this case, indeed, it becomes immoral and  
 profane in any one to deny absolutely, or dispute  
*the sacred authority* of the least line or syllable  
 contained in it. But should *the record*, instead of  
 being *single, short, and uniform*, appear to be  
*multifarious, voluminous, and of the most difficult*  
*interpretation*; it would be somewhat hard, if not  
 wholly impracticable in the magistrate, to suffer  
 this record to be *universally current*, and at the  
 same time prevent its being *variously apprehended*  
 and *descanted on*, by the several *differing geniuses*  
 and *contrary judgments* of mankind.

It is remarkable, that, in the politest of all na-  
 tions, the writings looked upon as most *sacred*  
 were those of their great POETS; whose works  
 indeed were truly *divine*, in respect of *art*, and  
*the perfection of their frame and composition*. But  
 there was yet more *divinity* ascribed to them\*,  
 than what is comprehended in this latter sense.  
 The notions of vulgar religion were built on their  
 miraculous narrations. The wiser and better sort  
 themselves paid a regard to them in this respect;  
 though they interpreted them indeed more *allego-*

\* *Supra*, p. 107. in the notes.

*rically.*

rically. Even the *philosophers* who criticised them with most severity, were not their least admirers; when they ascribed to them that divine *inspiration*\*, or *sublime ENTHUSIASM*, of which our author has largely treated elsewhere †.

It would, indeed, ill become any pretender to divine writing, to publish his work under a character of *divinity*, if, after all his endeavours, he came short of a *consummate and just performance*. In this respect the *Cumean Sibyl* was not so indiscreet or frantic, as she might appear, perhaps, by writing her *prophetic* warnings and pretended *inspirations upon joint leaves*; which, immediately after their elaborate superscription, were torn in pieces, and scattered by the wind.

*Insanam vatem aspicias; quæ rupe sub ima  
Fata canit, foliisque notas et nomina mandat.  
Quæcunque in foliis descripsit carmina virgo,  
Digerit in numerum, atque antro seclusa relinquit.*

*Illæ manent immota locis, neque ab ordine cedunt.*

*Verum eadem, verso tenuis cum cardine ventus  
Impulit, et teneras turbavit janua frondes:  
Nunquam deinde cavo volitantia prendere saxo,  
Nec revocare situs, aut jungere carmina curat.  
Inconsulti abeunt, sedemque odere SIBYLLE ‡.*

It was impossible to disprove the *DIVINITY* of such writings, whilst they could be perused only in fragments. Had the sister-priestess of *Delphos*, who delivered herself in audible plain metre, been found at any time to have transgressed the rule of *verse*, it would have been difficult in those days to

\* Vol. 1. p. 40. 41. &c.

† Viz. letter of enthusiasm, vol. 1.; and above, Misc. 2. chap. 1. 2.

‡ Virg. Æn. lib. 3.

father the lame poetry upon *Apollo* himself. But where the invention of *the leaves* prevented the reading of a single line entire; whatever interpretations might have been made of this *fragil* and *volatile* scripture, no imperfection could be charged on the *original* TEXT itself.

What those volumes \* may have been, which the disdainful *Sibyl* or prophets committed to the flames; or what the remainder was, which the *Roman* prince received and consecrated; I will not pretend to judge: though it has been admitted for truth by the ancient Christian fathers, that these writings were so far sacred and divine, as to have prophesied of the birth of our *religious founder*, and bore testimony to that *holy writ* which has preserved his memory, and is justly held, in the highest degree, *sacred* among Christians.

The policy however of *old Rome* was such, as not absolutely to rest the authority of their religion on any *composition of literature*. The *Sibylline volumes* were kept safely locked, and inspected only by such as were ordained, or deputed for that purpose. And in this policy the *new Rome* has followed their example, in scrupling to annex the supreme authority and sacred character of infallibility to *SCRIPTURE itself*, and in refusing to submit *that scripture* to *public* judgment, or to any eye or ear but what they qualify for the inspection of such sacred mysteries.

The *Mahometan* clergy seem to have a different policy. They boldly rest the foundation of their

\* *Libri tres in sacrum conditi, Sibyllini appellati. Ad eos quasi ad oraculum quindecimviri adeunt, cum Dii immortales publice consulendi sunt.* Aul. Gell. lib. 1. cap. 19. et Plin. lib. 13. cap. 13. But of this first *Sibylline* scripture, and of other canonised books and additional *sacred writ* among the *Romans*, see what *Dionysius Halicarnassensis* cites (from *Varro's Roman Theologies*) in his history, lib. 4. p. 62.

religion

religion on *a book*; such a one as (according to their pretension) is not only perfect, but *inimitable*. Were a real man of letters, and a just critic, permitted to examine this *scripture* by the known rules of art, he would soon perhaps refute this plea. But so barbarous is the accompanying policy and temper of these *Eastern* religionists, that they discourage, and in effect extinguish all true learning, science, and the politer arts, in company with the ancient authors and languages, which they set aside; and by this infallible method leave their SACRED WRIT the *sole standard of literate performance*. For being compared to nothing besides itself, or what is of an inferior kind, it must undoubtedly be thought *incomparable*.

It will be yielded, surely, to the honour of the *Christian world*, that their *faith* (especially that of the Protestant churches) stands on a more generous foundation. They not only allow *comparison* of authors, but are content to derive their proofs of the validity of their sacred record and revelation, even from those authors called *profane*; as being well apprised, (according to the maxim of our *divine master* \*), "that in what we bear witness only to ourselves, our witness cannot be established as a truth." So that there being at present no immediate testimony of *miracle* or *sign* in behalf of holy writ; and there being in its own particular composition or style nothing miraculous or self-convincing; if the collateral testimony of other ancient records, historians, and foreign authors, were destroyed, or wholly lost, there would be less argument or plea remaining against that natural suspicion of those who are called *sceptical*, "that the *holy records* themselves were no other

\* John v. 31.

" than

“ than the pure invention or artificial compilement  
 “ of an *interested party*, in behalf of *the richest*  
 “ *corporation* and most profitable *monopoly* which  
 “ could be erected in the world.”

Thus, in reality, the interest of our pious clergy is necessarily joined with that of *ancient letters*, and *polite learning*. By *this* they perpetually refute the crafty arguments of those objectors. When they abandon *this*, they resign their cause. When they strike at it, they strike even at the root and foundation of our holy *faith*, and weaken that pillar on which the whole fabric of our *religion* depends.

It belongs to mere *enthusiasts* and *fanatics* to plead the sufficiency of a reiterated translated *text*, derived to them through so many channels, and subjected to so many variations, of which they are wholly ignorant. Yet would they persuade us, it seems, that from hence alone they can recognise the divine Spirit, and receive it in themselves, unsubject (as they imagine) to any rule, and superior to what they themselves often call *the dead letter*, and *unprofitable science*.—This, any one may see, is building castles in the air, and demolishing them again at pleasure; as the exercise of any *aereal fancy*, or heated *imagination*.

But the judicious divines of the established Christian churches have sufficiently condemned this manner. They are far from resting their religion on the common aspect, or obvious form of their *vulgar BIBLE*, as it presents itself in the *printed copy*, or modern *version*. Neither do they, in *the original itself*, represent it to us as *a very masterpiece of writing*, or as absolutely perfect in the purity and justness, either of style or composition. They allow the holy authors to have written according to their best faculties, and the strength of their

their natural genius: "A shepherd like a shepherd, and a prince like a prince: A man of reading, and advanced in letters, like a proficient in the kind; and a man of meaner capacity and reading, like one of the ordinary sort, in his own common idiom and imperfect manner of narration."

It is the *substance* only of the narrative, and the *principal facts* confirming the authority of the revelation, which our divines think themselves concerned to prove, according to the best evidence of which the matter itself is capable. And whilst the sacred authors themselves allude not only to the *annals* and *histories* of the HEATHEN world, but even to the *philosophical* works, the regular *poems* \*, the very *plays* and *comedies* † of the learned and polite ancients; it must be owned, that as those ancient writings are impaired, or lost, not only the *light* and *clearness* of holy writ, but even the *evidence* itself of its *main facts*, must in proportion be diminished and brought in question. So ill advised were those devout churchmen ‡ heretofore,

\* *Aratus*, Acts xvii. 28.; and *Epimenides*, Titus i. 12. Even one of their own PROPHEETS. For so the holy apostle deigned to speak of a Heathen poet, a *physiologist*, and *divine*; who prophesied of events, wrought miracles, and was received as an inspired writer, and author of revelations, in the chief cities and states of Greece.

† *Menander*, 1 Cor. xv. 33.

‡ Even in the sixth century, the famed *Gregorius* Bishop of Rome, who is so highly celebrated for having planted the Christian religion, by his missionary monks, in our *English* nation of Heathen Saxons, was so far from being a cultivator or supporter of arts or letters, that he carried on a kind of general massacre upon every product of human wit. His own words, in a letter to one of the *French* bishops, a man of the highest consideration and merit, (as a noted modern critic, and satirical genius of that nation acknowledges), are as follow. *Pervenit ad nos quod sine verecundia memorare non possumus, fraternitatem tuam GRAMMATICAM quibusdam exponere. Quam rem ita moleste suscepimus, ac sumus vehementius aspernati, ut ea quæ prius dicta fuerunt, in gemitum et tristitiam verteremus,*

tofore, who in the height of zeal did their utmost to destroy all footsteps of *Heathen literature*, and consequently

*ceremus, quia in uno se ore cum Jovis laudibus Christi laudes non capiunt. \* \* \* \* Unde si post hoc evidenter ea quae ad nos perlata sunt, falsa esse claruerint, nec vos NUGIS et SECULARIBUS LITERIS studere contigerit, Deo nostro gratias agimus, qui cor vestrum maculari blasphemis nefandorum laudibus non permisit.* Gregorii opera, epist. 48. lib. 9. Paris. ann. 1533. And in his dedication, or first preface to his morals, after some very insipid rhetoric, and figurative dialect, employed against the study and art of speech, he has another sting at the classic authors and discipline; betraying his inveterate hatred to ancient learning, as well as the natural effect of this zealot-passion, in his own barbarity both of style and manners. His words are, *Unde et ipsam artem loquendi, quam magisteria disciplina exterioris insinuant, servare despexi. Nam sicut hujus quoque epistola tenor enunciat, non metacismi collisionem fugio: non barbarismi confusionem devito, situs motusque praepositionum rursusque servare contemno: quia indignum vehementer existimo, ut verba caelestis oraculi restringam sub regulis Donati.* That he carried this savage zeal of his so far as to destroy (what in him lay) the whole body of learning, with all the classic authors then in being, was generally believed. And (what was yet more notorious and unnatural in a Roman pontiff) the destruction of the statues, sculptures, and finest pieces of antiquity in Rome, was charged on him by his successor in the SEE; as, besides *Platina*, another writer of his life, without the least apology, confesses, See in the above-cited edition of *St Gregory's works*, at the beginning, viz. *Vita D. Gregorii ex Joan. Laziardo Caelestino*. It is no wonder, therefore, if other writers have given account of that folly of the prelate's zeal against the books and learning of the ancients; for which the reason alledged was very extraordinary, "That the holy scriptures would be the better relished, and receive a considerable advantage, by the destruction of these rivals." It seems they had no very high idea of the holy scriptures, when they supposed them such losers by a comparison. However, it was thought adviseable by other fathers (who had a like view) to frame new pieces of literature, after the model of these condemned ancients. Hence those ridiculous attempts of new heroic poems, new epics and dramatics, new Homers, Euripides's, Menanders, which were with so much pains and so little effect industriously set afoot by the zealous priesthood; when ignorance prevailed, and the hierarchal dominion was so universal. But though their power had well nigh compassed the destruction of those great originals, they were far from being able to procure any reception for their puny imitations. The mock-works have lain in their deserved obscurity; as will all other attempts of that kind, concerning which our author has already given his opinion, vol. 1.



consequently all further use of *learning* or *antiquity*.

But happily the *zeal* of this kind is now left as proper only to those despised and ignorant *modern enthusiasts* we have described. The *Roman church* itself is so recovered from this *primitive fanaticism*, that their great men, and even their *pontiffs* \*, are found ready to give their helping hand, and confer their bounty liberally, towards the advancement of all ancient and polite learning. They justly observe, that their very *traditions* stand in need of some collateral proof. The conservation of these other ancient and disinterested authors, they wisely judge essential to the credibility of those principal facts, on which the whole *religious history* and *tradition* depend.

It would indeed be in vain for us to bring a *Pontius Pilate* into our creed, and recite what happened under him in *Judea*, if we knew not “ un-

p. 279. &c. But as to the ill policy, as well as barbarity of this *zealot-enmity* against the works of the ancients, a foreign Protestant divine, and most learned defender of religion, making the best excuse he can for the *Greek fathers*, and endeavouring to clear them from this general charge of havock and massacre committed upon *science* and *erudition*, has these words. *Si cela est, voilà encore un nouveau sujet de mépriser les patriarches de Constantinople qui n'étoient d'ailleurs rien moins que gens de bien; mais j'ai de la peine à le croire, parce qu'il nous est resté de poètes infiniment plus sages que ceux qui se sont perdus. Personne ne doute qu'Aristophane ne fût beaucoup plus sage, que n'étoit Menander. Plutarque en est un bon témoin, dans la comparaison qu'il a faite de ces deux poètes. Il pourroit être néanmoins arrivé, que quelques ECCLESIASTIQUES ennemis des belles lettres, en eussent usé comme dit Chalcondyle, sans penser qu'en conservant toute l'antiquité Grecque, ils conserveroient la langue de leurs prédécesseurs, et une infinité de faits qui servoient beaucoup à l'intelligence et à la confirmation de l'histoire sacrée, et même de la religion Chrétienne. Ces gens-là devoient au moins nous conserver les histoires anciennes des orientaux, comme des Chaldéens, des Tyriens, et des Egyptiens; mais ils agissoient plus par ignorance et par négligence, que par raison.* BIBL. CHOIS. tom. 14. p 131. 132. 133.

\* Such a one is the present prince, *Clement XI.* an encourager of all arts and sciences.

“ der

“ der whom he himself governed, whose authority  
 “ he had, or what character he bore, in that re-  
 “ mote country, and amidst a foreign people.”  
 In the same manner, it would be in vain for a *Roman pontiff* to derive his title to spiritual sovereignty from the seat, influence, power, and donation of the *Roman Cæsars*, and their *successors*; if it appeared not by any *history*, or *collateral testimony*,  
 “ who the first *Cæsars* were; and how they came  
 “ possessed of that universal power, and long resi-  
 “ dence of dominion.”

MY reader, doubtless, by this time, must begin to wonder through what labyrinth of speculation, and odd texture of capricious reflections I am offering to conduct him. But he will not, I presume, be altogether displeas'd with me, when I give him to understand, that being now come into my last MISCELLANY, and being sensible of the little courtship I have paid him, comparatively with what is practis'd in that kind by other modern authors; I am willing, by way of compensation, to express my *loyalty* or *homage* towards him, and shew, by my natural sentiments and principles, “ what particular deference and high respect I think to be  
 “ his due.”

The issue therefore of this long *deduction* is, in the first place, with due compliments, in my capacity of *author*, and in the name of all *modest workmen* willingly joining with me in this representation, to congratulate our *English* READER on the establishment of what is so advantageous to himself; I mean, that mutual *relation* between him and ourselves, which naturally turns so much to his advantage, and makes *us* to be in reality the subservient party. And in this respect, it is to be hoped he will long enjoy his just superiority and privilege  
 over

over his humble servants, who compose and labour for his sake. The *relation* in all likelihood must still continue, and be improved. Our common religion and Christianity, founded on *letters* and *scripture*, promises thus much. Nor is this hope likely to fail us, whilst READERS are really allowed the liberty to *read*; that is to say, to *examine*, *construe*, and *remark with understanding*. LEARNING and SCIENCE must of necessity flourish, whilst the language of the wisest and most learned of nations is acknowledged to contain the principal and essential part of our holy revelation. And CRITICISM, *examinations*, *judgments*, *literate labours*, and *inquiries*, must still be in repute and practice, whilst *ancient authors*, so necessary to the support of *the sacred volumes*, are in request, and afford employment of such infinite extent to us *moderns*, of whatever degree, who are desirous to signalize ourselves by any achievement in *letters*, and be considered as the investigators of *knowledge* and *politeness*.

I may undoubtedly, by virtue of my preceding argument in behalf of criticism, be allowed, without suspicion of flattery or mere courtship, to assert the READER'S privilege above the *author*, and assign to him, as I have done, the upper hand, and place of honour. As to fact, we know for certain, that the greatest of *philosophers*, the very founder of philosophy itself, was no *author*. Nor did *the divine author* and *founder of our religion* condescend to be *an author* in this other respect. He who could best have given us the history of his own life, with the *entire* sermons and divine discourses which he made in public, was pleased to leave it to *others*, "*to take in hand*:" as there were *many*, it seems, long afterwards, who did; and undertook accordingly "*to write in order*, and *as seemed*"

VOL. III. P "good

“ good to them, for the better information of particular persons, what was then believed among the initiated or catechized, from tradition, and early instruction in their youth; or what had been transmitted, by report, from such as were the presumed auditors, and eye-witnesses of those things in former time\*.”

Whether those sacred books ascribed to the divine legislator of the Jews, and which treat of his death, burial, and succession, as well as of his life and actions †, are strictly to be understood as coming from the immediate pen of that holy founder, or rather from some other inspired hand, guided by the same influencing Spirit; I will not presume so

\* So *Luke*, chap. i.  $\Psi$  1. 2. 3. 4. (1.) “ Forasmuch as MANY have taken in hand to set forth, in order, a declaration (*exposition* or *narrative*, διήγησιν) of those things which are most surely believed among (or were fulfilled in, or among) us; (2.) Even as they delivered them unto us, which from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word: (3.) It seemed good to ME also, having had perfect understanding of all things from the very first, (or having looked back, and searched accurately into all matters from the beginning, or highest time, παρεκολυθηκότι ἀνωθεν πάντων ἀκριβῶς), to write unto thee in order, most excellent *Theophilus*; (4.) That thou mightst know the certainty (or validity, sound discussion, ἀσφάλειαν) of those things wherein THOU hast been instructed (or catechized), περὶ ὧν κατήχηθης.” Whether the words *πεπληροφορημένων ἐν ἡμῖν*, in the first verse, should be rendered *believed among*, or *fulfilled in*, or *among us*, may depend on the different reading of the original. For in some copies, the ἐν next following is left out. However, the exact interpreters, or verbal translators, render it *fulfilled*. *Vid. Ar. Montan. edit. Planin. 1584.* In  $\Psi$  4. the word CERTAINTY, ἀσφάλειαν, is interpreted ἀκριβείαν, *validity, soundness, good foundation*, from the sense of the preceding verse. See the late edition of our learned Dr Mill, *ex recensione Kusteri*, Rot. 1710. For the word *catechized*, κατήχηθης, (the last of the fourth verse), *Rob. Constantine* has this explanation of it. *Priscis theologis apud Aegyptios mos erat, ut mysteria voce tantum, veluti per manus, posteris relinquerent. Apud Christianos, qui baptismatis erant candidati, iis, viva voce, tradebantur fidei Christiana mysteria, sine scriptis: quod Paulus et Lucas κατήχων vocant. Unde qui docebantur, catechumeni vocabantur; qui docebant, catechistæ.*

† Deut. xxiv. 5. 6. 7. &c.

much

much as to examine or inquire. But in general, we find, that both as to public concerns in religion and in philosophy, the great and eminent *actors* were of a rank superior to the *writing-worthies*. The great *Athenian* legislator, though noted as a poetical genius, cannot be esteemed an *author*, for the sake of some few verses he may occasionally have made. Nor was the great *Spartan founder*, a *poet himself*, though *author* or *redeemer* (if I may so express it) to the greatest and best of poets; who owed in a manner his form and being to the accurate searches and collections of that great *patron*. The *politicians* and *civil SAGES*, who were fitted in all respects for the great scene of business, could not, it seems, be well taken out of it, to attend the slender and minute affairs of *letters*, and *scholastic science*.

It is true indeed, that without a *capacity* for action, and a *knowledge* of the world and mankind, there can be no author naturally qualified to write with dignity, or execute any noble or great design. But there are many, who, with the highest capacities for business, are, by their fortune, denied the privilege of that higher sphere. As there are others, who having once moved in it, have been afterwards, by many impediments and obstructions, necessitated to retire, and exert their genius in this lower degree.

It is to some catastrophe of this kind that we owe the noblest *historians*, (even the two *princes* and *fathers* of history), as well as the greatest *philosophical* writers, the *founder* of the ACADEMY, and others, who were also noble in respect of their birth, and fitted for the highest stations in the public; but discouraged from engaging in it, on account of some misfortunes experienced either in their own persons, or that of their near friends.

It is to the early banishment and long retirement of a heroic youth out of his native country, that we owe an original system of works, the politest, wisest, usefullest, and (to those who can understand the *divineness* of a just *simplicity*) the most *amiable* \*, and even the most elevating and exalting of all uninspired and merely human authors.

To this fortune we owe some of the greatest of the ancient poets. It was this chance which produced the MUSE of an exalted *Grecian* LYRIC †, and of his follower *Horace* ‡; whose character, though easy to be gathered from history, and his own works, is little observed by any of his commentators: the general idea, conceived of him, being drawn chiefly from his precarious and low circumstances at court, after the forfeiture of his estate, under the usurpation and conquest of an *Octavius*, and the ministry of a *Mæcenas*; not from his better condition, and nobler employments in earlier days, under the favour and friendship of *greater and better men*, whilst the *Roman* state and liberty subsisted. For of this change he himself, as great a courtier as he seemed afterwards, gives sufficient intimation ||.

Let

\* Τὸν ἠδίστον ἔχρησταιὸν Ἑλεροπόνητα, as *Athenæus* calls him, lib. 2. See vol. 1. p. 201.

† Et te sinantem plenius aureo,  
ALCÆE, plestro dura navis,  
Dura fuga mala, dura belli. Horat. Od. 13. lib. 2.

‡ ————— Age, dic Latinum,  
Barbite, carmen,  
Lesio primum modulate civi;  
Qui ferox bello, &c. Horat. Od. 32. lib. 1.

|| Dura sed emovere loco me tempora grato,  
Civilisque rudem belli tulit ætus in arma,  
Cæsaris Augusti non responsura iacertis.  
Unde simul primum me dimisere Philippi,  
Decisus humilem pennis, inopemque patrum

Et

Let **AUTHORS** therefore know themselves; and though conscious of worth, virtue, and a genius, such as may justly place them above flattery or mean courtship to their **READER**; yet let them reflect,

*Et laris et fundi, paupertas impulit audax  
Ut versus facerem.*

Horat. epist. 2. lib. 2. et sat. 6. lib. 1.

————— *At olim  
Quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno.*

*Viz.* under **Brutus**. Whence again that natural boast:

*Me primis urbis BELLII placuisse domique.* Epist. 20.

And again,

————— *Cum MAGNIS vixisse iuncta fatebitur usque  
Invidia.* Sat. 1. lib. 2.

Where the *vixisse* shews plainly whom he principally meant by his **MAGNI**, his early patrons and great men in the state: his apology and defence here, (as well as in his fourth and sixth satires of his first book, and his 2d epistle of his second, and elsewhere), being supported still by the open and bold assertion of his good education, (equal to the highest senators, and under the best masters), his employments at home and abroad, and his early commerce and familiarity with former great men, before these his new friendships and this latter court-acquaintance, which was now envied him by his adversaries.

*NUNC quia Mæcenæ, tibi sum convicter: at OLIM  
Quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno.*

The reproach now was with respect to a **Mæcenæ** or **Augustus**. It was the same formerly with respect to a **Brutus**, and those who were then the principal and leading men. The complaint or murmur against him on account of his being an *upstart* or *favourite* under a **Mæcenæ** and **Augustus**, could not be answered, by a *vixisse* relating to the same persons, any more than his *placuisse* joined with his **BELLII domique** could relate to those under whom he never went to war, nor would ever consent to bear any honours. For so he himself distinguishes (Sat. 6. to **Mæcenæ**)

————— *Quia non ut forsit honorem  
Jure mihi invidet quivis, ita te quoque amicum.*

He was formerly an actor, and in the ministry of affairs; now only a **FRIEND** to a minister; himself still a private and retired man. That he refused **Augustus's** offer of the secretaryship, is well known.

fect, that *as authors merely*, they are but of the second rank of men. And let the READER withal consider, “that when he unworthily resigns the place of honour, and surrenders his *taste*, or *judgment*, to *an author* of ever so great a name, or venerable antiquity, and not to *reason*, and *truth*, at whatever hazard; he not only betrays *himself*, but withal the *common cause* of AUTHOR and READER, the interest of *letters* and *knowledge*, and the chief *liberty*, *privilege*, and *prerogative* of the rational part of mankind.”

It is related in history of the *Cappadocians*, that being offered their *liberty* by the *Romans*, and permitted to govern themselves by their own laws and constitutions, they were much terrified at the proposal; and, as if some sore harm had been intended them, humbly made it their request, “that they might be governed by arbitrary power, and that an absolute governor might without delay be appointed over them at the discretion of the *Romans*.” For such was their disposition towards mere *slavery* and *subjection*, that they dared not pretend so much as to *chuse* their own MASTER. So essential they thought SLAVERY, and so *divine* a thing *the right of* MASTERSHIP, that they dared not be so *free* even as to presume to give themselves that blessing, which they chose to leave rather to *providence*, *fortune*, or a CONQUEROR to bestow upon them. They dared not *make* a king; but would rather *take* one from their powerful neighbours. Had they been necessitated to come to an

But in these circumstances, the politeness as well as artifice of *Horace* is admirable; in making *futurity* or *posterity* to be the speaking party in both those places where he suggests his intimacy and favour with the *great*, that there might, in some measure, be room left (though in strictness there was scarce any) for an *Octavius* and a *Mæcenas* to be included. See vol. I. p. 212. in the notes.

*election,*



*election*, the horror of such a use of liberty in government, would perhaps have determined them to chuse *blindfold*, or leave it to the decision of the commonest *lot*, cast of dye, *cross* or *pile*, or whatever it were which might best enable them to clear themselves of the hainous charge of using the least foresight, choice, or prudence in such an affair.

I should think it a great misfortune, were my READER of the number of those, who, in a kind of *Cappadocian* spirit, could easily be terrified with the proposal of giving him his *liberty*, and making him *his own judge*. My endeavour, I must confess, has been to shew him his just prerogative in this respect, and to give him the sharpest eye over his *author*, invite him to criticize honestly, without favour or affection, and with the utmost bent of his parts and judgment. On this account it may be objected to me, perhaps, "That I am not a little  
" vain and presumptuous, in my *own*, as well as  
" in my *author's* behalf, who can thus, as it were,  
" challenge my *reader* to a trial of his keenest  
" wit."

But to this I answer, That should I have the good fortune to raise the masterly spirit of *just* CRITICISM in my *readers*, and exalt them ever so little above the lazy, timorous, over-modest, or resigned state, in which the generality of them remain; though by this very spirit I *myself* might possibly meet my doom: I should however abundantly congratulate with myself on these my low flights, be proud of having plumed the arrows of better *wits*, and furnished artillery, or ammunition of any kind, to those powers, to which I *myself* had fallen a victim.

—Fungar vice cotis\*.—

\* Horat. de arte poet.

I could reconcile my ambition in this respect to what I call my *loyalty to the READER*, and say of his elevation in criticism and judgment, what a *Roman* princess said of her son's advancement to empire, "*Occidat, dum imperet* \*."

Had I been a *Spanish Cervantes*, and, with success equal to that comic author, had destroyed the reigning taste of *Gothic* or *Moorish* CHIVALRY, I could afterwards contentedly have seen my *burlesque-work* itself despised, and set aside; when it had wrought its intended effect, and destroyed those *giants* and *monsters* of the brain, against which it was originally designed. Without regard, therefore, to the prevailing *relish* or *taste* which, in my own person, I may unhappily experience, when these my miscellaneous works are leisurely examined; I shall proceed still in my endeavour to refine my *reader's* PALATE; *whetting* and *sharpening* it, the best I can, for use and practice, in the lower subjects; that by this exercise it may acquire the greater keeness, and be of so much the better effect in subjects of a higher kind, which relate to his chief happiness, his *liberty* and *manhood*.

SUPPOSING me therefore a mere *comic* humourist, in respect of those inferior subjects, which, after the manner of my familiar *prose-satire*, I presume to criticise; may not I be allowed to ask, "whether there remains not still among us noble *Britons*, something of that original *barbarous* and *Gothic* relish, not wholly purged away; when, even at this hour, *romances* and *gallantries* of like sort, together with *works* as monstrous of other kinds, are current, and in vogue, even with the people who constitute our reputed *polite world*?"

\* Tacit. annal. lib. 14.

Need I on this account refer again to our author\*, where he treats in general of *the style and manner of our modern authors*, from the *divine* to the *comedian*? What person is there of the least judgment or understanding, who cannot easily, and without the help of a *divine*, or rigid *moralist*, observe the lame condition of our *English STAGE*; which nevertheless is found the rendezvous and chief entertainment of our best company, and from whence in all probability our youth will continue to draw their notion of *manners*, and their taste of *life*, more directly and naturally, than from the *rehearsals* and *declamations* of a *graver THEATRE*?

Let those whose business it is, advance, as they best can, the benefit of that *sacred oratory*, which we have lately seen and are still like to see employed to various purposes, and further designs than that of instructing us in religion or manners. Let them in that high *scene* endeavour to refine our taste and judgment in sacred matters. It is the good critic's task to amend our *common STAGE*; nor ought this *dramatic* performance to be decried or sentenced by those critics of a higher sphere. The practice and *art* is honest in itself. Our *foundations* are well laid. And in the main, our *English STAGE* (as has been remarked †) is capable of the highest improvement; as well from the present genius of our nation, as from the rich ore of our early poets in this kind. But *faults* are easier imitated than beauties.

We find, indeed, our *THEATRE* become of late the subject of a growing criticism. We hear it openly complained, "that in our *newer* plays, as well as in our *older*, in *comedy* as well as *trage-*

\* *Viz.* in his *Advice to authors*, (treatise 3.), vol. 1.

† Vol. 1. p. 170, 1. &c. 175, 6. 204, 16, 17.

“ *dy*, the stage presents a proper scene of uproar ;  
 “ — duels fought ; swords drawn, many of a  
 “ side ; wounds given, and sometimes dressed too ;  
 “ the surgeon called, and the patient probed and  
 “ tented upon the spot : That in our *tragedy*, no-  
 “ thing is so common as wheels, racks, and gib-  
 “ bets properly adorned ; executions decently per-  
 “ formed ; headless bodies, and bodiless heads, ex-  
 “ posed to view : battles fought ; murders com-  
 “ mitted ; and the dead carried off in great num-  
 “ bers.” — Such is our politeness !

Nor are these *plays*, on this account, the less frequented by *either* of the sexes : which inclines me to favour the conceit our author has suggested concerning the mutual correspondence and relation between our *royal THEATRE*, and *popular CIRCUS* or *bear-garden* \*. For in the former of these assemblies, it is undeniable that at least the *two* upper regions or galleries contain such spectators, as indifferently frequent each place of sport. So that it is no wonder we hear such applause resounded on the victories of an *Almanzar* ; when the same parties had possibly, no later than the day before, bestowed their applause as freely on the *victorious butcher*, the *HERO* of *another stage* : where, amidst various frays, bestial and human blood, promiscuous wounds and slaughter, one sex are observed as frequent and as pleased spectators as the other, and sometimes not *spectators* only, but *actors* in the *gladiatorian* parts. — These congregations, which we may be apt to call *Heathenish* †, (though in reality never known among the *politer Heathens*), are, in our *Christian* nation, unconcernedly allowed and tolerated, as no way injurious to

\* Vol. 1. p. 213. &c.

† Vol. 1. p. 211, 12. &c.

*religious* interests; whatever effect they may be found to have on *national manners, humanity, and civil life* Of such *indulgencies* as these we hear no complaints. Nor are any *assemblies*, though of the most *barbarous* and *enormous* kind, so offensive, it seems, to *men of zeal*, as *religious assemblies* of a *different* fashion or habit from their own.

I am sorry to say, that though in the many parts of *poetry* our attempts have been high and noble; yet in general the *TASTE* of *wit* and *letters* lies much upon a level with what relates to our stage.

I can readily allow to our *British genius* what was allowed to the *Roman* heretofore:

—*Natura sublimis et acer:*

*Nam spirat tragicum satis, et feliciter audet* \*.

But then I must add too, that the excessive indulgence and favour shown to our *authors* on account of what their *mere genius* and *flowing vein* afford, has rendered them intolerably supine, conceited, and admirers of themselves. The public having once suffered them to take the ascendent, they become, like flattered princes, impatient of contradiction or advice. They think it a disgrace to be criticised, even by a *friend*; or to reform, at his desire, what they themselves are fully convinced is negligent and uncorrect.

*Sed turpem putat in scriptis, metuitque lituram* †.

The *limæ labor* ‡ is the great grievance with our countrymen. An *English* *AUTHOR* would be *all GENIUS*. He would reap the *fruits* of art; but without study, pains, or application. He thinks it necessary indeed (lest his learning should be called in question) to show the world that he errs

\* Horat. epist. 1. lib. 2.

† Ibid.

‡ Ars poet.

*knowingly*

knowingly against the rules of art. And for this reason, whatever piece he publishes at any time, he seldom fails, in some prefixed apology, to speak in such a manner of *criticism* and *art*, as may confound the ordinary *reader*, and prevent him from taking up *a part*, which, should he once assume, would prove fatal to the impotent and mean performance.

It were to be wished, that when once our authors had considered of a *model* or *plan*, and attained the knowledge of a **WHOLE** and **PARTS**\*; when from this beginning they had proceeded to *morals*, and the knowledge of what is called **POETIC MANNERS** and **TRUTH**†; when they had learned

\* "ΟΑΟΝ δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν, καὶ μέσον, καὶ τελευτὴν. Ἀρχὴ δὲ ἐστὶν, ἢ αὐτὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, μὴ μετ' ἄλλο ἐστὶ μετ' ἐκείνο δ' ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γένεσθαι. Τελευτὴ δὲ τὸναντίον, ὃ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι, ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἢ ὡς ἐπιτοπολύ· μετὰ δὲ τῆτο ἄλλο ἴδεν. Μέσον δὲ, καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο, καὶ μετ' ἐκείνο ἕτερον. Arist. de poet. cap. 7. And in the following chapter, Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν ἜΙΣ, ἢ ἄσπερ τινὲς οἰοῦνται, εἰάν περι ἕνα ἢ, &c.

*Denique sit quod vis simplex duntaxat et UNUM.*

Horat. de art. poet. See vol. I. p. 114.

It is an infallible proof of the want of just *integrity* in every writing, from the *epoee* or *heroic poem* down to the familiar *epistle*, or slightest *essay* either in *verse* or *prose*, if every several part or portion fits not its proper place so exactly, that the least transposition would be impracticable. Whatever is *episodic*, though perhaps it be *a whole*, and in itself *entire*, yet being inserted, as *a part*, in a work of greater length, it must appear only in its *due place*. And that place alone can be called its *due one*, which alone befits it. If there be any passage in the middle or end which might have stood in the beginning, or any in the beginning which might have stood as well in the middle or end; there is properly in such a piece neither beginning, middle, or end. It is a mere *hapsody*, not a work. And the more it assumes the air or appearance of *a real work*, the more ridiculous it becomes. See above, p. 18.; and vol. I. p. 114, 15.

† *Respicere exemplar vitæ morumque jubebo*

*Doctum imitatore, et VERAS hinc ducere voces.*

Horat. de arte poet.

The chief of ancient critics, we know, extols *Homer* above all things,

ed to reject *false thought*, *imbarassing* and *mixed metaphors*, the *ridiculous paint* in comedy, and the

things, for understanding how to *LIE* in perfection; as the passage shews which we have cited above, vol. 1. p. 271. His *LIES*, according to that master's opinion, and the judgment of many of the gravest and most venerable writers, were, in themselves, the justest *moral truths*, and exhibitiv of the best doctrine and instruction in life and manners. It may be asked perhaps, "How comes the poet then to draw no single pattern of the kind, no *perfect character*, "in either of his heroic pieces?" I answer, That should he attempt to do it, he would, as a poet, be preposterous and false. It is not *the possible*, but the *probable* and *lively*, which must be the poet's guide in *manners*. By this he wins attention, and moves the conscious reader or spectator; who judges best from *within*, by what he naturally feels and experiences in his own heart. The perfection of virtue is from long *art* and *management*, *self-control*, and, as it were, *force on Nature*. But the common auditor or spectator, who seeks pleasure only, and loves to engage his passion, by view of other passion and emotion, comprehends little of the restraints, allays, and corrections, which form this *new* and *artificial creature*. For such indeed is the *truly virtuous man*; whose *ART*, though ever so *natural* in itself, or justly founded in *reason* and *nature*, is an improvement far beyond the common stamp, or known character of human kind. And thus the completely virtuous and perfect character is *unpoetical* and *false*. Effects must not appear where causes must necessarily remain unknown and incomprehensible. A *HERO without passion* is, in poetry, as absurd as a *HERO without life or action*. Now, if *passion* be allowed, *passionate action* must ensue. The same heroic genius and seeming magnanimity which transport us when beheld, are naturally transporting in the lives and manners of *the great*, who are described to us. And thus the able *designer* who feigns in behalf of *truth* and draws his characters after the *moral rule*, fails not to discover Nature's propensity, and assigns to these high spirits their proper exorbitancy, and inclination to exceed in that tone or species of passion which constitutes the eminent or shining part of each poetical character. The passion of an *Achilles* is towards that glory which is acquired by arms and personal valour. In favour of this character, we forgive the generous youth his excess of ardour in the field, and his resentment when injured and provoked in council, and by his allies. The passion of an *Ulysses* is towards that glory which is acquired by prudence, wisdom, and ability in affairs. It is in favour of this character that we forgive him his subtle, crafty, and deceitful air; since the *intriguing spirit*, the *over-reaching manner*, and *over-refinement of art and policy*, are as naturally incident to the experienced and thorough politician, as *sudden resentment*, *indiscreet* and *rash behaviour*, to the

the *false sublime*, and *bombast* in heroic; they would at last have some regard to numbers, har-

open undesigning character of a warlike youth. The gigantic force and military toil of an *Ajax*, would not be so easily credible or engaging, but for the honest simplicity of his nature, and the heaviness of his parts and genius. For strength of body being so often noted by us, as unattended with equal parts and strength of mind; when we see this natural effect expressed, and find our secret and malicious kind of reasoning confirmed on this hand, we yield to an *hyperbole* of our poet, on the other. He has afterwards his full scope, and liberty of enlarging, and exceeding in the peculiar virtue and excellence of his hero. He may *lie* splendidly, raise *wonder*, and be as *astonishing* as he pleases. Every thing will be allowed him in return for this frank allowance. Thus the tongue of a *Nestor* may work prodigies, whilst the accompanying allays of a rhetorical fluency, and aged experience, are kept in view. An *Agamemnon* may be admired as a noble and wise chief, whilst a certain princely haughtiness, a stiffness and stately carriage natural to the character, are represented in his person, and noted in their ill effects. For thus the *excesses* of every character are by the poet *redressed*. And the misfortunes naturally attending such excesses, being justly applied, our passions, whilst in the strongest manner engaged and moved, are in the wholesomest and most effectual manner corrected and *purged*. Were a man to form himself by one single pattern or original, however perfect, he would himself be a mere *copy*. But whilst he draws from various models, he is *original*, *natural*, and *unaffected*. We see in outward carriage and behaviour, how ridiculous any one becomes who imitates another, be he ever so graceful. They are mean spirits who love to copy *merely*. Nothing is agreeable or natural, but what is *original*. Our manners, like our faces, though ever so beautiful, must differ in their beauty. An over regularity is next to a deformity. And in a *poem* (whether *epic* or *dramatic*) a complete and *perfect* character is the greatest *monster*, and of all poetic fictions not only the least *engaging*, but the least *moral* and *improving*.—Thus much by way of remark upon *poetical TRUTH*, and the just fiction or artful *lying* of the able poet, according to the judgment of the *master-critic*. What *Horace* expresses of the same *lying* virtue, is of an easier sense, and needs no explanation.

*Atque ita mentitur, sic veris falsa remiscet;*

*Primo ne medium, medio ne discrepet inum.*

De arte poet.

The same may be observed not only in *heroic* draughts, but in the inferior characters of *comedy*.

*Quam similis uterque est sui!*

Ter. Phorm. act. 3. sc. 2.

See vol. 1. p. 2. 111. 263. 274. &c. in the notes, at the end.

mony,



mony, and *an ear* \*; and correct, as far as possible, the harsh sounds of our language; in *poetry* at least, if not in *prose*.

But so much are our *British* poets taken up in seeking out that monstrous ornament which we call *rhyme* †, that it is no wonder if other ornaments, and *real graces*, are unthought of, and left unattempted. However, since in some parts of poetry, (especially in the *dramatic*), we have

\* Vol. 1. p. 171.

† The reader, if curious in these matters, may see *Jf. Vossius de viribus rhythmis*; and what he says, withal, of ancient *music*, and the degrees by which they surpass us moderns, (as has been demonstrated by late mathematicians of our nation); contrary to a ridiculous notion some have had, that because in this, as in all other arts, the ancients studied *simplicity*, and affected it as the highest perfection in their performances, they were therefore ignorant of *parts* and *symphony*. Against this, *Jf. Vossius*, amongst other authors, cites the ancient Peripatetic *περὶ κόσμου* at the beginning of his fifth chapter. To which he might have added another passage in chap. 6. The suitableness of this ancient author's thought to what has been often advanced in the philosophical parts of these volumes, concerning the universal *symmetry*, or union of *the whole*, may make it excusable if we add here the two passages together, in their inimitable original. "Ἴσως δὲ ἔ τῶν ἰαντίων ἡ φύσις γλίχεται, ἔ ἰκ τῶν ἀπολεῖν τὸ σύμφωνον, ἔ ἰκ τῶν ὁμοίων ὡσπερ ἀμίλει τὸ ἀρῖεν συνήχαη πρὸς τὸ θῆλυ, ἔ ἔχ ἰκάτερον πρὸς τὸ ὁμόφυλον, ἔ τὴν πρῶτην ὁμοιοίαν διὰ τῶν ἰαντίων συνήφεν, ἔ διὰ τῶν ὁμοίων. Ἔοικε δὲ ἔ ἔ τέχνη τὴν φύσιν μιμημένη, τῆτο ποιῆν. Ζωγραφία μὲν γὰρ, λιυκῶν τε ἔ μελάνων, ὠχρῶν τε ἔ ἰρυθρῶν χρωμάτων ἰγκηρασμένη εἴσις, τὰς εἰκόνας τοῖς προηγουμένοις ἀπέλεισε συμφάνης. Μυσική δὲ, ὄξῆς ἄμα ἔ βαρῆς, μακρῆς τε καὶ βραχῆς φθόγγος μίξασα, ἰν διαφόροις φωναῖς, μίαν ἀπέλεισει ἀρμονίαν. Γραμματική δὲ, ἰκ φωνήτων ἔ ἀφῶτων γραμμάτων κρῖσιν ποιησαμένη, τὴν ἔλην τέχνην ἀπ' αὐτῶν συνεσήσατο. τῆτο δὲ τῆτο ἦν ἔ τὸ παρὰ τῶ σχολῆτων λεγόμενον Ἔρακλέτης. συνάφειας ἔλα ἔ ἔχ ἔλα, συμπεριόμενον ἔ διαφερόμενον, συνᾶδον ἔ διαδόν, ἔ ἰκ πάντων ἔν, ἔ ἔξ ἰνὸς πάντα. And in the following passage, Μία δὲ ἰκ πάντων ἀρμονία συνᾶδόντων ἔ χοριούτων καλὰ τον ἔρανόν, ἔξ ἰνὸς τε γίνεαι, ἔ ἔς ἔν ἀπολήγει. Κόσμον δ' ἰτύμως τὸ σύμπαν, ἔλλ' ἔχ ἀκοσμίαν ὀνομάσαις ἔν. Καθᾶπὲρ δὲ ἰν χορῶ κορυφαῖν καλᾶρξάντος, συνεπηχεῖ πᾶς ὁ χορὸς ἀνδρῶν, ἰσδ' ὄτε ἔ γυναικῶν, ἰν διαφοροῖς φωναῖς ὄξυτέραις ἔ βαρυτέραις, μίαν ἀρμονίαν ἔμιελῆ κερανῖων, ἔτως ἔχει ἔ ἰπὶ τῆ τὸ σύμπαν διεποντες ΘΕΟΤ. See vol. 2. p. 159.; and above, p. 127. &c. in the notes.

been so happy as to triumph over this barbarous taste; it is unaccountable that our *poets*, who from this privilege ought to undertake some further refinements, should remain still upon the same level as before. It is a shame to our *authors*, that in their elegant style, and *metred prose*, there should not be found a peculiar grace and harmony, resulting from a more natural and easy disengagement of their periods, and from a careful avoiding the encounter of the shocking consonants and jarring sounds to which our language is so unfortunately subject.

They have of late, it is true, reformed in some measure the gouty joints and darning-work of *whereunto's*, *whereby's*, *thereof's*, *therewith's*, and the rest of this kind; by which complicated periods are so curiously strung, or hooked on, one to another, after the long-spun manner of the *bar* or *pulpit*. But to take into consideration no real accent or cadency of words, no sound or measure of syllables; to put together, at one time, a set of compounds, of the longest *Greek* or *Latin* termination; and at another, to let whole verses, and those too of our heroic and longest sort, pass currently in *monosyllables*; is, methinks, no slender negligence. If single verses at the head, or in the most emphatical places, of the most considerable works, can admit of such a structure, and pass for truly harmonious and poetical in this negligent form; I see no reason why more verses than one or two of the same formation, should not be as well admitted; or why an uninterrupted succession of these well-strung *monosyllables* might not be allowed to clatter after one another, like the hammers of a paper-mill, without any breach of music, or prejudice to the harmony of our language. But if persons who have gone no farther than a smith's anvil

vil to gain *an ear*, are yet likely, on fair trial, to find a plain defect in these *ten monosyllable* heroics; it would follow, methinks, that even a *prose*-author, who attempts to write politely, should endeavour to confine himself within those bounds, which can never, without breach of harmony, be exceeded in any just *metre*, or agreeable pronunciation.

THUS have I ventured to arraign the authority of those self-privileged writers, who would exempt themselves from *criticism*, and save their ill-acquired reputation, by the decial of an *art*, on which the cause and interest of *wit* and *letters* absolutely depend. Be it they themselves, or their great patrons in their behalf, who would thus arbitrarily support the credit of ill writings; the attempt, I hope, will prove unsuccessful. Be they moderns or ancients, foreigners or natives, ponderous and austere writers, or airy and of the humorous kind; whoever takes refuge here, or seeks protection hence; whoever joins his party or interest to this cause; it appears from the very fact and endeavour alone, that there is just ground to suspect some insufficiency or imposture at the bottom. And on this account the READER, if he be wise, will the rather redouble his application and industry, to examine the merit of his assuming author. If, as *reader* and *judge*, he dare once assert that *liberty* to which we have shewn him justly intitled, he will not easily be threatened or ridiculed out of the use of his *examining capacity*, and *native privilege* of CRITICISM.

It was to this *art*, so well understood and practised heretofore, that the wise ancients owed whatever was consummate and perfect in their productions. It is to the same *art* we owe the recovery of letters in these latter ages. To this alone we

must ascribe the recognition of ancient manuscripts, the discovery of what is spurious, and the discernment of whatever is genuine of those venerable remains which have passed through such dark periods of ignorance, and raised us to the improvements we now make in every science. It is to this *art*, that even the *sacred authors* themselves owe their highest purity and correctness. So *sacred* ought the art itself to be esteemed; when from its supplies alone is formed that judicious and learned strength by which the defenders of our holy religion are able so successfully to refute the *Heathens, Jews, sectarians, heretics*, and other enemies or opposers of our primitive and ancient faith.

But having thus, after our author's example, asserted the use of CRITICISM, in all literate works, from the main *frame* or *plan* of every writing, down to the minutest *particle*; we may now proceed to exercise this *art* upon our author himself, and, by his own rules, examine him in this his last treatise; reserving still to ourselves the same privilege of variation, and excursion into other subjects, the same *episodic* liberty, and right of wandering, which we have maintained in the preceding chapters.

CHAP.

## C H A P. II.

*Generation and succession of our national and modern wit. — Manners of the proprietors. — Corporation and joint stock. — Statute against criticism. A coffeehouse-committee. — Mr Bays. — Other Bays's in divinity. — Censure of our author's dialogue-piece; and of the manner of dialogue-writing used by reverend wits.*

ACCORDING to the common course of practice in our age, we seldom see the character of *writer* and that of *critic* united in the same person. There is, I know, a certain species of *authors* who subsist wholly by the *criticising* or *commenting* practice upon others, and can appear in no other form besides what this employment authorises them to assume. They have no *original* character, or *first* part; but wait for something which may be called a *work*, in order to graft upon it, and come in for sharers, at second hand.

The *penmen* of this capacity and degree are, from their function and employment, distinguished by the title of ANSWERERS. For it happens in the world, that there are readers of a genius and size just fitted to these *answering* authors. *These*, if they teach them nothing else, will teach them, they think, to *criticise*. And though the new practising critics are of a sort unlikely ever to understand any *original book* or *writing*; they can understand, or at least remember and quote the subsequent reflections, flouts, and jeers, which may accidentally be made on such a piece. Where-ever a gentleman of this sort happens at any time to be in company, you shall no sooner hear a new book spoken of, than it will be asked, "Who has an-  
" *swered*

“ fwered it ? ” or, “ When is there an answer to “ come out ? ” — Now, the *answer*, as our gentleman knows, must needs be *newer* than the *book*. And the *newer* a thing is, the more fashionable still, and the genteeler the subject of discourse. For this the bookseller knows how to fit our gentleman to a nicety : for he has commonly an *answer* ready bespoke, and perhaps finished, by the time his *new book* comes abroad. And it is odds but our fashionable gentleman, who takes both together, may read the *latter* first, and drop the other for good and all.

But of these *answering* WITS, and the manner of *rejoinders*, and reiterate *replies*, we have said what is sufficient in a former MISCELLANY \*. We need only remark in general, “ That it is necessary a *writing* CRITIC should understand how to “ *write*. And though every *writer* is not bound “ to shew himself in the capacity of a CRITIC, every writing critic is bound to shew himself capable of being a WRITER. For if he be apparently impotent in this *latter* kind, he is to be “ denied all title or character in *the other*.”

To *censure* merely what another person writes ; to *twitch*, *snap*, *snub up*, or *banter* ; to torture *sentences* and *phrases*, turn a few expressions into ridicule, or write what is now-a-days called an *answer* to any piece, is not sufficient to constitute what is properly esteemed a WRITER, or AUTHOR in due form. For this reason, though there are many ANSWERERS seen abroad, there are few or no CRITICS or SATIRISTS. But whatever may be the state of controversy in our *religion* or *politic* concerns ; it is certain, that, in the mere *literate* world, affairs are managed with a better understand-

\* *Viz.* *supra*, Misc. 1. chap. 2.

ing between the principal parties concerned. The WRITERS or AUTHORS *in possession*, have an easier time than any *ministry*, or *religious party*, which is uppermost. They have found a way, by decrying *all CRITICISM in general*, to get rid of their *dissenters*, and prevent all pretences to further *reformation* in their state. The CRITIC is made to appear distinct, and of another *species*; wholly different from *the writer*. None who have a GENIUS for *writing*, and can perform with any success, are presumed so ill-natured or illiberal, as to endeavour to *signalise* themselves in CRITICISM.

It is not difficult, however, to imagine why this practical difference between *writer* and *critic* has been so generally established amongst us, as to make the provinces seem wholly distinct and irreconcilable. The *forward WITS*, who, without waiting their due time, or performing their requisite studies, start up in the world as AUTHORS, having with little pains or judgment, and by the strength of fancy merely, acquired *a name* with mankind, can, on no account, afterwards submit to a decrial or disparagement of those raw works to which they owed their early character and distinction. It would it fare with them indeed, if, on these tenacious terms, they should venture upon CRITICISM, or offer to move that *spirit* which would infallibly give such disturbance to their established title.

Now we may consider, that in our nation, and especially in our present age, whilst wars, debates, and public convulsions, turn our minds so wholly upon business and affairs; the better *geniuses* being in a manner necessarily involved in the active sphere, on which the general eye of mankind is so strongly fixed; there must remain in the theatre of wit, a sufficient vacancy of place: and the quality of *actor* upon that stage, must, of consequence, be

be very easily attainable, and at a low price of ingenuity or understanding.

The persons therefore who are in possession of the *prime parts* in this deserted theatre, being suffered to maintain their ranks and stations in full ease, have naturally a good agreement and understanding with their fellow-wits. Being indebted to the times for this happiness, that, with so little industry or capacity, they have been able to serve the nation with *wit*, and supply the place of real dispensers and ministers of the *MUSES treasures*, they must necessarily, as they have any love for themselves, or fatherly affection for their works, conspire with one another, to preserve their common interest of indolence, and justify their remissness, incorrectness, insipidness, and downright ignorance of all *literate art*, or just *poetic beauty*.

*Magna inter molles concordia* \*.

For this reason, you see them mutually courteous and benevolent; gracious and obliging beyond measure; complimenting one another interchangeably, at the head of their works, in *recommendatory* verses, or in separate panegyrics, essays, and fragments of poetry; such as in the *miscellaneous collections* (our yearly retail of wit) we see curiously compacted, and accommodated to the relish of the world. Here the *tyrocinium* of geniuses is annually displayed. Here, if you think fit, you may make acquaintance with *the young* offspring of WITS, as they come up gradually under *the old*; with due courtship, and homage, paid to those high predecessors of fame, in hope of being one day admitted, by turn, into the noble order, and made WITS by *patent* and *authority*.

\* Juvenal, sat. 2. vers. 47.

This



This is the young *fry* which you may see busily surrounding the grown poet, or chief playhouse-*author*, at a *coffeehouse*. They are his guards; ready to take up arms for him; if, by some presumptuous *critic* he is at any time attacked. They are indeed the very shadows of their immediate predecessor, and represent the same features, with some small alteration perhaps for the worse. They are sure to aim at nothing above or beyond their master; and would, on no account, give him the least jealousy of their aspiring to any degree or order of writing above him. From hence that *harmony* and *reciprocal esteem*, which, on such a bottom as this, cannot fail of being perfectly well established among our poets: the age, mean while, being after this manner hopefully provided, and secure of a constant and like succession of meritorious wits, in every kind!

If by chance a man of sense, unapprised of the authority of these high powers, should venture to accost the gentlemen of this fraternity, at some *coffeehouse-committee*, whilst they were taken up in mutual admiration, and the usual praise of their national and cotemporary wits; it is possible he might be treated with some civility, whilst he inquired, for satisfaction sake, into the beauties of those particular works so unanimously extolled. But should he presume to ask in general, "Why is our *epic* or *dramatic*, our *essay* or *common prose* no better executed?" or, "Why in particular does such or such a reputed wit write so incorrectly, and with so little regard to justness of thought or language?" the answer would presently be given, "That we *Englishmen* are not tied up to such rigid rules as those of the ancient *Grecian*, or modern *French* critics."

"Be it so (Gentlemen!) it is your good pleasure."  
"sure."

" sure. Nor ought any one to dispute it with you.  
 " You are masters, no doubt, in your own coun-  
 " try. But (Gentlemen!) the question here is not  
 " what your authority may be over your own writ-  
 " ters. You may have them of what fashion or  
 " size of wit you please; and allow them to enter-  
 " tain you at the rate you think sufficient and sa-  
 " tisfactory. But can you, by your good plea-  
 " sure, or the approbation of your highest patrons,  
 " make that to be either *wit* or *sense*, which would  
 " otherwise have been bombast and contradiction?  
 " If your poets are still Mr *Bays's*\*, and your prose-  
 " authors Sir *Rogers*, without offering at a better  
 " manner; must it follow that *the manner itself* is

\* To see the incorrigibleness of our poets in their pedantic man-  
 ner, their vanity, defiance of criticism, their rhodomontade, and  
 poetical bravado; we need only turn to our famous poet-laureat, (the  
 very Mr *Bays* himself), in one of his latest and most valued pieces,  
 writ many years after the ingenious author of the *Rehearsal* had drawn  
 his picture. " I have been listening," (says our poet, in his preface  
 to *Don Sebastian*), " what objections had been made against the con-  
 " duct of the play; but found them all so trivial, that if I should  
 " name them, a true critic would imagine that I played booty.—  
 " Some are pleased to say the writing is dull. But *etatem habet, de*  
 " *se loquatur*. Others, that the double poison is unnatural. Let the  
 " common received opinion, and *Ausonius's* famous epigram, answer  
 " that. Lastly, a more ignorant sort of creatures than either of the  
 " former, maintain that the character of *Dorax* is not only unnatu-  
 " ral, but inconsistent with itself. Let them read the play, and  
 " think again. ——— A longer reply is what those cavillers deserve  
 " not. But I will give them and their fellows to understand, that  
 " the Earl of \* \* \* was pleased to read the tragedy twice over be-  
 " fore it was acted, and did me the favour to lend me word, that I  
 " had written beyond any of my former plays, and that he was dis-  
 " pleased any thing should be cut away. If I have not reason to  
 " prefer his single judgment to a whole faction, let the world be  
 " judge: for the opposition is the same with that of *Lucan's* hero  
 " against an army, *concurrere bellum atque virum*. I think I may  
 " modestly conclude," &c.

Thus he goes on, to the very end, in the self-same strain. Who,  
 after this, can ever say of the *Rehearsal*-author, that his picture of  
 our poet was overcharged, or the national humour wrong described?

" good,

“ good, or the *wit* genuine? — What say you  
 “ (Gentlemen!) to this new piece? — Let us ex-  
 “ amine these lines which you call *shining*! this  
 “ string of sentences which you call *clever*! this  
 “ pile of metaphors which you call *sublime*! —  
 “ Are you unwilling (Gentlemen!) to stand the  
 “ test? Do you despise the examination?

“ Sir! — since you are pleased to take this li-  
 “ berty with us; may we presume to ask you a  
 “ question? O Gentlemen! as many as you

“ please: I shall be highly honoured. Why

“ then (pray Sir!) inform us, whether you have  
 “ ever *writ*? Very often, (Gentlemen!),

“ especially on a post-night. But have you

“ writ (for instance, Sir!) a *play*, a *song*, an *es-  
 “ say*, or a *PAPER*, as, by way of eminence, the  
 “ current *pieces* of our weekly wits are generally  
 “ styled? Something of this kind I may per-

“ haps (Gentlemen!) have attempted, though with-  
 “ out publishing my work. But pray (Gentlemen!)

“ what is my *writing*, or *not writing*, to the que-  
 “ stion in hand? Only this, (Sir!), and you

“ may fairly take our words for it; that, whenever  
 “ you publish, you will find the town against you.

“ Your piece will infallibly be condemned.

“ So let it. But for what reason, Gentlemen? I  
 “ am sure you never saw the piece. No, Sir.

“ But you are a *CRITIC*. And we know by cer-  
 “ tain experience, that when a *critic* writes accor-

“ ding to rule and method, he is sure never to hit  
 “ the *English* taste. Did not Mr R. —, who cri-

“ ticised our *English* tragedy, write a sorry one of  
 “ his own? If he did, (Gentlemen!), it

“ was his own fault, not to know his genius better.  
 “ But is his criticism the less just on this account?

“ If a musician performs his part well in the hard-  
 “ est symphonies, he must necessarily know the

“ notes, and understand the rules of harmony and  
 “ music. But must a man therefore, who has an  
 “ ear, and has studied the rules of music, of ne-  
 “ cessity have a voice or hand? Can no one pos-  
 “ sibly judge a *fiddle*, but who is himself a *fiddler*?  
 “ Can no one judge a *picture*, but who is himself  
 “ a *layer of colours*?”——

Thus far our rational gentleman perhaps might venture, before his coffeehouse-audience. Had I been at his elbow to prompt him as a friend, I should hardly have thought fit to remind him of any thing further. On the contrary, I should have rather taken him aside, to inform him of this *cabal*, and established *corporation* of wit; of their declared aversion to *criticism*, and of their known laws and statutes in that case made and provided. I should have told him, in short, that learned arguments would be mispent on such as these; and that he would find little success, though he should ever so plainly demonstrate to the gentlemen of this size of wit and understanding, “ that the greatest *masters*  
 “ of art, in every kind of writing, were eminent in  
 “ the *critical* practice.” But that they really were so, witness, among the *ancients*, their greatest PHILOSOPHERS \*, whose *critical* pieces lie intermixed with their profound *philosophical* works, and other politer tracts ornamentally writ, for public use †. Witness in *history* and *rhetoric*, *Isocrates*, *Dionysius Halicarnassæus*, *Plutarch*, and the corrupt *Lucian* himself; the only one perhaps of these authors whom our gentlemen may, in some modern translation, have looked into, with any curiosity or

\* *Viz. Plato, Aristotle.* See, in particular, the *Phædrus* of the former; where an entire piece of the orator *Lyfias* is criticised in form.

† The distinction of treatises was into the ἀπομακρῶς, and ἰσοκρίτως.

delight.

delight. To these among the *Romans* we may add *Cicero, Varro, Horace, Quintilian, Pliny,* and many more.

Among *the moderns*, a *Boileau* and a *Corneille* are sufficient precedents in the case before us. They applied their *criticism* with just severity, even to their own works. This indeed is a manner hardly practicable with the poets of our own nation. It would be unreasonable to expect of them, that they should bring such measures in use, as being applied to their works, would discover them to be wholly deformed and disproportionable. It is no wonder therefore if we have so little of this *critical* genius extant, to guide us in our taste. It is no wonder if what is generally current in this kind, lies in a manner buried, and in disguise under burlesque, as particularly in the witty comedy of a noble author of this last age\*. To the shame, however, of our professed wits and enterprisers in the higher spheres of poetry, it may be observed, that they have not wanted good advice and instruction of the graver kind, from as high a hand in respect of quality and character: since one of the justest of our modern poems, and so confessed even by our poets themselves, is a short *criticism*, an ART OF POETRY; by which if they themselves were to be judged, they must in general appear no better than mere bunglers, and void of all true sense and knowledge in their art. But if in reality both *critic* and *poet*, confessing the justice of these rules of art, can afterwards, in practice, condemn and approve, perform and judge, in a quite different manner from what they acknowledge just and *true*; it plainly shews, that, though perhaps we are not indigent in

\* The *Rehearsal*. See vol. 1. p. 204. and just above, p. 192. in the notes.

*wit*, we want what is of more consequence, and can alone raise *wit* to any dignity or worth ; even plain HONESTY, MANNERS, and a *sense* of that MORAL TRUTH, on which (as has been often expressed in these volumes \*) *poetic TRUTH* and *beauty* must naturally depend.

*Qui didicit patriæ quid debeat, et quid amicis,  
Quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et  
hospes,  
Quod sit conscripti, quod iudicis officium,——  
————— ille profecto  
Reddere personæ scit convenientia cuique †.*

As for this species of *morality* which distinguishes the civil offices of life, and describes each becoming personage or character in this scene ; so necessary it is for the *poet* and *polite author* to be apprised of it, that even *the divine* himself may with juster pretence be exempted from the knowledge of this sort. The composer of religious discourses has the advantage of that *higher scene* of mystery, which is above the level of human commerce. It is not so much his concern or business to be *agreeable*. And often when he would endeavour it, he becomes more than ordinarily displeasing. *His* theatre, and *that* of the polite world, are very different : insomuch that in a *reverend* AUTHOR, or DECLAIMER of this sort, we naturally excuse the ignorance of ordinary *decorum*, in what relates to the affairs of our inferior temporal world. But for *the* POET or *genteel* WRITER, who is of this world merely, it is a different case. He must be *perfect* in this moral science. We can easily bear

\* *Viz.* vol. 1. p. 164. &c. and 218. & 263. &c. So above, p. 180. and in the notes.

† Horat. de art. poet. § 312. &c.

the loss of *indifferent* POETRY or ESSAY. A good bargain it were, could we get rid of every *moderate* performance in this kind. But were we obliged to hear only *excellent* SERMONS, and to read nothing, in the way of devotion, which was not *well writ*; it might possibly go hard with many Christian people, who are at present such attentive auditors and readers. Established pastors have a right to be *indifferent*. But voluntary discoursers and attempters in wit or poetry, are as intolerable, when they are indifferent, as either fiddlers or painters :

— *Poterat duci quia cœna sine istis \**.

Other *Bays's* and *poetasters* may be lawfully baited; though we patiently submit to our *Bays's* *indivinity*.

Had the author of our *subject-treatises* considered thoroughly of these literate affairs †, and found how the interest of wit stood at present in our nation, he would have had so much regard surely to his own interest, as never to have writ, unless either in the single capacity of mere CRITIC, or that of AUTHOR *in form*. If he had resolved never to produce a regular or legitimate piece, he might pretty safely have writ on still after the rate of his first volume, and *mixed* manner. He might have been as *critical*, as *satirical*, or as full of *railery*, as he had pleased. But to come afterwards as a grave actor upon the stage, and expose himself to criticism in his turn, by giving us a work or two in form, after the regular manner of composition, as we see in his second volume; this, I think, was no extraordinary proof of his judgment or ability, in what related to his own credit and advantage.

\* *Hor. ars poet.* v. 376.

† *Supra*, p. 94. 131, 2

One of these formal pieces (the INQUIRY already examined) we have found to be wholly after the manner which in one of his critical pieces he calls *the methodic*. But his next piece (the MORALISTS, which we have now before us) must, according to his own rules \*, be reckoned as an undertaking of greater weight. It is not only, at the bottom, as *systematical, didactic, and preceptive*, as that other piece of formal structure; but it assumes withal another garb, and more fashionable turn of wit. It conceals what is *scholastical*, under the appearance of a polite work. It aspires to *dialogue*, and carries with it not only those poetic features of the pieces anciently called MIMES; but it attempts to unite the several personages and characters in ONE *action*, or *story*, within a determinate compass of *time*, regularly divided, and drawn into different and proportioned *scenes*: and this too with variety of *STYLE*; the *simple, comic, rhetorical*, and even the *poetic or sublime*; such as is the aptest to run into enthusiasm and extravagance. So much is our author, by virtue of this piece †, a *POET in due form*, and by a more apparent

\* Vol. i. p. 152. &c. and p. 201, 2.

† That he is conscious of this, we may gather from that line or two of advertisement, which stands at the beginning of his first edition. "As for the characters and incidents, they are neither wholly feigned" (says he) "nor wholly true: but according to the liberty allowed in the way of *DIALOGUE*, the principal matters are founded upon truth, and the rest as near resembling as may be. It is a *sceptic* recites; and the hero of the piece passes for an *enthusiast*. If a perfect character be wanting, it is the same case here, as with the poets in some of their best pieces. And this surely is a sufficient warrant for the author of a *PHILOSOPHICAL ROMANCE*." — Thus our author himself; who, to conceal, however, his strict imitation of the ancient *poetic DIALOGUE*, has prefixed an auxiliary title to his work, and given it the surname of *RHAPSODY*; as if it were merely of that *essay* or *mixed* kind of works, which come abroad with an affected air of elegance and irregularity. But whatever our author may have affected



apparent claim, than if he had writ a **PLAY**, or *dramatic piece*, in as regular a manner, at least, as any known at present on our stage.

It appears, indeed, that as high as our author, in his *critical* capacity, would pretend to carry the refined manner and accurate **SIMPLICITY** of the ancients, he dares not, in his own model and principal performance, attempt to unite his philosophy in one solid and uniform body, nor carry on his argument in *one* continued chain or thread. Here our author's timorousness is visible. In the very plan or model of his work, he is apparently put to a hard shift to contrive how or with what probability he might introduce men of any note or fashion, reasoning expressly and purposely \*, without play or trifling, for two or three hours together, on mere **PHILOSOPHY** and **MORALS**. He finds these subjects (as he confesses) so wide of common conversation, and, by long custom, so

sected in his *title-page*, it was so little his intention to write after that model of incoherent workmanship, that it appears to be solely against his will, if this *dialogue-piece* of his has not the just character, and correct form of those ancient *poems* described. He would gladly have constituted **ONE** single *action* and *time*, suitable to the just *simplicity* of those dramatic works. And this, one would think, was easy enough for him to have done. He needed only to have brought his first speakers immediately into action, and saved the *narrative* or *recitative* part of *Philocles* to *Palemon*, by producing them as speaking personages upon his stage. The scene all along might have been *the park*. From the early evening to the late hour of night, that the two gallants withdrew to their town-apartments, there was sufficient time for the narrator *Philocles* to have *recited* the whole transaction of the second and third part; which would have stood throughout as it now does: only at the conclusion, when the *narrative* or *recitative* part had ceased, the *simple* and *direct* **DIALOGUE** would have again returned, to grace the *exit*. By this means the *temporal* as well as *local* unity of the piece had been preserved. Nor had our author been necessitated to commit that *anachronism*, of making his first part *in order*, to be *last in time*.

\* Vol. 1. p. 157. &c.

appropriated

appropriated to the *school*, the *university-chair*, or *pulpit*, that he thinks it hardly safe or practicable to treat of them elsewhere, or in a different tone. He is forced therefore to raise particular *machines*, and constrain his principal characters, in order to carry a better face, and bear himself out against the appearance of *pedantry*. Thus his gentleman-philosopher *Theocles*, before he enters into his real character, becomes a feigned *preacher*. And even when his real character comes on, he hardly dares stand it out; but to deal the better with his *sceptic* friend, he falls again to personating, and takes up the humour of the *poet* and *enthusiast*. *Palemon* the man of quality, and who is first introduced as speaker in the piece, must, for fashion-sake, appear *in love*, and under a kind of melancholy produced by some misadventures in the world, How else should he be supposed so serious? *Philocles* his friend (an airy gentleman of the world, and a thorough raillier) must have a home-charge upon him, and feel the anger of his grave friend before he can be supposed grave enough to enter into a philosophical discourse. A quarter of an hour's reading must serve to represent an hour or two's debate. And a new scene presenting itself, ever and anon, must give refreshment, it seems, to the faint reader, and remind him of the characters and business going on.

It is in the same view that we MISCELLANARIAN authors, being fearful of the natural lassitude and satiety of our indolent reader, have prudently betaken ourselves to the way of *chapters* and *contents*; that as the reader proceeds, by frequent intervals of repose, contrived on purpose for him, he may from time to time be advertised of what is yet to come, and be tempted thus to renew his application.

Thus.

Thus in our modern *plays* we see, almost in every other leaf, descriptions or illustrations of the action, not in the *poem* itself, or in the mouth of the actors; but by the poet, in his own person; in order, as appears, to help out a defect of the text, by a kind of marginal note, or comment, which renders these pieces of a *mixed* kind between the *narrative* and *dramatic*. It is in this fashionable style, or manner of dumb shew, that the reader finds the action of the piece more amazingly expressed than he possibly could by the lines of the *drama* itself, where the parties alone are suffered to be speakers.

It is out of the same regard to ease, both in respect of writer and reader, that we see long characters and descriptions at the head of most dramatic pieces, to inform us of the relations, kindred, interests, and designs of the *dramatis personæ*; this being of the highest importance to the reader, that he may the better understand *the plot*, and find out the principal characters and incidents of the piece; which otherwise could not possibly discover themselves, as they are read in their due order. And to do justice to our play-readers, they seldom fail to humour our poets in this respect, and read over the characters with strict application; as a sort of *grammar* or *key*, before they enter on the piece itself. I know not whether they would do so much for any philosophical piece in the world. Our author seems very much to question it; and has therefore made that part easy enough which relates to the distinction of his characters, by making use of the narrative manner: though he had done as well, perhaps, not to have gone out of the natural plain way, on this account. For with those to whom such philosophical subjects are agreeable, it could be thought no laborious task  
to

to give the same attention to characters in *dialogue*, as is given at the first entrance by every reader to the easiest *play*, composed of fewest and plainest personages. But for those who read these subjects with mere supineness and indifference, they will as much begrudge the pains of attending to the characters thus particularly pointed out, as if they had only been discernible by inference and deduction from the mouth of the speaking parties themselves.

MORE reasons are given by our author himself\*, for his avoiding the *direct way* of DIALOGUE; which at present lies so low, and is used only now and then in our *party-pamphlets*, or new-fashioned *theological essays*. For of late, it seems, the manner has been introduced into church-controversy, with an attempt of *raillery* and *humour*, as a more successful method of dealing with heresy and infidelity. The burlesque-divinity grows mightily in vogue. And the cried-up answers to heterodox discourses are generally such as are written in drolery, or with resemblance of the facetious and humorous language of conversation.

Joy to the *reverend* authors who can afford to be thus gay, and condescend to correct us in this *lay-wit*. The advances they make in behalf of piety and manners, by such a *popular* style, are doubtless found, upon experience, to be very considerable. As these reformers are nicely qualified to hit the air of breeding and gentility, they will in time, no doubt, refine their manner, and improve this jocular method, to the edification of the polite world; who have been so long seduced by the way of *raillery* and *wit*. They may do wonders

\* Vol. 2. p. 139.

by their *comic* MUSE, and may thus, perhaps, find means to *laugh* gentlemen into their religion, who have unfortunately been laughed out of it. For what reason is there to suppose, that orthodoxy should not be able to laugh as agreeably, and with as much refinedness, as heresy or infidelity?

At present, it must be owned, the *characters*, or *personages*, employed by our new orthodox dialogists, carry with them little proportion or coherence; and in this respect may be said to suit perfectly with that figurative metaphorical style and rhetorical manner in which their logic and arguments are generally couched. Nothing can be more complex or multiform than their moral *draughts* or *sketches* of humanity. These, indeed, are so far from representing any *particular* MAN, or *order of* MEN, that they scarce resemble any thing of *the kind*. It is by their names only that these *characters* are figured. Though they bear different titles, and are set up to maintain contrary points; they are found, at the bottom, to be all of the same side; and, notwithstanding their seeming variance, to co-operate in the most officious manner with the author, towards the display of his own proper wit, and the establishment of his private opinion and maxims. They are indeed his very legitimate and obsequious *puppets*; as like *real men* in voice, action, and manners, as those wooden or wire engines of the lower stage. *Philotheus* and *Philatheus*, *Philautus* and *Philaethes*, are of one and the same order: just tallies to one another: questioning and answering in concert, and with such a sort of alternative as is known in a vulgar play, where *one* person lies down blindfold, and presents himself, as fair as may be, to *another*, who, by favour of the company, or the assistance of his good fortune, deals his companion  
many

many a sound blow, without being once challenged, or brought into his turn of *lying down*.

There is the same curious mixture of *chance*, and *elegant vicissitude*, in the style of these mock-personages of our new *theological drama*: with this difference only, "that after the poor phantom or shadow of an adversary has said as little for his cause as can be imagined, and given as many opens and advantages as could be desired, he *lies down* for good and all, and passively submits to the killing strokes of his unmerciful conqueror."

Hardly, as I conceive, will it be objected to our MORALIST, (the author of the *philosophic dialogue* above), "That the personages who sustain the *sceptical* or *objecting parts*, are over tame and tractable in their disposition." Did I perceive any such foul dealing in his piece, I should scarce think it worthy of the criticism here bestowed. For in this sort of writing, where personages are exhibited, and natural conversation set in view; if *characters* are neither tolerably preserved, nor *manners* with any just similitude described; there remains nothing but what is too gross and monstrous for *criticism* or *examination*.

It will be alledged, perhaps, in answer to what is here advanced, "That should A DIALOGUE be wrought up to the exactness of these rules, it ought to be condemned as the worse piece, for affording the *infidel* or *sceptic* such good quarter, and giving him the full advantage of his argument and wit."

But to this I reply, That either DIALOGUE should never be attempted; or if it be, the parties should appear *natural*, and *such as they really are*. If we *paint* at all, we should endeavour to paint *like life*, and draw creatures as they are knowable, in  
their

their *proper* shapes and better features ; not in metamorphosis, not mangled, lame, distorted, awkward forms, and impotent chimera's. *Atheists* have their sense and wits, as other men ; or why is **ATHEISM** so often challenged in those of *the better rank* ? why charged so often to the account of *wit and subtle reasoning* ?

Were I to advise these authors, towards whom I am extremely well affected on account of their good-humoured zeal, and the seeming sociableness of their religion ; I should say to them, “ Gentlemen !  
 “ be not so cautious of furnishing your *representative* SCEPTIC with too good *arguments*, or too  
 “ shrewd a turn of *wit* or *humour*. Be not so  
 “ fearful of giving quarter. Allow your adversary  
 “ his full reason, his ingenuity, sense, and art.  
 “ Trust to the *chief character* or HERO of your  
 “ *piece*. Make him as dazzling *bright* as you are  
 “ able. He will undoubtedly overcome the utmost  
 “ force of his opponent, and dispel the darkness or  
 “ cloud which the adversary may unluckily have  
 “ raised. But if when you have fairly wrought up  
 “ your *antagonist* to his due strength and cogni-  
 “ fable proportion, your *chief character* cannot  
 “ afterwards prove a match for him, or shine with  
 “ a superior brightness : whose fault is it ?—  
 “ the *subjects* ?—This, I hope, you will never  
 “ allow.—Whose, therefore, beside *your own* ?—  
 “ Beware then, and consider well your strength  
 “ and mastery in this manner of writing, and in  
 “ the qualifying practice of the polite world, ere  
 “ you attempt these accurate and refined limnings  
 “ or portraitures of mankind, or offer to bring  
 “ *gentlemen* on the stage. For if *real gentlemen*  
 “ seduced, as you pretend, and made erroneous in  
 “ their religion or philosophy, discover not the  
 “ least feature of their real faces in your looking-  
 VOL. III. S “ glafs,

“ glafs, nor know themselves, in the least, by your  
 “ description; they will hardly be apt to think  
 “ they are refuted. How wittily soever your co-  
 “ medy may be wrought up, they will scarce ap-  
 “ prehend any of that wit to fall upon themselves.  
 “ They may laugh indeed at the diversion you are  
 “ pleased to give them: but *the laugh* perhaps may  
 “ be different from what you intend. They may  
 “ smile secretly to see themselves thus encounter-  
 “ ed; when they find, at last, your authority laid  
 “ by, and your *scholastic* weapons quitted, in fa-  
 “ vour of this weak attempt, *to master them by*  
 “ *their own arms, and proper ability.*”

THUS we have performed our *critical* task, and  
 tried our strength, both on our author, and those  
 of his order, who attempt to write in *dialogue*, af-  
 ter the active dramatic, *mimical* or personating  
 way\*; according to which a writer is properly  
*poetical*.

What remains, we shall examine in our succeed-  
 ing and last chapter.

### C H A P. III.

*Of extent or latitude of thought.*—Free-thinkers.  
 —*Their cause, and character.*—Dishonesty,  
 a half-thought.—*Short-thinking, cause of vice*  
*and bigotry.*—*Agreement of slavery and su-*  
*perstition.*—LIBERTY, *civil, moral, spiritual.*  
 —*Free-thinking divines.*—*Representatives*  
*incognito.*—*Ambassadors from the moon.*—  
*Effectual determination of Christian controversy*  
*and religious belief.*

**B**EING now come to the conclusion of my work,  
 after having defended the cause of *critics* in

\* See vol. 1. p. 152. &c.

general,



general, and employed what strength I had in that science upon our adventurous author in particular ; I may, according to equity, and with the better grace, attempt a line or two, in defence of that *freedom of thought* which our author has used, particularly in one of the personages of his last *dialogue-treatise*.

There is good reason to suppose, that however *equally* framed, or near *alike*, the race of mankind may appear in other respects, they are not always *equal thinkers*, or of a like ability in the management of this natural talent which we call **THOUGHT**. The *race*, on this account, may therefore justly be distinguished, as they often are, by the appellation of the *thinking*, and the *unthinking* sort. The mere *unthinking* are such as have not yet arrived to that happy thought by which they should observe, "how necessary thinking is, and how fatal the want of it must prove to them." The *thinking* part of mankind, on the other side, having discovered the assiduity and industry requisite to *right* thinking, and being already *commenced THINKERS* upon this foundation, are, in the progress of the affair, convinced of the necessity of *thinking to good purpose*, and carrying the work to a *thorough* issue. They know, that if they *refrain* or *stop* once upon this road, they had done as well *never to have set out*. They are not so supine as to be withheld by mere laziness, when nothing lies in the way to interrupt the *free* course and progress of their thought.

Some obstacles, it is true, may, on this occasion, be pretended. *Spectres* may come across, and *shadows* of reason rise up against **REASON itself**. But if men have once heartily espoused the *reasoning* or *thinking habit*, they will not easily be induced to lay the practice down ; they will not as

an instant be arrested, or made to stand, and yield themselves, when they come to such a certain boundary, land-mark, post, or pillar, erected here or there, (for what reason may probably be guessed) with the inscription of a *Ne plus ultra*.

It is not, indeed, any authority on earth, as we are well assured, can stop us on this road, unless we please to make the arrest, or restriction, of our own accord. It is our own *thought* which must restrain our thinking. And whether *the restraining thought* be just, how shall we ever judge, without examining it *freely*, and out of all constraint? How shall we be sure that we have justly quitted REASON; as too high and dangerous, too aspiring or presumptive; if, through *fear* of any kind, or submitting to mere *command*, we quit our very examining thought, and in the moment stop short, so as to put an end to further thinking on the matter? Is there much difference between this case, and that of the obedient beasts of burden, who stop precisely at their appointed inn, or at whatever point the *charioteer*, or *governor of the reins*, thinks fit to give the signal for a *halt*?

I cannot but from hence conclude, that of all species of creatures said commonly *to have brains*, the most insipid, wretched, and preposterous are those whom, in just propriety of speech, we call *half-thinkers*.

I have often known *pretenders to WIT* break out into admiration, on the sight of some raw, heedless, unthinking gentleman; declaring on this occasion, that they esteemed it the happiest case in the world, "never *to think*, or trouble one's head" with *study* or *consideration*." This I have always looked upon as one of the highest airs of distinction, which the self-admiring wits are used to themselves in public company. Now, the *echo*  
or

or *antiphony* which these elegant exclaimers hope, by this reflection, to draw necessarily from their audience, is, "that they themselves are over-freighted with this merchandise of *THOUGHT* ; and have not only enough for *ballast*, but such a *cargo* over and above, as is enough to sink them "by its weight." I am apt however to imagine of these gentlemen, that it was never their *over-thinking* which oppressed them ; and that if their thought had ever really become oppressive to them, they might thank themselves, for having *under-thought*, or *reasoned short* ; so as to rest satisfied with a very superficial search into matters of the first and highest importance.

If, for example, they overlooked the *chief enjoyments of life*, which are founded in *honesty* and a *good mind* ; if they presumed *mere life* to be fully worth what its tenacious lovers are pleased to rate it at ; if they thought *public distinction, fame, power, an estate, or title* to be of the same value as is vulgarly conceived, or as they concluded, on a first thought, without further *scepticism* or after-deliberation ; it is no wonder, if being in time become such mature *dogmatists*, and well-practised dealers in the affairs of what they call a *settlement* or *fortune*, they are so hardly put to it, to find ease or rest within themselves.

These are the deeply-loaded and over-pensive gentlemen, who esteeming it the truest wit to pursue what they call their *interest*, wonder to find they are still as little at ease when they have succeeded, as when they first attempted to advance.

There can never be less *self enjoyment* than in these supposed *wise characters*, these *selfish* computers of happiness and private good ; whose pursuits of *interest*, whether for this world or another, are attended with the same steady vein of *cunning*

and low thought, fordid deliberations, perverse and crooked fancies, ill dispositions, and false relishes of *life* and *manners*. The most negligent undesigning thoughtless *rake* has not only more of sociableness, ease, tranquillity, and freedom from worldly cares, but in reality more of worth, virtue, and merit, than such grave plodders, and *thoughtful* gentlemen as these.

If it happens, therefore, that these graver, more circumspect, and deeply-interested gentlemen, have, *for their soul's sake*, and through a careful provision for *hereafter*, engaged in certain speculations of RELIGION; their *taste* of VIRTUE, and *relish* of LIFE is not the more improved on this account. The thoughts they have on these new subjects of *divinity* are so biassed, and perplexed, by those *half-thoughts* and *raw* imaginations of interest, and worldly affairs, that they are still disabled in the rational pursuit of happiness and good: and being necessitated thus to remain *short-thinkers*, they have the power to go no further than they are led by those to whom, under such disturbances and perplexities, they apply themselves for cure and comfort.

IT has been the main scope and principal end of these volumes, "to assert the reality of a BEAUTY and CHARM in *moral* as well as *natural* subjects, "and to demonstrate the reasonableness of a *proportionate* TASTE, and *determinate* CHOICE, in "*life* and *manners*." The STANDARD of this kind, and the noted character of *moral* TRUTH, appear so firmly established in nature itself, and so widely displayed through the intelligent world, that there is no genius, mind, or *thinking principle*, which (if I may say so) is not really conscious in *the* case. Even the most refractory and obstinate under..andings

understandings are by certain *reprises* or *returns* of thought, on every occasion, convinced of this existence, and necessitated, in common with others, to acknowledge the actual RIGHT and WRONG.

It is evident, that whensoever the mind, influenced by passion or humour, consents to any action, measure, or rule of life contrary to this *governing STANDARD* and *primary MEASURE* of *intelligence*, it can only be through a weak *thought*, a scantiness of judgment, and a defect in the application of that unavoidable *impression* and first natural rule of *honesty* and *worth*; against which, whatever is advanced, will be of no other moment than to render a life distracted, incoherent, full of irresolution, repentance, and self-disapprobation.

Thus every immorality and enormity of life can only happen from a partial and narrow view of happiness and good. Whatever takes from the *largeness* or *freedom of thought*, must of necessity detract from that first *relish*, or TASTE, on which virtue and worth depend.

For instance, when the eye or appetite is eagerly fixed on *treasure*, and the *moneyed* bliss of *bags* and *coffers*; it is plain there is a kind of *fascination* in the case. The sight is instantly diverted from all other views of excellence or worth. And here, even the vulgar, as well as the more liberal part of mankind, discover the contracted genius, and acknowledge the narrowness of such a mind.

In luxury and intemperance we easily apprehend how far *thought* is oppressed, and the mind debarred from just reflection, and from the *free* examination and censure of its own opinions or maxims, on which the conduct of a life is formed.

Even in that complicated *good* of vulgar kind, which we commonly call INTEREST, in which we comprehend both *pleasure*, *riches*, *power*, and o-  
ther

ther *exterior advantages*; we may discern how a *fascinated sight* contracts a genius, and by shortening the view even of that very *interest* which it seeks, betrays the KNAVE, and necessitates the ablest and wittiest profelyte of the kind, to expose himself on every emergency and sudden turn.

But above all other enslaving vices, and restrainers of *reason* and *just thought*, the most evidently ruinous and fatal to the understanding is that of SUPERSTITION, BIGOTRY, and *vulgar ENTHUSIASM*. This passion, not contented like other vices to deceive, and tacitly supplant our reason, professes open war, holds up the intended chains and fetters, and declares its resolution *to enslave*.

The artificial managers of this human frailty declaim against *free-thought*, and *latitude* of understanding. To go beyond those bounds of thinking which they have prescribed, is by them declared a *sacrilege*. To them, FREEDOM of mind, a MASTERY of sense, and a LIBERTY in thought and action, imply debauch, corruption, and depravity.

In consequence of their moral maxims, and political establishments, they can indeed advance no better notion of human happiness and enjoyment, than that which is in every respect the most opposite to *liberty*. It is to them doubtless that we owe the opprobriousness and abuse of those naturally honest appellations of *free-livers*, *free-thinkers*, *latitudinarians*, or whatever other character implies a largeness of mind, and generous use of understanding. Fain would they confound *licentiousness in morals*, with *liberty in thought and action*; and make *the libertine*, who has the least mastery of himself, resemble his direct *opposite*. For such indeed is the man of resolute purpose and immoveable adherence to REASON, against every thing which *passion*, *prepossession*, *craft*, or *fashion* can advance.

advance in favour of ought else. But here, it seems, the grievance lies. It is thought dangerous for us to be over-rational, or too much masters of ourselves, in what we draw, by just conclusions, from *reason* only. Seldom therefore do these *expositors* fail of bringing the thought of LIBERTY into disgrace. Even at the expence of *virtue*, and of that very idea of GOODNESS on which they build the mysteries of their profitable science, they derogate from *morals*, and reverse all true *philosophy*; they refine on *selfishness*, and explode *generosity*; promote a *slavish* obedience in the room of *voluntary* duty and *free service*; exalt blind *ignorance* for *devotion*, recommend *low thought*, decry *reason*, extol *voluptuousness*, *wilfulness*, *vindicativeness*, *arbitrariness*, *vain-glory*\*; and even deify those weak passions which are the disgrace rather than ornament of human nature †.

But so far is it from the nature of LIBERTY to indulge such *passions* as these †, that whoever acts at any time under the power of any *single one*, may be said to have already provided for himself an *absolute master*. And he who lives under the power of a whole race, (since it is scarce possible to obey *one* without *the other*), must of necessity undergo the worst of servitudes, under the most capricious and domineering lords.

That this is no *paradox*, even the writers for entertainment can inform us; however others may moralise who discourse or write (as they pretend) for profit and instruction. The POETS even of the wanton sort give ample testimony of this slavery and wretchedness of *vice*. They may extol voluptuousness to the skies, and point their wit as

\* Vol. 2. p. 191.; and below, p. 215, 16.

† Vol. 1. p. 29.

‡ Vol. 2. p. 188. 325.

sharply

sharply as they are able against a virtuous state. But when they come afterwards to pay the necessary tribute to their commanding pleasures, we hear their pathetic moans, and find the inward discord and calamity of their lives. Their example is the best of precepts; since they conceal nothing, are sincere, and speak their passion out aloud. And it is in this that the very worst of *poets* may justly be preferred to the generality of modern *philosophers*, or other *formal writers* of a yet more specious name. The *MUSES pupils* never fail to express their passions, and *write* just as they *feel*. It is not, indeed, in their nature to do otherwise, whilst they indulge their vein, and are under the power of that natural *enthusiasm* which leads them to what is highest in their performance. They follow Nature: they move chiefly as she moves in them; without thought of disguising her free motions, and genuine operations, for the sake of any *scheme* or *hypothesis*, which they have formed at leisure, and in particular narrow views. On this account, though at one time they quarrel perhaps with *VIRTUE*, for restraining them in their *forbidden loves*, they can at another time make her sufficient amends; when with indignation they complain, "that *MERIT* is neglected, and " their worthless rival preferred before them \*."

*Contrane lucrum nil valere candidum  
Pauperis ingenium † ?"*

And thus even in common *elegiac*, in *song*, *ode*, or *epigram*, consecrated to pleasure itself, we may often read the dolorous confession in behalf of virtue, and see, at the bottom, how the case stands:

\* Vol. I. p. 10.  
†: epoc. II.



*Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo  
Eliciuntur.*

The airy poets, in these fits, can, as freely as the *tragedian*, condole with VIRTUE, and bemoan the case of *suffering* MERIT :

*Th' oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,  
The insolence of office, and the spurns  
That patient MERIT of th' unworthy takes.*

The poetic chiefs may give what reason they think fit for their humour of representing our mad *appetites* (especially that of LOVE) under the shape of urchins and wanton boys, scarce out of their state of infancy. The original design and moral of this fiction, I am persuaded, was to shew us, how little there was of *great* and *heroic* in the government of these pretenders, how truly *weak* and *childish* they were in themselves, and how much lower than mere children we then became, when we submitted ourselves to their blind tutorage. There was no fear lest in this fiction the boyish nature should be misconstrued as *innocent* and *gentle*. The storms of passion, so well known in every kind, kept the *tyrannic* quality of this wanton race sufficiently in view. Nor could the poetical description fail to bring to mind their *mischievous* and *malignant play*. But when the image of *imperious threatening*, and *absolute command*, was joined to that of *ignorance*, *puerility*, and *folly*; the notion was completed, of that wretched *slavish* state, which modern *libertines*, in conjunction with some of a *graver character*, admire, and represent, as the most eligible of any. — “Happy condition!” (says one), “happy life, that of the indulged PASSIONS; might we pursue it! — Miserable condition! miserable life, that  
“ of

“ of REASON and VIRTUE, which we are bid pursue \* ! ”

It is the same, it seems, with men, in *morals*, as in *politics*. When they have been unhappily born and bred to SLAVERY, they are so far from being sensible of their *slavish* course of life, or of that ill usage, indignity, and misery they sustain, that they even admire their own condition : and being used to *think short*, and carry their *views* no further than those bounds which were early prescribed to them, they look upon TYRANNY as a *natural case*, and think mankind in a sort of dangerous and degenerate state, when under the power of *laws*, and in the possession of a *free government*.

We may by these reflections come easily to apprehend what men they were who first brought *reason* and *free-thought* under disgrace, and made the noblest of characters (that of a *freethinker*) to become invidious. It is no wonder if the same interpreters would have those also to be esteemed *free* in their lives, and masters of *good living*, who are the least masters of themselves, and the most impotent in passion and humour of all their fellow-creatures. But far be it, and far surely will it ever be, from any worthy genius, to be consenting to such a treacherous language, and abuse of words. For my own part, I thoroughly confide in the *good powers* of REASON, “ that LIBERTY and “ FREEDOM shall never, by any artifice or delusion, be made to pass with me as frightful “ sounds, or as reproachful, or invidious, in any “ sense.”

I can no more allow *that* to be *free-living*, where unlimited passion and unexamined fancy go-

\* Vol. 2. p. 191.

vern, than I can allow that to be a *free government* where the mere people govern, and not the LAWS. For no people in a civil state can possibly be *free*, when they are otherwise governed than by such *laws* as they themselves have constituted, or to which they have *freely* given consent. Now, to be released from these, so as to govern themselves by each day's will or fancy, and to vary on every turn the rule and measure of government, without respect to any ancient constitutions or establishments, or to the stated and fixed rules of equity and justice, is as certain slavery, as it is violence, distraction, and misery; such as in the issue must prove the establishment of an irretrievable state of *tyranny* and *absolute dominion*.

In the determinations of life, and in the choice and government of actions, he alone is *free* who has within himself no hindrance, or controul, in acting what he himself, by *his best judgment*, and *most deliberate choice*, approves. Could VICÆ agree possibly with itself, or could *the vicious* any way reconcile the various judgments of their inward *counsellors*; they might with justice perhaps assert their liberty and independency. But whilst they are necessitated to follow least, what, in their sedate hours, they most approve; whilst they are passively assigned, and made over from one possessor to another\*, in contrary extremes, and to different ends and purposes, of which they are themselves wholly ignorant; it is evident, that the more they turn their eyes † (as many times they are

\* *Huncine an hunc sequeris? Sudeus alternus oportet  
Ancipiti obsequio dominos.*

Perf. sat. 5.

See vol. I. p. 223, 4. 242, 53. &c.

† *Magne Pater divum, sevos punire tyrannos  
Hæc alia ratione velis, cum dira libido  
Moverit ingeniam ferventi tincta venena,  
Virtutem videant, intabescantque relicta.*

Perf. sat. 3.  
obliged)

obliged) towards *virtue* and *a free life*, the more they must confess their misery and subjection. They discern their own captivity, but not with force and resolution sufficient to redeem themselves, and become *their own*. Such is the real *tragic* state, as the old *tragedian* represents it :

——— *Video meliora proboque,  
Deteriora sequor* \*.

And thus the highest spirits, and most refractory wills, contribute to the lowest servitude and most submissive state. *Reason* and *Virtue* alone can bestow LIBERTY. *Vice* is unworthy, and unhappy, on this account only, “ that it is *slavish* and *debauching*.”

THUS have we pleaded the cause of LIBERTY in general; and vindicated, withal, our author's particular freedom, in taking the person of a *sceptic*, as he has done in this last treatise †, on which we have so largely paraphrased. We may now perhaps, in compliance with general custom, justly presume to add something in defence of the same kind of freedom we ourselves have assumed in these latter *miscellaneous comments*; since it would doubtless be very unreasonable and unjust, for those who had so freely played *the critic*, to expect any thing less than the same free treatment, and thorough criticism in return.

As for the STYLE or *language* used in these *comments*; it is very different we find; and varies in proportion with the *author commented*, and with

\* Καὶ μανθάνω μὲν ὅτι τολμήσω κακὰ· θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσω τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων. Eurip. Med. act. 4.

† Viz. the MORALISTS, or *philosophical dialogue*, recited in the person of a *sceptic*, under the name of *Philocles*. See treatise 5. vol. 2. p. 154. &c.

the

the different *characters* and *persons* frequently introduced in the original treatises. So that there will undoubtedly be scope sufficient for censure and correction.

As for the observations on ANTIQUITY; we have in most passages, except the very common and obvious, produced our vouchers and authorities in our own behalf. What may be thought of our *judgment* or *sense* in the application of these authorities, and in the deductions and reasonings we have formed from such learned topics, must be submitted to the opinion of the wise and learned.

IN MORALS, of which the very force lies in a love of *discipline*, and in a willingness to *redress* and *rectify* false thought, and erring views; we cannot but patiently wait redress and amicable censure from the sole competent judges, *the wise* and *good*; whose interest it has been our whole endeavour to advance.

The only subject on which we are perfectly secure, and without fear of any just censure or reproach, is that of FAITH and *orthodox* BELIEF. For, in the first place, it will appear, that, through a profound respect, and religious veneration, we have forbore so much as to name any of the sacred or solemn *mysteries* of *revelation* \*. And, in the next place, as we can with confidence declare, that we have never in any writing, public or private, attempted such high researches, nor have ever in practice acquitted ourselves otherwise than as just *conformists* to the lawful church; so we may, in a proper sense, be said faithfully and dutifully to *embrace* those holy *mysteries*, even in their-minutest particulars, without the least exception on account of their amazing depth. And though we are sen-

\* *Supra*, p. 49. &c.

sible, that it would be no small hardship to deprive *others* of a liberty of examining and searching, with due modesty and submission, into the nature of those subjects; yet as for *ourselves*, who have not the least scruple whatsoever, we pray not any such grace or favour in our behalf; being fully assured of our own steady *orthodoxy*, *resignation*, and entire *submission* to the truly *Christian* and *catholic* doctrines of our holy church, as by law established.

It is true indeed, that as to *CRITICAL learning*, and the examination of *originals*, *texts*, *glosses*, *various readings*, *styles*, *compositions*, *manuscripts*, *compilements*, *editions*, *publications*, and other *circumstances*, such as are common to the *sacred books* with *all other writings and literature*; this we have confidently asserted to be a just and lawful study\*. We have even represented this species of *criticism* as necessary to the preservation and purity of scripture: that *sacred scripture*, which has been so miraculously preserved in its successive copies and transcriptions, under the eye (as we must needs suppose) of holy and learned *critics*, through so many dark ages of Christianity, to these latter times; in which learning has been happily revived.

But if this *critical* liberty raises any jealousy against us, we shall beg leave of our offended reader to lay before him our case, *at the very worst*: that if, on such a naked exposition, it be found criminal, we may be absolutely *condemned*; if otherwise, *acquitted*; and with the same favour *indulged*, as others, *in the same circumstances*, have been before us.

On this occasion, therefore, we may be allowed to borrow something from the form or manner of

\* Vol. I. p. 114, 15

our dialogue-author, and represent a conversation of the same free nature as that recited by him in his *night-scene* \*; where the supposed SCEPTIC or *freethinker* delivers his thoughts, and reigns in the discourse.

IT was in a more considerable company, and before a more numerous audience, that not long since, a gentleman of some rank, (one who was generally esteemed to carry a sufficient caution and reserve in religious subjects of discourse, as well as an apparent deference to religion, and in particular to the national and established church), having been provoked by an impertinent attack of a certain violent bigotted party, was drawn into an open and *free* vindication, not only of *free-thinking*, but *free professing* and *discoursing*, in matters relating to religion and faith.

Some of the company, it seems, after having made bold with him, as to what they fancied to be his principle, began to urge "the necessity of reducing men to *one* profession and belief." And several gentlemen, even of those who passed for *moderate* in their way, seemed so far to give into this *zealot*-opinion, as to agree, "that, notwithstanding the *right* method was not yet found, it was highly requisite that some way should be thought on, to reconcile differences in opinion; since so long as this variety should last, RELIGION, they thought, could never be successfully advanced."

To this our gentleman at first answered coldly, That "what was *impossible* to be done, could not, he thought, be properly pursued as *necessary* to be done." But the *raillery* being ill taken, he

\* Vol. 2. p. 241, 2, 3. &c.

was forced at last to defend himself the best he could, upon this point; “*That variety of opinion was not to be cured;*” and, “*That it was impossible all should be of one mind.*”

“*I well know,*” said he, “*that many pious men, seeing the inconveniencies which the disunion of persuasions and opinions accidentally produces, have thought themselves obliged to stop this inundation of mischiefs, and have made attempts accordingly. Some have endeavoured to unite these fractions, by propounding such a GUIDE as they were all bound to follow; hoping that the unity of a guide would have produced unity of minds. But who this GUIDE should be, after all, became such a question, that it was made part of that fire itself which was to be extinguished. Others thought of a RULE. — This was to be the effectual means of union! this was to do the work, or nothing could! — But supposing all the world had been agreed on this RULE, yet the interpretation of it was so full of variety, that this also became part of the disease.*”

The company, upon this preamble of our gentleman, pressed harder upon him than before; objecting the authority of *holy scripture* against him, and affirming *this* to be of itself a sufficient *guide* and *rule*. They urged again and again that known saying of a famed controversial divine of our church against the divines of another, “*That the scripture, the scripture was the religion of Protestants.*”

To this our gentleman, at first, replied only, by desiring them to explain their word *SCRIPTURE*, and by inquiring into the original of this collection of ancients and later tracts, which in general they comprehended under that title: whether it were the *apocryphal* *SCRIPTURE*, or the more *canonical*?



*cal?* the full or the half authorised? the doubtful, or the certain? the controverted, or uncontroverted? the singly-read, or that of various reading? the texts of these manuscripts, or of those? the transcripts, copies, titles, catalogues of this church and nation, or of that other? of this sect and party, or of another? of those in one age called ORTHODOX, and in possession of power, or of those who in another overthrew their predecessors authority, and in their turn also assumed the guardianship and power of holy things? For how these sacred records were guarded in those ages, might easily (he said) be imagined by any one who had the least insight into the history of those TIMES which we called *primitive*, and those CHARACTERS of men whom we styled FATHERS of the church.

“It must be confessed,” (continued he), “it was a strange industry and *unlucky* diligence which was used, in this respect, by these *ecclesiastical fore-FATHERS*. Of all those heresies which gave them employment, we have absolutely no record, or monument, but what themselves who were adversaries have transmitted to us; and we know that adversaries, especially such who observe all opportunities to discredit both the persons and doctrines of their enemies, are not always the best recorders or witnesses of such transactions. We see it,” (continued he, in a very emphatical, but somewhat embarrassed style), “we see it *now* in this very age, in the present distemperatures, that parties are no good registers of the actions of the adverse side: and if we cannot be confident of the truth of a story now, (*now*, I say, that it is possible for any man, especially for the interested adversary, to discover the imposture), it is far more unlikely, that

“ that after ages should know any other truth than  
 “ such as serves the ends of the representers.”

Our gentleman by these expressions had already given considerable offence to his zealot-auditors. They plied him faster with passionate reproaches, than with arguments or rational answers. This, however, served only to animate him the more, and made him proceed the more boldly, with the same assumed formality and air of declamation, in his general CRITICISM of *holy literature*.

“ There are,” said he, “ innumerable places  
 “ that contain (no doubt) great mysteries ; but so  
 “ wrapped in clouds, or hid in umbrages, so  
 “ heightened with expressions, or so covered with  
 “ allegories and garments of rhetoric ; so profound  
 “ in the matter, or so altered and made intricate  
 “ in the manner, that they may seem to have  
 “ been left as *trials* of our industry, and as *occa-*  
 “ *sions* and *opportunities* for the exercise of mu-  
 “ tual charity and toleration, rather than as the  
 “ *repositories* of FAITH, and *furniture* of *creeds*.  
 “ For when there are found in the explications of  
 “ these writings, so many commentaries ; so ma-  
 “ ny senses and interpretations ; so many volumes  
 “ in all ages, and all like mens faces, no one ex-  
 “ actly like another : either this *difference* is ab-  
 “ solutely no fault at all ; or if it be, it is excuse-  
 “ able. There are, besides, so many thousands of  
 “ *copies* that were writ by persons of several *in-*  
 “ *terests* and *persuasions*, such different under-  
 “ standings and tempers, such distinct abilities and  
 “ weaknesses, that it is no wonder there is so  
 “ great *variety of readings* : — whole verses in  
 “ *one*, that are not in *another* : — whole books  
 “ admitted by *one* church or communion, which  
 “ are rejected by *another* : and whole stories and  
 “ relations admitted by *some* fathers, and rejected  
 “ by

“ by *others*. — I consider withal, that there  
 “ have been many *designs* and *views* in expound-  
 “ ing these writings: many *senses* in which they  
 “ are expounded; and when the *grammatical*  
 “ *sense* is found out, we are many times never  
 “ the nearer. Now, there being such variety of  
 “ *senses* in scripture, and but few places so mark-  
 “ ed out, as not to be capable of more than one;  
 “ if men will write commentaries *by fancy*, what  
 “ infallible *criterion* will be left to judge of the  
 “ *certain sense* of such places as have been the mat-  
 “ ter of question? I consider again, that there  
 “ are indeed divers places in these sacred volumes,  
 “ containing in them mysteries and questions of  
 “ great concernment: yet such is the fabric and  
 “ constitution of the whole, that there is no cer-  
 “ tain mark to determine whether the sense of  
 “ these passages should be taken as *literal* or *figu-*  
 “ *rative*. There is nothing in the nature of the  
 “ thing to determine *the sense* or *meaning*: but it  
 “ must be gotten out as it can. And therefore it  
 “ is unreasonably required, that what is of itself  
 “ ambiguous, should be understood in its own  
 “ prime sense and intention, under the pain of ei-  
 “ ther a *sin*, or an *anathema*. Very wise men,  
 “ even the *ancient fathers*, have expounded things  
 “ *allegorically*, when they should have expound-  
 “ ed them *literally*. Others expound things *lite-*  
 “ *rally*, when they should understand them *in al-*  
 “ *legory*. If such great spirits could be deceived  
 “ in finding out what kind of *senses* were to be  
 “ given to scriptures, it may well be endured that  
 “ we, who sit at their feet, should be subject at  
 “ least to equal failure. If we follow any *ONE*  
 “ *translation*, or any *ONE* man’s *commentary*,  
 “ what *rule* or *direction* shall we have, by which  
 “ to chuse that *ONE* aright? Or is there any *one*  
 “ man

“ man that hath translated *perfectly*, or expounded *infallibly*? If we resolve to follow *any one* as far only as we like, or fancy, we shall then only do wrong or right *by chance*. If we resolve absolutely to follow *any one*, whithersoever he leads, we shall probably come at last where, if we have any eyes left, we shall see ourselves become sufficiently ridiculous.”

The reader may here perhaps, by his natural sagacity, remark a certain air of studied discourse and declamation, not so very proper or natural in the mouth of a mere *gentleman*, nor suitable to a company where alternate discourse is carried on, in unconcerted measure, and unpremeditated language. Something there was so very emphatical, withal, in the delivery of these words, by the *sceptical gentleman*, that some of the company who were still more incensed against him for these expressions, began to charge him as a *preacher* of pernicious doctrines, one who attacked religion *in form*, and carried his lessons or lectures about with him, to repeat by rote, at any time, to the *ignorant* and *vulgar*, in order to seduce them.

It is true, indeed, said he, Gentlemen! that what I have here ventured to repeat is addressed chiefly to those you call *ignorant*; such, I mean, as, being otherwise engaged in the world, have had little time perhaps to bestow upon inquiries into divinity-matters. As for you (Gentlemen!) in particular, who are so much displeased with my *freedom*, I am well assured, you are in effect so able and knowing, that the truth of every assertion I have advanced is sufficiently understood and acknowledged by you; however it may happen, that, in your great wisdom, you think it proper to conceal these matters from such persons as you are pleased to style *the vulgar*.

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It is true, withal, Gentlemen ! (continued he), I will confess to you, that the words you have heard repeated are not my own. They are no other than what have been publicly and solemnly delivered, even by one of the Episcopal order \*.

\* The pious and learned Bishop *Taylor*, in his treatise *on the liberty of prophesying*, printed in his collection of polemical and moral discourses, *anno* 1657. The pages answering to the places above cited are, 401. 402. (and in the epistle dedicatory, three or four leaves before), 438. 439.—444. 451. 452. After which, in the succeeding page, he sums up his sense on this subject of sacred literature, and the liberty of criticism, and of private judgment and opinion in these matters, in the following words. " Since there are  
 " so many copies, with infinite varieties of reading; since a various  
 " interpunction, a parenthesis, a letter, an accent, may much alter  
 " the sense; since some places have divers literal senses, many have  
 " spiritual, myttical, and allegorical meanings; since there are so  
 " many tropes, metonymies, ironies, hyperboles, proprieties, and  
 " improprieties of language, whose understanding depends upon such  
 " circumstances, that it is almost impossible to know the proper in-  
 " terpretation, now that the knowledge of such circumstances and  
 " particular stories is irrecoverably lost; since there are some mys-  
 " teries, which, at the best advantage of expression, are not easy  
 " to be apprehended, and whose explication, by reason of our im-  
 " perfections, must needs be dark, sometimes weak, sometimes  
 " unintelligible: and lastly, since those ordinary means of ex-  
 " pounding scripture, as searching the originals, conference of pla-  
 " ces, parity of reason, and analogy of faith, are all dubious, un-  
 " certain, and very fallible; he that is the wisest, and by conse-  
 " quence the likeliest to expound truest, in all probability of reason,  
 " will be very far from confidence; because every one of these, and  
 " many more, are like so many degrees of improbability and un-  
 " certainty, all depressing our certainty of finding out truth, in  
 " such mysteries, and amidst so many difficulties. And therefore a  
 " wise man that considers this, would not willingly be prescribed to  
 " by others; for it is best every man should be left in that liberty  
 " from which no man can justly take him, unless he could secure  
 " him from error." The reverend prelate had but a few pages be-  
 " fore (*viz.* p. 427.) acknowledged, indeed, " that we had an aposto-  
 " lical warrant to contend earnestly for the faith. But then," (says  
 " the good Bishop, very candidly and ingenuously), " as these things  
 " recede further from the foundation, our certainty is the less.—  
 " And therefore it were very fit that our confidence should be ac-  
 " cording to our evidence, and our zeal according to our confidence." He adds, p. 507. " All these disputes concerning tradition, coun-  
 " cils,

a celebrated *churchman*, and one of the *highest* sort; as appears by his many devotional works, which carry the rites, ceremonies, and pomp of worship, with the honour and dignity of the priestly and Episcopal order, to the highest degree. In effect, we see the Reverend Doctor's treatises standing, as it were, in the front of this order of authors, and as the foremost of those *good books* used by the politest and most refined *devotees* of either sex. They maintain the principal place in the study of almost every elegant and high *divine*. They stand in folio's and other volumes, adorned with variety of pictures, gildings, and other decorations, on the advanced shelves or glass-cupboards of the *ladies* closets. They are in use at all seasons, and for all places, as well for church-service as closet-preparation; and, in short, may vie with any devotional books in *British Christendom*. And for the life and character of the man himself, I leave it to you, Gentlemen, (you, I mean, of the *zealot* kind), to except against it, if you think proper. It is your *manner*, I know, and what you never fail to have recourse to, when any authority is produced against you. Personal reflection is always seasonable, and at hand, on such an occasion. No matter what virtue, honesty, or sanctity, may

“cils, fathers, &c. are not arguments against or besides reason,  
 “but contestations and pretences of the best arguments, and the  
 “most certain satisfaction of our reason. But then all these coming  
 “into question, submit themselves to reason; that is, to be judged  
 “by human understanding upon the best grounds and information  
 “it can receive. So that scripture, tradition, councils, and fathers,  
 “are the evidence in a question; but Reason is the judge: that is,  
 “we being the persons that are to be persuaded, we must see that  
 “we be persuaded reasonably; and it is unreasonable to assent to a  
 “lesser evidence, when a greater and clearer is propounded: but of  
 “that every man for himself is to take cognisance, if he be able to  
 “judge: if he be not, he is not bound under the tie of necessity  
 “to know any thing of it.”

lie

lie in the character of the person cited. No matter though he be ever so much, in other respects, of your own party, and devoted to your interest. If he has indiscreetly spoken some home-truth, or discovered some secret which strikes at the temporal interests of certain spiritual societies, he is quickly doomed to calumny and defamation.

I shall try this experiment, however, once more, (continued our gentleman); and, as a conclusion to this discourse, will venture to produce to you a further authority of the same kind. You shall have it before you, in the exact phrase and words of the great author, in his *theological* capacity; since I have now no further occasion to conceal my citations, and accommodate them to the more familiar style and language of conversation.

Our excellent archbishop \*, and late father of our church, when expressly treating that very subject of a *RULE in matters of belief*, in opposition to Mr S—— and Mr R——, his *Romish* antagonists, shews plainly how great a shame it is for us *Protestants* at least (whatever the case may be with *Romanists*) to disallow *difference* of opinions, and forbid private *examination*, and *search* into matters of *ancient RECORD*, and *scriptural TRADITION*; when, at the same time, we have no pretence to *oral* or *verbal*; no claim to any absolute superior judge, or decisive judgment in the case; no polity, church, or community; no particular man, or number of men, who are not, even by our own confession, plainly *fallible*, and subject to *error* and *mistake*.

“The Protestants” (says his Grace, speaking in the person of Mr S—— and the *Romanists*)  
 “cannot know *how many* the books of scripture

\* *Viz.* Archbishop Tillotson, in his *Rule of faith*, p. 677.

“ ought to be ; and *which* of the many contro-  
 “ verted ones may be securely put in that cata-  
 “ logue ; *which* not.—But I shall tell him,”  
 (replies his Grace), “ that we know that just so  
 “ many ought to be received as *uncontroverted*  
 “ books, concerning which it cannot be shewn  
 “ *there was ever any controversy.*” It was not  
 incumbent perhaps on my Lord Archbishop to  
 help Mr S—— so far in his objection, as to add,  
 that in reality the *burning, suppressing, and inter-*  
*polating* method, so early in fashion, and so tightly  
 practised on the *epistles, comments, histories, and*  
*writings* of the orthodox and heretics of old, made  
 it impossible to say with any kind of assurance,  
 “ what *books, copies, or transcripts* those were,  
 “ *concerning which there was never any contro-*  
 “ *versy at all.*” This indeed would be a point  
 not so easily to be demonstrated. But his Grace  
 proceeds in shewing the weakness of the *Romish*  
 pillar, TRADITION. “ For it must either (says he)  
 “ acknowledge *some* books to have been contro-  
 “ verted, or *not.* If *not,* why doth he make a  
 “ supposition of controverted books ? If oral *tra-*  
 “ *dition* acknowledges *some* books to have been  
 “ controverted, then it cannot assure us that they  
 “ have not been controverted, nor consequently  
 “ that they ought to be received as never having  
 “ been controverted ; but only *as such, concern-*  
 “ *ing which those churches who did once raise a*  
 “ *controversy about them, have been since satisf-*  
 “ *fied that they are canonical* \*.—Where is then  
 “ the

\* His Grace subjoins immediately : “ The traditionary church  
 “ now receives the epistle to the Hebrews as canonical. I ask, Do  
 “ they receive it as ever delivered for such ? That they must, if  
 “ they receive it from oral tradition, which conveys things to them  
 “ under this notion as ever delivered ; and yet St Hierom (speaking  
 “ not as a *speculator,* but a *testifier*) says expressly of it, *that the*  
 “ *custom*



“ the infallibility of oral tradition ? How does the  
 “ *living voice of the present church* assure us, that  
 “ what *books* are now received by her, were ever  
 “ received by her ? And if it cannot do this, but  
 “ the matter must come to be tried by the best  
 “ *records* of former ages, (which the Protestants  
 “ are willing to have the *catalogue* tried by) ; then  
 “ it seems the Protestants have a better way to  
 “ know what books are canonical, than is the in-  
 “ fallible way of oral tradition. And so long as it  
 “ is better, no matter though it be not called in-  
 “ fallible.”——

Thus the free and generous Archbishop. For, indeed, what greater *generosity* is there, than in owning TRUTH frankly and openly, even where the greatest advantages may be taken by an adversary ? Accordingly, our worthy Archbishop, speaking again immediately in the person of his adversary, “ The Protestants,” says he \*, “ cannot know  
 “ that the very *original*, or a *perfectly true copy*  
 “ of these books, hath been preserved. Nor  
 “ is it necessary” (replies the Archbishop) “ that  
 “ they should know either of these. It is suffi-  
 “ cient that they know that those copies which  
 “ they have are not materially corrupted. — But  
 “ how do the church of *Rome* know that they  
 “ have *perfectly true copies* of the scriptures in the  
 “ *original* languages ? They do not pretend to  
 “ know this. The learned men of that church  
 “ acknowledge the *various readings* as well as we,  
 “ and do not pretend to know, otherwise than by

“ *custom of the Latin church doth not receive it among the canonical*  
 “ *scriptures.* What saith Mr S—— to this ? It is clear from this  
 “ testimony, that the *Roman church* in *St Hierom's* time did not  
 “ acknowledge this *epistle* for canonical ; and it is as plain, that the  
 “ present *Roman church* doth receive it for canonical.”

\* Page 678.

“ *probable conjecture* (as we also may do) which  
 “ of those readings is the true one \*.” —

And thus (continued our *lay-gentleman*) I have  
 finished my quotations, which I have been necessi-

\* The reader perhaps may find it worth while to read after this what the Archbishop represents (p. 716. &c.) of the plausible introduction of the grossest article of belief, in the times when the habit of making creeds came in fashion. And accordingly it may be understood, of what effect the *dogmatizing* practice in divinity has ever been. “ We will suppose then, that about the time when universal ignorance, and the genuine daughter of it, (call her *Devotion* or *Superstition*), had overspread the world, and the generality of people were strongly inclined to believe *strange things*; and even the greatest contradictions were recommended to them under the notion of MYSTERIES; being told by their *priests* and *guides*, that the more contradictory any thing is to reason, the greater merit there is in believing it: I say, let us suppose, that in this state of things one or more of the most eminent then in the church, either out of design, or out of superstitious ignorance and mistake of the sense of our Saviour’s words used in the consecration of the sacrament, should advance this new doctrine, that the words of consecration, &c. \* \* \* Such a doctrine as this was very likely to be advanced by the ambitious *clergy* of that time, as a probable means to draw in the people to a greater veneration of them. \* \* \* Nor was such a doctrine less likely to take and prevail among the people in an age prodigiously ignorant and strongly inclined to superstition, and thereby well prepared to receive the grossest absurdities under the notion of *mysteries*. \* \* \* Now, supposing such a doctrine as this, so fitted to the humour and temper of the age, to be once asserted, either by chance or out of design, it would take like *wild-fire*; especially if, by some one or more who bore sway in the church, it were but recommended with *convenient gravity and solemnity*. \* \* \* And for the contradictions contained in this doctrine, it was but telling the people then, (as they do in effect now), that contradictions ought to be no scruple in the way of faith; that the more impossible any thing is, it is the fitter to be believed; that it is not praiseworthy to believe plain possibilities; but this is the gallantry and heroic power of faith, this is the way to oblige God almighty for ever to us, to believe flat and downright contradictions. \* \* \* The more absurd and unreasonable any thing is, it is for that very reason the more proper matter for an article of faith. And if any of these innovations be objected against, as contrary to former belief and practice, it is but putting forth a lusty act of faith, and believing another contradiction, that though they be contrary, yet they are the same.” Above, p. 57. &c.

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tated to bring in my own defence; to prove to you that I have asserted nothing on this head of *religion, faith,* or the sacred *mysteries,* which has not been justified and confirmed by the most celebrated *churchmen* and respected *divines.* You may now proceed in your *investives;* bestowing as free language of that kind, as your *charity* and *breeding* will permit. And you (*Reverend SIRs!*), who have assumed a character which sets you above that of the mere *gentleman,* and releases you from those *decorums,* and constraining *measures of behaviour,* to which we of an inferior sort are bound; you may liberally deal your *religious compliments* and *salutations* in what *dialect* you think fit; since, for my own part, neither the names of HETERO-DOX, SCHISMATIC, HERETIC, SCEPTIC, nor even INFIDEL, or ATHEIST itself, will in the least scandalise me, whilst the sentence comes only from *your* mouths. On the contrary, I rather strive with myself to suppress whatever vanity might naturally arise in me from such *favour* bestowed. For whatever may, in the bottom, be intended me by such a treatment, it is impossible for me to term it other than *favour;* since there are certain enmities which it will be ever esteemed a real honour *to have merited.*

If, contrary to the rule and measure of conversation, I have drawn the company's attention towards me thus long, without affording them an intermission, during my recital; they will, I hope, excuse me, the rather, because they heard the other *recitals,* and were witnesses to the heavy charge and personal reflection, which, without any real provocation, was made upon me in public by these *zealot-gentlemen* to whom I have thus replied. And notwithstanding they may, after such breaches of charity as are usual with them, presume me

equally out of charity, on my own side ; I will take upon me however to give them this good advice at parting, “ That since they have of late been  
 “ so elated by some seeming advantages, and a  
 “ prosperity, which they are ill fitted to bear ;  
 “ they would at least beware of accumulating too  
 “ hastily those high characters, appellations, titles,  
 “ and ensigns of *power*, which may be tokens,  
 “ perhaps, of what they expect hereafter, but  
 “ which, as yet, do not answer the real power  
 “ and authority bestowed on them.” The *garb*  
 and *countenance* will be more graceful, when *the thing* itself is secured to them, and in their actual possession. Mean while, the anticipation of high titles, honours, and nominal dignities, beyond the common style and ancient usage ; though it may be highly fashionable at present, may not prove beneficial or advantageous in the end.

I would, in particular, advise my elegant antagonists of this *zealot* kind, that among the many titles they assume to themselves, they would be rather more sparing in that high one of AMBASSADOR, till such time as they have just means and foundation to join that of PLENIPOTENTIARY together with it. For, as matters stand hitherto in our *British* world, neither their commission *from the sovereign*, nor that which they pretend *from heaven*, amounts to any absolute or determining power.

The first holy MESSENGERS (for that I take to be the highest *apostolic* name) brought with them their proper testimonials in their *lives*, their *manners*, and *behaviour* ; as well as in *powerful works*, MIRACLES, and SIGNS from *heaven*. And tho' indeed it might well be esteemed a *miracle* in the kind, should our *present* MESSENGERS go about to represent their *predecessors* in any part of their demeanor

meanor or conversation; yet there are further *miracles* remaining for them to perform, ere they can in modesty plead the *apostolic* or *messenger* authority. For though, in the torrent of a sublime and figurative style, a *holy apostle* may have made use, perhaps, of such a phrase as that of EMBASSY or AMBASSADOR, to express the dignity of his errand; it were to be wished, that some who were never sent of any errand or message at all from GOD *himself*, would use a modester title to express their voluntary *negotiation* between US and HEAVEN.

I must confess for my own part, that I think the notion of an EMBASSY from *thence* to be at best somewhat high strained, in the metaphorical way of speech. But certain I am, that if there be any such *residentship* or *agentship* now established, it is not immediately from GOD *himself*, but thro' *the magistrate*, and by *the prince* or *sovereign power* here on earth, that these gentlemen-*agents* are appointed, distinguished, and set over us. They have undoubtedly a legal CHARTER \* and *character*, legal titles and *precedencies*, legal habits, *coats of arms*, *colours*, *badges*. But they may do well to consider, that a thousand *badges* or *liveries* bestowed by MEN merely, can never be sufficient to intitle them to the same authority as theirs who bore the *immediate testimony* and MIRACULOUS SIGNS of *power*, from ABOVE. For in this case there was need only of *eyes*, and ordinary *senses*, to distinguish the COMMISSION, and acknowledge the EMBASSY OR MESSAGE as *divine*.

But allowing it ever so *certain* a truth, "That  
 " there has been a thousand, or near two thousand  
 " years *succession* in this commission of EMBAS-  
 " SY;" where shall we find this *commission* to

\* Vol. 1. p. 281, 2.

have

have lain?—How has it been supplied still, or renewed?—how often *dormant*?—how often *divided*, even in one and the same species of claimants?—What party are they, among moderns, who, by virtue of any *immediate testimonial* from *heaven*, are thus intitled?—Where are the LETTERS-PATENT? *the CREDENTIALS*? For *these* should, in the nature of the thing, be *open, visible, and apparent*.

A certain *Indian* of the train of the ambassador-princes sent to us lately from some of those *Pagan* nations, being engaged, one Sunday, in visiting our churches, and happening to ask his interpreter, “Who the eminent persons were whom he observed haranguing so long with such authority from a high place?” was answered, “They were *ambassadors* from the ALMIGHTY, or (according to the *Indian* language) from the SUN.” Whether the *Indian* took this seriously or in raillery, did not appear. But having afterwards called in, as he went along, at the chapels of some of his brother-ambassadors, of the *Romish* religion, and at some other Christian dissenting congregations, where matters, as he perceived, were transacted with greater privacy, and inferior state; he asked, “Whether *these* also were *ambassadors* from the same place?” He was answered, “That they had indeed been heretofore of the embassy, and had possession of the same chief places he had seen: but they were now succeeded there by others.” “If *those*, therefore,” replied the *Indian*, “were *ambassadors* from the SUN; *these*, I take for granted, are from the MOON.”

Supposing, indeed, one had been no *Pagan*, but a *good Christian*; conversant in the original *holy scriptures*, but unacquainted with the rites, titles,

titles, habits, and ceremonials, of which there is no mention in those writings; might one not have inquired with humble submission into this affair? Might one not have softly, and at a distance, applied for information concerning this *high* EMBASSY; and addressing perhaps to some inferior officer or liveryman of *the train*, asked modestly, “*How and whence they came? whose equipage they appeared in? at whose charges they were entertained? and by whose suffrage or command appointed and authorized? — Is it true, (pray, SIRs!), that their excellencies of the present establishment are the sole-commissioned? or are there as many real commissioners as there are pretenders? If so, there can be no great danger for us whichever way we apply ourselves. We have ample choice, and may adhere to which COMMISSION we like best. If there be only ONE single TRUE one, we have then, it seems, good reason to look about us, search narrowly into the affair, be scrupulous in our choice, and (as the current physic-bills admonish us) beware of counterfeits; since there are so many of these abroad, with earthly powers, and temporal COMMISSIONS, to back their spiritual pretences.*”

It is to be feared, in good earnest, that the discernment of this kind will prove pretty difficult; especially amidst this universal contention, embroil, and fury of religious challengers, these high *defiances* of contrary believers, this zealous opposition of *commission* to *commission*; and this din of hell, *anathema's*, and *damnations*, raised every where by one religious party against another.

So far are the pretendedly *commissioned parties* from producing their *commission* openly, or proving it from the original record, or court-rolls of heaven,

heaven, that they deny us inspection into these very records they plead, and refuse to submit their *title* to human judgment or examination.

A POET of our nation insinuates indeed in their behalf, that they are fair enough in this respect. For when the murmuring people, speaking by their chosen ORATOR, or *spokesman*, to the priest, says to them,

*With ease you take what we provide with care,  
And we who your LEGATION must maintain,  
Find all your tribe in the commission are,  
And none but HEAV'N could send so large a  
TRAIN;*

the APOLOGIST afterwards excusing this boldness of the people, and soothing the incensed priests with fairer words, says to them, on a foot of *moderation*, which he presumes to be their character,

*You with such temper their intemp'rance bear,  
To shew your solid science does rely  
So on itself, as you no trial fear:  
For arts are weak that are of SCEPTICS shy\*.*

The poet, it seems, never dreamed of a time when the very *countenance* of *moderation* should be out of fashion with the gentlemen of this order, and the *word* itself exploded as unworthy of their *profession*. And, indeed, so far are they at present from bearing with any SCEPTIC, or *inquirer*, ever so *modest* or discreet, that to hear an argument on a contrary side to theirs, or read whatever may be writ in answer to their particular assertions, is made the highest crime. Whilst they have among themselves such differences, and sharp debates, about their *heavenly* COMMISSION, and are even *in one*

\* *Gondibert*, book 2. canto 1.

*and*



and the same community or establishment, divided into different *sects* and *headships*; they will allow no particular survey or inspection into the foundations of their controverted title. They would have us inferior passive mortals, amazed as we are, and beholding with astonishment from afar these tremendous subjects of dispute, wait blindfold the event and final decision of the controversy. Nor is it enough that we are merely *passive*. It is required of us, that, in the midst of this irreconcilable debate concerning heavenly *authorities* and *powers*, we should be as confident of the veracity of *some one*, as of the imposture and cheat of *all the other* pretenders: and that believing firmly there is still *a real COMMISSION* at the bottom, we should endure the misery of these conflicts, and engage on one side or the other, as we happen to have our birth or education; till by *fire* and *sword*, *execution*, *massacre*, and a kind of *depopulation* of this earth, it be determined at last amongst us\*, “which  
“ is the *true COMMISSION*, *exclusive* of all o-  
“ thers, and superior to the rest.”

HERE our *secular GENTLEMAN*, who in the latter end of his discourse had already made several motions and gestures which betokened a retreat, made his final bow in form, and quitted the place and company for that time; till (as he told his auditors) he had another opportunity, and fresh leisure to hear, in his turn, whatever his *antagonists* might anew object to him, in a manner more favourable and moderate; or (if they so approved) in the same *temper*, and with the same *zeal*, as they had done before.

\* *Supra*, p. 63.



T R E A T I S E VII.

V I Z.

A N O T I O N

O F T H E

H I S T O R I C A L D R A U G H T

O R

T A B L A T U R E

O F T H E

J U D G M E N T

O F

H E R C U L E S,

According to *Prodicus, lib. 2. Xen. de Mem. Soc.*

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*Potiores  
Herculis ærumnas credat, sævosque labores,  
Et Venere, et cœnis, et pluma Sardanapali.*

Juv. sat. 10.

Printed first in the year MDCCXIII.

VOL. III.

X



T H E  
J U D G M E N T  
O F  
H E R C U L E S.

I N T R O D U C T I O N.

**B**Efore we enter on the examination of our historical sketch, it may be proper to remark, that by the word *tablature* (for which we have yet no name in *English*, besides the general one of *picture*) we denote, according to the original word *TABULA*, a work not only distinct from a mere *portraiture*, but from all those wilder sorts of painting which are in a manner absolute and independent; such as the paintings *in fresco* upon the walls, the cielings, the stair-cases, the cupola's, and other remarkable places either of churches or palaces.

Accordingly we are to understand, that it is not merely the shape or dimension of a cloth, or board, which denominates the *piece* or *tablature*; since a work of this kind may be composed of any coloured substance, as it may of any form; whether square, oval, or round. But it is then that in painting we give to any particular work the name of *tablature*, when the work is in reality  
“ a single piece, comprehended in one view, and  
“ formed according to one single intelligence,  
“ meaning, or design; which constitutes a real  
X 2 “ WHOLE,

“WHOLE, by a mutual and necessary relation of its parts, the same as of the members in a natural body.” So that one may say of a picture composed of any number of figures differently ranged, and without any regard to this correspondency or union described, that it is no more a real *piece* or *tablature* than a picture would be a man’s *picture*, or proper *portraiture*, which represented on the same cloth, in different places; the legs, arms, nose, and eyes of such a person, without adjusting them according to the true proportion, air, and character which belonged to him.

This regulation has place even in the inferior degrees of painting; since the mere flower-painter is, we see, obliged to study the form of *festons*, and to make use of a peculiar order or architecture of *vases*, *jars*, *canisters*, *pedestals*, and other inventions, which serve as *machines*, to frame a certain proportionate assemblage, or united mass, according to the rules of perspective; and with regard as well to the different shapes and sizes of his several flowers, as to the harmony of colours resulting from the whole; this being the only thing capable of rendering his work worthy the name of a *composition* or *real piece*.

So much the more, therefore, is this regulation applicable to *history-painting*, where not only *men*, but *manners*, and human passions, are represented. Here *the unity of design* must with more particular exactness be preserved, according to the just rules of poetic art; that in the representation of any event, or remarkable fact, the *probability*, or *seeming truth*, (which is the *real truth* of art), may with the highest advantage be supported and advanced; as we shall better understand in the argument which follows on the historical *tablature* of the *judgment of Hercules*; who being young, and retired

tired to a solitary place, in order to deliberate on the choice he was to make of the different ways of life, was accosted (as our historian relates) by the two goddesses, VIRTUE and PLEASURE. It is on the issue of the controversy between these *two* that the character of *Hercules* depends. So that we may naturally give to this piece and history, as well the title of *The education*, as *the choice or judgment of Hercules*.

## C H A P. I.

*Of the general constitution or ordinance of the tablature.*

**T**HIS fable or history may be variously represented, according to the order of time :

Either in the instant when the two goddesses (VIRTUE and PLEASURE) accost *Hercules* ;

Or when they are entered on their dispute ;

Or when their dispute is already far advanced, and VIRTUE seems to gain her cause.

According to the *first* notion, *Hercules* must of necessity seem surpris'd on the first appearance of such miraculous forms. He admires, he contemplates ; but is not yet engaged or interested. According to the *second* notion, he is interested, divided, and in doubt. According to the *third*, he is wrought, agitated, and torn by contrary passions. It is the last effort of the vicious one, striving for possession over him. He agonizes, and with all his strength of reason endeavours to overcome himself :

*Et premitur ratione animus, vincique laborat.*

Of these different periods of time the latter has been chosen ; as being the only one of the three which can well serve to express *the grand event*, or consequent

consequent *resolution* of *Hercules*, and the *choice* he actually made of a life full of toil and hardship, under the conduct of VIRTUE, for the deliverance of mankind from tyranny and oppression. And it is to such a *piece*, or *tablature*, as represents this issue of the balance, in our pondering hero, that we may justly give the title of *the decision* or *judgment* of *Hercules*.

The same history may be represented yet according to a *fourth* date or period; as at the time when *Hercules* is entirely won by *Virtue*. But then the signs of this resolute determination reigning absolutely in the attitude and air of our young hero, there would be no room left to represent his agony, or inward conflict; which indeed makes the principal action *here*; as it would do in a *poem*, were this subject to be treated by a good poet. Nor would there be any more room left in this case, either for the persuasive rhetoric of VIRTUE, (who must have already ended her discourse), or for the insinuating address of PLEASURE, who having lost her cause, must necessarily appear displeas'd, or out of humour: a circumstance which would no way suit her character.

In the original story or fable of this adventure of our young *Hercules*, it is particularly noted, that PLEASURE, advancing hastily before VIRTUE, began her plea, and was heard with prevention, as being first in turn. And as this fable is wholly *philosophical* and *moral*, this circumstance in particular is to be considered as essential.

In this *third* period therefore of our history, (dividing it, as we have done, into *four* successive dates or points of time), *Hercules* being auditor, and attentive, speaks not. PLEASURE has spoken. VIRTUE is still speaking. She is about the middle, or towards the end of her discourse; in the place



place where, according to just rhetoric, the highest tone of voice and strongest action are employed.

It is evident, that every master in painting, when he has made choice of the determinate date or point of time, according to which he would represent his history, is afterwards debarred the taking advantage from any other action than what is immediately present, and belonging to that single instant he describes. For if he passes the present only for a moment, he may as well pass it for many years. And by this reckoning he may with as good right repeat the same figure several times over, and in one and the same picture represent *Hercules* in his cradle, struggling with the serpents; and the same *Hercules* of full age, fighting with the *Hydra*, with *Anteus*, and with *Cerberus*: which would prove a mere confused heap, or knot of pieces, and not a single entire piece, or *tablature*, of the historical kind.

It may however be allowable, on some occasions, to make use of certain *enigmatical* or *emblematical* devices; to represent a future time; as when *Hercules*, yet a mere boy, is seen holding a small club, or wearing the skin of a young lion. For so we often find him in the best *antiques*. And though history had never related of *Hercules*, that being yet very young, he killed a lion with his own hand; this representation of him would nevertheless be entirely conformable to *poetic truth*; which not only admits, but necessarily presupposes *prophecy* or *prognostication*, with regard to the actions and lives of heroes and great men. Besides that, as to our subject, in particular, the natural genius of *Hercules*, even in his tenderest youth, might alone answer for his handling such arms as these, and bearing, as it were in play, these early tokens of the future hero.

To

To preserve therefore a just conformity with *historical truth*, and with the *unity of time and action*, there remains no other way by which we can possibly give a hint of any thing future, or call to mind any thing past, than by setting in view such passages or events as have actually subsisted, or according to nature might well subsist, or happen together in *one and the same* instant. And this is what we may properly call *the rule of consistency*.

How is it therefore possible, says one, to express a change of passion in any subject, since this change is made by succession; and that in this case the passion which is understood as present, will require a disposition of body and features wholly different from the passion which is over, and past? To this we answer, That notwithstanding the ascendancy or reign of the principal and immediate passion, the artist has power to leave still in his subject the tracks or footsteps of its predecessor; so as to let us behold not only a rising passion together with a declining one, but, what is more, a strong and determinate passion, with its contrary already discharged and banished. As for instance, when the plain tracts of tears new fallen, with other fresh tokens of mourning and dejection, remain still in a person newly transported with joy at the sight of a relation or friend, who the moment before had been lamented as one deceased or lost.

Again, by the same means which are employed to call to mind *the past*, we may anticipate *the future*; as would be seen in the case of an able painter, who should undertake to paint this history of *Hercules* according to the third date or period of time proposed for our historical tablature. For in this momentary turn of action, *Hercules* remaining still in a situation expressive of suspense and  
doubt,

doubt, would discover nevertheless, that the strength of this inward conflict was over, and that victory began now to declare herself in favour of *Virtue*. This transition, which seems at first so mysterious a performance, will be easily comprehended, if one considers, that the body, which moves much slower than the mind, is easily outstripped by this latter; and that the mind on a sudden turning itself some new way, the nearer situated and more sprightly parts of the body (such as the eyes, and muscles about the mouth and forehead) taking the alarm, and moving in an instant, may leave the heavier and more distant parts to adjust themselves, and change their attitude some moments after.

This different operation may be distinguished by the names of *anticipation* and *repeal*.

If by any other method an artist should pretend to introduce into this piece any portion of time, future or past, he must either sin directly against the law of *truth* and *credibility*, in representing things contrary and incompatible; or against that law of *unity* and *simplicity of design* which constitutes the very being of his work. This particularly shews itself in a picture, when one is necessarily left in doubt, and unable to determine readily, *which* of the distinct successive parts of the history or action is that *very one* represented in the design. For even here the case is the same as in the other circumstances of poetry and painting, "That what is principal or chief should immediately shew itself, without leaving the mind in any uncertainty."

According to this rule of the *unity of time*, if one should ask an artist, who had painted this history of *the judgment of Hercules*, "Which of these four periods or dates of time above proposed" "see

“ sed he intended in his picture to represent \*?” and it should happen that he could not readily answer, It was this, or that : it would appear plainly he had never formed a *real notion* of his workmanship, or of the history he intended to represent. So that when he had executed, even to a miracle, all those other beauties requisite in a *piece*, and had failed in this single one, he would from hence alone be proved to be in truth no *history-painter*, or artist in the kind, who understood not so much as how to form the real design of a *historical piece*.

## C H A P. II.

*Of the first or principal figure.*

**T**O apply therefore what has been said above to our immediate design or *tablature* in hand ; we may observe, in the first place, with regard to *Hercules*, (the *first* or *principal figure* of our piece), that being placed in the middle between the two goddesses, he should by a skilful master be so drawn, as, even setting aside the air and features of the face, it should appear by the very turn or position of the body alone, that this young hero had not wholly quitted the balancing or pondering part. For in the manner of his turn towards the

\* If the same question concerning the *instantaneous* action, or present moment of time, were applied to many famous historical paintings much admired in the world, they would be found very defective ; as we may learn by the instance of that single subject of **ACTEON**, one of the commonest in painting. Hardly is there any where seen a design of this poetical history, without a ridiculous anticipation of the *metamorphosis*. The horns of **ACTEON**, which are the effect of a charm, should naturally wait the execution of that act in which the charm consists. Till the goddess therefore has thrown her cast, the hero's person suffers not any change. Even while the water flies, his forehead is still sound. But in the usual design we see it otherwise. The horns are already *sprouted*, if not full grown ; and the goddess is seen watering the *sprouts*.

worthier

worthier of these goddesses, he should by no means appear so averse or separate from the other, as not to suffer it to be conceived of him, that he had ever any inclination for her, or had ever hearkened to her voice. On the contrary, there ought to be some hopes yet remaining for this latter goddess PLEASURE, and some regret apparent in *Hercules*; otherwise we should pass immediately from the *third* to the *fourth* period, or at least confound one with the other.

*Hercules*, in this agony described, may appear either sitting or standing; though it be more according to probability for him to appear standing, in regard to the presence of the two goddesses, and by reason the case is far from being the same here as in the judgment of *Paris*, where the interested goddesses plead their cause before their judge. Here the interest of *Hercules* himself is at stake. It is his own cause which is trying. He is in this respect not so much the judge, as he is in reality the party judged.

The superior and commanding passion of *Hercules* may be expressed either by a strong admiration, or by an admiration which holds chiefly of love.

— *Ingenti percussus amore.*

If the latter be used, then the reluctant passion, which is not yet wholly overcome, may shew itself in pity and tenderness, moved in our hero by the thought of those pleasures and companions of his youth which he is going for ever to abandon. And in this sense *Hercules* may look either on the one or the other of the goddesses; with this difference, that if he looks on *Pleasure*, it should be faintly, and as turning his eyes back with pity; having still his action and gesture turned the other way towards *Virtue*. If, on the contrary, he looks on *Virtue*,  
it

it ought to be earnestly, and with extreme attention, having some part of the action of his body inclining still towards *Pleasure*, and discovering, by certain features of concern and pity, intermixed with the commanding or conquering passion, that the decision he is about to make in favour of *Virtue* cost him not a little.

If it be thought fit rather to make use of admiration, merely to express the *commanding* passion of *Hercules*; then the *reluctant one* may discover itself in a kind of horror, at the thought of the toil and labour to be sustained in the rough rocky way apparent on the side of VIRTUE.

Again, *Hercules* may be represented as looking neither towards VIRTUE nor PLEASURE, but as turning his eyes either towards the mountainous rocky way pointed out to him by VIRTUE, or towards the flowery way of the vale and meadows, recommended to him by PLEASURE. And to these different attitudes may be applied the same rules for the expression of the *turn* or *balance of judgment* in our pensive hero.

Whatever may be the manner chosen for the designing of this figure of *Hercules*, according to that part of the history in which we have taken him; it is certain he should be so drawn, as neither by the opening of his mouth, or by any other sign, to leave it in the least dubious whether he is speaking or silent. For it is absolutely requisite that *silence* should be distinctly characterised in *Hercules*, not only as the natural effect of his strict attention, and the little leisure he has from what passes at this time within his breast; but in order withal to give that appearance of majesty and superiority becoming the person and character of pleading VIRTUE; who, by her eloquence and other charms,

charms, has ere this made herself mistress of the heart of our enamoured hero :

— *Pendetque iterum narrantis ab ore* \*.

This image of *the sublime*, in the discourse and manner of VIRTUE, would be utterly lost, if, in the instant that she employed the greatest force of action, she should appear to be interrupted by the ill-timed speech, reply, or utterance of her auditor. Such a design or representation as this would prove contrary to order, contrary to the history, and to the decorum or decency of manners. Nor can one well avoid taking notice here of that general absurdity committed by many of the esteemed great masters in painting; who, in one and the same company or assembly of persons jointly employed and united, according to the history, in one single or common action, represent to us not only *two* or *three*, but *several*, and sometimes *all*, speaking at once: which must naturally have the same effect on the eye, as such a conversation would have upon the ear, were we in reality to hear it.

### C H A P. III.

#### *Of the second figure.*

**A**FTER what has been said on the subject of *Hercules*, it appears plainly what the *attitude* must be of our second figure, VIRTUE; who, as we have taken her in this particular period of our history, must of necessity be *speaking* with all the force of action, such as would appear in an excellent orator, when at the height, and in the most affecting part of his discourse.

\* Virg. Æn. lib. 4. ver. 79.

She ought therefore to be drawn *standing*; since it is contrary to all probable appearance, and even to nature itself, that, in the very heat and highest transport of speech, the speaker should be seen sitting, or in any posture which might express repose.

She may be *habited* either as an *Amazon*, with the helmet, lance, and in the robe or vest of *Pallas*; or as any other of the *virtues*, *goddeses*, or *heroines*, with the plain original crown, without rays, according to genuine antiquity. Our history makes no mention of a helmet, or any other armour of VIRTUE. It gives us only to understand, that she was dressed neither negligently, nor with much study or ornament. If we follow this latter method, we need give her only in her hand the imperial or magisterial sword\*; which is her true characteristic mark, and would sufficiently distinguish her, without the helmet, lance, or other military habit. And in this manner the opposition between herself and her rival would be still more beautiful and regular.—“But this beauty,” says one, “would be discoverable only by the learned.”—Perhaps so. But then again there would be no loss for others; since no one would find this piece the less intelligible on the account of this regulation. On the contrary, one who chanced to know little of antiquity in general, or of this history in particular, would be still further to seek, if, upon seeing an armed woman in the piece, he should represent to himself either a *Pallas*, a *Bellona*, or any other warlike form or deity of the female kind.

As for the *shape*, *countenance*, or person of VIRTUE; that which is usually given to *Pallas* may fitly serve as a model for this dame; as, on

\* Parazonium.



the other side, that which is given to *Venus* may serve in the same manner for her rival. The historian whom we follow represents VIRTUE to us as a lady of a goodly form, tall and majestic. And, by what he relates of her, he gives us sufficiently to understand, that though she was neither lean, nor of a tanned complexion, she must have discovered however, by the substance and colour of her flesh, that she was sufficiently accustomed to exercise. PLEASURE, on the other hand, by an exact opposition, is represented in better case, and of a softness of complexion, which speaks her manners, and gives her a middle character between the person of a *Venus*, and that of a *Bacchanal nymph*.

As for the *position* or *attitude* of VIRTUE; though in a historical piece, such as ours is designed, it would on no account be proper to have immediate recourse to the way of *emblem*; one might, on this occasion, endeavour nevertheless, by some artifice, to give our figure, as much as possible, the resemblance of the same *goddess*, as she is seen on medals, and other ancient *emblematic* pieces of like nature. In this view, she should be so designed, as to stand firm with her full poise upon one foot, having the other a little advanced, and raised on a broken piece of ground or rock, instead of the helmet or little globe on which we see her usually setting her foot, as triumphant, in those pieces of the *emblematic* kind. A particular advantage of this attitude, so judiciously assigned to VIRTUE by ancient masters, is, that it expresses as well her aspiring effort, or ascent towards the stars and heaven, as her victory and superiority over fortune and the world. For so the poets have, of old, described her.

———— *Negata tentat iter via* \*.

*Virtutisque viam deserit arduæ* †.

\* Horat. lib. 3. od. 2.

† Idem, ibid. od. 24.

And in our piece particularly, where the *arduous* and *rocky way* of VIRTUE requires to be emphatically represented, the ascending posture of this figure, with one foot advanced, in a sort of climbing action, over the rough and thorny ground, must of necessity, if well executed, create a due effect, and add to the sublime of this ancient poetic work\*.

As for the *hands* or *arms*, which in real oratory, and during the strength of elocution, must of necessity be active; it is plain, in respect of our goddess, that the arm in particular which she has free to herself, and is neither incumbered with lance or sword, should be employed another way, and come in, to second the discourse, and accompany it, with a just emphasis and action. Accordingly, VIRTUE would then be seen with this hand turned either *upwards* to the rocky way marked out by her with approbation; or to the sky, or stars, in the same sublime sense; or *downwards* to the flowery way and vale, as in a detesting manner, and with disapprobation of what passes there; or last of all (in a disdainful sense, and with the same appearance of detestation) against PLEASURE herself. Each manner would have its peculiar advantage. And the best profit should be made of this arm and hand at liberty, to express either the *disapprobation* or the *applause* proposed. It might prove, however, a considerable advantage to our figure of

\* As ancient as the poet *Hesiod*: which appears by the following verses, cited by our historian as the foundation or first draught of this *Herculean* tablature.

Τὴν μὲν γὰρ κακότητα καὶ Ἰλαδὸν εἶσιν εἰεῖσθαι  
 Ρηϊδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδὸς, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθει ναίει.  
 Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάρουθεν ἴθικαν  
 Αθάνατοι, μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος ὄμιος ἐπ' αὐτήν,  
 Καὶ τρηχύς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἰκησάι,  
 Ρηϊδίη δ' ἠπείλα πείλει, χαλεπή περ ἴυσα.

VIRTUE,

VIRTUE, if holding the lance, or imperial sword, slightly, with one of her hands stretched downwards, she could, by that very hand and action, be made to express *the latter* meaning; opening for that purpose some of the lower fingers of this hand, in a refusing or repelling manner; whilst, with the other arm and hand at liberty, she should express as well *the former* meaning, and point out to *Hercules* the way which leads to honour, and the just glory of heroic actions.

From all these circumstances of history, and action, accompanying this important figure, the difficulty of the design will sufficiently appear to those who carry their judgment beyond the *mere form*, and are able to consider the character of the *passion* to which it is subjected. For where a real character is marked, and *the inward form* peculiarly described, it is necessary *the outward* should give place. Whoever should expect to see our figure of VIRTUE, in the exact mien of a *fine talker*, curious in her choice of action, and forming it according to the usual decorum and regular movement of one of the fair ladies of our age, would certainly be far wide of the thought and genius of this piece. Such studied action and artificial gesture may be allowed to the actors and actresses of the stage. But the good painter must come a little nearer to TRUTH, and take care that his action be not *theatrical*, or at second hand; but *original*, and drawn from NATURE herself. Now, although, in the ordinary tenor of discourse, the action of the party might be allowed to appear so far governed and composed by art, as to retain that regular *contrast* and nice balance of movement which painters are apt to admire as the chief grace of figures; yet in this particular case, where the natural eagerness of debate, supported by a thorough

Y 3

antipathy

antipathy and animosity, is joined to a sort of *enthusiastic agitation* incident to our prophetic dame, there can be little of that fashionable mien, or genteel air, admitted. The painter who, in such a piece as we describe, is bound to preserve the heroic style, will doubtless beware of representing his heroine as a mere *scold*. Yet this is certain, that it were better for him to expose himself to the meanness of such a fancy, and paint his lady in a high rant, according to the common weakness of the sex, than to engage in the embellishment of the mere *form*; and forgetting the character of severity and reprimand belonging to the illustrious rival, present her to us a fair specious personage, free of emotion, and without the least bent or movement which should express the real *pathetic* of the kind.

## C H A P. IV.

*Of the third figure.*

Concerning PLEASURE, there needs little to be said, after what has been already remarked in relation to the two preceding figures. The truth of *appearance*, that of *history*, and even the *decorum* itself, (according to what has been explained above), require evidently, that, in this period or instant described, PLEASURE should be found silent. She can have no other language allowed her than that merely of *the eyes*. And it would be a happy management for her in the design, if, in turning her eyes to meet those of *Hercules*, she should find his head and face already turned so much on the contrary side, as to shew it impossible for her as yet to discover the growing passion of this hero in favour of her rival. By this means she might still with good right retain her fond airs of dalliance and

and courtship; as having yet discovered no reason she has to be dissatisfied.

She may be drawn either *standing, leaning, sitting, or lying*; without a crown, or crowned either with roses, or with myrtle, according to the painter's fancy. And since in this *third* figure the painter has so great a liberty left him, he may make good advantage of it for the other *two*, to which *this latter* may be subjected, as the last in order, and of least consequence.

That which makes the greatest difficulty in the disposition or ordinance of this figure PLEASURE, is, that, notwithstanding the supine air and character of ease and indolence which should be given her, she must retain still so much life and action as is sufficient to express her *persuasive effort*, and manner of *indication* towards her proper paths; those of the flowery kind, and vale below, whither she would willingly guide our hero's steps. Now, should this *effort* be over-strongly expressed, not only the supine character and air of indolence would be lost in this figure of PLEASURE; but, what is worse, the figure would seem to speak, or at least appear so, as to create a double meaning, or *equivocal sense* in painting; which would destroy what we have established as fundamental, concerning the absolute reign of *silence* throughout the rest of the piece, in favour of VIRTUE, the sole speaking party at this instant, or third period of our history.

According to a computation, which in this way of reasoning might be made, of the whole *motion* or *action* to be given to our figure of PLEASURE; she should scarce have *one fifth* reserved for that which we may properly call *active* in her, and have already termed her *persuasive* or *indicative effort*. All besides should be employed to express (if one may say so) her *inaction*, her *supineness*, *effeminacy*,

*effeminacy*, and *indulgent ease*. The head and body might entirely favour this latter passion. One hand might be absolutely resigned to it; serving only to support, with much ado, the lolling lazy body. And if the other hand be required to express some kind of gesture or action toward the road of pleasures recommended by this dame; the gesture ought however to be slight and negligent, in the manner of one who has given over speaking, and appears weary and spent.

For the *shape*, the *person*, the *complexion*, and what else may be further remarked as to the *air* and *manner* of PLEASURE; all this is naturally comprehended in the opposition, as above stated, between *herself* and VIRTUE.

#### C H A P. V.

*Of the ornaments of the piece; and chiefly of the drapery, and perspective.*

IT is sufficiently known, how great a liberty painters are used to take in the colouring of their habits, and of other draperies belonging to their historical pieces. If they are to paint a *Roman* people, they represent them in different dresses; though it be certain the common people among them were habited very near alike, and much after the same colour. In like manner, the *Egyptians*, *Jews*, and other ancient nations, as we may well suppose, bore in this particular their respective likeness or resemblance one to another, as at present the *Spaniards*, *Italians*, and several other people of *Europe*. But such a resemblance as this would, in the way of painting, produce a very untoward effect; as may easily be conceived. For this reason the painter makes no scruple to introduce *philosophers*, and even *apostles*, in various colours,

colours, after a very extraordinary manner. It is here that the *historical truth* must of necessity indeed give way to that which we call *poetical*, as being governed not so much by *reality*, as by *probability*, or *plausible appearance*. So that a painter who uses his privilege or prerogative in this respect, ought however to do it cautiously, and with discretion. And when occasion requires that he should present us his *philosophers* or *apostles* thus variously coloured, he must take care at least so to mortify his colours, that these plain poor men may not appear in his piece adorned like so many lords or princes of the modern garb.

If, on the other hand, the painter should happen to take for his subject some solemn entry or triumph, where, according to the truth of *fact*, all manner of magnificence had without doubt been actually displayed, and all sorts of bright and dazzling colours heaped together and advanced, in emulation, one against another; he ought on this occasion, in breach of the *historical truth*, or truth of *fact*, to do his utmost to diminish and reduce the excessive gaiety and splendor of those objects, which would otherwise raise such a confusion, oppugnancy, and riot of colours, as would to any judicious eye appear absolutely intolerable.

It becomes therefore an able painter in this, as well as in the other parts of his workmanship, to have regard principally, and above all, to the agreement or correspondency of things. And to that end it is necessary he should form in his mind a certain note or character of *unity*; which being happily taken, would, out of the many colours of his piece, produce (if one may say so) a *particular distinct species* of an original kind; like those compositions in music, where, among the different airs, (such as *sonatas*, *entries*, or *sarabands*), there are different

different and distinct species ; of which we may say in particular, as to each, " That it has its own " proper character or genius, peculiar to itself."

Thus the *harmony* of painting requires, " that " in whatever *key* the painter begins his piece, he " should be sure to finish it in the same."

This regulation turns on the *principal figure*, or on the two or three which are *eminent*, in a tablature composed of many. For if the painter happens to give a certain height or richness of colouring to his principal figure, the rest must in proportion necessarily partake this genius. But if, on the contrary, the painter should have chanced to give a softer air, with more gentleness and simplicity of colouring, to his principal figure ; the rest must bear a character proportionable, and appear in an extraordinary simplicity ; that one and the same spirit may, without contest, reign through the whole of his design.

Our historical draught of *Hercules* will afford us a very clear example in the case. For considering that the hero is to appear on this occasion retired and gloomy, being withal in a manner naked, and without any other covering than a lion's skin, which is itself of a yellow and dusky colour ; it would be really impracticable for a painter to represent this principal figure in any extraordinary brightness or lustre. From whence it follows, that, in the other inferior figures or subordinate parts of the work, the painter must necessarily make use of such still quiet colours, as may give to the whole piece a character of solemnity and simplicity, agreeable with itself. Now, should our painter honestly go about to follow his historian, according to the literal sense of the history, which represents VIRTUE to us in a resplendent robe of the purest and most glossy white ; it is evident he must, after this manner,

. destroy



destroy his piece. The *good painter* in this, as in all other occasions of like nature, must do as the *good poet*; who undertaking to treat some common and known subject, refuses however to follow strictly, like a mere copyist or translator, any preceding poet or historian; but so orders it, that his work in itself becomes really new and original.

*Publica materies privati juris erit, si  
Nec circa vilem patulumque moraberis orbem;  
Nec verbum verbo curabis reddere fidus  
Interpres\*.*

As for what relates to the *perspective* or *scene* of our historical piece, it ought so to present itself, as to make us instantly conceive that it is in the country, and in a place of retirement, near some wood or forest, that this whole action passes. For it would be impertinent to bring *architecture*, or buildings of whatever kind, in view, as tokens of company, diversion, or affairs, in a place purposely chosen to denote solitude, thoughtfulness, and premeditated retreat. Besides that, according to the poets, (our guides and masters in this art), neither the goddesses, nor other divine forms of whatever kind, cared ever to present themselves to human sight, elsewhere than in these deep recesses. And it is worth observing here, how particularly our philosophical historian affects to speak, by way of prevention, of the solitary place where *Hercules* was retired, and of his thoughtfulness preceding this apparition: which from these circumstances may be construed henceforward as a mere *dream*; but as such, a truly rational and *divine* one.

As to the *fortress*, *temple*, or *palace* of VIR-

\* Hor. de arte poet. ver. 331.

TUE, situated on a mountain, after the emblematical way, as we see represented in some pieces formed upon this subject; there is nothing of this kind expressed by our historian. And should this, or any thing of a like nature, present itself in our design, it would fill the mind with foreign fancies, and mysterious views, no way agreeable to the taste and genius of this piece. Nor is there any thing, at the same time, on PLEASURE's side, to answer, by way of opposition, to this *palace* of VIRTUE; which, if expressed, would on this account destroy the just simplicity and correspondency of our work.

Another reason against the *perspective* part, the *architecture*, or other studied ornaments of the *landskip* kind, in this particular piece of ours, is, that in reality there being no occasion for these appearances, they would prove a mere incumbrance to the eye, and would of necessity disturb the sight, by diverting it from that which is principal, the *history* and *fact*. Whatsoever appears in a historical design, which is not essential to the action, serves only to confound the representation, and perplex the mind: more particularly, if these *episodic* parts are so lively wrought, as to vie with the principal subject, and contend for precedency with the *figures* and *human life*. A just design, or *tableture*, should, at first view, discover, what *nature* it is designed to imitate; what *life*, whether of the higher or lower kind, it aims chiefly to represent. The piece must by no means be equivocal or dubious; but must with ease distinguish itself, either as *historical* and *moral*, or as *perspective* and merely *natural*. If it be *the latter* of these beauties which we desire to see delineated according to its perfection, then *the former* must give place. The higher *life* must be allayed, and in a manner discountenanced and obscured; whilst the

*lower*

*lower* displays itself, and is exhibited as principal. Even that which, according to a term of art, we commonly call *still-life*, and is in reality of the last and lowest degree of painting, must have its superiority and just preference in a tablature of its own species. It is the same in *animal pieces*, where beasts or fowl are represented. In *landskip*, inanimates are principal: it is the earth, the water, the stones, and rocks, which live. All other life becomes subordinate. Humanity, sense, manners, must in this place yield, and become inferior. It would be a fault even to aim at the expression of any real beauty in this kind, or go about to animate or heighten, in any considerable degree, the accompanying figures of men, or deities which are accidentally introduced, as appendices, or ornaments, in such a piece. But if, on the contrary, the *human species* be that which first presents itself in a picture; if it be the *intelligent life* which is set to view; it is the *other species*, the *other life*, which must then surrender, and become subservient. The *merely natural* must pay homage to the *historical* or *moral*. Every beauty, every grace, must be sacrificed to the *real BEAUTY of this first and highest order*. For nothing can be more deformed than a confusion of many beauties: and the confusion becomes inevitable, where the subjection is not complete.

By the word *MORAL* are understood, in this place, all sorts of judicious representations of the human passions; as we see even in *battle-pieces*; excepting those of distant figures, and the diminutive kind; which may rather be considered as a sort of *landskip*. In all other martial pieces, we see expressed in lively action the several degrees of valour, magnanimity, cowardice, terror, anger, according to the several characters of nations, and

particular men. It is here that we may see *heroes* and *chiefs* (such as the *Alexanders* or *Constantines*) appear, even in the hottest of the action, with a tranquillity and sedateness of mind peculiar to themselves : which is, indeed, in a direct and proper sense, profoundly *moral*.

But as the *moral* part is differently treated in a *poem* from what it is in *history*, or in a *philosophical* work ; so must it, of right, in *painting*, be far differently treated from what it naturally is, either in the *history* or *poem*. For want of a right understanding of this maxim, it often happens, that, by endeavouring to render a piece highly *moral* and *learned*, it becomes thoroughly ridiculous and impertinent.

For the ordinary works of SCULPTURE, such as the *low-relieves*, and ornaments of *columns* and *edifices*, great allowance is made. The very rules of perspective are here wholly reversed, as necessity requires, and are accommodated to the circumstance and genius of the place or building, according to a certain œconomy or order of a particular and distinct kind ; as will easily be observed by those who have thoroughly studied the *Trajan* and *Antoninus pillars*, and other *relieve* works of the ancients. In the same manner, as to pieces of engraved work, medals, or whatever shews itself in one substance, (as brass or stone), or only by shade and light, (as in ordinary drawings, or stamps), much also is allowed, and many things admitted, of the *fantastic*, *miraculous*, or *hyperbolical* kind. It is here that we have free scope, withal, for whatever is *learned*, *emblematical*, or *enigmatic*. But for the completely imitative and illusive art of PAINTING, whose character it is to employ in her works the united force of different colours ; and who, surpassing by so many degrees, and in so many

ny privileges, all other human fiction, or imitative art, aspires in a directer manner towards deceit, and a command over our very sense; she must of necessity abandon whatever is over *learned, humorous, or witty*; to maintain herself in what is *natural, credible, and winning of our assent*; that she may thus acquit herself of what is her chief province, *the specious appearance of the object she represents*. Otherwise we shall naturally bring against her the just criticism of *Horace*, on the scenical representation so nearly allied to her:

*Quodcunque ostendis mihi sic, incredulus odi.*

We are therefore to consider this as a sure maxim or observation in painting, "That a *historical* and *moral* piece must of necessity lose much of its natural simplicity and grace, if any thing of the *emblematical* or *enigmatical* kind be visibly and directly intermixed:" As if, for instance, the circle of the *zodiac* \*, with its twelve signs, were introduced. Now, this being an appearance which carries not any manner of similitude or colourable resemblance to any thing extant in real nature; it cannot possibly pretend to win the sense, or gain belief, by the help of any *poetical enthusiasm, religious history, or faith*. For by means of these, indeed, we are easily induced to contemplate as realities those divine personages and miraculous forms, which the leading painters, ancient and modern, have speciously designed, according to the particular doctrine or theology of their several religious and national beliefs. But for our tablature in par-

\* This is what *Raphael* himself has done, in his famous design of the *judgment of Paris*. But this piece having never been painted, but designed only for *Marc Antonio's* engraving, it comes not within our censure; as appears by what is said in the paragraph just preceding.

ticular, it carries nothing with it of the mere *emblematical* or *enigmatical* kind; since, for what relates to the double way of the vale and mountain, this may naturally, and with colourable appearance, be represented at the mountain's foot. But if, on the summit or highest point of it, we should place the fortress or palace of *Virtue*, rising above the clouds; this would immediately give the enigmatical mysterious air to our *picture*, and of necessity destroy its persuasive simplicity, and natural appearance.

In short, we are to carry this remembrance still along with us, "That the fewer the objects are, besides those which are absolutely necessary in a piece, the easier it is for the eye, by one simple act, and in one view, to comprehend the *sum* or *whole*." The multiplication of subjects, though subaltern, renders the subordination more difficult to execute in the ordinance or composition of a work. And if the *subordination* be not perfect, the *order* (which makes the beauty) remains imperfect. Now, the *subordination* can never be perfect, except "when the ordinance is such, that the eye not only runs over with ease the several parts of the design, (reducing still its view each moment on the principal subject on which all turns), but when the same eye, without the least detainment in any of the particular parts, and resting, as it were, immoveable in the middle or centre of the tablature, may see at once, in an agreeable and perfect correspondency, all which is there exhibited to the sight\*."

\* This is what the *Grecian* masters so happily expressed by the single word *εὐκρίνοισιν*. See vol. 1. p. 114.

## C H A P. VI.

*Of the casual or independent ornaments.*

There remains for us now to consider only of the separate ornaments, independent both of figures and perspective; such as the *machine-work* or *divinities* in the sky \*, the winds, *Cupids*, birds, animals, dogs, or other loose pieces which are introduced without any absolute necessity, and in a way of humour. But as these belong chiefly to the *ordinary life*, and to the *comic* or *mixed* kind; our tablature, which, on the contrary, is wholly *epic*, *heroic*, and in the *tragic* style, would not so easily admit of any thing in this light way.

We may besides consider, that whereas the mind is naturally led to fancy mystery in a work of such a genius or style of painting as ours, and to confound with each other the two distinct kinds of the *emblematic* and merely *historical*, or *poetic*; we should take care not to afford it this occasion of error and deviation, by introducing into a piece of so uniform a design, such appendices, or supplementary parts, as, under pretext of giving light to the history, or characterising the figures, should serve only to distract or dissipate the sight, and confound the judgment of the more intelligent spectators.

“Will it then,” says one, “be possible to make out the story of these two *dames* in company with *Hercules*, without otherwise distinguishing them than as above described?” We answer, it is possible; and not that only, but certain and infallible, in the case of one who has the least genius,

\* This is understood of the *machine-work*, when it is merely ornamental, and not essential in the piece, by making part of the history, or fable itself.

or has ever heard in general concerning *Hercules*, without so much as having ever heard this history in particular. But if, notwithstanding this, we would needs add some exterior marks, more declaratory and determinative of these two personages, VIRTUE and PLEASURE; it may be performed, however, without any necessary recourse to what is absolutely of the *emblem* kind. The manner of this may be explained as follows.

The energy or natural force of *Virtue*, according to the moral philosophy of highest note among the ancients, was expressed in the double effect of *forbearance* and *endurance*\*, or what we may otherwise call *refrainment* and *support*. For the former, *the bit or bridle*, placed somewhere on the side of *Virtue*, may serve as emblem sufficient; and for the second, *the helmet* may serve in the same manner; especially since they are each of them appurtenances essential to *heroes*, (who, in quality of warriors, were also subduers or managers of horses †), and that at the same time these are really portable instruments, such as the martial dame, who represents *Virtue*, may be well supposed to have brought along with her.

On the side of PLEASURE, certain *vases*, and other pieces of embossed plate, wrought in the figures of *satyrs*, *fauns*, and *bacchanals*, may serve to express the debauches of the table-kind. And certain draperies thrown carelessly on the ground, and hung upon a neighbouring tree, forming a kind of bower and couch for this luxurious dame, may serve sufficiently to suggest the thought of

\* *Κατάρσια, ἔσπρασεια*. They were described as sisters in the emblematic moral philosophy of the ancients. Whence that known precept, *Ἀπέχου καὶ ἀπέχου*, *Sustine et abstine*.

† *Caster, Pollux*; all the heroes of *Homer*; *Alexander the Great*, &c.

other



other indulgences, and to support the image of the effeminate, indolent, and amorous passions. Besides that, for this latter kind, we may rest satisfied, it is what the painter will hardly fail of representing to the full. The fear is, lest he should overdo this part, and express the affection too much to the life. The appearance will, no doubt; be strongly wrought in all the features and proportions of this *third figure*; which is of a relish far more popular, and vulgarly engaging, than that *other* opposed to it, in our historical design.

### C O N C L U S I O N.

WE may conclude this argument with a general reflection, which seems to arise naturally from what has been said on this subject in particular, "That in a real *history-painter*, the same knowledge, the same study, and views, are required, as in a real *poet*." Never can the *poet* (whilst he justly holds that name) become a *relator*, or *historian* at large. He is allowed only to describe a single action, not the actions of a single man, or people. The *painter* is a historian at the same rate, but still more narrowly confined, as in fact appears; since it would certainly prove a more ridiculous attempt to comprehend two or three distinct actions or parts of history in *one* picture, than to comprehend ten times the number in *one* and *the same* poem.

It is well known, that to each species of poetry there are natural proportions and limits assigned. And it would be a gross absurdity indeed to imagine, that in a poem there was nothing which we could call *measure* or *number*, except merely in the verse. An elegy, and an epigram, have each of them their measure and proportion, as well as a tragedy,

tragedy, or épic poem. In the same manner, as to painting, sculpture, or statuary, there are particular measures which form what we call a *piece*: as for instance, in mere portraiture, a *head*, or *bust*: the former of which must retain always the whole, or at least a certain part of the neck; as the latter the shoulders, and a certain part of the breast. If any thing be added or retrenched, the *piece* is destroyed. It is then a mangled trunk, or dismembered body, which presents itself to our imagination; and this too not through use merely, or on the account of custom, but of necessity, and by the nature of the appearance; since there are such and such parts of the human body, which are naturally matched, and must appear in company; the section, if unskilfully made, being in reality horrid, and representing rather an *amputation* in surgery, than a seemly *division* or *separation* according to *art*. And thus it is, that in general, thro' all the plastic arts, or works of imitation, "whatsoever is drawn from nature, with the intention of raising in us the imagination of the natural species or object, according to real *beauty* and *truth*, should be comprised in certain complete portions or districts, which represent the correspondency or union of each *part* of nature with *entire* NATURE *herself*." And it is this natural apprehension, or anticipating sense of *unity*, which makes us give even to the works of our inferior artificans the name of *pieces*, by way of excellence, and as denoting the *justness* and *truth* of work.

In order therefore to succeed rightly in the formation of any thing truly beautiful in this higher order of design; it were to be wished, that the artist, who had understanding enough to comprehend what a *real piece* or *tablature* imported, and who,  
in

in order to this, had acquired the knowledge of a *whole and parts*, would afterwards apply himself to the study of *moral and poetic truth*; that by this means the thoughts, sentiments, or *manners*, which hold the first rank in his historical work, might appear suitable to the higher and nobler species of humanity in which he practised, to the genius of the age which he described, and to the principal or main action which he chose to represent. He would then naturally learn to reject those false ornaments of *affected graces, exaggerated passions, hyperbolical and prodigious forms*; which, equally with the mere *capricious and grotesque*, destroy the just *simplicity and unity* essential in a PIECE. And for his *colouring*, he would then soon find how much it became him to be reserved, severe, and chaste, in this particular of his art; where luxury and libertinism are, by the power of fashion and the modern taste, become so universally established.

It is evident however from reason itself, as well as from history \* and experience, that nothing is more fatal, either to painting, architecture, or the other arts, than this *false relish*, which is governed rather by what immediately strikes the sense, than by what consequentially, and by reflection, pleases the mind, and satisfies the thought and reason. So that whilst we look on *painting* with the same eye as we view commonly the rich stuffs and coloured silks worn by our ladies, and admired in dress, equipage, or furniture; we must of necessity be effeminate in our taste, and utterly set wrong as to all judgment and knowledge in the kind. For of this *imitative art* we may justly say, "That though it borrows help indeed from colours, and

\* See *Vitruvius* and *Pliny*.

" uses

## 274 *The Judgment of Hercules.* Concl.

“ uses them, as means, to execute its designs ;  
“ it has nothing, however, more wide of its real  
“ aim, or more remote from its intention, than  
“ to make a *shew* of colours, or from their mix-  
“ ture to raise a *separate* and *flattering* pleasure to  
“ the SENSE \*.”

\* The pleasure is plainly foreign and *separate*, as having no concern or share in the proper delight or entertainment which naturally arises from the subject, and workmanship itself. For the subject, in respect of pleasure, as well as science, is absolutely completed, when the design is executed, and the proposed imitation once accomplished. And thus it always is the best, when the colours are most subdued, and made subservient.

A

A  
L E T T E R  
CONCERNING THE  
A R T, or S C I E N C E,  
O F  
D E S I G N,

Written from *Italy*, on the occasion of  
The Judgment of HERCULES,

T O  
My L O R D \* \* \*

— *Ante omnia Musæ.*

Virg. Georg. lib. 2.



A  
L E T T E R  
C O N C E R N I N G  
D E S I G N .

My LORD,

**T**HIS letter comes to your Lordship, accompanied with a small writing, intituled, A NOTION: for such alone can that piece deservedly be called, which aspires no higher than to the forming of a *project*, and that too in so vulgar a science as *painting*. But whatever the subject be, if it can prove any way entertaining to you, it will sufficiently answer my design. And if possible it may have that good success, I should have no ordinary opinion of my project; since I know how hard it would be to give your Lordship a real entertainment by any thing which was not in some respect worthy and useful.

On this account I must, by way of prevention, inform your Lordship, that after I had conceived my NOTION such as you see it upon paper, I was not contented with this, but fell directly to work; and, by the hand of a master-painter, brought it into *practice*, and formed a real *design*. This was not enough. I resolved afterwards to see what effect it would have, when taken out of mere black and white, into colours: and thus a *sketch* was afterwards drawn. This pleased so well, that being encouraged by the *virtuosi*, who are so eminent in this part of the world, I resolved at last to engage

Vol. III.                      A a                      my

my painter in the great work. Immediately a cloth was bespoke of a suitable dimension, and the figures taken as big or bigger than the common life; the subject being of the heroic kind, and requiring rather such figures as should appear above ordinary human stature.

Thus my NOTION, as light as it may prove in the *treatise*, is become very substantial in the *workmanship*. The piece is still in hand, and like to continue so for some time; otherwise the first draught or design should have accompanied the *treatise*, as the *treatise* does this letter. But the *design* having grown thus into a *sketch*, and the *sketch* afterwards into a *picture*, I thought it fit your Lordship should either see the several pieces together, or be troubled only with that which was the best; as undoubtedly the great one must prove, if the master I employ sinks not very much below himself, in this performance.

Far surely should I be, my Lord, from conceiving any vanity or pride in amusements of such an inferior kind as these, especially were they such as they may naturally at first sight appear. I pretend not here to apologise either for *them*, or for *myself*. Your Lordship however knows, I have naturally ambition enough to make me desirous of employing myself in business of a higher order; since it has been my fortune in public affairs to act often in concert with you, and in the same views, on the interest of *Europe* and mankind. There was a time, and that a very early one of my life, when I was not wanting to my country in this respect. But after some years of hearty labour and pains in this kind of workmanship, an unhappy breach in my health drove me not only from the seat of business, but forced me to seek these foreign climates; where, as mild as *winters* generally are, I have  
with



with much ado lived out this *latter one*; and am now, as your Lordship finds, employing myself in such easy studies as are most suitable to my state of health, and to the genius of the country where I am confined.

This in the mean time I can, with some assurance, say to your Lordship, in a kind of spirit of prophecy, from what I have observed of the rising genius of our nation, That if we live to see a peace any way answerable to that generous spirit with which this war was begun and carried on, for our *own* liberty and that of *Europe*; the figure we are like to make abroad, and the increase of knowledge, industry, and sense, at home, will render *united Britain* the principal seat of arts; and, by her politeness and advantages in this kind, will shew evidently, how much she owes to those counsels which taught her to exert herself so resolutely in behalf of the *common cause*, and that of her own *liberty*, and happy *constitution*, necessarily included.

I can myself remember the time, when, in respect of *MUSIC*, our reigning taste was in many degrees inferior to the *French*. The long reign of luxury and pleasure under King *Charles II.* and the foreign helps and studied advantages given to *music* in a following reign, could not raise our genius the least in this respect. But when the spirit of the nation was grown more *free*, though engaged at that time in the fiercest war, and with the most doubtful success; we no sooner began to turn ourselves towards *music*, and inquire what *Italy* in particular produced, than in an instant we outstripped our neighbours the *French*, entered into a genius far beyond theirs, and raised ourselves an *ear* and *judgment* not inferior to the best now in the world.

In the same manner, as to *PAINTING*: Though

we have as yet nothing of our own native growth in this kind worthy of being mentioned; yet since the public has of late begun to express a relish for engravings, drawings, copyings, and for the original paintings of the chief *Italian* schools, (so contrary to the modern *French*), I doubt not that, in very few years, we shall make an equal progress in this other science. And when our humour turns us to cultivate these designing arts, our genius, I am persuaded, will naturally carry us over the slighter amusements, and lead us to that higher, more serious, and noble part of *imitation*, which relates to *history*, *human nature*, and the chief degree or order of *BEAUTY*; I mean that of the *rational* life, distinct from the merely *vegetable* and *sensible*, as in animals, or plants; according to those several degrees or orders of painting which your Lordship will find suggested in this extemporary *notion* I have sent you.

As for *ARCHITECTURE*, it is no wonder if so many noble designs of this kind have miscarried amongst us; since the genius of our nation has hitherto been so little turned this way, that through several reigns we have patiently seen the noblest public buildings perish, (if I may say so), under the hand of one single court-architect; who, if he had been able to profit by experience, would long since, at our expence, have proved the greatest master in the world. But I question whether our patience is like to hold much longer. The devastation so long committed in this kind, has made us begin to grow rude and clamorous at the hearing of a new palace spoilt, or a new design committed to some rash or impotent pretender.

It is the good fate of our nation in this particular, that there remain yet two of the noblest subjects for architecture; our prince's *palace*, and  
our

*Our house of parliament.* For I cannot but fancy, that when *Whitehall* is thought of, the neighbouring *Lords* and *Commons* will at the same time be placed in better chambers and apartments than at present; were it only for majesty's sake, and as a magnificence becoming the person of the prince, who here appears in full solemnity. Nor do I fear, that when these new subjects are attempted, we should miscarry as grossly as we have done in others before. Our *state*, in this respect, may prove perhaps more fortunate than our *church*; in having waited till a national taste was formed, before these edifices were undertaken. But the zeal of the nation could not, it seems, admit so long a delay in their ecclesiastical structures, particularly their *metropolitan*. And since a zeal of this sort has been newly kindled amongst us, it is like we shall see from afar the many spires arising in our great city, with such hasty and sudden growth as may be the occasion perhaps that our immediate relish shall be hereafter censured, as retaining much of what artists call the *Gothic* kind.

Hardly, indeed, as the public now stands, should we bear to see a *Whitehall* treated like a *Hampton-Court*, or even a new cathedral like *St Paul's*. Almost every one now becomes concerned, and interests himself in such public structures. Even those pieces too are brought under the common censure, which, though raised by private men, are of such a grandeur and magnificence, as to become national ornaments. The ordinary man may build his cottage, or the plain gentleman his country-house, according as he fancies: but when a great man builds, he will find little quarter from the public, if, instead of a beautiful pile, he raises, at a vast expence, such a false and counterfeit piece of magnificence, as can be justly arraigned for its de-

formity by so many knowing men in art, and by the whole *people*, who, in such a conjuncture, readily follow their opinion.

In reality, *the people* are no small parties in this *cause*. Nothing moves successfully without them. There can be no PUBLIC, but where they are included. And without a *public voice*, knowingly guided and directed, there is nothing which can raise a true ambition in the artist; nothing which can exalt the genius of the workman, or make him emulous of after fame, and of the approbation of his *country*, and of *posterity*. For with *these* he naturally, as a *freeman*, must take part: in *these* he has a passionate concern and interest, raised in him by the same genius of *liberty*, the same *laws* and *government*, by which his property, and the rewards of his pains and industry, are secured to him, and to his generation after him.

Every thing co-operates, in such a *state*, towards the improvement of *art* and *science*. And for the *designing arts* in particular, such as *architecture*, *painting*, and *statuary*, they are in a manner linked together. The taste of one kind brings necessarily that of the others along with it. When the *free spirit* of a nation turns itself this way, judgments are formed; critics arise; the public eye and ear improve; a right taste prevails, and in a manner forces its way. Nothing is so improving, nothing so natural, so *congenial* to the liberal arts, as that reigning liberty and high spirit of a people, which, from the habit of judging in the highest matters for themselves, makes them freely judge of other subjects, and enter thoroughly into the characters as well of *men* and *manners*, as of the *products* or *works* of men, in art and science. So much, my Lord, do we owe to the excellence of our national constitution, and legal monarchy;  
happily

happily fitted for us, and which alone could hold together so mighty a people; all sharers (though at so far a distance from each other) in the government of *themselves*, and meeting under *one* head in *one* vast *metropolis*; whose enormous growth, however censurable in other respects, is actually a cause that workmanship and arts of so many kinds arise to such perfection.

What encouragement our higher powers may think fit to give these growing arts, I will not pretend to guess. This I know, that it is so much for their advantage and interest to make themselves the chief parties in the cause, that I wish no court or ministry, besides a truly virtuous and wise one, may ever concern themselves in the affair. For should they do so, they would in reality do more harm than good; since it is not the nature of a court (such as courts generally are) to improve, but rather corrupt *a taste*. And what is in the beginning set wrong by their example, is hardly ever afterwards recoverable in the genius of a nation.

Content therefore I am, my Lord, that *Britain* stands in this respect as she now does. Nor can one, methinks, with just reason, regret her having hitherto made no greater advancement in these affairs of art. As her *constitution* has grown, and been established, she has in proportion fitted herself for other improvements. There has been no anticipation in the case. And in this surely she must be esteemed wise, as well as happy, that ere she attempted to raise herself any other taste or relish, she secured herself a right one in *government*. She has now the advantage of beginning in other matters on a new foot. She has her *models* yet to seek, her *scale* and *standard* to form, with deliberation and good choice. Able enough she is at present

present to shift for herself, however abandoned or helpless she has been left by those whom it became to assist her. Hardly, indeed, could she procure a single *academy* for the training of her youth in exercises. As good soldiers as we are, and as good horses as our climate affords, our princes, rather than expend their treasure this way, have suffered our youth to pass into a foreign nation to learn to ride. As for other *academies*, such as those for painting, sculpture, or architecture, we have not so much as heard of the proposal; whilst the prince of our rival nation raises academies, breeds youth, and sends rewards and pensions into foreign countries, to advance the interest and credit of his own. Now if, notwithstanding the industry and pains of this foreign court, and the supine unconcernedness of our own, the national taste however rises, and already shews itself in many respects beyond that of our so highly-assisted neighbours; what greater proof can there be of the superiority of genius in one of these nations above the other?

It is but this moment that I chance to read in an article of one of the gazettes from *Paris*, that it is resolved at court to establish a new *academy* for political affairs. "In it the present chief minister is to preside; having under him six academists, *douez des talens nécessaires*. — No person to be received under the age of twenty-five. A thousand livres pension for each scholar. — Able masters to be appointed for teaching them the necessary sciences, and instructing them in the treaties of peace and alliances which have been formerly made. — The members to assemble three times a-week. — *C'est de ce seminaire* (says the writer) *qu'on tirera les secretaires d'ambassade; qui par degrez pourront monter à de plus hauts emplois.*"

I must confess, my Lord, as great an admirer as I am of these regular institutions, I cannot but look upon *an academy for ministers* as a very extraordinary establishment, especially in such a monarchy as *France*, and at such a conjuncture as the present. It looks as if the ministers of that court had discovered lately some new methods of negotiation, such as their predecessors *Richelieu* and *Mazarine* never thought of; or that, on the contrary, they have found themselves so declined, and at such a loss in the management of this present treaty, as to be forced to take their lesson from some of those ministers with whom they treat: a reproach, of which, no doubt, they must be highly sensible.

But it is not my design here to entertain your Lordship with any reflections upon politics, or the methods which the *French* may take to raise themselves *new* ministers, or *new* generals; who may prove a better match for us than hitherto, whilst we held our *old*. I will only say to your Lordship on this subject of *academies*, that indeed I have less concern for the deficiency of such a one as this, than of any other which could be thought of for *England*; and that as for a seminary of *statesmen*, I doubt not but, without this extraordinary help, we shall be able, out of our *old* stock, and the common course of business, constantly to furnish a sufficient number of well-qualified persons to serve upon occasion, either at home, or in our foreign treaties, as often as such persons accordingly qualified shall duly, honestly, and *bona fide*, be required to serve.

I return therefore to my *virtuoso*-science; which being my chief amusement in this place and circumstance, your Lordship has by it a fresh instance that I can never employ my thoughts with satisfaction

faction on any subject, without making you a party. For even this very NOTION had its rise chiefly from the conversation of a certain day, which I had the happiness to pass a few years since in the country with your Lordship. It was there you shewed me some engravings which had been sent you from *Italy*. One in particular I well remember, of which the subject was the very same with that of my written NOTION inclosed. But by what hand it was done, or after what master, or how executed, I have quite forgot. It was the summer-season, when you had recess from business. And I have accordingly calculated this *epistle* and *project* for the same recess and leisure. For by the time this can reach *England*, the spring will be far advanced, and the national affairs in a manner over, with those who are not in *the immediate administration*.

Were *that* indeed your Lordship's lot at present, I know not whether, in regard to my country, I should dare throw such amusements as these in your way. Yet, even in this case, I would venture to say however, in defence of my project, and of the *cause of painting*, that could my young hero come to your Lordship as well represented as he might have been, either by the hand of a *Marat* \* or a *Jordano*, (the masters who were in being, and in repute, when I first travelled here in *Italy*), the *picture* itself, whatever the *treatise* proved, would have been worth notice, and might have become a present worthy of our court, and prince's *palace*; especially were it so blessed as to lodge within it a royal issue of her Majesty's. Such a piece of furniture might well fit the gallery, or hall of exer-

\* *Carlo Marat* was yet alive, at the time this letter was written; but had been long superannuated, and incapable of any considerable performance.

cises,



cises, where our young princes should learn their usual lessons. And to see VIRTUE in this garb and action, might perhaps be no slight memorandum hereafter to a *royal youth*, who should one day come to undergo this trial himself; on which his own happiness, as well as the fate of *Europe* and of the world, would in so great a measure depend.

This, my Lord, is making (as you see) the most I can of my *project*, and setting off my amusements with the best colour I am able; that I may be the more excusable in communicating them to your Lordship, and expressing thus, with what zeal I am,

My LORD,

*Your Lordship's*

Naples, March 6.

N. S. 1712.

*most faithful*

*humble servant,*

SHAFTESBURY.

I N-



# I N D E X.

The volumes are denoted by numeral letters, the pages by figures.

When different pages are referred to at any article, if the numbers are disjoined by a comma, the first figure or figures in the preceding number are supposed to be repeated in the subsequent.

When several particulars occur under an article, all to be found in one volume, the volume is not repeated.

## A

- A** Brabara, patriarch, his character and life iii. 36. 37. 86  
 Absolute power. See Arbitrary power  
 Absolute princes i. 160. Seem to act by counsel and advice 165, 6. Their education and manners *ib.* No real society in absolute government 81. 82. No public, or sense of public good 82. No social or common affection *ib.* No community or mother-country iii. 100. Absolute monarchy, debauching in religious and moral principles i. 82. iii. 216. Necessary subjection and homage in absolute government i. 172. iii. 120  
 Academic philosophy i. 13. 199. Its excellence 62. 201, 2. ii. 140. 141, 72, &c. 229, 30. See Sceptic. Academic founder and successor ii. 189, 90. Academic discipline amongst the ancients i. 95. ii. 142  
 Academies for exercise, wanted for our youth; unhappily neglected i. 261. See Exercises, School, University  
 Academists, their way of arguing unsuitable to the impatient humour of our age ii. 141, 2  
 Acteon, a common absurdity in the pictures of his metamorphosis iii. 250  
 Actions, spring of actions ii. 63  
 Activity, or action, how necessary to mankind ii. 97. 98  
 Actor, stage i. 4. In the public *ib.*  
 Admiration, weakness of the passion i. 112, &c. ii. 244, &c. See Miracle, Wonder. Just admiration ii. 19. Admiration founded in the natural and necessary imagination of a sublime and beautiful in things i. 107, 8. 263, 4. ii. 19. 20. 297. 316, 22, 23. iii. 20. 21, &c. 127, 8, &c. Admiration, motive or incentive to philosophy iii. 24. 25. Restraint of it in philosophy 24. 25. 140, &c. A strong admiration distinguished from that of love 252.  
 Advice. See treatise of, viz. vol. 1. 121, &c.  
 Egypt, its description ii. 290. Origin and enormous growth of superstition from Egypt ii. 290, 1. iii. 29. 30, &c. Natural as well as political causes iii. 31. 32. Unsociableness of religion, mutual  
 Vol. III. B b  
abhorrence

# I N D E X.

- abhorrence of worshippers, and persecution of sects, begun from hence ii. 290, 1. iii. 29. 41. 42. 55. 56, &c. Unhappy settlement, cantonment, and agrarian of the primitive Egyptians iii. 29. 30, &c. Egyptian mysteries 170. See Hierarchy, Priesthood. Egyptian loan i. 280. Catechism and catechumens originally Egyptian iii. 170. See Circumcision
- Æsop iii. 143
- Æthiopia, its empire and priesthood iii. 33. 34. Æthiopian spectator i. 63. 64
- Affectation in behaviour opposite to grace i. 149, 50. In belief, faith, religion, praise i. 3. 4. 25. 26. 31. 32, &c.
- Affection, natural, towards moral beauty i. 219, 20. Social, enjoyment 243. Confessed in love of country, &c. iii. 100, 1, 2, &c. In parental, filial affection 101. Strength of social affection i. 10. Conjugal affection ii. 98. 99. iii. 152. It is by affection merely that a creature is esteemed good or ill ii. 13. Private or self affection 13. 14. When vitious 14. 15. 16. When good 15. Reflex affection 18. Unequal affection, or iniquity 21. Opposition of the affections 37. Religious affection 55. See Devotion, Enthusiasm. System of the affections 62. That system explained 63. Three kinds of affections *ib.* Degrees of affections 64. Private affection too weak, when 65. Affections towards private good, necessary 66. Energy of natural affections 75, &c. What pleasure attends the very disturbances belonging to natural affection 79. Effects of natural affection *ib.* &c. Partial affection has no foundation in reason iii. 77. How slender satisfaction it affords ii. 83. Entire affection, its advantages 84. Analysis or plan of the affections, as they relate to human happiness or unhappiness iii. 135, &c. Natural affection, *σὸφυν* 154. The same parental or filial kind 101. Balance of the affections ii. 69. 76. 97, &c. Exercise of the social or natural affections, how necessary to man 100, &c. Of the affections which relate to the immediate self, or private interest of the creature 104. Unnatural affections 122, &c. Their consequences 125, &c.
- Age, the present, improving, in our nation, why i. 6. 7
- Agrarian, untoward one in the Egyptian state iii. 29, &c. How occasioned 33. 34. 40. 41
- Air of person. See Grace
- Alchemy ii. 137, 41. 283. iii. 111, 12
- Alchymists, why their philosophy still prevails so much in our age ii. 141
- Alcibiades iii. 88
- Alexander the Great i. 196. 255. Modern Alexanders 178
- Amanuensis, the author's i. 239. iii. 11. 132
- Ambassadors from heaven, in what sense iii. 234, 5, 6, &c. from the moon 236. Apostolic commission, embassy, succession 234, 5
- Ambition i. 251, 5, 6, &c. ii. 117. 325, 30, 1
- Amble, common able, pace, or canterbury of writers iii. 18
- Amorous passion, what occasion of disorder ii. 113, &c.

Amour,

# I N D E X

- Amour**, manner of it with the fair sex iii. 80. **History of an amour**  
 i. 139, &c. *See* Gallantry, Love, Novel  
**Amphictonian council** iii. 96  
**Amphitheatre**. *See* Gladiator. **Amphitheatrical spectacles** i. 212  
**Anacharxis** i. 69. 70  
**Anatomy of the mind** i. 162. **Of the body** ii. 227, &c.  
**Andrew**, Merry-Andrew and executioner, a picture i. 50  
**Angelical company** i. 4  
**Anger**, use of the passion in the inferior orders of creatures, and in  
 the ordinary characters of men ii. 107, 8. Its ill effects when in-  
 dulged 108, 9, &c. Void in the highest and most virtuous cha-  
 racters 107. **Anger an acknowledgment of just and unjust** 315, &c.  
**Animal**, how becomes a part of another system ii. 10. **Animal sy-**  
**stem** 10. 11. **Wild and tame animals of the same species**, how  
 different 97. 98  
**Answers to books** iii. 6. 7. **Answer-writers** *ib.* 188  
**Ant** ii. 71. iii. 153  
**Anticipation** ii. 315. *See* Preconception. **Anticipation and real**  
 iii. 249  
**Antidote to Enthusiasm**. *See* Enthusiasm  
**Ancients**, their discipline of youth i. 95. ii. 142. *See* Academy.  
**Ancient policy**, in the affairs of religion and philosophy i. 12. 13.  
 ii. 196  
**Antipater** i. 196  
**Antipathy**, religious. *See* Religion  
**Apelles** i. 178. *See* Painter  
**Apollo** iii. 161, 2. **Apollo and Muses** i. 2. 3. 4. *See* Delphic, Mu-  
 ses, Pythian  
**Apologue** iii. 143. *See* Æsop, Fable, Mythology  
**Apology**, practice of i. 258, 9. *See* Preface  
**Appearances**. *See* Species  
**Appetite**, elder brother to reason i. 148. **Appetites high**, eager  
 iii. 123  
**Applause**. *See* praise  
**Aratus**, poet iii. 165  
**Arbitrary power** i. 173, 4. **The sweet and bitter** 173. **Arbitrary**  
**power**, or absolute monarchy, destructive of arts i. 172, 3, 87,  
 &c. iii. 15. 16. *See* Absolute power, Tyranny, Will  
**Arcadia** i. 15  
**Architect ambitious** iii. 93  
**Architecture**, barbarous, Gothic i. 276. **True and natural**, inde-  
 pendent of fancy *ib.* **Founded in truth and nature** iii. 126  
**Aristides** i. 210  
**Aristophanes** i. 193  
**Aristotle cited** i. 111, 14, 90, 1, &c. iii. 45. 46. 97. 180, 94. *See*  
 Peripatetic  
**Arm**, secular arm, deliver over i. 50. iii. 76. 77  
**Arms and hands**, expressive in oratory iii. 256  
**Arthur**, King iii. 78

# I N D E X.

- Articles of belief.** See Belief, Divinity
- Artisan** honest, resolute i. 206
- Artists** rejoice in criticism i. 184. 206, &c. **Virtue and generosity of artists** 205. See Architect, Painter, Poet, &c.
- Arts and sciences**, how raised and improved i. 188, &c. 195, &c. iii. 95, &c. **Arts and virtues mutual friends** i. 264
- Assemblies**, public, demand respect i. 57
- Atellan**, plays i. 197
- Atheism.** See Chance, Ill humour. **The consequences of Atheism** with respect to virtue ii. 58, &c. Compared in that respect with Theism 52. **Atheism from superstition** 252, &c. **Martyrs for Atheism** iii. 44. **Atheism preferable to superstition** i. 31. iii. 87, &c. **Faith of Atheism** ii. 268. **Atheism charged on the people of the better rank and fashion** ii. 198. iii. 205. **Charged upon wit and subtle reasoning** *ib.*
- Atheist**, a strong believer ii. 268. **A complete one, his belief or faith** 223, 4, 5, 68. **Hard to pronounce certainly of any man, that he is an Atheist** 6. **Atheists personated** iii. 205, &c. **Best writers against Atheists** ii. 194. **Two sorts of people called Atheists** 195. **Different in themselves, and to be used differently** 195, 6. **Atheists miscalled** i. 270. **Enthusiasts** i. 40. iii. 45
- Atheistical hypothesis** ii. 224. **Certain principles common to Atheists with the devout, or zealots** i. 75. 91. 96. 103. 270, 5, &c. ii. 49. 58. 191, 2. iii. 212. **Atheistical writers or talkers, no genuine Atheists** i. 68. 69, &c.
- Athenians** i. 22. 23. **Their antiquity, genius** iii. 106. **Manners, modesty** *ib.* See Greece. **Progress of arts and letters amongst them** i. 194, &c. **Attic elegance** 183
- Atticus** iii. 14
- Attila**, Gothic prince iii. 64
- Audience** i. 208, 9, 17. See Stage
- Augustus** i. 173, 9. 214, &c. iii. 15. 173, 4
- Authors**, saint-authors i. 130. iii. 165, 6. **Author in solitude** i. 138. **Prince-authors** 168. **Author's courtship to the reader** i. 157. 258. **Selfishness of authors** 157. **Coquetry of an author** 158. **Author once an honourable name** iii. 2. **A character or note of understanding** *ib.* **Jealousy of free authors** ii. 2. 196. **Author orthodox** i. 280, &c. **Orthodoxy of our author in particular** iii. 48. 49. 219, 20. **Authors not excusable for their ill performance, because neglected by the great** i. 175, 6, &c. 180, 1, &c. or because of criticism and censure 181, &c. or because of the public genius or ear 205, &c. **Author and reader, their mutual relation, interest** iii. 157, 8, &c. **Their pretensions, privileges, place, ceremonial** 158. **Divinest characters and personages no authors, either in sacred or profane letters** 169, &c. **Great authors capable of business, though out of it** 171, &c. 189, 90. **Authors of narrow geniuses, incapable of action or speculation** 189. 190. **Bookseller makes the author** i. 208. iii. 18. 19. **Modern author professes laziness, precipitancy, carelessness** i. 182, 3. In doubt.

# I N D E X.

- Doubt about his own work iii. 19. *See* Miscellany, Penman, Piece. Author of these treatises, accidentally engaged in them iii. 132. His first treatise, viz. letter of enthusiasm, a real letter *ib.* 8. 9. 13. 14
- Authority, divine, judged by morals i. 233
- Avarice i. 250. iii. 137. 211. Avaritious temper, how miserable ii. 116, &c.
- Awe, its effects on mens understandings i. 74. *See* Fear

## B

- B**abylonian empire and hierarchy iii. 33. *See* Hierarchy
- Bacon, Lord, cited iii. 48
- Banter, fashionable with modern politicians and negotiators i. 47.
- Banter from persecution 55
- Barbarian. *See* Goth, Indian
- Barbarism, chief mark of iii. 107. From universal monarchy i. 174
- Bart'lemy fair i. 21
- Bays, Mr iii. 191, 2, &c. Other Bays's in divinity 197, &c.
- Bear-garden i. 212, 13. iii. 178
- Beasts: Beast or brute science iii. 128, 51. Passionate love and fondness towards the bestial or animal forms, virtues, beauties 128. 150, 1, &c. Beasts, their natural instincts ii. 230, 1. Oeconomy or order of nature in beasts. *See* Oeconomy
- Beaver iii. 153
- Beauty, where to be found ii. 303, 4. Mysterious charms of beauty 157, &c. Knowledge in the degrees and orders of beauty *ib.* Three degrees or orders of beauty 305, 6. Scale or scheme of beauty iii. 127, &c. Moral beauty ii. 308. Confessed i. 220. ii. 315, &c. iii. 210, 11. Moral beauty and deformity ii. 19. 20. Beauty of sentiments, characters, mind i. 105, 63. iii. 210. *See* Character, Heart, Mind, Virtue. Beauty is truth i. 110, 11. iii. 125, 6, &c. Beauty of virtue i. 247, &c. of the soul ii. 312. of the body 311. Beauty dangerous i. 144. Outward beauty expressive of inward 107. Natural health the inward beauty of the body iii. 126. Mechanic beauties in opposition to moral and intellectual i. 108. Beauty in animals iii. 151. How attractive, inchanting 150, &c. The scale of beauty iii. 127, &c. The odd and pretty in the room of the graceful and beautiful 4. Idea of beauty natural ii. 311. Beauty and good the same 300, 17. Not the object of the sense 317, 18. Its extent 157, 8, &c.
- The Beautiful, *honestum, pulchrum, τὸ καλόν.* *See* Decorum, Enthusiasm, Fair
- Bee ii. 69. 71. iii. 153
- Beggars i. 27. Beggary religion *ib.* iii. 87, &c.
- Belief. *See* Faith. Belief at a venture i. 26. No merit in believing on weak grounds *ib.* Affectation of belief 27. Articles of belief i. 282. iii. 42. 43. 44. 55. 56. Grosest article of belief, how introduced

# I N D E X.

- produced of old into the church iii. 232. Sacred and indisputable articles of belief 48. 49. Whether a man can be accountable for his wrong belief ii. 245. Men persuade themselves into whatever opinion or belief iii. 70, &c. Belief at the stretch of reason i. 25. iii. 73  
 Believer against his will i. 26. iii. 89. Superstitious believer wishes there were no God iii. 89  
 Belly: Gluttonous imagination, or belly-sense i. 222  
 Bibliothèque Choisie iii. 13. 14. 167. See Clerc  
 Bigotry, its spirit i. 57. First rise iii. 56. Force of the word 57  
 Bird ii. 226, &c.  
 Bit or bridle, proper emblem for the figure of virtue iii. 270  
 Body politic, head and members i. 87. 88. See Constitution  
 Boileau, French satirist i. 171. iii. 195  
 Bombast i. 182, 90. iii. 182  
 Books. See Burning, Reading, Scholar. Good books so called i. 130. iii. 228. Books of chivalry, gallantry, prodigies, travels, barbarous nations, and customs i. 267, &c. Interpolating, suppressing practice on books iii. 230. See Fathers, Scripture  
 Bookfeller i. 238. See Amanuensis, Author. Begets a fray or learned scuffle iii. 7. 8. 10. 11, &c. Bookfeller and glazier 10. 11. Bookfeller's shop and trade 11. Bookfeller determines titles 19. Fits his customers 188  
 Bossu, Pere, du poeme epique i. 111  
 Breeding. See Academy, University. Good-breeding i. 49. ii. 180. Leading character to virtue i. 100. 105. 261. iii. 112, 17. Good-breeding and liberty necessarily joined i. 57. 58. Man of good-breeding incapable of a brutal action 100. Acts from his nature, without reflection, and by a kind of necessity 100, 1. Compared with the thorough honest man 101. See Gentleman  
 Britain, its advantages i. 172. Old Britain 213  
 British liberty i. 169, 70, 5. British sense in politics 61. British countrymen fellow-citizens iii. 101, &c.  
 Britons, their sense of government, and a constitution i. 83. 84. See England, Englishmen  
 Brute ii. 229. See Beast  
 Brutus iii. 173  
 Buffoons i. 55. See Banter, Burlesque, Italian, Laugh  
 Build, easier to demolish than build iii. 93  
 Burlesque, its principal source i. 54. 55. See Banter. Mere burlesque rejected by the ancients i. 55. 56. See Comedy, Parodies. Burlesque-wit and buffoonry on the stage iii. 195. Burlesque-divinity. See Divinity  
 Burnet's Archæol. cited iii. 85  
 Burning zeal. See Zeal. Burning and destruction of books, learning, &c. iii. 165, &c. See Fathers of the church  
 Business, man of business i. 243

Cabalistic



# I N D E X.

## C

- C**abalistic learning iii. 56.  
 Cæsar, Julius i. 213, 14. Cæsar's commentaries 176. His ability i. 179  
 Cæsars, Roman i. 18. 103, 4. 173. iii. 28. 60. 63  
 Cake, not eat and have i. 101  
 Camp i. 261  
 Cantonising i. 87  
 Canterbury. *See* Amble  
 Cappadocians iii. 174  
 Carnival i. 63, &c.  
 Carver carnal, spiritual iii. 78, &c.  
 Catechism, theological, metaphysical i. 240. Moral, philosophical 240, 1. Catechism and catechumens originally Egyptian iii. 170.  
*See* Circumcision  
 Catholic church. *See* Church, Pope, Rome. Catholic opinion, how formed iii. 60. 61, &c. *See* Uniformity  
 Catullus i. 179  
 Cause, common cause i. 175  
 Cebeus ii. 189  
 Censors of manners i. 189. Censure free 6  
 Ceremony i. 160. *See* Compliments  
 Ceremonial between author and reader iii. 157, &c.  
 Ceremonies. *See* Rites  
 Cervantes, Michael iii. 176  
 Chaldea iii. 33  
 Challenge. *See* Duel. Spiritual challengers, lists, combatants i. 284. iii. 237. *See* Priests, Religion  
 Chance preferred to providence by the superstitious i. 32. iii. 88, &c.  
*See* Atheism  
 Chaos and darkness from universal monarchy i. 174, 5. Chaos of the English poets iii. 43  
 Characters: Dealer in characters must know his own i. 149. Sacred characters i. 221  
 Character divine i. 17. 28. in God, in man 29. 31. 32. Beauty of character 105. *See* Beauty. Character with one's self and others i. 101. 231. Character, generous and vile, set in opposition 110  
 Real characters and manners 153. 157, 8, &c. *See* Manners.  
 Perfect character, veiled 153. Perfect character unartificial in poetry 264. Monstrous in epic, or on the stage iii. 180, 1, &c.  
 Homer's characters. *See* Homer. Principal characters and underparts i. 153. Characters in holy writ, not subjects for a poem 278, 9. Characters or personages in dialogue iii. 203. *See* Dialogue. Sublime of characters i. 263. Inward character i. 265. iii. 23. Character from circumstances of nativity iii. 103. Characters in the state 114, 19, &c. Inward character and worth 122. Character of a critic. *See* Critic  
 Characteristic of understandings i. 159

Charity

# I N D E X.

- Charity and good-will, pretext to what ends i. 67. 103. iii. 80. 93.  
*See* Morals. Christian charity i. 77. Charitable foundations, to  
 whose benefit 103. Supernatural charity i. 13. iii. 80. Heathen  
 charity iii. 106, 7
- Charm of nature, in moral objects. *See* Beauty, Harmony, Na-  
 ture, Taste
- Childrens play i. 50
- Chivalry i. 214. Originally Moorish, Gothic i. 269, &c. iii. 176.  
 Books of chivalry i. 269. Dregs of it ii. 145. *See* Gallantry
- Christian author i. 50. Good Christian 76. Christian, Maho-  
 metan, Pagan i. 276. iii. 72. Sceptic Christian iii. 50
- Christianity no way concerned in modern miracles ii. 245, 8, 9, &c.  
 Not founded in miracle merely *ib.* and i. 233
- Church i. 6. *See* Catholic, Hierarchy. Roman Christian and  
 catholic church iii. 63. *See* Monarchy. National church i. 12.  
 20. Its interest asserted 12. Panic fear for the church iii. 58.  
 59, &c. Church-lands i. 19. 103. iii. 31. 55. Writing church-  
 militant iii. 6. 7, &c. and 202, &c. Ancient Heathen church  
 i. 38. iii. 88. 89, &c. Church of England iii. 9. 10, &c. *See*  
 divines. Church-patriot iii. 119
- Chymistry. *See* Alchymy
- Cicero i. 164. 261. iii. 14. 15. 127, 95
- Circumcision, its origin among the Ægyptians iii. 36. 37. Received  
 by the Hebrew patriarch their guest *ib.* by Moses on his return  
 38. Laid down again, on his retreat 36. Again renewed, by  
 Joshua, with regard to the same Ægyptians 36. 37. 38. 39
- City, heavenly city Jerufalem i. 221
- Clan. *See* tribe
- Cleanliness i. 97
- Clerc (Mr Le, Sylv. Phil.) iii. 149. *See* Bibliotheque Choisie
- Clergy, benefit of i. 239. Interest of Christian clergy in ancient  
 and polite learning iii. 164. Management and practices of the an-  
 cient clergy iii. 232, 3, &c. *See* Clerics, Fathers of the church,  
 Priesthood
- Clerics seditious iii. 62. *See* Government, Magistrate
- Climates, regions, soils, compared iii. 105
- Closet-thoughts i. 108
- Clown, judges philosophers iii. 75. Better philosopher than some  
 so called 142
- Club, liberty of the club i. 57. *See* Committee. Club-method 210
- Coffeehouse iii. 10. 191, &c. Coffeehouse-committee 191, &c.  
 Coffeehouse hero *ib.*
- College i. 261. ii. 137
- Collision amicable i. 49
- Comedy i. 156. Posterior to tragedy 191, 2. *See* Burlesque,  
 Drama, Farce, Play, Theatre. Comedy, ancient, first, second,  
 third i. 192, 3, &c. 198, 9, &c.
- Comic style i. 202, 3. *See* Satire, Style

Commission,

# I N D E X.

- Commission, sole commission for authorship** i. 262. **Heavenly commission, pretends to it examined** iii. 71. 111. 234, 5, &c.  
**Committee** iii. 191, &c. *See* Club  
**Common sense.** *See* Nature, Senses. Men not to be reasoned out of it i. 74  
**Company provocative to fancy** i. 125, 6. *See* Assemblies, Conversations  
**Complexions, religious** i. 64. *See* Persecution, Salvation  
**Compliments** i. 160, 1. *See* Ceremony  
**Comprehension in religion.** *See* Uniformity  
**Conference, free** i. 53. 54  
**Conformity in religion** iii. 219, 20. *See* Uniformity  
**Conformists occasional** iii. 59  
**Conjurer, a wise and able one** i. 249. **Conjurers** 67. 138. 273. *See* Inchanter, Magi, Priest  
**Conquest, national** iii. 103  
**Conscience, moral** ii. 89. Its effects 90. 91, &c. **Religious conscience supposes moral conscience** 89. **False conscience, its effects** 90, 1. **Conscience from interest** 92. 93  
**Consecration of opinions, notions** i. 46  
**Consistency, rule of** iii. 248  
**Constitution, state or government** i. 83. 187. **English constitution** i. 167, 70. iii. 105  
**Contemplation** ii. 54. 55. *See* Meditation  
**Controversy: Controversial writings** iii. 6. 7. 8. 187, 8. **Church-controversy** 202, &c. **Religious controversy, and decision of the cause, according to modern priesthood** 237, 8, &c.  
**Conversation** i. 52. 53, &c. 57. 58. iii. 233, 4. **Life of conversation** i. 57. 58. **Sterility of the best conversations, the cause** 58. 59. **Remedy** 59. **Modern conversation effeminate, enervate** ii. 138  
**Convocation, synod, council, what endow, temper** i. 282  
**Coquetry.** *See* Author  
**Corneille, French tragedian, cited** iii. 60. 195  
**Corporation of wit** iii. 194. *See* Wit  
**Correctness.** *See* Critic, Genius. **In writing** i. 182, 3. 189. iii. 58. **Incorrectness** iii. 2. 3, &c. 154. **Cause of incorrectness in our English writers** *ib.* and 189, 90, 1  
**Covetousness.** *See* Avarice  
**Counsellor, privy counsellors, of wise aspect** i. 166  
**Countenances.** *See* Complexions  
**Cowardice** i. 245, 6. ii. 104, 5. *See* Fear  
**Country, love of native country** iii. 100. *See* Love. **Native country, name wanting** 104. **Higher city or country recognized** 110, 11  
**Court** i. 6. 261. **Court-power** iii. 15. 16. **Grandeur of a court, what influence on art and manners** i. 173, &c. 187, &c. 267. iii. 15. 16. **Spirit of a court** i. 81. 82. **Spectres met with there** 108.

# I N D E X

108. Place at court iii. 117, 18, 45. Court-slavery 117, 18, &c.  
*See Slavery.* Court-engines 121. *See Favourites*  
 Courtier i. 151. Honest courtier iii. 17. 122, 3  
 Creature, every one a private interest ii. 9, &c. Private ill of every  
 creature *ib.* No creature good, if by his nature injurious to his  
 species, or to the whole in which he is included 10. When a  
 creature is supposed good 14. 15, &c. What makes an ill crea-  
 ture 17. 18. What makes a creature worthy or virtuous 20. 21.  
 Creature void of natural affection 59. Creature, when too good  
 66. 67  
 Creed iii. 167. Furniture of creeds 224. Creed-making 42. 43. 44.  
 56. 57. 212, &c. *See Article, Belief, Watch-word*  
 Credulity and incredulity i. 270. Credulity, how dangerous ii.  
 245, 6  
 Criterion of truth i. 46  
 Critical truth. *See Truth.* Critical liberty iii. 220. Critical art,  
 support of sacred writ 163, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9  
 Criticism, rejoices the real artist i. 184, &c. Toleration of criticism  
 essential to wit 204. Sacred criticism iii. 49. 50. 159, 60, &c.  
 Prevention against 114, 15  
 Critics, the ingenious and fair sort i. 62. Formidable to the au-  
 thor or poet, why i. 181, 2. iii. 189, 90, &c. French critics iii.  
 195. *See Bossu, Journalists.* Critic-haters i. 185, 6. iii. 114, &c. 179.  
 189. 191, 2. Self-critic i. 132. Interest, party, cause, or writ-  
 ting, to be suspected, which declares against criticism, or declines  
 the proof iii. 206, 38, 9. Critics, pillars of state in wit and letters  
 i. 185, &c. 189, 90. iii. 185, 6. Critics, notaries, expositors,  
 prompters i. 189, 90. Treated as whimsical 213. Their cause de-  
 fended iii. 114, 15. Critics by fashion i. 214. Writing-critics, or  
 satirists iii. 188. Critics, satirists, sceptics, scrupulists 76  
 Crocodile, worshipped ii. 22. iii. 56. Emblem of superstition ii.  
 290, 1. Crocodiles, chimera's, scholastic iii. 56  
 Crowns, how purchased on some occasions i. 108  
 Crudities i. 129, 30, 31  
 Cudworth, Dr, his character ii. 196. Why accused of being a  
 friend to Atheists *ib.* Cited iii. 45  
 Custom and fashion powerful seducers i. 278. Custom vicious ii. 24  
 Cybele, goddess ii. 189

## D

- D**Æmon, or guardian spirit i. 133. iii. 19. Dæmon, to what that  
 name belongs ii. 5. *See Witch*  
 Dæmonist, who, what ii. 5. 6  
 Dancer i. 152. Figured dances iii. 64. High dance in religion and  
 prophecy 81  
 Death, king of terrors i. 246. ii. 189. *See Fear*  
 Debate, free i. 53. iii. 108. *See Conference, Freedom*  
 Debauch has a reference to society i. 242, 3. ii. 94. 95,  
 Declamation i. 53. *See Preaching*

Decorum

# I N D E X.

- Decorum i. 108. 264. ii. 311. iii. 125, 6. 137, 8. Decorum and sublime of actions iii. 23. *See* Beauty, Grace. Dulce et decorum i. 79. 95
- Dedication. *See* Preface
- Defender of the faith i. 168
- Deist, the name set in opposition to Christianity ii. 156
- Deity, when viewed amiss i. 24. 25. Deity fought in chaos and confusion, not in order and beauty ii. 253, 4. Various combinations of opinions concerning Deity 4. 5. How men are influenced by the belief of a Deity 33. 34. 35. Terror of the Deity implies not moral conscience 89. Different characters, aspects, or views of Deity iii. 26. 27. Species multiplied 33. 34. 35. Heathen attributes of Deity 107. *See* Genius, Mind. Deity, the sovereign beauty, and source of all beauties ii. 221, 2. *See* God
- Delphic inscription i. 134
- Demosthenes i. 127, 64. iii. 98
- Denmark and Sweden iii. 120
- Despotic. *See* Absolute, Arbitrary
- Devil. *See* Hell
- Devotion of the dismal sort, its effects ii. 86. 87. The abject, beggarly, illiberal, sycophantic, knavish kind i. 25. 26. iii. 87, &c.
- Dialogue, manner of writing used by the ancients i. 56. Preliminary science to poetry and just writing 149, 50, 1. Moderns, why so sparing and unsuccessful in the way of dialogue-writing ii. 138, 9. How practised by some modern divines iii. 202, 3, 4. Dialogue between an author and his bookseller 10. 11. between God and man 85. between man and beast *ib.* between God and Satan *ib.* between God and Jonah 83. 84
- Diana iii. 55. 58
- Diodorus Siculus cited iii. 30. 33. 34
- Dion Cassius, wretched historian i. 212. iii. 17
- Dionysius Halicarnassensis iii. 162, 94
- Discourse continued and alternate i. 53. 54. Vicissitude in discourse, a law 53. 58
- Dishonesty, a half-thought iii. 207, 10. *See* Knavery, Thinking
- Disinterestedness in friendship i. 77. 78. *See* Friendship. Disinterestedness in religion, and its holy founders 220, 1, 2. *See* Love, Reward
- Distraction, real i. 252, &c.
- Divine, or godlike i. 25. 29. *See* Character, Theogony, Theology. Divine example ii. 40. Divine presence 40. 41
- Divines, theologians iii. 85. 162, 4, 5, &c. 196. 202, 3, &c. 211, 12. 219, 20, 26, 27, &c. Why incautious, and ill managers, in the cause of religion ii. 269, 70. Divine, in humour, out of humour iii. 90. 91
- Divinity-doctor, combatant in print iii. 7. 8. 9. Polemic divinity 6. 7, &c. Burlesque divinity 202, &c. Surnames and titles of divinity 42. *See* Deity, Theology

Doctrine.

# I N D E X.

- Doctrines.** See Hypothesis  
**Dog.** See Beast, Fable  
**Dogmatists,** why so fashionable in this age ii. 141, 2. Dogmatizing in religion, and on a future state *ib.* 176. 223. See Sceptic  
**Dominion** founded in property iii. 34  
**Drama,** English drama, lame support of it iii. 201. Dramatis personæ *ib.* See Bays, Comedy, Play, Stage, Tragedy. Theological drama 204  
**Drapery,** rules concerning it iii. 260, 1  
**Dryden** iii. 42. 43. See Bays  
**Duels** i. 214, 84. See Challenges

## E

- EAR** in music i. 32. 105, 71, 84, 5, 6. Ear lost 269. Public ear 207, 16, 17. See Audience. Distemper in the ear 254. Ears to hear, &c. 48. Ear in poetry i. 171. 216. iii. 183  
**Earth,** system of the earth, how a part of some other system ii. 11. 12. Another earth or world i. 221. Our relation to mere earth and soil iii. 101, 2, &c. Sons of earth 102  
**Education.** See Academy, School, Tutor, University  
**Effeminacy** i. 245, 6. ii. 138. iii. 129  
**Effeminate wit** iii. 114, 15  
**Egypt.** See Egypt  
**Elephant** iii. 153  
**Eloquence** i. 5. Leprosy of 126. Corruption of iii. 15. 16. Eloquence and other arts depend on liberty i. 172. See Liberty  
**Emblematical,** nothing of that kind to be directly mingled in an historical piece iii. 266, 7. An instance from Raphael 267, &c.  
**Emperors,** Roman i. 18. 19. 103, 73, 9. Convert emperors i. 103, 4. iii. 54. 55  
**Empiric** i. 129, 85  
**Engine,** court-engines iii. 121  
**Engineer of letters** iii. 11. in philosophy and sciences 93  
**England,** a conquest, whence to be feared iii. 103, 4. Old England 105. Late England *ib.* See Britain. Church of England. See Church, Divines  
**Englishmen,** fellow-citizens, countrymen iii. 101, 2, &c. Name whence brought 104  
**English inhospitable humour** iii. 105, 6. English authors in general i. 208. Speeches and admired wit of our English ancestors iii. 98. 99. English liberty i. 170, 5, 6. English poetry. See Muses.  
**Incorrection of English poets** i. 206. iii. 179, 80, 3, &c. English divines iii. 85. See Divines  
**Enjoyment,** deceitful kind i. 242, 3. Sincere 244. Social 243  
**Enthusiasm,** definition of the natural sort, &c. iii. 20. Enthusiasm of holy souls 47. Legitimate and bastard sort i. 40. iii. 47. Raised from internals iii. 63. ii. 201. from externals iii. 28. 63. Philosophical enthusiasm 57. Prophetical 47. Poetical i. 15. Mathematical

# I N D E X.

- thematical ii. 77. Enthusiasm of the lover, hero, virtuoso, &c. ii. 300, &c. 323. iii. 21. Universal, or in all i. 41. iii. 20. Enthusiasms of different sorts iii. 28. Comprehended in the Romish church 63. 64, &c. Vulgar sort, and more refined *ib.* Enthusiasm divine i. 41. Modification of enthusiasm 12-13. Various operations 36, &c. Enthusiasm at second hand 33. Enthusiasm justified i. 41. 42. ii. 41. 296, 7. 300, 1, 2, 7. iii. 19. 20, &c. Ravage of enthusiasm i. 69. Antidote to enthusiasm 42. Virtue itself a noble enthusiasm iii. 22-23. Enthusiasm a natural and honest passion 26. Soft and lovely ii. 162, 3. Enthusiasm works differently, by fear, by love iii. 26. Its amorous lineage 26. Contrary and miraculous effects of enthusiasm 27. 28. Enthusiasm catching, communicable, imparted i. 33. 34. iii. 19. 20. See Melancholy, Prophecy. Sociable enthusiast ii. 162  
 Enthusiast itinerant i. 225. Epicureans, enthusiastical Atheists i. 40. iii. 44. Enthusiastic inebriation iii. 46  
 Envy, unnatural passion ii. 123  
 Ephesian worshippers iii. 57. 58, &c. Zeal for their church *ib.*  
 Epicurus, his connivance in matters of vision and fanaticism i. 37, &c. Recognition of the force of nature, and natural affection 91. 92. Toleration of natural enthusiasm i. 37, &c. iii. 22. 23. Epicurus, primitive father to some concealed moderns i. 91. 92. Love and religion cruelly treated by Epicurus iii. 21. 22. 23. 24. Nature, a deity to the Epicurean Atheist i. 39. 40. iii. 44. See Enthusiasm, Atheism. Epicurean atomist i. 236. Epicurean hypothesis iii. 22. 23. 48. Epicurean sect tolerated i. 13. Vulgar Epicurism ii. 94. 95  
 Epimenides iii. 165  
 Epistles: Tully's epistles iii. 14. Seneca's epistles 15. 16. 17  
 Epistolary style iii. 12, &c.  
 Epistle dedicatory. See Preface  
 Ergamenes, King, destroys a hierarchy iii. 34  
 Essays i. 128. Essay-writing *ib.* See Miscellaneous  
 Euphranor, painter i. 112  
 Euripides i. 192, 3, &c. iii. 98. 166. 218  
 Executioner. See Magistrate  
 Excellency. See Titles  
 Exemplars, in the writing-art i. 151, 2, 62  
 Exercises i. 150. See Academy  
 Eyes, fitted to certain lights i. 47. Eye in painting 105, 84, 5. Eye in painting lost, how 269. Distemper in the eye 254. Harmony to the eye iii. 3. Eye debauched 4

## F

- F**ables used by wise men and moralists i. 48. iii. 143. See Mythology, Parable. Fable of the man and lion ii. 140. of the travelling dogs iii. 144. Truth of fable. See Truth  
 Fact: Matter of fact, how judged by zealots i. 34. 35. 42. 115, 16.

# I N D E X.

- Matter of fact, in the language of the superstitious 33. 34.  
 Matters of fact, unably though sincerely related, prove the worst  
 sort of deceit 236, 7. See Truth
- Faction, spirit of i. 88
- Fair, Bart'lemy i. 20
- Fair, beautiful i. 108. See Beauty, Decorum, Numbers. Fair,  
 species of 108
- Fairies i. 3. 4
- Faith, (religious), ancient, modern i. 3. 4. Implicit faith i. 73.  
 iii. 160. Definition iii. 51. Extension of faith i. 3. 4. 5. Act  
 of faith *ib.* Faith on any terms 27. Heroic faith iii. 232. Re-  
 ligious faith, dependent on what i. 30. Historical faith iii. 50.  
 Personal 51. Faith national, hereditary, entailed by law i. 270.  
 283. iii. 72. Faith in travellers, romancers, legends i. 269, 70,  
 &c. Rule of faith iii. 222, 3, 4, &c. See Belief. Rule of faith,  
 treatise of Abp Tillotson, cited iii. 229, &c. Chinese or Indian  
 faith i. 270. Historical, critical faith iii. 15. Confession of faith,  
 the author's 219. Gradual decay of the evidence relating to the  
 matters of our faith 165, &c.
- Fanatics, ancient i. 36. 37, &c. Compared with modern *ib.* Fa-  
 natic errant ii. 248. See Lymphatics. Fanatics in all churches  
 and religions i. 38. 39. iii. 26. 27. Fanaticism, its true character  
 ii. 247, 8. Fanatic sense and judgment of scripture iii. 164. Po-  
 pish fanaticism 65. 165, 6
- Fancies apostrophised i. 148. Sophisters, impostors *ib.* Govern-  
 ment of fancy i. 241, 2, &c. ii. 172. Fancy, her assault, com-  
 bat, fortress i. 244, &c. 251, &c. Fancies, sollicitresses, in-  
 chantresses 245. Reprimanded, questioned, examined, dismiss-  
 ed 254, &c. Disagreement with fancy makes the man himself;  
 agreement, not himself 254, &c. Lady Fancy crossed by a what  
 next 255. Fancies in a tribe 251, 6. Florid fancy iii. 123.  
 Power of fancy in religion 47. See Humour
- Farce i. 116, 17. iii. 4. 5. 6. See Atellan, Fescennin, Parody
- Fasces i. 12. See Magistrate
- Fashion. See Custom, Modes
- Father of a country i. 28. 252
- Fathers of the church disputing and disputed iii. 227, 8. Industrious  
 in suppressing all scripture or arguments of their adversaries which  
 made against them 223, 4, &c. 230, &c. Burning method of  
 Roman and Greek fathers, bishops, &c. 165, 6
- Favourites i. 151. ii. 103. See Court
- Fear, passion of i. 230. ii. 39. 40, &c. Description by Des Cartes  
 i. 230. Its root and cure 231, &c. Fear of death ii. 105, &c.  
 How improved or abated i. 247, 8. iii. 136, 7. 141, 2. Fear and  
 hope in religion ii. 39. See Future state, Rewards and punish-  
 ments
- Ferments. See Humours
- Fescennin, plays i. 197
- Fiction. See Fable

Figure,



# I N D E X.

- Figure, principal in a picture, to govern the rest iii. 261, 2  
 Flattery in devotion i. 26. See Devotion, Sycophant  
 Fly ii. 11. See Spider  
 Fools, the greatest, who ii. 172  
 Football i. 147. iii. 10. 11  
 Force and arbitrary power destructive of all arts i. 172, 3, 87, 8, &c.  
 Form, outward, in a figure, to give place where the inward is described iii. 257  
 Formality i. 8. 9. 56. 57  
 Formalists i. 9. 137. 262. iii. 68. The author himself a formalist iii. 94  
 Foreignness, treatment of them by different nations iii. 106, 7. See Hospitality  
 Free thought. See Thought  
 Freethinker. See Thought  
 Free writer ii. 2  
 Free states i. 187, &c.  
 Freedom of wit i. 53. See Debate, Discourse, Wit. Consequence of a restraint 54  
 French authors i. 262. Theatre iii. 4. 5. French critics. See Bosfu, Critics  
 Friend, knowable, unknowable i. 223. Friend of mankind ii. 184  
 Friendship, real good ii. 178, &c. Comprehends society and mankind 178, 9, &c. Friendship, how prevalent and diffusive 81.  
 Friendship, Christian, Heathen i. 76. 77. See Charity, Disinterestedness, Hospitality. Friendship its own reward 77  
 Fucus, mask or vizard of superstition i. 65  
 Fungus iii. 102  
 Future state i. 13. 75. 76. 77. 78. ii. 176. iii. 219. See Rewards and punishments

## G

- Gallant i. 151  
 Gallantry, original and progress i. 213, 14, 15. 259. ii. 144, 5. iii. 176. Devout gallantry i. 15. 283. Gallantry and heroic power of faith iii. 232. Merit in the gallant world i. 259. See Chivalry, Ladies, Novel  
 Gallows i. 98. iii. 123. See Jail  
 Gardens iii. 117. See Palace  
 Gellius, Aulus, cited iii. 162  
 Generation, natural instinct in the case ii. 309  
 Genius, or guardian-angel i. 133. Genius of the world ii. 183. 213. 221, 57, 60, 65, &c. See Deity  
 Genius, not sufficient to form a writer or poet i. 152. iii. 179. English author would be all genius i. 183. iii. 179. Fashionable affectation of a genius, without correctness, in our English writers i. 206, 7. iii. 179, 80. See English poets  
 Gentleman: Character of a gentleman i. 104, 5. iii. 109, &c. See Breeding. Amusements of gentlemen more improving than the profound

# I N D E X.

- profound researches of pedants i. 262. iii. 117. Fine gentleman, owing to masters i. 150  
 Gibbet i. 97. See Gallows, Jail, Hell  
 Gibbets and rods succeed to charity and love, when iii. 80  
 Giddiness in life i. 261, 2  
 Gladiators, barbarity of gladiatorian spectacles i. 212. iii. 177, 8  
 Gladiatorian pennen iii. 8  
 Glafs. See Looking-glafs  
 Glasier iii. 10. 11  
 Glory, a sting for glory's sake, how far divine i. 29  
 Gnostics, ancient heretics iii. 52  
 God : God and goodness the same i. 25, &c. 30, &c. Nothing in God but what is godlike *ib.* Question concerning his being, what issue 30, 1. See Attributes, Deity, Praise. God, what ii. 4. 5. What idea given of God in certain religions 6. 7. Ill character of a God, its consequences in respect to morality 33. 34. 35. 36. How God can be said to witness for himself to men 250, 1. Belief of a God, considered as powerful 39. as worthy and good 40  
 Gondibert iii. 238  
 Good, how predominant in nature ii. 161, 2. What is truly good 168, 9. Good of the whole i. 30. 31. Private good, what 160. See Interest, Pleasure. Good, what, where found 241, 2, &c. Good and happiness ii. 169, 70. iii. 136, 7, 8, 9. Opinion of good *ib.*  
 Goods of fortune, and goods of the mind, compared ii. 325, 6, &c.  
 Goodness, divine i. 17. Opinion of goodness creates trust i. 72. ii. 251. iii. 80. Goodness, what, in a sensible creature ii. 13  
 Gorgias Leontinus i. 56  
 Goth i. 66. 68. Gothic influence in philosophy and religion, as well as arts 274. Gothic government iii. 105. Gothic notion i. 66. Gothic poetry 170, 1. Gothic architecture 185. Gothic conqueror, conquered by spiritual arms iii. 63  
 Gothicism. See Barbarians, Barbarism  
 Government absolute. See Absolute. Free government or constitution i. 170. Definition iii. 217. Origin or rise of civil government, ridiculous account of it i. 84. See State of nature. Natural account 85. 86. 185, 6, 7, &c. Civil government conforming and subordinate 85. 186. Defied, insulted, imbroiled i. 284. iii. 62. 63  
 Grace. See Decorum. The naturally graceful i. 105. See Beauty, Numbers. Grace and action in human bodies 149. Grace. See Titles  
 Grammatical rules necessarily applicable to scripture, of whatever kind iii. 158, 9  
 Grandees. See Ministers  
 Grapes not from thorns i. 224  
 Gratitude ii. 49. 50  
 Gratuity i. 179, 80. See Reward  
 Gravity, tried, proved i. 7. 8. True and false 8. Of the essence of

# I N D E X.

- of imposture 8. 9. Convenient gravity of this sort iii. 232. *See* Formality, Grimace, Solemnity
- Great men. *See* Ministers. The great, (great people), their influence on wit, and in the literate world i. 5. 165, &c. Their character ii. 102, 3
- Greece, fountain of arts, science, and politeness i. 172. iii. 96. 97. Early writers of Greece formed the public taste i. 207, 8. Grecian religion iii. 87. 88. 89. 90. Manners 106, 7. *See* Athenians
- Greek language, original beauty and refinement iii. 97, &c.
- Gregorius the Great iii. 165, 6
- Grimace, religious and zealot kind i. 50. 51. 56. 116, 17. *See* Gravity. Grimace, from constraint and persecution 64
- Grotesque figures i. 116, 17
- Guardian, honest, when i. 97. 98

## H

- H**alf-jesters i. 62
- Half-knave, thorough fool i. 101, 2, 3
- Half-thinkers iii. 208, 9. *See* Thought
- Harmony, such by nature, not by fashion or will i. 276. Natural harmony, now advanced 187. Harmony, rules of 109. *See* Music
- Haunt. *See* Spectre
- Heart, unsound, hollow i. 33. A heart in lovers language 106. Descend on the territories of the heart 278. Heart merely human 280. Heart after the pattern of God almighty *ib.* Numbers of the heart iii. 23. Wisdom of i. 217. *See* Beauty, Character. Heart makes the philosopher iii. 112
- Heathen charity. *See* Charity
- Heathen church. *See* Church
- Hell iii. 123. *See* Devil, Gallows, Jail
- Heraldry i. 283
- Herald of fame i. 176
- Hercules ii. 140. Judgment of Hercules, the subject of it iii. 244, 5. The principal figure in the piece 250. His different appearance in the several parts of the dispute 245, 6, 50, 1. Herculean law i. 210
- Hereafter, a question with a sceptic ii. 176. *See* Future state
- Heretic by birth iii. 72. Good-humoured man properly no heretic 73
- Hermit, never by himself i. 138
- Hero: Philosophic hero i. 153, 6. Hero of the black tribe 273
- Heroic prince, a character and story i. 139. Heroic virtue. *See* Virtue. Heroic sign-post i. 177
- Heroism and philanthropy i. 87. Heroism in faith. *See* Faith, Volunteer
- Herodotus iii. 171. Cited 29
- Hierarchy i. 66. iii. 33. *See* Magi, Priest. Its power in Persia, Ethiopia, Egypt iii. 33. Its growth over the civil magistrate 33-34. Acquisition of lands and consequent dominion *ib.* Certain

# I N D E X.

- Law, permission, or indulgence, necessarily producing this effect, and fatal to the civil magistrate 30. 31. 54. 55. Establishment of the hierarchy over the monarchy, or state in the Egyptian, Ethiopian, Babylonian empires 33. 34. Parallel effect in the Roman 54. 55. 60, &c. Roman Christian and Catholic hierarchy, its growth under the universal Roman monarchy 63. and afterwards over the barbarous nations 63. 64. Its prevalency, policy, comprehensiveness, majesty, and grandeur 64. 65. Affected pretenders, imitators, and copists after these originals 74
- History compared with poetry i. 113
- History of critics i. 189, 90
- Historian i. 95. 149. Disinterested 176, 7. See Poet
- Historical truth. See Truth
- Hobbes i. 68, &c. 72
- Homer ii. 153, 65. His character i. 164. iii. 22. Cited iii. 107. Characters of his works i. 154, 5. iii. 22. 107. Father and prince of poets iii. 22. i. 191. Age when he rose i. 191. Revolution made by him *ib.*
- Homeral characters or personages i. 155, 6, 63. iii. 180, 1, 2. Homer understood how to lie in perfection i. 271. iii. 180, 1, 2
- Honest in the dark i. 97
- Honesty, its value i. 94. Honesty and harmony reside together 164. See Integrity, Virtue. Honesty the best policy i. 103. iii. 142
- Honours. See Titles. Point of honour ii. 145. Auctions or sales of honour iii. 118, 45
- Hope and fear in religion ii. 39. 41, &c. See Future state, Reward and punishment
- Horace cited, *passim*.—Passages of Horace explained i. 39. (*viz.* sat. 5. vers. 97.), iii. 140, 1. (*viz.* epist. 6. lib. 1. bis.), 172, 3. (*viz.* epist. 20. sat. 1. lib. 2. &c. also his epistle to Augustus, lib. 2.), i. 212. Horace best genius and most gentleman-like of Roman poets i. 257. His history, character iii. 141, 72, 3. ii. 167
- Horse, hound, hawk, &c. See Beast. Hobby-horse i. 171. Horseman and horsemanship 152
- Hospitality, what kind of virtue ii. 124. Ancient, Heathen iii. 100. 101. See Charity, Friendship. Inhospitable disposition or hatred of foreigners, what sign 107. Inhospitality, English 106, 7.
- Hot-cockles iii. 203
- Hound, horse. See Beast
- Humility, what virtue, in religion and love i. 259
- Humour, good-humour best security against enthusiasm i. 16. 42. Force of humour in religion iii. 67, 8, 9. 75, &c. Ill-humour, cause of Atheism i. 16. 17. Good-humour and imposture, enemies 24. 25. Good humour proof of religion 24. of wit 56. A natural lenitive against vice 99. Specific against superstition and enthusiasm 99. 42. Humour and fancy, ill rule of taste i. 265, 6, &c. iii. 114, 15, 16, &c. Ill rule of good and ill *ib.* & 138, 9
- Humours, as in the body, so in the mind i. 9. 10
- Hydrophobia i. 38

Hylomania

# I N D E X.

- Hylomania iii. 45. 46  
 Hypocrites i. 63  
 Hypothesis. *See* System. Fantastic hypothesis ii. 142. iii. 114.  
 Hypotheses, systems, destroyed, blown up i. 67. 68. Religious  
 hypotheses multiplied iii. 32. 33

## I

- J**ail i. 97. iii. 123. *See* Gallows  
 Janus face of zealot-writers i. 50  
 Ideas, simple, complex, adequate, &c. i. 225, 6, 7, 35, 6, 7. *See*  
 Metaphysics. Comparison of mere ideas and articulate sounds,  
 equally important 225, 6. Examination of our ideas not pedan-  
 tic, when 244, 5. True and useful comparison, proof, and  
 ascertainment of ideas 235, 6, &c. Ideas innate i. 38. 276, 7.  
 ii. 30, &c. 301. iii. 25. 148, 9, 50, &c. Not innate, of what  
 kind iii. 115. Ideas of the world, pleasure, riches, &c. what i.  
 236. *See* Fancy, Opinion  
 Ideal world iii. 147  
 Identity ii. 262, 3, 4, 5. iii. 133, &c.  
 Idol-notions, idolaters i. 46. 279  
 Jephthah iii. 86  
 Jest, true, false i. 57. 62. 99. 100. *See* Ridicule  
 Jews, a cloudy people i. 22. 221. iii. 38. 39, &c. 80. 81. Sullen,  
 bitter, persecuting *ib.* Their character by God himself iii. 38.  
 Jewish understanding i. 222, 3. Disposition towards the darker  
 superstitions iii. 86. Jews, a chosen people i. 279. iii. 254. Left  
 to philosophy for instruction in virtue i. 78  
 Jewish people, originally dependent on the Egyptians iii. 36—41.  
 Their rites, ceremonies, learning, science, manners, how far  
 derived thence *ib.* How tenacious and bigotted in this respect *ib.*  
 Spirit of persecution and religious massacre, propagated from  
 hence *ib.* & 41. 42. 43. 56. 57. 60. 61, &c. *See* Persecution.  
 Jewish princes 80. 81. 86. 87  
 Ill, whether really existent in the universe ii. 3. 4. Absolute ill,  
 what 12. Relative ill 12. 13. The appearances of ill no argu-  
 ment against the existence of a perfect sovereign mind 272, 3.  
 No real ill in things 273. Appearance of ill necessary 216, 17  
 Imitation poetical i. 152. *See* Poet. Works of imitation, how  
 to be regulated iii. 272, 3  
 Imperium in imperio i. 88  
 Impostors speak the best of human nature i. 72. *See* Goodness  
 Imposture arraigned i. 6. Hid under formality 56. Essence of im-  
 posture 7. Imposture fears not a grave enemy 24. Strangely  
 mixed with sincerity, hypocrisy, zeal, and bigotry ii. 243, 4  
 Inchanter i. 273. *See* Conjuror, Magi, Priest  
 Indian music and painting i. 190. 266. Indian princes late ambaf-  
 sadors iii. 236  
 Indolence i. 242, 3, 9, 50. Its dangerous consequences ii. 118, 19  
 Informers i. 98

Ingratitude,

# I N D E X.

- Ingratitude, a negative vice ii. 125
- Inhumanity not compatible with good-breeding ii. 122, 3. Unnatural *ib.*
- Inquiry concerning virtue, Deity, &c. See vol. 2. treatise 1. and l. 232. Occasion of this treatise ii. 1. 2. 3. Its defence 196. to 210. Inquiry, freedom of i. 25
- Inquisition i. 15. 146. iii. 72
- Inquisitors i. 49. 50. Self-inquisitor 146
- Inspiration i. 4. 34. See Poets. Prophets. Inspiration a divine enthusiasm 41. Atheistical inspiration iii. 45. True and false, alike in their outward symptoms i. 41. Inspiration credited, how iii. 27. 28. Judgment of the inspired concerning their own inspiration 44. 51. 52. 170. See Poets, Sibyls
- Instinct from nature ii. 309, 10. See Ideas
- Intelligent being, what contributes most to his happiness ii. 74. 75
- Interest governs the world, a false maxim i. 89. 90. Self-interest ii. 58. Rightly and wrong taken i. 220, 21. iii. 209, 10. Unwisely committed to the care of others iii. 111. How formed i. 232. Varied, steered *ib.* True interest either wholly with honesty or villany 101, 2. 135, 6. Judgment of true interest i. 241. iii. 139. Disinterestedness real, if virtue and goodness be such i. 75. 76
- Job i. 25. 26. 96
- Jonah, prophet iii. 82. 83. 84
- Joseph, patriarch, education, character iii. 40
- Joshua i. 279, 80
- Jove ii. 33. 34. 151
- Journalists: Journal des savans de Paris iii. 12. Histoire des ouvrages des savans 13. Nouvelles de la republique des lettres *ib.* Bibliotheque choisie 13. 14. See Bibliotheque choisie
- Irony i. 55. See Banter, Raillery
- Isis iii. 33
- Isocrates iii. 194
- Italians, buffoons i. 55. 100. Italian wit and authors 262, 70, 1. Italian taste, the best in painting, music, &c. 265, 6
- Judgment, preliminary right i. 8. Previous judgment 42
- Julian, emperor i. 19. iii. 60. 61. 62. 63. His letter to the Bosphrenians iii. 61
- Jupiter. See Jove
- Just and unjust acknowledged ii. 315
- Justin, historian iii. 38. 40
- Juvenal explained i. 79, &c. Cited l. 53. 82. 98. 199. iii. 16. 29. 35. 124. 190

## K

- K**ind (species), union with a kind ii. 57. Opposed by self-interest<sup>58</sup>
- Kings. See Court, Great, Monarchy, Princes
- Knave, natural and civil i. 84. By what principle different from the

# I N D E X.

the saint, or how distinguished from the honest man 97. 98. 99. 136, 7. Knave incapable of enjoyment 101. Betrays himself, however able iii. 212. Knaves in principle, in practice i. 72. Knave, no quarrel with religion *ib.* Half-knave, thorough fool i. 101, 2, 36. ii. 130. Zealot-knave i. 102, 3. *See* Zeal. Court-knaves iii. 117, &c. Knaves, friends to moderation, in what sense i. 88. Knave, young, middle-aged, old iii. 124  
 Knavery, mere dissonance and disproportion i. 164. *See* Dishonesty  
 Knavish indulgence, the consequences i. 93. 94. 101, 2. 136. 243. iii. 210, 11. Knavish religion iii. 87. *See* Religion  
 Knight-errantry i. 14. *See* Chivalry, Gallantry  
 Knights-templar, growing to be an over-match for the magistrate i. 66. Extirpated *ib.* *See* Hierarchy, Magophony  
 Knowledge, first principle, previous i. 31. 32, &c. 42. 211, 61, 2. Knowledge of men and things, true philosophy, how learned i. 94. 95

## L

**L**adies, fainted, worshipped, deified i. 214, 59, 60. ii. 145, 6. *See* Chivalry, Gallantry. English ladies seduced by tales and impostures i. 272, 3. Type or prophecy of this in our ancient stage-poet 272. *See* Sex, Superstition, Women  
 Lampoons i. 208  
 Lands. *See* Agrarian, Property. Religious land-bank iii. 30, 31, &c.  
 Latitude of thought iii. 207, 8, &c.  
 Latitudinarians iii. 207  
 Laugh, half-way i. 62. Both ways 100. Laugh wrong turned iii. 206. *See* Ridicule. Men not to be laughed out of their wits i. 74. Men laughed out of and into religion iii. 202, 3. Difference in seeking what to laugh at, and what deserves laughter i. 99.  
 Laugh, mutual, and in turn 116  
 Laws, royal counsellors in our English constitution i. 167. Guardian-laws 172. Religion by law established i. 283. iii. 49. 72. 160. 219, 35, 6. *See* Mysteries, Revelation, Rites. Heraldry by law established i. 284. Herculean law 210  
 Laziness i. 243. *See* Indolence  
 Learning, passion for learning or science ranked with natural affection ii. 77. 78  
 Legitimate work or piece, in writing i. 263. iii. 1. 18  
 Leon, St iii. 64  
 Letters. *See* Epistles  
 Leviathan hypothesis i. 68. *See* Hobbes, Wolf  
 Liberal arts. *See* Arts. Liberal education ii. 47. Liberal and illiberal service 40. 47  
 Liberty of criticism iii. 185. 219, 20. *See* Critics. Liberty civil, philosophical, or moral, personated ii. 188, 9. Abuse of the notion of liberty in morals and government iii. 213.—215, &c. Liberty of the will i. 140, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, &c. Liberty or free disposition

# I N D E X.

- position to follow the first motion of the will, is the greatest slavery i. 166. ii. 172. Liberty philosophical, moral ii. 188, &c. 325, &c. iii. 140, 2. 213, 14, 15, &c. Protestant liberty. See Protestant. Liberty. See British, Constitution, English, Government. Its patrons, well-wishers i. 4. 5. Consequence of its rise and fall 171, 2, 3, 4. Liberty in conversation 57. Falsely censured 6. 7. See Freedom, Wit. Prejudice against liberty 69. Arts, sciences, and virtues, its dependents 48. 49. 55. 74. 172. 173, 4. See Arts, Sciences, Virtue
- Lies, judiciously composed, teach truth in the best manner i. 271. Homer perfect in this science *ib.* & iii. 181, &c.
- Life, its value i. 94. 96. 237. Living well, or good living, false sense of the phrase 96. Living fast, false application of the phrase i. 247. ii. 94. 95. Life sometimes a misery ii. 105. Over-love of life, contrary to the interest of a creature 105, 6, 7. Future life, the belief, of what advantage 42.—46
- Lineage of philosophy and poetry i. 187, 8, 99, &c. iii. 95. 96. 97, &c.
- Livy, the historian i. 36. 37
- Logic of modern schools i. 224, 5, 61, 2, 3. 274
- Looking-glass, vocal i. 135. Magical pocket looking-glass 154. Looking-glass to the age 157, 60, 1. False looking-glasses iii. 205, 6
- Love. See Charity. Love of friends ii. 178. Love of mankind 180. Love of one's country iii. 100.—105, &c. Love of order and perfection ii. 158. Love imperfect and narrow, generous and equal iii. 100, 1, 2, 3, &c. See Affection. Public love i. 28. See Public. Love, highest, noblest ii. 157, 8, &c. Divine love 182, 3. See Enthusiasm. Love, dangerous sophister i. 144, 5. Passion of love in the sexes 139, &c. Subject the most affecting, in the passion of love between the sexes ii. 78. 79. Flattery of love i. 107, 8. Religious love between the sexes iii. 26. Love cruelly treated by Epicurus 21. 22. Self-love ii. 41. Its effects in religion 42. 43. Silly reasoning about self-love by pretended wits i. 69. 91. 92. 93. See Self. Religion and love 259, 60. Gallant love, and religious charity of a certain kind, compared iii. 80
- Lover, martyr. See Martyr. Lover solitary i. 138. Story of a heroic lover 139, &c. Lovers pursuit and enjoyment, of what kind 241, 2. See Enjoyment
- Luke, St, cited, commented iii. 170
- Lucretius i. 40. 91. iii. 22
- Luxury i. 243, 6, 50, 1, 2. ii. 110, 11, &c. iii. 138, 9. 211, 12
- Lycurgus iii. 171
- Lymphatics i. 38. 39. See Enthusiasm, Fanatics
- Lysias, orator iii. 194

## M

- M**achine, in epic and dramatic i. 281. World a machine ii. 253  
Madman, real, how i. 252.—255, &c.

Mæccenas



# I N D E X.

- Mæcenas** i. 173. 212. iii. 15. 172, 3  
**Magi of Persia, &c.** i. 65. Their power iii. 33. See *Hierarchy*  
**Magicians.** See *Magi*  
**Magic, moral** i. 106. **Magic of enthusiasm** iii. 19  
**Magistrate, his duty and becoming part in religion** i. 6. 12. 14. ii. 195. iii. 72, 73, &c. Executioner to the priest, when i. 50. iii. 76. 77. A dresser i. 64. Dressed in his own turn *ib.* See *Government, Hierarchy.* Civil magistrate insulted i. 284. iii. 62. 63. Controlled iii. 30. Overawed 32. Deposed, sentenced 33. 34.  
**Magnificence, true and false** i. 108, 9  
**Magophony, Persian** i. 66, &c. **Ethiopian** iii. 34. **European and Christian** i. 65. 66  
**Mahometism** iii. 72. **Mahometan clergy** 162, 3  
**Malice, only where interests are opposed** i. 30. None in the general mind, nor in mere nature *ib.*  
**Malignity, passion unnatural** ii. 123  
**Man, a good, an ill** ii. 12. 13. Formidable, in what sense 69. Subject to nature ii. 226. Why no wings 226, 7. Man's excellency different from that of a brute 228, 9. Why man has not the same instincts which are in brutes 230, 1. Whether sociable by nature 233, 4, 5. Whether a man can be accounted a wolf to a man 240. Absurdity of that saying *ib.* Man's dignity and interest 319. Different manners of men 322, 3, 4.  
**Mankind, how corrupt** ii. 147, 8  
**Manners, poetic, and truth** iii. 180.—183. See *Poet, Truth*  
**Marshami chronicus canon** iii. 37. 38. 86. 87  
**Martyrdom** i. 20, &c. iii. 86  
**Martyrs for Atheism** i. 69. 70. iii. 44. Pro and con, for any opinion iii. 28. Amorous, heroic, religious martyrs ii. 78. iii. 23  
**Mask.** See *Carnival*  
**Mas** i. 19  
**Massacre.** See *Magophony*  
**Masters in exercises and philosophy** i. 150. **Masters in mechanics.** See *Mechanics.* Young masters of the world i. 81. 166  
**Mathematical demonstration in morals.** See *Morals*  
**Mathematics** i. 14. Delightful, whence ii. 77. necessary i. 227. modest *ib.*  
**Matter, whole and parts** ii. 276. Not capable of real simplicity 264. Not constitutive of identity *ib.* Substance material, immaterial 265. Matter and thought, how mutually affecting or productive 221, 2. 276, 7  
**Maximus Tyrius cited** ii. 221. iii. 22  
**Mechanics, masters in** i. 184, 5  
**Mechanic forms, beauties** i. 106, 7. See *Palaces*  
**Mechanism, human** i. 89. 230. **Divine** ii. 253, 4  
**Medea** iii. 218  
**Meditation rural-philosophical** ii. 258. **Meditations published** i. 129. **Meditation imposing, conceited, pedantic** 129, 30. 268, 9. **Meditation in the praise of a Deity** ii. 258, 9. upon the works of Nature

# I N D E X.

- ture 275.—281. upon the elements 282.—285. upon the variety of seasons and climates 287.—294
- Melancholy, a pertinacious and religious complexion iii. 47. Melancholy in religion, love i. 9. Power of melancholy in religion iii. 46. Devout melancholy i. 16. 24. 34. iii. 46. 47. Treatises of melancholy iii. 20. See *Enthusiasm*, *Religion*
- Memoirs i. 128. Memoir-writing 158, 76. 271. See *Miscellany*
- Memory, τὸ ἐπιμνηστικόν i. 112
- Menander i. 193. iii. 165
- Mental enjoyment, whence ii. 74, 5. 87.—94
- Mercenariness i. 98. See *Reward*
- Merit in believing. See *Belief*
- Messias iii. 54. See *Monarchy*
- Metaphor, or metaphoric style or manner i. 190, 1
- Metaphysics i. 227, 35, 36. ii. 266. iii. 134, 5. *Metaphysics*, necessary knowledge of nothing knowable or known iii. 146
- Metaphysicians, their character i. 227, 8
- Metaphysical articles of belief i. 240
- Milo ii. 228
- Milton i. 217, 80
- Mimes i. 152. iii. 198. See *Imitation*, *Mimicry*
- Mimicry i. 154. *Mimographer* *ib.*
- Mind, free i. 101. A kingdom iii. 142. Beauty of the mind i. 107. Value of a mind ii. 330. iii. 117, 18, 42. Its inward proportion ii. 60, 1. Mind, particular minds prove an universal one ii. 266, 7. Universal mind, how proved 218
- Minister of state i. 28. 151. Ministers of state concerned for their character and memory 177. Conduct necessary to preserve them 178, 9, &c. Claim of the people over them *ib.* Dangerous conceit of ministers and great men 180. Ministers Mæcenas's 169. Good minister, how to be valued and judged 17. 18
- Ministry, good, in England iii. 103, 4. The new, the old 145. Ill and slavish ministry, of what consequence 104, 5
- Miracles, scriptural, traditional i. 3. Modern i. 34. iii. 49. Christian, Moorish, Pagan i. 270, &c. Past, present ii. 249. The danger of believing new miracles 246, 7. Whether miracles can witness for God or men 248, 9. Mere miracles insufficient proof of divinity or revelation ii. 250, 1. iii. 79. 80. Merry miracle iii. 85
- Mirror. See *Looking-glass*
- Misanthropy, what kind of passion ii. 123. Sometimes, in a manner, national ii. 124. iii. 106, 7
- Miscellanarian authors, their policy and art iii. 200. *Miscellanies* 1. 2. 3, &c. *Miscellaneous* memoir, essay-writing, style, and manner *ib.* & 66. 67. 157. See *Essay*, *Memoir*. *Miscellaneous* collections, annual iii. 190
- Modes of religion i. 64
- Models, current, of religion i. 64. Models for poetry and writing 162. See *Exemplar*

Moderation

# I N D E X.

**Moderation** philosophical iii. 25. When in fashion with the zealots of every party 77. 78. Moderation disclaimed 238. Moderation in a writer i. 209

**Monarch**, grand, now, and of old in Greece i. 175

**Monarchy.** See Hierarchy. Monarchy universal i. 170, 3, 4. iii. 16. See Barbarians, Tyranny. Absolute monarchy destructive of arts, manhood, reason, sense i. 172, 3, 4. 186, 7, &c. iii. 15. 16. 54. World groaning under the Roman monarchy iii. 54. 55. Hopes of a divine deliverer or Messias from hence 54. See Emperor, Roman

**Monarchs** ii. 102, 3

**Monosyllables** in files or strings iii. 184. Clash or clattering re-  
counter of them in our language *ib.*

**Monstrous imaginations** i. 46. Monstrous objects and taste i. 269. 272, &c. iii. 109, 10

**Moon**, ambassadors from it iii. 236. Moon and planets ii. 280, &c. Traveller from the moon 148

**Moorish hero** i. 272

**Moor of Venice**, play i. 272, &c.

**Morals**, rule and distinction of revelation i. 233. Difference about morals 53. 54. Morals interwove with political religious institutions 67. Brought into disgrace 69. See Charity. New forgers of morals 103. Moral magic 106. Morals and government, how related 82, 3, 4. Morals essential to poetical performance 218. See Manners, Poetic truth. Morals mathematically demonstrated ii. 129, &c. iii. 135, &c. 148, &c. See Philosophy

**Moral sense**, rise of it ii. 18. 19. 37, &c. Foundation in nature 310, 11, &c. Whether it can be perfectly lost in any rational creature 28. 29. Impaired by opposite affection 30. Not by opinion merely 31. Corruption of moral sense 32. Causes of this corruption 32.—36. Rise of moral sense, antecedent to the belief of a God 38. Moral inquiries, why out of fashion 138. Moral excellence i. 29. Moral Venus and graces 263, 4. Moral species. See Species. Moral, the word, in painting, signifies the representation of the passions iii. 265

*The Moralists*, viz. treatise 5. p. 135, &c. criticised iii. 198. Moralists, the fashionable sort i. 64. 96. See Philosophy, Virtue

**More**, Dr iii. 45. 46. 47

**Moroseness** i. 17

**Moses** i. 280, 1. Character and life iii. 36. 37. 38. 39. 81. 170

**Mountebanks**, modern Prometheus's ii. 153. Mountebanks. See Empirics

**Mummius** i. 214

**Muse** i. 1. 4. 5. Divine, orthodox 281. Muses what, in the Hea-  
then creed 4. 5. British muses 170.—174. In their cradle 170. 206, 7. Lipping speech 170. Hobby-horse and rattle 171. Mu-  
ses, tutorelles 173. Favourites 1. 176. Chief recorders *ib.* Mu-  
ses degraded by Epicurus iii. 22. Muses personating the passions,  
Vol. III. D d virtues,

# I N D E X.

- virtues, and vices i. 245.—249, &c. Profane mistresses in re-  
 spect of sacred letters 280  
 Music barbarian i. 190. Just, real, independent on caprice or will  
 276. See Harmony  
 Musician ashamed of praise from the unskilful i. 32. Delighted with  
 examination and criticism 184, 5. Musician-legislators 186, 7  
 Mystery makes any opinion become considerable i. 70. Gives rise  
 to party-feels *ib.* Mysteries by law established 281, 2. Reli-  
 gious mysteries 282. Mysteries debated iii. 7. 8. Sacred myste-  
 ries inviolable with our author, and, as such, unnamed by him  
 49. 219. Mysteries the most absurd, how introduced into the  
 church 232, 3  
 Mystical love ii. 157, 81  
 Mystics ii. 157, 81. Consequences of their indifferet zeal 202, 3.  
 Mystics i. 138. See Quietists  
 Mythology i. 281. Mythological or fabulous style of our blessed  
 Saviour iii. 85

## N

- N**astiness. See Cleanliness  
 National church i. 12. See Church. National opinion 6  
 Natural affection, confessed i. 71. See Affection. The natural and  
 unnatural in things iii. 148, 9, 50. Natural ideas. See Ideas, In-  
 stinct  
 Nature, its energy ii. 270. Nature in man 225. In brutes *ib.*  
 Its admirable distribution 230, 1. State of nature, imaginary,  
 fantastical i. 84. 85. ii. 233.—241. See Society. Nature, Di-  
 vinity with Epicurus iii. 44. 45. See Epicurus. Power of na-  
 ture in moral actions and behaviour i. 70. ii. 96. *Naturam ex-  
 pellas furca* iii. 150. Nature will not be mocked i. 277. Has a  
 strong party within ourselves *ib.* Makes reprisals on her antago-  
 nists *ib.* Prerogative of nature *ib.*  
 Nero i. 18. 81. iii. 16  
 Nobility: Polish-English iii. 105. Young noblemen i. 79. 80. 81.  
 82. Young noblemen, English iii. 118, 19, 20, 22. 150, 1  
 Nose, (discernment or sense), in morals, life, &c. i. 97. See Sense,  
 Taste. Noses counted 115  
 Novels, sweet natural pieces, highly in vogue ii. 145. iii. 176, 7.  
 See Chivalry, Gallantry  
 Numbers and proportion i. 108. 263. Numbers of life 110. See  
 Beauty, Proportion  
 Nympholepti i. 38. See Fanatics

## O

- O**ccotthy of the animal races ii. 67. 68. 69. 97. 98, &c. 225 to  
 228, &c. 238.—241. iii. 153, 4, 5, &c. See Society  
 Olympics, ancient, modern i. 211. Olympic games, and congress  
 of Greece iii. 96  
 Omnipotence, what i. 30. 31. ii. 4. 5. 41. 50. 51, &c. 151, 2.  
 270, 1, 2, 3. What not i. 82, 83. ii. 7

Opinion.

# I N D E X.

- Opinion.** See *Doctrine, Hypothesis.* National, or by inheritance i. 6. iii. 72. Governor, and governed i. 146. Ground of passion 230, 1, &c. Principle of conduct 241, 2. Opinion all in all ii. 327, &c. iii. 130, 6, 7, 8, &c. Freedom in examining our own opinions, as well as the opinions of others i. 45. 46. Corrupt opinion cause of wrong ii. 21. 22. Opinion and fashion supposed measure of virtue and vice i. 61. 62. 275, 6. ii. 313, 14. Life regulated by opinion 327, 8, 9
- Oracle** i. 98. Divine oracles guardianship 281. Heathen and Christian oracles ii. 248, 9. iii. 161.—167, &c.
- Oration.** See *Declamation, Preaching, Rhetoric*
- Orator** i. 127. Orators 210
- Order,** principle of, universal ii. 271, 2. Love of order 158. Study and contemplation of it, a natural joy, inclination, and affection in man 77. 78. Order and Providence 206, 7. Order in writing. See *Style*
- Ornament** independent, to be cautiously employed in the action of Hercules iii. 269. The emblematic and historical not to be confounded *ib.* An objection concerning it answered 269, 70. False ornaments to be avoided 273
- Orthodoxy,** casual, fortunate iii. 72, &c. Orthodox muse i. 281. Orthodoxy of the author iii. 48. 49. 219, 20. Orthodox divine, or churchman 7. 8
- Osiris** iii. 33
- Ovid** cited iii. 100

## P

**PAcc.** See *Amble*

Pageant of state i. 160, 1. Court-pageant iii. 129

**Pain** and pleasure mixed ii. 175

**Paint.** See *Fucus*

**Painter** of history, to fix his date iii. 247. Not at liberty to mingle actions of different dates *ib.* Test of his judgment 249, 50. Not to make his action theatrical, but according to nature 257. The same qualifications necessary in him as in a poet 271. Painters, ill, compared with like poets i. 177, 8. Painter put to his shift 161, 2. Painters: Raphael i. 265. iii. 159. Carache i. 265. Painters after the life iii. 204. Face-painters i. 113. Painting and painters 111, 12, 13, &c. Master-painter 155, 62, 78. Battle-painter 159. See *Artists, Statuary*

**Painting,** false taste in i. 265. True taste how gained 265, 6. Dignity, severity, austerity of the art 265, 6, 7. Style in painting ii. 139. Simplicity and unity of style and colouring i. 111, 112. 266, 7. Unity and truth of design, the *εὐνοῦκλον* 111. &c. 277. Greatness 111, 12. Ancient masters 111, 12. 266, 7, 8. False taste and corruption of the art, whence *ib.* Grotesque painting iii. 4. Imposture in painting 159. Pretended heavenly style and divine hand disproved *ib.* Painting of history, the regulation of it 243, 4

**Palaces** and their ornaments i. 108. iii. 121, 29, 30. See *Beauty Palestine,*

# I N D E X.

- Palestine, the country, its superstitions iii. 86. 87. *See Jew, Syria*  
 Pan i. 10. 11. 12. Panic fear *ib.* Panic rage or popular fury *ib.*  
 Religious panic *ib.* & iii. 46. 47. 48. Panic fear for the church  
 iii. 58. 59. 60. Panic zeal *ib.* & 48. i. 33. 34  
 Panegyrics the worst of satires i. 177. Panegyrics English 209, &c.  
 Panegyric games 211. Herculean law, or club-method in pane-  
 gyric 210. Panegyrics modern iii. 190  
 Parables, double meaning to amuse i. 48  
 Paracelsus i. 225  
 Parasites i. 27. *See Sycophants*  
 Paris, judgment of, how distinguished from that of Hercules iii. 252  
 Parody i. 156, 93. *See Comedy*  
 Parterre. *See Palace*  
 Passion, genealogy of the passions i. 89. 90. 231. Study of the pas-  
 sions i. 241, 2. iii. 21. 22. Belle passion i. 3. iii. 21. Heroic  
 passion of the devout i. 14. OEconomy of the passions ii. 67. 68.  
 69, &c. *See OEconomy.* Passion too strong or too weak 67.  
 Human and weak passion deified i. 29. ii. 191. iii. 213. Passion,  
 how the change of it may be expressed in a subject iii. 248, 9  
 Patch-work iii. 3  
 Patent, letters-patent iii. 236  
 Patentees for authorship i. 262. for religion iii. 236  
 Patria: *Non ille, &c.* i. 95. *Dulce et decorum* 79. The word  
 wanting in our language iii. 104  
 Patriot i. 77. 78. Bought and sold iii. 118, &c. Patriots of the  
 soil 105  
 Patrons, modern i. 180. 210, 11, 38  
 Paul, St, his character i. 22. 23. iii. 51. 52. 58, &c. Style iii. 58,  
 &c. & 235. Cited i. 19. 78. 221, 33. iii. 165, 70. St Paul al-  
 lows to the Heathen their own prophets iii. 165, 6. Cites their  
 poets with honour *ib.*  
 Pedagogue i. 55. *See Pedant, Tutor*  
 Pedant baited iii. 9. Pedant and pupil i. 49. 95. Pedant. *See Pe-*  
*dagogue, Scholastic, University, Zealot*  
 Pedantry a millstone i. 51. Pedantry in-conversation 53. Pedantry  
 opposed to true knowledge 95  
 Pencil, sacred, or heaven guided iii. 159. *See Painting*  
 Penmen, gladiatorian iii. 8  
 People, naturally good judges of the poet i. 218  
 Perfection of workmanship i. 260, 3, 4  
 Peripatetic philosophy, genius i. 200, 1. Author *de mundo* ii. 159.  
 160. iii. 183  
 Persecution ii. 24. iii. 80. In Arcadia i. 15. Unknown to the polite  
 Heathen world ii. 124, 5. iii. 107. How begun i. 18. 19. iii. 41.  
 42. 60. 61, &c. *See Ægypt, Jews.* Romish persecution, of any  
 other the most tolerable, and of best grace and countenance iii.  
 65. 66. 72. 74. Persecution of features, airs, complexions, miens  
 i. 64  
 Persian empire and hierarchy iii. 33. *See Hierarchy*

Persius

# I N D E X.

- Persius** i. 128, 34, 5, 49. 246. iii. 110. 217, 18  
**Perspective**, the rules of it reversed in sculpture iii. 266  
**Persuasion**, goddess i. 186, 7, &c. Mother of music, poetry, and other arts *ib.* Sister to liberty *ib.* Men persuade themselves into whatever opinions iii. 215  
**Petronius** cited i. 151  
**Petulance**, wanton mischievousness, unnatural ii. 123  
**Phænomena** in scripture i. 221. Moral phænomena *ib.*  
**Phallica** i. 197. See **Fasces**  
**Phoenix**-nest i. 20  
**Philip** i. 196  
**Philologists** i. 189, 93. ii. 222  
**Philosophers**, savage i. 69. 73. 187, 8, 9. See **Clown**. Moral philosophers of a modern sort, more ignorant and corrupt than the mere vulgar i. 102, 3. 276. iii. 142. Run a tale-gathering i. 274.  
**Philosophers**, their original and rise 189. Posterior in birth to poets, musicians, critics, sophists *ib.* iii. 95. Philosophers themselves critics of a double kind i. 189, &c. Philosophers ancient schools dissolved iii. 55. Philosophers and bear-garden 6. 7. 8  
**Philosophy**, modern i. 94. 95. 96. iii. 214. Ancient i. 13. 94. 95. Home-span 33. 284. Mastery in life and manners iii. 111. Its state and liberty in the ancient world i. 13. Philosophical speculations innocent 74. See **Doctrine**, **Hypothesis**. Philosophy, where confined now-a-days i. 261, 2. ii. 137. Its study incumbent on every man i. 252, 3, &c. ii. 329, &c. Philosophy speculative and practical i. 228, 9, &c. Vain, or solid 233, &c. Guide to virtue in all religions 78. 79. Balance against superstition 13. Philosophy judge of religion 233. of herself, and of every thing besides 234. Majesty of philosophy 234, 5. Philosophy appealed to by all 223. Standard or measure of trust, friendship, or merit, in men 223, 4. Genuine and false fruits 224. Unhappy mixture or conjunction of philosophy with religion iii. 42. 43. 53. Monstrous issue and product of this union 55. 56, &c. Dry philosophy 133. Vocal philosophy i. 225, 6. Ideal philosophy. See **Idea**. Lineage of philosophy and poetry. See **Lineage**. Philosophy of the woods ii. 321  
**Physician** iii. 126. Physicians in the body-politic i. 10  
**Physiologists**. See **Metaphysicians**  
**Piece**, (work, treatise), legitimate, illegitimate i. 263. iii. 1. 2  
**Pilate**, Pontius iii. 167  
**Planets**. See **Moon**. Planetary system ii. 12. 278, 9, &c.  
**Plat**, embossed with satire, fauns, &c. proper to accompany the figure of Pleasure iii. 270  
**Plato** i. 47. iii. 53. 171, 94. Cited i. 41  
**Platonists**, latter sort i. 13  
**Plays**, theatrical, how frequented i. 208. See **Comedy**, **Theatre**, **Tragedy**. Plays, vulgar. See **Foot-ball**, **Hot-cockles**  
**Pleasant sensations** i. 96. 97. 98  
**Pleasure**, whether our good i. 241, 2. ii. 169, 70, 1. iii. 139, 40, &c.

# I N D E X

- All pleasure not to be reckoned as good ii. 171, 2. Enjoyments of reason not really comprehended in the notion of pleasure 173-174. Pleasure no rule of good i. 242, 266. Pleasures of the mind greater than those of the body ii. 73, 74. Sensual pleasure, who the properest judge of it 75, 76. Sensual pleasures dependent on social and natural affection 93, 94, 95. Distasteful, inconsistent, and insupportable without it 96, 97. Unnatural pleasure in general, its effects 124, 5. Pleasure (luxury) 110, 11. *See* Luxury. Understanding in pleasure i. 109. Rule and order in pleasure *ib.* Men of pleasure, forced to acknowledge virtue *ib.* *See* Poets. Pleasure, solicits Hercules in opposition to Virtue iii. 245. Is first heard 246. Her figure to be drawn silent 258. Her posture and ornament 258, 9
- Pliny cited i. 112. iii. 195
- Plum, cant-word among rich knaves i. 101
- Plutarch i. 261. Cited i. 31, 41. iii. 87, 88, 89, 194
- Pneumatophobia iii. 45
- Poem heroic, epic, (*see* Homer), i. 279, &c. iii. 180, &c. Not to be modelled on holy writ i. 279, &c.
- Poet, character of a poet and poetry from Strabo i. 164. Poet, second maker 163. Poet, herald of fame 176. Ill poets worse than ill painters 177. Poets preferable to most philosophers i. 94, 95. iii. 213, 14. More instructive than historians i. 270, 1. Morality of poets i. 106. iii. 214, 15. Poets acknowledge virtue i. 106, 7. Strongest party on virtue's side 248, 9. Poets, enthusiasts i. 1, &c. iii. 45, 46, 160, 1. Friends to revelation i. 1, 10, 4. French poets 171, 2. Modern poets or poetical writers affected, and false in their draughts or imitations i. 160, 1. iii. 201, &c. Conceited, combined iii. 190, &c. Injudicious i. 163. Impotent *ib.* English poets, of a preceding age iii. 191, 2. Of the present 192, &c. Audience forms the poet i. 208. Poet, how far of necessity a philosopher, and true to virtue and morals i. 217, 18. iii. 195, 6. Divine or orthodox poets i. 4, 280, 1. iii. 82, 160.—164, &c. Orthodox mock-poets iii. 166, 7. Poets fanatics i. 39. Poets inspired i. 4, 39. iii. 45, 46, 158, 9, &c. 164, 5. Poet. *See* Author
- Poetess, English ii. 176
- Poetical enthusiasm i. 15. Poetical genius 126. Poetical imitation 151, 2, &c. Poetical truth. *See* Truth. Poetic science 110, 10, 115
- Poetry. *See* Muses. Lineage of poetry and philosophy. *See* Lineage. Sacred wit and poetry iii. 82. Indifferent poetry, detestable 196, 7. Art of poetry, an English poem 195. Poetry epic or dramatic, incompatible with orthodox divinity i. 278, 9, 280
- Point, jingle or pun i. 262
- Points of wit iii. 3, 181, 2
- Point of honour ii. 145. *See* Duel, Gallantry
- Poison to reason i. 70

Policy,



# I . N . D . E . X .

- Policy, British and Dutch, Turkish and French** i. 61  
**Politeness owing to liberty** i. 49. 55. 74. *See Liberty.* Flux and reflux of politeness i. 213, 14.  
**Politicians** i. 148  
**Politics, part of morals** ii. 137  
**Polytheist, definition** ii. 5  
**Pope Clement XI.** iii. 167. *See Gregorius, Leon*  
**Popery.** *See Church, Mass, Rome, Priest*  
**Post-way of writers.** *See Correctness, Writers*  
**Power, balance of** i. 73  
**Praise of the Deity** i. 32, &c. Qualifications for such praise *ib.* Value of praise or glory from the ignorant *ib.* Value of forced praise or applause *ib.* True praise how learned *ib.*  
**Preaching** i. 53. 54. 55. 104, 5, 30, 1. iii. 68. 207, 8. Elegant and gross iii. 78. 79. Fashionable and unfashionable *ib.* Solemn, melancholy i. 104. Variously humoured, alternate, high and low iii. 91. *See Declamation, Pulpit*  
**Preconception** ii. 230, 1. 310. *See Anticipation*  
**Prefaces, dedications, &c.** i. 157, 8, 82. 238. iii. 19. Preface become a word to signify excuse i. 258  
**Prelate** i. 3. *See Bishop*  
**Presentation.** *See Preconception*  
**Press, printing-press** i. 239. *See Printer*  
**Priests, consecrated by the magistrate** i. 283. iii. 235. Their faction, sedition, and engagement of mankind in their quarrels iii. 36. 41. 42. 56. 59. 60. 61. 238, 9. Their love of blood i. 21. Propagation and increase of the priesthood, manner and consequence iii. 30.—34, &c. Model of the Egyptian and Asiatic priesthoods, and difference from the European, or that of Greece or Rome 30.—44. *See Hierarchy*  
**Prince.** *See Absolute.* Story of an heroic prince i. 139, &c.  
**Princes use the plural style, whence** 165, 6, 7. Prince-authors 167  
**Princely.** *See Royal*  
**Principle, one universally active** ii. 273, 4  
**Printer** iii. 12. *See Amanuensis, Bookseller*  
**Printing, free** i. 239, 40  
**Prodicus** ii. 189  
**Prometheus, poetical solution of the phenomenon of ill** ii. 143, 50. Poet a Prometheus i. 163  
**Proof.** *See Criterion, Test, Trial*  
**Prophecy catching** i. 34. 35. The evil as well as the good spirit i. 35. iii. 81. Prophecy of prophet-errant, processional, saltant iii. 81. 82. Naked prophecy *ib.*  
**Prophet, the name allowed to Heathens** iii. 165. Prophets, passive organs i. 21. Modern prophets 35. 36, &c. Compared with ancient *ib.*  
**Property, dominion founded in** iii. 34

Proportion

# I N D E X.

- Proportion and Symmetry founded in nature, not in opinion or fancy i. 276. See Architecture, Symmetry
- Protestant authors iii. 12. 13. Protestant liberty 163. 222. 229. 233
- Public i. 28. See Constitution. Public assemblies. See Assemblies
- Pulpit i. 23. 24. iii. 177, 84. 200. See Preaching
- Punishments and rewards, of what use in the state i. 97. 98. ii. 45. 46. In families 46. In religion 47
- Puns. See Point, University
- Pupil. See Pedant, Royal, Tutor
- Puppets, in dialogue iii. 203. See Dialogue
- Puppet-show i. 24
- Pyrrho, Pyrrhonist ii. 266. iii. 135, 47. See Sceptic
- Pyrrhus i. 255
- Pythagoras iii. 53. 88. 141
- Pythagorean sect i. 13
- Pythian god i. 98. Prophets. See Sibyl

## Q

- Queen Elisabeth iii. 105
- Quibble. See Point, Pun
- Quietists iii. 26. 64

## R

- Railery, sober use of it i. 99. Defensive railery 46. 47. Opposition to banter i. 48. iii. 156. Gross lost and refined i. 48. 49. iii. 156, 7. See Ridicule. Socratic railery i. 152. 6. Railery affected by grave doctors i. 49. iii. 202. Grim railery *ib.* See Burlesque. Spirit of railery, why prevalent in certain conversations i. 73. 74. Why carried into the extreme 55. Nothing proof against railery, but what is honest and just 56. 57
- Take a better character than that of certain grave and thoughtful gentlemen iii. 210
- Reader, courteous, uncourteous i. 238, 9
- Reading, wrong choice and manner i. 268, 9, &c. Multiplicity of reading *ib.* Task-reading *ib.* Surfeiting 269. Polite reading and converse, chief qualifications in a character 284. Gothic and barbarous reading 269, 70, &c.
- Realist in morality ii. 200
- Reason, its nourishment, health i. 52. 53, &c. Its antidote, poison 70. Reason, correctrix of the fancies, &c. 292, 3, &c. Intendant, mistress, housekeeper *ib.* Reason quitted, for what reason, when, how iii. 207, 8, &c. Reason confined, what effect i. 53. 54. 59
- Reasoning, habit of, alone can make a reasoner i. 53. 54. 59
- Records, recorders, compilers, registers in sacred matters i. 282. iii. 160.—166, &c. Ruled by law *ib.*
- Rehearsal, comedy i. 204. iii. 197, 5
- Religion, virtue, how allied, founded, derived, maintained. See Treatise

# I N D E X.

- Treatise 4. viz. The Inquiry, first of vol. 2. Religion, a public leading, or national church i. 12. Religion by law established i. 283. iii. 49. See Law. Differences in religion i. 60. See Models, Modes. Religious antipathy i. 13. ii. 71. iii. 28. 42. 56. 178. Religious passion iii. 24. Different aspects of religion, according to the views or aspects of divinity 27. Power of fancy or imagination in religion 47. Religion considered as a passion ii. 65. Its influence 35. Religion, ancient Grecian iii. 87. 88. 89. Roman, Ægyptian, Syrian 28. 29. Where first it grew unsociable ii. 290, 1. Religion cruel enemy to virtue, by what means 191. Religion liberal, illiberal 204. Knave's religion i. 97. 98. 103, 4. iii. 87, &c. True foundation of religion ii. 201, 2. Religion betrayed 209. Overlaid i. 75. Exhilaration of religion iii. 66. 86. Different faces or representations of religion, with what design 91. 92. Uniformity in religion. See Uniformity**
- Relish, false, fatal to painting and the other arts iii. 273**
- Resignation, devout, false ii. 42. 43**
- Resolution. See Will**
- Retirement, agreeable, necessary ii. 166, 7**
- Revelation judged by morals i. 233. What previous and antecedent i. 29. 30. ii. 150, 1. See Authority**
- Revolution, the late happy one i. 170. iii. 105. Revolution in the world and nature ii. 12. 13. 160, 1. 275, 85, 6. In ourselves i. 222, 3. ii. 176, 7. See Self**
- Rewards and punishments, of what use in the state ii. 45. In families 46. In religion 47. 48. 204. Future rewards and punishments, wrong enforcement i. 75. ii. 49. Virtue for reward, not worth rewarding i. 75. Reward most deserved, when unsought 77. 78. No goodness or virtue in nature, if no motive besides reward 75. A knave not the less such, when reward and punishment alone make him honest in outward behaviour 97. 98. 135, 6, 7. Conscience, only reward of friendship 77. See Disinterestedness, Mercenariness**
- Rhetoricians iii. 98**
- Rhetoric. See Declamation, Preaching. In what part of a discourse its greatest energy should be employed iii. 246, 7.**
- Rhythmus, false and true i. 170, 1. iii. 183**
- Ridicule, its rule, measure, test i. 7. 8. See Test. Appeal to ridicule 46. Affectation of it by pedants 49. See Banter. Ridicule ridiculous, when half-way, lame, or leaning to one side 62. Injudicious and imposing, when far strained, and beyond its force 62. 63. 64. Nonsensical, when raised from contraries. 100. Nothing ridiculous but what is deformed 99. Virtue not capable of being ridiculed *ib.***
- Right and wrong ii. 22. 23. In nature, not from opinion, will, or law 24. See Opinion, Virtue**
- Rites or rituals by law established i. 281, 2**

Rites,

# I N D E X.

- Rites, ceremonies, habits, processions, pomp, their use and effect in religion iii. 64. 65
- Roger, Sir Roger iii. 192
- Roman eloquence corrupted iii. 15. 16. Monarchy. *See* Monarchy. Empire, rise and fall i. 172, 3, 4. Emperors iii. 28. 54. 62. 63. 168. *See* Cæsars. Worthies i. 210, 11. Romans old, raised from barbarity by Greece 175. 212, 13, 14. Their gradual refinement 197. 215. Growth of Heathen religion under the Romans iii. 28
- Romance. *See* Novel
- Rome old i. 172. iii. 162. Rome modern i. 265. iii. 64. 162. *See* or court of Rome iii. 167
- Royal preceptor i. 168. *See* Prince. Royal pupils 81. 166, 7
- Rule. *See* Law. Rule of dispatch i. 210
- Rustics i. 149

## S

- Sacrifice human ii. 24. Familiar to the inhabitants of the Palestine iii. 86. 87. *See* Abraham, Jephtha
- Sacrifice of forms, natures. *See* Subordination
- Sadducees iii. 53
- Saint, on what terms iii. 88. 89. Female saints 26. Saint-prosecutions i. 215
- Saint-errantry i. 15
- Salvation. *See* Saying
- Saracen's head i. 283
- Satires, Roman, their origin i. 203. *See* Atellan, Fescennin. Satire, English 209. Spirit of satire iii. 76
- Satiric and comic genius, style i. 203, 4, &c.
- Satirists, true to virtue i. 110. iii. 17. *See* Poet
- Savage. *See* Goth. Savages i. 69
- Savageness, inroad whence i. 74. *See* Barbarians
- Saving, of souls i. 14. of complexions 65
- Saul i. 35. iii. 81
- Scandal i. 196
- Scene, of the story of Hercules, to be laid in the country iii. 263. To have nothing in it to call the eye off from the subject 264
- Sceptical conversation i. 52. 53. 60, 1, &c.
- Scepticism, support, to reason i. 52. 53. 60, 1, &c. *See* Reason.
- Scepticism, fashionable sort ii. 153, 4. Defence of scepticism iii. 50—54. Partial scepticism cause of vice and folly i. 54. 55. *See* Thinking. Scepticism, remedy against the dogmatical spirit 73. Sceptical wit, apology 74. Scepticism of a reverend divine iii. 47. 48
- Sceptics, the advantages of their philosophy ii. 153, 4. Sceptic personated iii. 205. Modern sceptics dogmatized ii. 172, 3. Real sceptic *ib.* & 176. Christian sceptic iii. 50. *See* Academy, Pyrrho

Scholar

# I N D E X.

- Scholar and gentleman i. 261, &c. Scholar, ill read 268. True scholar, or man well read, reads few authors 268, 9
- Scholastic i. 51. See Style. Scholastic brood iii. 56. Scholastic weapons 206
- School, inferior schools of arts and exercises teach truth and nature better than some higher i. 261, 2, 3
- Sciences in general i. 227. Mock-science 225. Science of articulation 227. Science. See Art
- Scripture, judgment of i. 114, 15. Criticism iii. 50, 51. Scripture sacred and profane 160.—164. Sacred history, characters, scripture, subject to human criticism, philosophy, and rules of art i. 115. ii. 201, 2. iii. 159.—164. Scripture interpolated, suppressed, controverted, mangled iii. 221, 2, &c. 230, 1, &c. See Fathers of the church. Variety of readings, controverted passages, books, copies, catalogues 225, &c. Scripturae fragae, volatile 162
- Scythian. See Anacharsis, Goth
- Sea to drink iii. 144, 5
- Secular. See Arm
- Sedition. See Faction
- Self, a man when himself, when not himself i. 254. See Identity, Revolution. What makes a man himself ii. 188, 9. Self-love. See Love. True self-love depends on knowledge of self i. 93. 161, &c. Self-knowledge i. 134, 5. iii. 131. 203, &c.
- Selfishness i. 89. 90. 91, &c. ii. 14. 219. Destructive of self-enjoyment i. 247. iii. 209, 10. Improved by certain philosophers i. 96, &c. Folly of the endeavour ii. 231
- Self-inspection i. 154. Acknowledgment of a better self 220.
- Self-reverence 135, 6, 7. Self-abasement i. 259, 60. iii. 87. 179. See Interest, Sycophants
- Seneca, his character, genius, style iii. 15. 16. 17
- Sensations. See Pain, Pleasure
- Sense impaired ii. 21. Sense in morals, life i. 102, 3. iii. 155, 6. See Nose, Taste. Common sense, various signification i. 59. 60, &c. Common sense, honest sense i. 103. iii. 141, 2. Sense, equivocal, in painting, to be avoided in the story of Hercules iii. 259
- Sensus communis interpreted i. 79. 80
- Sermon, law of ii. 211. See Preaching
- Sexes. See Love, Women. Fair-sex seduced by tales, impostures, i. 272, 3, 4. Inclined to monstrous loves, according to our ancient poet 272. See Ladies, Superstition. Won by appearance of submission and tenderness iii. 80. Exposition of the modesty of the sex in barbarous nations i. 214, 15. Better conduct of the more polite *ib.* Prerogatives of the fair sex ii. 144, 5. Writings ii. 145. iii. 176, 7. Taste and humour ii. 202, 3. iii. 115, 178
- Sextus Empiricus cited i. 66
- Shepherds. See Arcadia

Sibyl

# I N D E X.

- Sibyl** i. 36. iii. 161. Sibylline scripture iii. 157, 61, 2, 3  
**Sight**, single, simple; τὸ ἰσοῦναι i. 111  
**Silence**, to be distinctly characterised in the figure of Hercules, daring the contention iii. 252  
**Simplicity**. See **Style**  
**Sinner** against good-breeding i. 131. Against grammar *ib.*  
**Sins** i. 130. iii. 123  
**Slavery**, court-slavery i. 108, 9. ii. 87. 88. iii. 117.—122. 145—  
 Slavery of vice iii. 213, &c. 216, &c. Slavish principles and spirit 104. 117, 74, 5. 213.—218  
**Smithfield** i. 21  
**Social animals** iii. 153. Social enjoyment. See **Enjoyment**. Social affection. See **Affection**  
**Society**. See **Government**, **Tribe**. Early state and progress of society i. 185. Natural growth of a society, or national community 85. 86. Principle of society, natural 84. 85. 86, &c. Proved from sedition, war 87. 88. from the greatest opposers of this principle 69. 70, 1. from its force in ill, as well as in good passions 11. Society in nature, not from art or compact 84. See **Nature**. Religious orders or societies 88  
**Socrates** i. 23. 199. iii. 149, 69. See **Raillery**. Chartæ Socraticæ i. 151, &c. 162. Socratics, their characters i. 199. 200, &c.  
**Soil**, climate, region iii. 101, 2, &c. Patriots of the soil 105  
**Solemnity**: Folly and amusements become solemn i. 62. See **Gravity**, **Imposture**  
**Soliloquy**, see treatise of, viz. vol. I. p. 119  
**Solitude**, &c. i. 137, 8. ii. 166, 7  
**Solomon**, British i. 168  
**Solon** iii. 171  
**Sophocles** i. 192  
**Sophists** once honourable, and of highest dignity i. 189. Sophists language-masters iii. 98. First teachers of philosophy 95. Sophistry i. 56. See **Imposture**  
**Sot**, sottishness i. 242, 3  
**Soul**, two, in man i. 145  
**Sounds articulate** i. 225, 6  
**Space**, vacuum i. 236. Space, plenitude, substance, mode, matter, immateriality. See **Metaphysics**  
**Species**, interest of ii. 8. 9. A whole species subservient to some other 10. 11. Species of fair i. 108, 10. See **Beauty**, **Decorum**, **Fair**. Moral species, or appearances, overbearing all other ii. 75. iii. 22. 23  
**Spectres** i. 46. iii. 207  
**Spencer**, de legibus Heb. iii. 38. 39  
**Spider** ii. 11  
**Spirits**, judgment of others i. 42. Of our own *ib.* Fear of spirits, in an odd sense. See **Pneumatophobia**. Animal spirits confined i. 54  
**Spleen** i. 14. Objected to critics and satirists iii. 75. 76

Stage

# I N D E X.

- Stage of the world ii. 137. Stage, English i. 213. iii. 177, 8. 201. 202. See Drama. Stage allowed to instruct as well as the pulpit i. 282. iii. 177
- Standard of manners, breeding, gentility iii. 125, &c. Standard of wit, English i. 208. iii. 188.—193, &c. Standard of moral rectitude i. 82. 233. 276. iii. 211
- Statuary, *Lyfippus* i. 178. Statuary and statuaries. See Painters. Statuary, with other arts and letters, destroyed by ancient bishops of Rome and Greece iii. 165, 6, 7
- Statute against criticism iii. 189, 93, 4. Statute of mort-main and repeal among the ancients 31. 34. 54. See Hierarchy. Statutes. See Laws
- Stories, old wives i. 3. Told up and down 28
- Storks iii. 56
- Strabo cited i. 164, 98. iii. 107
- Styles and manners of writing, the several kinds i. 190, 1, 2, &c. 201, 2. Didactic, preceptive style i. 18. iii. 198. Scholastic, pedantic i. 201, &c. iii. 99. Metaphoric i. 190, 1. iii. 98. 181. 182. 235. Methodic i. 201, 2, 3. Simple *ib.* & iii. 14. 15. 98, &c. Sublime i. 201, 2, &c. 217. iii. 129. See Bombast, Comic, Farce, Sublime, Tragic. Heavenly style in painting iii. 159. See Painter, Painting. Style of our blessed Saviour 85. 86. English style in prose and verse 183, 4, 5, 6. 191, 2, 3, 4, &c. Gouty joints, darning-work, &c. iii. 184. Discord, dissonance *ib.* See Monosyllables
- Subjects, multiplication of them in a piece perplexes the ordinance of a work iii. 268
- Sublime iii. 97. Sublime in speaking i. 5. 262. False and true 190, 1, &c. See Bombast. Sublime of characters 263. of actions iii. 23. Sublime in things. See Admiration, Beauty
- Subordination necessary in nature ii. 160, 1, 2. What required to make it perfect iii. 268
- Succession, church-succession i. 282. iii. 235. Succession of wit and humour i. 199, &c. See Lineage
- Superstition ii. 124. See *Ægypt*, Enthusiasm, Hierarchy, Magi, Miracle, Priest, Tales. Difference between superstition and enthusiasm iii. 27. Anti-superstitious passion or counter-enthusiasm i. 67. 68, &c. iii. 45. 46. Superstition, fear i. 231. iii. 45. Superstition the most enslaving and worst of vices iii. 212. Female superstition i. 272, 3, 4. iii. 33. See Ladies. Picture or character of superstition, iii. 87.—90. Superstition destructive of moral rectitude ii. 32.—36. The superstitious are willing Atheists iii. 87. 88. 89. Unable to believe as they desire *ib.* Quantity of superstition answers to the number of religious dealers iii. 32
- Supineness, proper for the figure of Pleasure iii. 259
- Surgeons, spiritual iii. 66. 74
- Surgery in politics and religion i. 11. 12. iii. 74. Inward surgery i. 123
- Sweden. See Denmark

# I N D E X.

- Sycophants** in religion i. 27. iii. 37.—90. *See* Beggars, Flattery  
**Symbol.** *See* Creed, Test, Watch-word.  
**Symmetry** i. 276. iii. 183. *Real* iii. 117, 25. *See* Beauty, De-  
 corum  
**Synods** i. 282, &c.  
**Syria**, its religion iii. 28. 29. *See* Egypt, Jews, Palestine  
**System**, a fool by method and system i. 228. *See* Hypothesis. *Sy-*  
*stems imposed by authority* i. 74. *System of the world* ii. 215.  
*Particular systems, and their single parts, united in one system* ii,  
 &c. 214

## T

- T**ablature, specifically distinguished iii. 243, 4. The design of it  
 should be immediately apparent 264  
**Tacitus** cited iii. 38. 176  
**Tail**, works or pieces without head or tail. *See* Works  
**Tale**, its use, upon occasion ii. 151. *Tales*, love of, and mon-  
 strous stories, its affinity with the passion of superstition i. 272, 3.  
*Tremendous tale-tellers* *ib.*  
**Talkers** i. 131  
**Tartar.** *See* Gosh. *Tartar-notion* i. 63  
**Taste**, explanation of a right one in manners, morals, government  
 iii. 114.—117, &c. In wit and ingenuity, how raised and im-  
 proved i. 188, 96. A taste in morals, life i. 277, 8. iii. 123, 4,  
 &c. *See* Nose, Sense. *Moral taste or sense, how acquired* ii.  
 307. *Taste in inward beauty and characters founded in nature*  
 i. 263. iii. 210, 11. *True taste or judgment in life, how gained*  
 i. 265. *Lies in our own power* iii. 130. *Virtuoso-taste* i. 105.  
*Ruin of taste from multiplicity of reading* 268, 9, &c. *Taste*  
*barbarised* 270. *Reformation of taste, great work* 277. *Good*  
*taste in the polite world* iii. 108, 9  
**Taylor**, Bishop, cited i. 76. 77. iii. 28. 221.—227, &c.  
**Temper**, the truly divine i. 28. Best or worst in man ii. 71.  
 What makes a good temper 85, 86. The fittest temper for  
 judgment 8. 24. 25  
**Temperance**, how valuable ii. 185, 6, 7. Set in opposition to ava-  
 rice and ambition 188, 9  
**Terence** i. 262. iii. 126, 82  
**Terra incognita** i. 269. iii. 146  
**Test**, religious tests, problems, &c. i. 45. 46. *See* Creed, Symbol.  
*Test of ridicule* 7. 22. 23. 46. *See* Criterion. *Test of gravity*  
 56. 57  
**Testimony**, human i. 35. 115, 16. ii. 249. *Divine* ii. 250, 1  
**Theatre.** *See* Stage-play  
**Theism**, how it tends to promote virtue ii. 51. 52. Compared in  
 that respect with Atheism 52. 53. *Theism, to what opposed*  
 156. *Faith of Theism* 269  
**Theist**, the belief of a perfect one ii. 5. *Theists*, nominal; real  
 200, 1

*Theogony,*



# I N D E X.

- Theogony, Theology, Heathen and Christian i. 281, 2, &c. See Divinity
- Theology i. 281
- Thinking : Freethinking iii. 207, &c. Freethinkers *ib.* Half-thinkers, a sorry species 208. Dishonesty, a half-thought 206, &c. Under-thinking, or short-thinking, its nature, cause, and consequences 209, 10, &c. See Scepticism
- Thorns, grapes not from i. 224
- Thought, whether able to produce matter ii. 157, 8
- Thucydides iii. 171
- Tiberius i. 81
- Tillotson, Abp, cited iii. 229—232
- Time, points of, the judgment of Hercules capable of being divided into three iii. 245. The proper circumstances of each 245, 6. Objections against a fourth 246. A future time may be expressed by epigrammatical devices 247
- Tire-men i. 64
- Title of a work last determined iii. 19
- Titles i. 160, 1
- Toilette, a general's iii. 130
- Tolerance. See Liberty, Persecution. When and on what account opposed iii. 77, 78. When admired and recommended *ib.* See Charity
- Top, child's top i. 147. Works without top or bottom. See Works
- Tragedy, genius of i. 171, 2. See Euripides. Prior to comedy 191. 192, &c. iii. 98. Tragedy, modern; love and honour i. 216. 217. See Play, Theatre. English tragedy iii. 42, 43. Moral and virtue of tragedy i. 248, 9. iii. 215
- Tragi-comedy iii. 5
- Tragic aspect of certain divines i. 49, 50, 56
- Trajan i. 179
- Traveller, or travel-writer in form i. 271. History of certain travelling-gentlemen iii. 69, &c.
- Treachery, negative vice ii. 125
- Treatise. See Piece
- Tribe, formation of a clan or tribe i. 86. of federate tribes, mixed colonies, &c. *ib.* & 185, 6, &c.
- Trustee. See Guardian
- Truth bears all lights i. 7, 23, 24, 46. Ridicule, a light or criterion to truth 46. Truth injured by over-much discovery 47. Face of truth suffers by masks 67. Truth (*see* Beauty) powerful 2. Principal even in fable and fiction *ib.* Poetic truth i. 111, &c. 153, 4, 263, 277. iii. 125, &c. 182, 3, 95. Plastic or graphical truth i. 114. iii. 126. Historical, critical, moral, philosophical, and religious truth *ib.* & 126, 7, 8. See History, Revelation. *Magna, et pravalebit* i. 116. Truth of work 203, 6, &c. Truth of actions *ib.* *Verum atque decens* iii. 113. Strength of perception no sure ground of truth 47. Truth, historical, to give

# I N D E X.

- give way to poetic or probable, in painting 261, 2, 3. Truth, poetic, presupposes prognostication 247  
 Trial. See Criterion, Proof, Test  
 Turks i. 19. Turkish policy destructive of letters i. 178. iii. 163  
 Turn. See Vicissitude  
 Tutor. See Pedagogue. Tutor and pupil i. 166. The age not to be tutored 51  
 Tyranny i. 82. Worshipped 172. See Absolute, Arbitrary, Force  
 Tyro's in philosophy iii. 25

## U

- U**ndermining or sapping method in wit and philosophy iii. 93  
 Understanding and eyes fitted to so much light, and no more i. 47. Plot of mankind against their own understanding iii. 70. 71, &c.  
 Uniformity in religion, hopeful project i. 13. 14. How practicable iii. 62. 63. 71. 72. 74. 221, 2  
 Unity in the universe ii. 260, 1  
 Universe ii. 158, 9. iii. 156, 7  
 University-wit i. 49. See Pedant. University-learning 224, 5, 24  
 261, 2, 3. University-chair ii. 192, 3. iii. 200. Modern universities not very fortunate in the education of youth i. 261, 2, 3  
 Urbanity i. 55

## V

- V**anity i. 232  
 Vatro iii. 162  
 Venus: The Venus, venustum, or grace in things i. 108. 269, 4  
 See Decorum. Every one a Venus 108  
 Vice, artifice of i. 137. Vice in opinion ii. 23. Causes of vice 27. Most essential part of vice 71. 72. See Slavery  
 Vicissitude, law of discourse and conversation i. 53  
 View. See Sight  
 Virgil i. 36. ii. 166, 7. 257. iii. 161  
 Virtue, honesty, and justice in nature, not from will or law i. 84. 276, 7. Nothing to do with fashion or vogue *ib.* & 22. Independent of opinion, and above the world 206. Virtue the truth and symmetry of manners. See Harmony, Music, Proportion, Symmetry. Beauty of virtue i. 108, 9. Virtue, fashion and name only in the sense of some fashionable moralists 61. 70, 1. 96, &c. 276. Less a sufferer by being contested than betrayed 74. 75. Overlaid by its nurses *ib.* Under-propped *ib.* Forfeited ii. 21. Trial of virtue 24. 25. Degrees of virtue 26. 27. Causes of virtue 28. Virtue degraded and defaced 190. See Religion. Virtue made mercenary i. 75. Heroic virtue 78. Virtue and morals demonstrated. See Vol. 2. treatise 4. and vol. 3. p. 135, 6, &c. Virtue incapable of being ridiculed i. 99. 100. See Jest, Raillery, Ridicule. Virtue, her figure in the piece iii. 255, 6. To be drawn standing 253. How habited 254. Her proper attitude 255. Her palace not to be inserted 263, 4  
 Virtuous

# I N D E X

- Virtuosi iii. 109, 27. ii. 136. 296. Mock virtuoso or pedant of the kind i. 267. iii. 109, 10. Virtuosi and philosophers compared iii. 109, 10  
 Virtuoso-lovers i. 106, 7, 45. ii. 136. 296. Virtuoso-passion iii. 128. Virtuoso-taste. See Taste  
 Virtuosity, a step towards virtue i. 261. iii. 112. Science of virtuoso, and that of virtue, almost the same i. 265  
 Visionaries. See Fanatics  
 Vitruvius iii. 126  
 Voluntier in faith i. 3. in morals 153  
 Vossius, *J. de viribus rhythmi* iii. 183

## W

- WAR**, passion of heroic spirits, why i. 87. England seat of war, whence feared iii. 103, 4  
 Watchmaker i. 229, 30  
 Watch-word in divinity iii. 42  
 Whole : A whole and parts i. 111, 63. ii. 213. iii. 180. The whole, a system complete ii. 214. iii. 243, 4  
 Will, freedom of i. 145, 6. Resolution and will a nose of wax 145. Top or foot-ball 147. Will insured, ascertained *ib.* Readiness to obey the first motion of will, is impotence and slavery ii. 172. Will and power no rule of good or just i. 82. 83. 96. See Arbitrary. Will, (testament), power and practice of the priesthood in making people's wills iii. 55. 62  
 Wisdom in permitting folly i. 9. 10. Wisdom, as well as charity, begins at home 148, 9  
 Wise men of Greece i. 69  
 Wit, mere or sheer wit iii. 2. Mannerly wit can hurt no honest cause i. 74. Orthodox wit iii. 202, 3. Lay wit 202. Bottom of wit enlarged 3. Lineage of wit. See Lineage. Separate provinces of wit and wisdom 4. Generation and succession of our national and modern wit 187, &c. Freedom of wit, a cure to false wit i. 14. 49. Liberty of wit 53. See Freedom, Liberty. Liberty of wit and trade parallel 53. False wit, how proved 56. 57. Men frightened, not laughed out of their wits 74. Wit and humour. See Treatise 2. viz. vol. 1. p. 43, &c. & iii. 68, &c.  
 Wits or poets, offspring of iii. 190. Wits by patent *ib.* Stratagem of affected wits iii. 208  
 Witches i. 115, 16  
 Wolf, silly comparison of man and wolves i. 67. 68. 71. 91. 92. ii. 240  
 Women. See Lady, Sex. Women spectators, judges of combats, duels, amphitheatrical spectacles, masculine games i. 214, 15. ii. 145. Judges of the state, and poetical performance i. 213, 14, &c. Flattery of their taste by poets i. 213, 16, 17. iii. 180, 1. Silly women won by preachers i. 273. Forsake courteous knights for black enchanters *ib.* Follow the hero of a black tribe *ib.*  
 Women who live by prostitution ii. 95

# I N D E X.

- Wonder, wonderment i. 112, 13, 14, &c. ii. 244, &c. *See* Admiration
- Work. *See* Piece. Truth of work i. 205, &c.
- Works without head or tail, beginning or end i. 114, 15. iii. 6. 17.  
 What contributes to the perfection of a work ii. 139
- Workman. *See* Artisan
- World iii. 22. *See* Universe
- Worship, vitious ii. 23. 24
- Worth and baseness acknowledged ii. 316
- Wrestler i. 152
- Writer. *See* Author. Ancient writer *de mundo* iii. 183. Just writer, an able traveller or horseman iii. 18. Modern writers, their foundation, polity, state, mystery 2. 3. 4. 5, &c. 188, 9, &c. *See*-saw of modern writers 18. Post-way *ib.*
- Writings. *See* Essay, Memoir, Miscellany
- Writing, fashionable model of iii. 18. *See* Correctness, Critic, Incorrectness, Penmen
- Wrong, right and wrong, what ii. 21. 22. 23. *See* Right, Virtue

## X

- Xenocrates i. 198
- Xenophon i. 261. iii. 172. His commentaries i. 176. His genius, character, style i. 200. iii. 172

## Z

- Zeal and knavery i. 102, 3, 4. ii. 244. iii. 87. Imprudent zeal ii. 49. Zeal, compound of superstition and enthusiasm iii. 26. 27. Offensive and defensive 57. 60, &c. *See* Bigotry, Persecution: Amorous zeal 26
- Zealots bear no raillery i. 45. Pretend to rally others 46. Character of modern zealots iii. 151, 2
- Zealot-writers, their grimace i. 49. 50. Picture *ib.* Affectation of pleasantry and humour *ib.* & iii. 202. Character of a zealot-author i. 50. 51. Anti-zealots i. 70. iii. 45
- Zealous charity for the conversion of our neighbours, how far suspicious iii. 74. 75. 77. 78

*The End of the* THIRD VOLUME.









